No Ownership, No Commitment: A Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform

GFN-SSR aims to promote better networking and information sharing within the developing field of security sector reform. It is a resource funded by the UK Government’s Global Conflict Prevention Pool, run jointly by the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO), Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Department for International Development (DFID).

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A Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform

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With country case studies by Bernardo Arévalo de León, Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe, Kellie Conteh, Adedeji Ebo, Laurie Nathan and Emma Sky

This publication was commissioned by the Security Sector Reform Strategy of the UK Government's Global Conflict Prevention Pool. The views expressed in the publication are those of the authors.

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ISBN: 0 7044 2564 5
978 0 7044 2564 4
To Rebekah Malaika
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Foreword

More than a decade after South Africa's transition to democracy, our country remains for many a 'model' for other emerging democracies. South Africans, still grappling with the complexities of transformation, tend to be more cautious and humble when sharing their experiences. In my assessment, the aspects of our transition that have broad applicability are those relating to considerations of process rather than to the content of our negotiated settlement and new constitution.

Our settlement and constitution reflect and were intended to address South African realities and aspirations, and cannot be considered as universal blueprints! Of crucial significance was the continued assertion by the liberation movement of the right to self determination for all South Africans in designing the society they wished to live in; and over many years deciding the methods necessary to achieve their aspirations.

During the struggle we resisted external mediation and prescriptions, and encouraged research and study on solutions and future policies drawing on the knowledge and experience of other countries. The result was that the outcome was not forced on us by foreigners, however well meaning, but was designed by South Africans – of all political persuasions, ethnicities, languages and ages, in an inclusive and participatory process.

Precisely because it is the product of our struggle for liberation and our efforts at the negotiating table, South Africans are committed to and will defend our democratic dispensation, even as we strive to improve it.

This is a crucial lesson for countries that have been shattered by war and become dependent on foreign donors and international agencies for aid and reconstruction support. Often the people lack the confidence and means to challenge their financial sponsors and assert their right to determine their own destiny. Sometimes, the support offered is based on the national perspective and interests of the donors, rather than the needs of the people. Even where there is a genuine desire to help, many donors are both ignorant and arrogant, over-confident, impatient and intent on solving problems and designing policies on behalf of local actors.

The net result has not been beneficial. As the title of this book asserts, unless there is ownership by local actors, there can be little possibility of national commitment. And where there is no national commitment, then government and society become lethargic and stagnate. This is as true in the arena of security reform as it is in other sectors. The reasons are not hard to discern: people want to be treated as subjects and not
objects, they crave a measure of control over their lives, and they deeply resent being patronised and bullied.

This book is an important contribution to the growing literature on security sector reform for two reasons: it goes beyond the customary rhetoric about local ownership and considers in detail how this principle can and should be applied by donors and other external institutions; and it empowers domestic actors by offering analytical and diagnostic tools as well as insights from security reform in a range of countries.

Laurie Nathan is eminently qualified to present guidelines on security reform. He has made a significant contribution to security and defence transformation in South Africa since the early 1990s, is increasingly involved in reform endeavours elsewhere and is now regarded as one of the leading international experts on the subject.

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1. Introduction

1.1 Aim

Experience shows that reform processes will not succeed in the absence of commitment and ownership on the part of those undertaking reforms. Assistance should be designed to support partner governments and stakeholders as they move down a path of reform, rather than determining that path and leading them down it. A major problem in the area of security system reform in some regions, particularly in Africa, has been a lack of local input to and ownership of the emerging reform agenda. This issue is most significant in ‘difficult partnership’ countries. *OECD DAC Policy Statement on Security System Reform and Governance*¹

In policy statements on security sector reform (SSR), the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), DFID and other donors have embraced the principle of local ownership.² In practice, however, the principle is often very difficult to apply, it is frequently breached by donor governments and it has not been translated into a set of donor strategies and methods of working in the field. As currently conceived, local ownership is more of a rhetorical device than a guide to donor officials engaged in SSR.³

The aim of this book is to contribute to operationalising the donors’ policy commitment to local ownership of SSR. The emphasis is on political and practical guidance to donors and other external actors rather than on analytical depth or a comprehensive review of SSR.⁴

The book includes planning and diagnostic tools that could be used by external actors supporting SSR as well as by local actors engaged in security reform. The tools and recommendations are based on the country case studies in this volume and on my experience as an SSR and conflict resolution practitioner over the past fifteen years, principally in South Africa.⁵

The book was commissioned by the SSR Strategy of the British Government’s Global Conflict Prevention Pool to assist SSR programme managers and practitioners and to contribute to the development of the OECD DAC’s *Implementation Framework for Security System Reform* (forthcoming). The *Implementation Framework* covers SSR principles, assessment, design, implementation, management, monitoring and evaluation.
SSR takes place in a wide range of countries, with diverse political conditions, security threats and levels of development and stability. This diversity necessarily limits the applicability of generalisations made in the book. Perhaps the strongest general recommendation is that donors should avoid a mechanical or formulaic approach to SSR and should instead develop programmes that are flexible, responsive to local actors and finely tuned to local conditions.

1.2 Problem Statement and Motivation for Local Ownership

South Africa’s transition to democracy, widely regarded as a success, highlights the significance of local ownership. To a large extent the success was due to the process that was followed. The process was inclusive horizontally in the sense that all political parties were invited and urged to participate in the negotiations. The process was also inclusive vertically as numerous civil society bodies engaged in debate on all aspects of the settlement. Most importantly, the process was driven by local actors without dictates from external actors. In every sector, policies and models were designed by South Africans and not imposed on them by outsiders. As a result, the system of governance enjoys substantial legitimacy and this has contributed greatly to political stability.

In other emerging democracies and post-conflict societies, external actors often flout the principle of local ownership and impose their models and programmes on local actors. There are several reasons for this, some of which are demand-side problems. Unlike South Africa, many developing countries have weak states and weak civil societies. Particularly in the aftermath of war and state collapse, the government might lack legitimacy; local actors might lack the expertise to prepare sound policies and plans; and they might be too divided and disorganised to reach consensus on policies and priorities.

Donor governments also impose their models and programmes for a variety of supply-side reasons that reflect a mixture of arrogance and naivety:

- The donors are imbued with a sense of superiority and believe that Western models of governance are applicable everywhere.
- They lack respect for local actors and regard them as incompetent.
- They underestimate the difficulties of state building and transformation, and become overly frustrated with the slow pace or lack of reform.
- Their financial and bureaucratic systems require programmes with a high level of pre-determined detail, inhibiting flexibility and responsiveness to local circumstances.
Their short-term funding cycles require deliverables within unrealistic time frames. They are sometimes intent on pursuing their own political agendas at the expense of local interests.

Donor governments tend to worry a great deal about the demand-side problems and very little about the supply-side problems, but it is the latter and not the former that lie substantially within their power to address.

Whatever the reasons for the absence of local ownership, it is inimical to development and democracy: domination and paternalism by external actors generate resentment, resistance and inertia among local actors; local actors have little commitment to externally imposed products; these products do not adequately reflect local needs, dynamics and resources; and democracy cannot take root other than by democratic means.

The imperative of local ownership is both a matter of respect and a pragmatic necessity. The bottom line is that reforms that are not shaped and driven by local actors are unlikely to be implemented properly and sustained. In the absence of local ownership, SSR is bound to fail. Local ownership is therefore more than an important theme. It should constitute the fundamental framework and point of departure for security reform. It should be a primary objective and outcome of all external programmes to support SSR.

The underlying assumption is not that local actors will necessarily develop good policies. Rather, the assumption is that a process-oriented approach that respects and empowers local actors is more likely to yield good results in the long-term than a product-oriented approach that undermines local actors and is not sustainable.

Throughout this book a distinction is drawn between content and process issues. Proper consideration of the latter is neglected by donors but it is no less important than the former. However good the content of an SSR initiative, a poor process that treats people as objects rather than subjects will lead to flawed outcomes.

Donor officials tend to justify the absence of local ownership of SSR in post-conflict countries on the grounds that local actors lack capacity, legitimacy or both. Yet these are exactly the problems that SSR is meant to address. They do not constitute valid grounds for bypassing local actors. If the security of citizens in a given country is to be enhanced, and if the provision of security is to conform to democratic norms, then it is essential to build the capacity and legitimacy of the institutions and actors that comprise the security sector in that country.
The applicability of the principle of local ownership is not confined to relatively strong developing states like South Africa. The principle has been validated both by the presence of local ownership, leading to positive security reforms, and by its absence, leading to dysfunctional outcomes and little or no sustained reform, in a variety of places, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guatemala, East Timor, Kosovo, Bougainville, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ethiopia and Afghanistan. While the country case studies in this book acknowledge the difficulties related to local ownership of SSR, they also reveal the greater problems associated with a lack of local ownership. They highlight the fact that local ownership is not idealistic and should not be treated as a romantic notion.

Nor is the principle of local ownership limited to the security sector. It has broad applicability to development and post-conflict peacebuilding. This is well-illustrated by a major study on aid and reform in ten African countries, published by the World Bank in 2001. In the foreword to the publication, James Wolfensohn, then the President of the World Bank, writes as follows:

The ten case studies that make up this volume also show that country ownership is the way to make assistance effective. These studies of aid and reform in Africa confirm that when aid supports a country-owned development strategy, it can lead to sustained growth and poverty alleviation. The case studies also show that when reform is imposed from abroad, even as a quid pro quo for aid, it is not sustainable.

1.3 Defining Local Ownership

The principle of local ownership of SSR will have little import if it is treated simply as a romantic and woolly concept. In practical terms it means that the reform of security policies, institutions and activities in a given country must be designed, managed and implemented by local actors rather than external actors.

The principle is misconstrued if it is understood to mean that there must be a high level of domestic support for donor activities. What is required is not local support for donor programmes and projects but rather donor support for programmes and projects initiated by local actors. The question for donor governments is not “how can we undertake SSR in partner countries?” but “how can we support local actors who want to undertake SSR in partner countries?”.

The principle does not preclude donors seeking to stimulate and encourage local interest in SSR. Nor does it preclude international actors putting pressure on governments whose security forces violate human rights. Nevertheless, the actual reform of the security sector must be shaped and driven by local actors.
It has been argued that local ownership is a vague and ambiguous concept because public policies have a range of disparate local owners that are unlikely to agree on any single approach or desired outcome.\(^8\) This argument is mistaken for two reasons. First, free and open contestation of politics and interests is integral to democracy and entirely consistent with local ownership.

Second, the argument fails to recognise that the disparate local actors have different functions, responsibility and authority in relation to governance. Put crudely, the principle of local ownership of SSR does not mean that the minister for police affairs, police constables, community leaders and gangsters have similar responsibility for policing reforms. From the perspective of the OECD DAC, SSR is a democratic project (see section 2.2). One of its objectives is precisely to ensure that domestic decision-making and governance in the security sector conform to democratic norms (see section 2.3).

A further goal of SSR as a democratic project is to make sure that local ownership is not confined to the executive but broadened to include parliament and civil society. The overarching goal is national ownership rather than government ownership of security reforms (see chapters 4, 13 and 14).

### 1.4 Scope

The book covers the following ground:

**Chapter 2** discusses the political nature of security sector reform and highlights some of the key aspects of SSR politics in relation to local ownership and donor activities. It provides an overview of the objectives, orientation, beneficiaries and context of SSR.

**Chapter 3** is concerned with the content of SSR. It motivates the importance of developing a democratic security vision, offers an example of such a vision and covers the complementary issues of security legislation and SSR objectives.

**Chapter 4** focuses on the attainment of broad local ownership through inclusive and consultative SSR design. It presents guidelines to ensure that various categories of local actor are properly engaged in designing security policies and reforms. It distinguishes between the decision-makers, the implementing agencies, the technical designers of reforms, the advisers and the interested parties.

**Chapter 5** focuses on the beneficiaries of SSR. It summarises the strategies for meeting the security needs of citizens and vulnerable groups; presents a local security survey template for identifying the needs of poor communities; and indicates the types of support that donors could provide to enhance the security of vulnerable groups.
Chapter 6 examines the major obstacles to security reform and presents a diagnostic framework for analysing the obstacles in a given country. It identifies the main obstacles as complexity, lack of capacity, resistance to change, and instability and insecurity.

Chapter 7 presents five capacity-building proposals that donors could support in the interests of local ownership. The proposals cover research support for parliamentary committees that deal with security; security policy and planning units in government; a small grants scheme for civil society activities relating to security reform; drafting security legislation; and comparative SSR exchange and study.

Chapter 8 proposes that the principle of local ownership be institutionalised in donor governments through inclusion in their funding, evaluation, reporting and other bureaucratic procedures.

Chapter 9 is a case study by Emma Sky on security sector reform in Afghanistan, a process that has been driven by foreign actors with insufficient co-ordination, domestic ownership and local capacity-building.

Chapter 10 is a case study by Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe on the demobilisation and reintegration of former soldiers in Ethiopia after the fall of Mengistu. It describes a nationally owned programme that succeeded because of its flexibility, responsiveness and creative use of domestic resources.

Chapter 11 is a case study by Bernardo Arévalo de León on a series of interventions aimed at promoting and facilitating inter-sectoral dialogue on SSR in Guatemala. The interventions built the capacity of civil society to advance democratic reform and helped to overcome resistance to security reform.

Chapter 12 is a case study by Adedeji Ebo on security reform in Liberia, a process characterised by an absence of local ownership and a controversial outsourcing of SSR to foreign security companies.

Chapter 13 is a case study by Kellie Conteh on the comprehensive security sector review and transformation process conducted in Sierra Leone after the end of the civil war.

Chapter 14 is a case study by Laurie Nathan on the inclusive process that was used to prepare the South African White Paper on Defence.
1.5 Beyond the Scope of This Book

The book does not examine SSR in relation to peace agreements, peace support operations and small arms proliferation. Nor does it look at the downsizing of security services, and the consequent impact on stability and the security of citizens, as a result of structural adjustment programmes prescribed by some donors.

I use the term ‘security sector’ to cover the police, the military, the intelligence agencies, the prison services, other official security organisations and the civilian authorities that are meant to control and oversee these bodies. The book does not deal with non-state armed groups such as rebels. Nor does it focus on the judiciary. Although the security of citizens is intimately linked to the system of justice, the institutional terrain is distinct. Whereas the security services in a democracy should function strictly under the control of the executive, the judiciary should be independent of the executive.

Donor governments and multi-lateral organisations view SSR as a critical need exclusively in developing countries. Yet the need for security reform is just as great in many industrialised countries, including many donor countries. The development of an agenda for ‘SSR in the North’ lies outside the scope of the book but would include the following issues:

- the violation of international law prohibiting the use and threat of force;
- the limited role of parliament when governments decide to embark on war;
- the manipulation of intelligence and public opinion in these decisions;
- the failure to abide by the Geneva conventions and the prohibitions against torture;
- arms sales and other forms of security support to repressive regimes;
- secret funding of security services in developing countries, fuelling corruption and conflict;
- infringements of civil liberties in industrialised countries and encouragement of repressive measures in developing countries as part of the ‘war on terror’;
- double standards in relation to weapons of mass destruction; and
2. THE POLITICS OF SSR

This chapter highlights the deeply political nature of security sector reform and outlines some of the key aspects of the politics of SSR in relation to local ownership and donor activities.

2.1 The Primacy of the Political

SSR is profoundly political: it focuses on the most sensitive sector of the state; it challenges power relations, vested interests and dominant paradigms; it can provoke significant contestation within the state and between the state and other actors; and it is influenced by, and can exacerbate, broader political struggles. Moreover, donor supported SSR inevitably reflects the political goals and orientation of the donor institution and entails a complicated political relationship between external and local actors with unequal strength.

It is consequently not possible for donors to adopt an apolitical humanitarian, development or technical approach to SSR. Donors have to recognise that the politics of security reform are its most important dimensions. They have to grasp the peculiarities of these politics wherever they wish to support SSR and they have to gauge the risks and dangers of their interventions.

There is always a risk that local actors will view donor involvement in security reform as political interference in domestic affairs and resist it for that reason. This risk can only be mitigated if donors are sensitive, respectful and supportive of local actors. The highly political nature of security strongly reinforces the need for local ownership of SSR.

2.2 SSR as a Democratic Project

According to the OECD DAC Policy Statement on Security System Reform and Governance, donor support for SSR “seeks to increase the ability of partner countries to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance and the rule of law”. The DAC donors are committed to SSR that is “people-centred, locally owned and based on democratic norms and human rights principles and the rule of law, seeking to provide freedom from fear”.

8
In these formulations, SSR is a democratic project and a democratising project. It has technical components but it is not a technical endeavour and it is not simply concerned with making the security services more efficient and effective. The democratic and democratising nature of SSR is a theme that pervades this book.

Where donor governments and other external actors provide security support to repressive regimes, or support in any fashion security activities that entail human rights abuses, they are not engaged in SSR and they undermine the potential for SSR. Their behaviour is reprehensible and warrants radical political and security reform.

2.3 Democratic Governance

The term ‘local actors’ covers a wide range of different types of domestic actor. In a democracy, these actors have different activities, functions, responsibility and authority in relation to governance. One of the primary objectives of SSR is to ensure that the security sector is governed by democratic arrangements, which can be summarised broadly as follows:

- The executive determines security policy and exercises control over the security services. It is accountable to citizens, chiefly through parliament and regular elections but also through media scrutiny and public consultation and debate.
- Parliament approves security legislation and budgets, performs oversight functions in respect of the security services and provides a forum for political parties to deliberate on security policy and activities.
- The security services execute government policy and carry out their mandates as prescribed by law.
- Independent courts perform judicial functions and various statutory bodies might have watchdog functions in relation to the security services.
- Individuals, the media and civil society organisations are free to engage in research, debate, advocacy and other activities that might be critical or supportive of the security services and government’s security policy.

Within this general framework, each of the security services requires appropriate governance arrangements (e.g. community policing in the case of the police, and democratic civil-military relations in the case of the armed forces). These arrangements will have common features, like executive control and accountability to parliament, as well as different features. For example, the President might have direct authority over the armed forces as the commander-in-chief but have no similar authority over the police; and the police, unlike the military, might in certain respects be accountable to community organisations.
Countries undergoing SSR typically face multiple obstacles to the attainment of democratic and effective governance of the security sector. The obstacles include resistance from political and security figures; the dominance of informal political and security actors; the absence of a democratic tradition; the weakness of the state; and a lack of capacity on the part of the executive, parliament and civil society (see further chapter 6). Forging democratic governance arrangements for the security sector invariably entails intense and protracted political and organisational struggles.

An emphasis on democratic governance does not mean that Western models should be replicated elsewhere. The Western models are themselves varied, each of them a product of particular historical and constitutional developments. So too in the case of countries undergoing SSR, the details of new security systems should be determined by local actors according to their circumstances and donors should avoid promoting assiduously the models of their own countries.

It cannot be argued that any one of the executive, parliament, civil society and the judiciary is more important than the others. Nevertheless, it needs to be stressed that the executive is responsible for SSR design and for crafting security policies and laws. The orientation and capacity of ministers, civil servants and security officers are therefore crucial determinants of the character and success of SSR. Section 7.2 focuses on enhancing the executive’s capacity to design and implement progressive security reforms.

2.4 The Beneficiaries of SSR

SSR aims to ensure that the state fulfils its responsibility to provide for the security of its people and that it does so in a manner consistent with human rights and other democratic norms. In general terms the primary beneficiaries of SSR are thus the citizens of the country undertaking the reforms. Specific reform initiatives might have specific beneficiaries and the security services might be among these beneficiaries (e.g. prison reforms might be intended to benefit inmates, warders, prison managers and local communities).
In most countries the actual determination of beneficiaries is a political affair. Among other things, it depends on the ideology, policy priorities and responsiveness of government; the distribution of power in society; the extent to which particular groups are marginalised; and the ability of political parties and civil society organisations to advance the interests of their constituencies through the political system.

In developing countries that have limited resources and are wracked by insecurity, governments have to make far-reaching political decisions when prioritising security threats and allocating resources to address those threats. From development and humanitarian perspectives, particular attention should be paid to the security of groups that are most vulnerable and least able to ensure that their safety needs are met. These groups typically include the poor, minorities, women, children, and communities where militia or gangs are rife (see further chapter 5).

Donor governments that promote security reform in developing countries are not motivated necessarily or exclusively by humanitarian and altruistic concerns. They might stimulate and support SSR because it serves their own political, strategic and economic interests. In this sense they can be considered beneficiaries of SSR. This is not intrinsically problematic but it is completely unacceptable for donor governments to pursue their interests at the expense, and to the detriment, of local communities and citizens.

### 2.5 Women and Security

In many countries the security of women warrants special attention for one or more of the following reasons:

- Women are subject to a high level of general violence and insecurity, and also to pernicious gender-based violence and fear.
- Women are marginalised in political decision-making and the determination of security priorities and resource allocation.
- Public discussion of sexual and domestic violence is taboo.
- The security services, headed and predominantly staffed by men, neglect gender-based violence, are themselves guilty of this form of violence, and discriminate against their female members.

Donors can use their funds productively by supporting groups that address these issues (see further section 5.3). Such groups include local women’s organisations and human rights bodies; government departments and security services that have programmes to enhance the security of women and children; and international organisations like...
UNIFEM and the UN International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW). When designing their SSR programmes, donor governments should consult these international organisations and local women’s groups.

2.6 Contextual Factors

The degree to which security reform is realisable in a given country depends on three main factors. The first is the nature of the political system. SSR requires a context of democracy or democratisation. Authoritarian regimes do not undertake democratic reform of their security sector. The democratisation of the political system, which typically occurs after the end of a civil war or the collapse of an authoritarian regime, creates the space for SSR. The extent of democratisation is a key determinant of the potential for security reform.

The second critical factor is political leadership. In the context of democratisation, SSR is possible but not inevitable. There is invariably resistance from political and security groupings. At least some members of the executive must want to reform the security community; if none of them want reform in this area, it will not happen. In many instances the executive is ambivalent, divided and constrained by conservative elements in the security services.

The third critical factor is capacity. If the executive wants to undertake SSR, it needs the capacity to design, manage and implement reforms. The term ‘capacity’ refers both to people with the requisite knowledge, expertise and skills and to the required material resources, including funds and equipment. Governments in low income countries, fragile states and war-torn societies usually lack the necessary capacity.

Other contextual factors that have a strong bearing on the potential for SSR include the strength of the state; the strength of civil society; the level of development; the nature and intensity of conflict and threats to security; and, in post-war societies, the period that has elapsed since the termination of hostilities.

A recurring theme throughout this book is that the context matters greatly when designing security reforms and that a formulaic approach to SSR is completely inappropriate.
2.7 Donor Strategies

In light of the contextual factors outlined above, the main donor strategies can be summarised as follows:

- If a state is fully authoritarian, there is little potential for SSR. Instead, as often occurs, the international community should focus on the broader challenge of political democratisation by supporting pro-democracy groups, engaging in diplomacy and advocacy, and applying punitive measures in extreme cases.

- If a state is democratic or undergoing a process of democratisation, donor strategies should be geared to supporting local actors that want to pursue SSR. The nature of that support will depend on whether these actors are located in the executive, the security services, parliament or civil society. It will also depend on the nature of their activities and requests for donor support. Where there is no will on the part of the executive, there might be civil society groups that advocate SSR and need support (see further chapter 5 and section 7.3).

- Where local actors want to engage in SSR but lack the capacity to do this, donors can provide valuable assistance. There is no possibility of sustainable reform unless domestic actors have the capacity to ensure sustainability; and without sufficient capacity, the state cannot provide adequately for the security of citizens. Long-term support for capacity-building on terms acceptable to local actors is probably the most useful contribution that donors can make to SSR (see further chapter 7).

2.8 SSR as the Art of the Possible

SSR initiatives have to be grounded in the circumstances of each country. They will fail if they are undertaken in a mechanical fashion according to a how-to-do-it manual or another country’s experience. They are only likely to succeed if they are flexible, creative, responsive and finely tuned to local conditions. There are no formula applicable to all situations; there are no general remedies for the problems that so frustrate donors, such as corruption, spoilers and inertia; and there are no quick fix options for donor governments with short time frames.

SSR is a complex and uncertain business that entails protracted organisational and political struggles. It demands not only security expertise but also political adroitness on the part of local actors and their international partners. It requires an ability to identify and seize opportunities, develop appropriate strategies, build alliances and win over or outmanoeuvre opponents. SSR is quintessentially a process of struggle and a matter of politics as the art of the possible.
This perspective is relevant to the question of whether the goal of SSR is limited reform or radical transformation; it also relevant to the question of whether the reforms should be sector-wide or limited to some of the institutions (e.g. military, police, etc). How these questions are resolved in practice depends on the circumstances. Far-reaching sector-wide change might be eminently desirable in a given situation but it might be too demanding in terms of available capacity and it might be politically unfeasible. Change should be sought where change is possible.

The maxim of 'politics as the art of the possible' highlights the need to analyse accurately in each situation the potential for reform, the risks and structural constraints, the proponents and allies of progressive change, the opponents of change and the reasons for their opposition. Donors that simply attribute the slow pace or lack of reform to incompetence or resistance among local actors have an incomplete understanding. For analytical and strategic purposes it is necessary to have a more comprehensive and nuanced diagnosis (see further chapter 6).

2.9 Problems of Legitimacy

Some donors are understandably loathe to provide SSR support to governments that lack legitimacy. Decisions in this regard have to be made on a case-by-case basis but three general considerations should be borne in mind. First, SSR cannot be undertaken by the amorphous category of ‘local actor’ and it cannot be undertaken by civil society organisations, which can support and lobby for reforms but do not have the authority to implement them. SSR can only be carried out by an executive authority that controls or seeks to control the security services.

Second, it is in the nature of SSR that it frequently takes place in the complicated grey zone between a full democracy and a wholly authoritarian state. It is a democratising project, which is to say that it is part of the struggle to construct and entrench democracy. It does not assume the existence of legitimate actors but endeavours to establish legitimate institutions, processes and policies.

Consequently, the critical criteria for donors should have less to do with the legitimacy of governmental actors than with the legitimacy of SSR initiatives in a given country. The primary question is whether these initiatives are orientated towards strengthening repressive machinery and methods or towards enhancing democratic norms and governance. Where this is unclear in practice, donors should err on the side of caution and refrain from providing security support.
Third, the domestic legitimacy of security reforms depends very much on the process by which they are designed. The more consultative and inclusive the process, and the more the outputs reflect the views raised during the consultations, the more likely it is that the results will enjoy public credibility and acceptance (see chapter 4). When donor governments manipulate the process – because they do not like certain local actors, seek to advance their own interests or insist that the recipients of their funds meet their short-term timeframes – they compromise the legitimacy of SSR.

2.10 The Burden of Time

In the relatively favourable conditions of post-apartheid South Africa, it took eight years to prepare a White Paper on Defence, a Defence Review and a new Defence Act (see chapter 14). In less favourable conditions, the duration might be longer. Donors, on the other hand, have a project funding cycle of one to three years. This puts considerable pressure on the donor officials responsible for projects and grants, and the pressure for results is transferred to the local recipients with negative consequences. It leads to short-cuts, haste and frustration, generates inappropriate and unsustainable solutions, undermines local ownership, and damages partnerships between domestic actors and donors.

Donors also compromise the democratic process when local dialogue, debate and consensus-building are by-passed or truncated in order to satisfy external time frames.

There is a great need to overcome the donor preoccupation with short-term objectives and results. Short- and long-term objectives should be seen as complementary rather than mutually exclusive. Short-term objectives in the absence of a long-term programme do not lead to systemic and sustainable change, and any long-term programmatic endeavour requires short- and medium-term objectives.

Security sector reform is usually a slow, protracted and intermittent enterprise, with many difficulties and obstacles and with no certain results. Donor officials who appreciate this point have to find ways of developing within their governments an institutional culture in which expectations are realistic, patience is considered a virtue, and SSR processes are regarded as no less significant than SSR outcomes.

More concretely, donor governments should institutionalise the principle of local ownership in their funding, evaluation, reporting and other bureaucratic procedures. Given the donor pressure for results, these procedures should treat local ownership of SSR and local capacity-building as key objectives and result areas in their own right (see further chapter 8).
3. SECURITY VISIONS, LAWS AND OBJECTIVES

The preparation of democratic security visions and laws is arguably the most significant of all SSR ventures since these higher-order instruments determine the paradigm, agenda and plan for reforming the doctrine, operations, conduct, structure, culture, training and other features of the security services. This chapter motivates the importance of a democratic security vision, provides an example of such a vision and covers the complementary issues of security legislation and SSR objectives.

3.1 Motivation for a Democratic Security Vision

Countries that embark on SSR programmes should, ideally, have an overarching, democratic vision of security. Without an *overarching* vision, the reforms are likely to lack coherent long-term objectives and there is risk that they will be piecemeal, superficial, inconclusive and unsustainable. Without a *democratic* vision, progress in a democratic direction is improbable. Against a background of war, militarism and authoritarianism, moreover, new concepts of security and governance of the security sector are every bit as important as new operational methods.

A democratic security vision is not a ‘magic bullet’ that will cure all ills. Indeed, there is no guarantee that politicians and the security services will adhere to it. Nevertheless, for the following reasons it has the potential to be a very powerful tool, especially if it is incorporated into the constitution and legislation:

- It can provide a normative framework for determining security threats, priorities and allocation of resources in the interests of citizens and vulnerable groups.
- It can help to shift the locus of power away from informal security networks towards the official security organisations and oversight bodies.
- It can provide an authoritative mandate and guidance to the officials who are tasked with designing and implementing SSR programmes.
- It can provide progressive criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of SSR programmes and projects.
- It can provide benchmarks for civil society organisations and opposition parties to hold government to account for the conduct of the security services.
- It can provide government and the judiciary with a basis for dealing with human rights abuses and other misconduct by the security services.
- It can consequently help to ensure that the security services do not pose a threat to citizens.
Democratic visions are required both in relation to the security sector as a whole and in relation to each of the security institutions. Section 3.2 presents a national security vision and chapter 14 looks at the crafting of a democratic vision for defence. If such visions are to be more than idle philosophy, they have to be translated into legislation (section 3.3) and into SSR programmes and projects (section 3.4).

The construction of democratic security visions and laws is likely to be fiercely contested since they challenge power relations, vested interests and conservative ideologies. To the greatest extent possible, the struggles should be played out in open forums and the process of preparing the visions and legislation should be inclusive and consultative (see chapters 4, 11 and 14). Open and inclusive processes help to establish the legitimacy of the outcomes, contribute to a sense of national ownership and create space for progressive voices that would not be heard in an environment of secrecy.

The preparation of security visions and legislation through a consultative process can be a protracted undertaking that takes several years even in conditions that are favourable to reform. Donors that rush the process because of their short-term funding and political deadlines compromise the process and the legitimacy of the outputs.

There are many reasons for the slow pace of reform, including a lack of local capacity and expertise (see chapter 6). Donors can make a significant contribution to alleviating these problems. For example, they can support the establishment and functioning of policy and planning units in the security departments of partner governments (see section 7.2). They can also support comparative exchange and study that enable local actors to learn about security models and legislation in other countries (section 7.5).

### 3.2 A Democratic Security Vision

Set out below is a national security vision based on the precepts of democracy and human security. Drawn from the South African experience, its first version was prepared by an anti-militarist advocacy group in the early 1990s in anticipation of the advent of democracy. A revised version was adopted by the African National Congress at its policy conference in 1992. It was thereafter adapted for inclusion in the White Paper on Intelligence of 1994 and the White Paper on Defence of 1996. A number of its provisions were incorporated into the new Constitution.¹²
The vision is presented for illustrative purposes. It is not intended to be reproduced in other countries. National security visions must necessarily take account of local values and aspirations, historical circumstances and domestic and regional security dynamics. They must also, in the interests of national ownership, be prepared by local actors in an inclusive fashion.

- National security shall be sought primarily through efforts to meet the political, economic, social and cultural rights and needs of our people. The stability and security of our country depend on the well-being and security of its inhabitants.
- Security is an all-encompassing condition in which citizens live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment that is not detrimental to their health and well-being.
- Security policy must therefore contribute to the consolidation of democracy; the achievement of social justice, economic development and a safe environment; and a substantial reduction in the level of crime, violence and political instability.
- At the international level the objectives of security policy include the achievement of regional security and the maintenance of national sovereignty, territory and independence.
- We will pursue peaceful relations with other states and seek a high level of political, economic and security co-operation with neighbouring states in particular.
- We will adhere to international law on armed conflict, to all international treaties to which our country is party, and to decisions of the United Nations Security Council.
- We will participate in, and seek to strengthen, international and regional efforts to contain and prevent the proliferation of small arms, conventional armaments and weapons of mass destruction.
- The mandates and functions of the security services are determined and regulated by the Constitution and legislation. The security services must operate strictly within these parameters.
- The security services are subordinate and fully accountable to Parliament and the Executive.
- The security services will respect the democratic political process and the rights and dignity of citizens. They will provide education and instruction to their members on the Constitution and the law.
- Members of the security services must disobey a manifestly illegal order.
Security policy and activities will be sufficiently transparent to ensure meaningful parliamentary and public scrutiny and debate, without endangering the lives of security personnel or jeopardizing security operations.

The security services will not further or prejudice party political interests.

The security services will develop a non-discriminatory and gender sensitive institutional culture.

The composition of the security services will broadly reflect the demographic composition of our country. To this end, affirmative action and equal opportunity programmes will be introduced where required.

The security services will respect the rights and dignity of their members within the normal constraints of discipline, training and operations.

The government will consult parliament, political parties and citizens in the formulation of security policies.

The government will endeavour to provide the security services with the resources that are required to perform their functions adequately, build and maintain their professionalism and ensure satisfactory service conditions for their members.

The government will not misuse the security services for partisan political purposes.

3.3 Security Legislation

One of the fundamental components of SSR is the preparation and promulgation of laws that govern and regulate security matters according to democratic norms. In some situations the security services or elements thereof might ignore these laws but without the legislation it is impossible to entrench the rule of law and establish democratic accountability in the security sector. Sound security legislation is an essential tool in efforts to diminish the influence of informal security actors, build a culture of respect for human rights and ensure that the durability of reforms is not dependent on a few individuals.

The issues that should be covered in the laws include the following:

- The functions, powers and authority of the executive, parliament and other oversight bodies in relation to the security sector.
- The mandates, functions and powers of each of the security services.
- The powers, responsibilities and accountability of key officials (e.g. the minister for policing; the chief of defence force; the director-general for correctional services; etc).
In addition to these general issues, the problems relating to sexual violence and domestic violence should be addressed in legislation. This legislation should define and criminalise these forms of violence; ensure that the victims have access to justice; protect and preserve the victims' dignity in the course of police investigations and criminal trials; specify the responsibilities of the police, the prosecuting authority and medical services; and tackle specific types of abuse that are prevalent in the country concerned.

Section 7.4 focuses on donor support for building the capacity of local actors to draft security legislation.

### 3.4 Cascading Objectives for SSR

The formulation of objectives for SSR in a given country is critical. If the objectives are not defined clearly and appropriately, there will be much wasted effort, SSR programmes and projects will lack direction and cohesion, and the results will be sub-optimal.

It may be helpful in this regard to develop cascading objectives that flow logically from higher to lower levels. At the highest level there are overarching national goals and priorities (e.g. consolidation of democracy; poverty reduction; reconstruction and development; etc). At the intermediate level the objectives relate to the security sector as a whole or to a particular institution (e.g. police; intelligence; etc). At the lowest level the objectives relate to specific SSR programmes and projects.

This idea of cascading objectives can be illustrated with the following example from the process of defence transformation in post-apartheid South Africa.

**National priority:** the state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights, which binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state [sections 7(2) and 8(1) of the Constitution of 1996].

**National security injunction:** the security services must act, and must teach and require their members to act, in accordance with the Constitution and the law [section 199(5) of the Constitution of 1996].
Legislative provision: the Chief of the Defence Force must ensure that all members of the Defence Force are trained in law, including international law, to the required level, and will be responsible to the Minister of Defence for the performance of this function [section 7 of the Defence Amendment Act, no. 4 of 1997].

Departmental objective: design and implement a civic education programme that promotes throughout the Defence Force an understanding of, and respect for, the Constitution, the Geneva Conventions and the precepts of democratic civil-military relations and military professionalism [ministerial directive].

Programme objectives: establish a civic education committee comprising military officers, civilians and parliamentarians; identify key themes and topics for the civic education curriculum; prepare the curriculum for application in the Defence Force; train trainers to deliver the courses; develop a monitoring and evaluation system; prepare reports for the Minister and the parliamentary defence committee; etc [terms of reference of the civic education committee].

Project objectives: develop a code of conduct based on the civic education curriculum; devise ways of disseminating and promoting the code within the Defence Force; include the code in the new Defence Act; etc [terms of reference for the code of conduct project of the civic education committee].

This example of cascading objectives highlights the constitutional, legislative, policy and organisational dimensions of a security reform endeavour. It indicates that national goals and priorities should be translated into actionable programme and project objectives; that SSR programme and project objectives should be based on national objectives and priorities; and that there should be a logical political and organisational flow from the national level down to the programme and project levels.
4. GUIDELINES FOR ACHIEVING NATIONAL OWNERSHIP THROUGH INCLUSIVE SSR DESIGN

This chapter focuses on the attainment of national ownership through inclusive and consultative SSR design. It presents planning guidelines to ensure that various categories of local actor are properly engaged in the process of designing security policies and reforms.

4.1 Planning for Inclusive SSR Design

SSR initiatives should have clearly defined objectives, outputs and desired outcomes. It is also important at the outset to prepare a process plan that identifies the actors that will be involved in the design, consultation and decision-making components of the process; the main stages of the process; and the estimated timeframe.

A plan of this kind would be useful when preparing, for example, a national security review, new security legislation or a new security doctrine such as community policing. It would help to ensure that key officials and bodies are not excluded from the design process; that political mistakes which could undermine or scupper the reforms are avoided; that the outputs are technically sound; and that the overall outcome is optimal and legitimate. The plan would also be helpful to donors that fund the initiative and to prospective donors.

The plan should cover the following categories of actor, each of which is discussed below:

- the decision-makers;
- the implementing agencies;
- the designers of the reforms;
- the advisers; and
- the interested parties, which include official bodies as well as non-governmental bodies and beneficiaries.
4.2 The Decision-Makers

The decision-makers are the individuals and bodies that have the authority to accept or reject the proposed reforms. There might be several functional and political decision-makers in respect of a given SSR initiative (e.g. the chief of police; the responsible minister; cabinet; and the parliamentary committee for policing).

All reform initiatives should have a principal decision-maker. This person should formally initiate the process; appoint the technical designers of the reforms; approve their terms of reference; review their reports and work-in-progress; provide political direction and leadership; and take responsibility for the final product. In major SSR reforms this person is typically a minister but in some cases it might be a national security adviser, a director-general or the chairperson of a parliamentary committee.

As a general rule, all officials and bodies that have the authority to approve or reject the proposed reforms should be consulted by the technical designers prior to the formal submission of the designers’ work. This enables the timely incorporation of the decision-makers’ views; allows for the early identification and fixing of problems; prevents perceptions of exclusion; reduces the incidence and intensity of conflict; and for all these reasons minimises resistance to the formal submission.

Even if parliamentary approval is not required for a particular initiative, it is advisable for the technical designers or their principals to consult the relevant parliamentary committees. Parliaments tend to be weak in new democracies but nothing is gained by ignoring them and thereby reinforcing the problem. Consultation with parliament is vital if the institution is representative and robust; if not, the consultation might at least serve to highlight the formal role and expectations of parliament (see further section 7.1).

4.3 The Implementing Agencies

The implementing agencies are the security services, government departments and other official bodies responsible for implementing reforms that have been approved by the political decision-makers. These agencies are often steeped in conservative thinking on security and very protective of tradition and vested interests; in some instances they might include or be led by criminal and malevolent elements. If they are strongly opposed to democratic reform, it might seem obvious that they should be excluded from the design process or assigned only a marginal role.

This will almost certainly be a mistake. The security services are much more likely to resist reforms that have been imposed on them than reforms that they have helped to
design. Precisely because they have the bureaucratic and informal means to prevent the proper implementation of approved reforms, their views have to be both challenged and accommodated during the design process.

Involving the security services fully in this process allows them to raise their concerns, contribute their professional input and protect their institutional interests in an open and legitimate manner. It also creates the possibility of a positive reorientation of their perspectives, which is hardly likely to occur if they are excluded from the process. Reforms that are not owned by the security services are most likely to be dead in the water.

The current book does not explore all the methods of addressing the problems of conservatism and criminality in the security services. These methods include education and training programmes; exposure to good practice internationally; and disciplinary measures and punitive action (which might entail some risk of hostile reaction). For present purposes in relation to SSR design, the following strategies are relevant:

- The top political leadership must be dedicated to reforming the security sector, and the principal decision-maker must provide strong direction and support to the technical design team. If these conditions are absent, there might be little prospect of reform.
- The principal decision-maker can balance the security officers who serve on an SSR design team with political advisers, members of civil society, parliamentarians and/or foreign experts. The decision-maker can also endeavour to ensure that reform-minded officers serve on the team.
- The security services should be regarded as beneficiaries of SSR and this should be explicit when designing the reforms. The institutional benefits that can make security reform less threatening to the services include greater professionalism and operational effectiveness; heightened legitimacy and public respect and co-operation; greater international acceptability and security co-operation; and additional resources, including equipment to improve operations and funds to improve service conditions.

### 4.4 The Designers

Security reforms can be designed by a team of people from a single government department (e.g. for a programme to demilitarise prisons) or from several departments (e.g. for a national security review). It might be beneficial to include civil society experts who offer a different perspective from that of government officials and it might be worthwhile politically to include parliamentarians.
The design team could be an existing or embryonic security policy and planning unit that comprises a mixture of civilian officials and security officers. Such units are crucial mechanisms for designing and driving major SSR endeavours (see further section 7.2). They can benefit greatly from exposure to security models and SSR experience in other countries (see section 7.5).

It is essential that the design team has a clear written mandate and terms of reference approved by the principal decision-maker; that the appointment of its members is confirmed in writing by this person; that its reporting relationships are unambiguous; that it prepares regular reports on its progress; and that it receives feedback and guidance from the principal decision-maker.

Ideally, the main criteria in selecting the members of the team should be technical skills and knowledge; representivity in relation to the implementing agencies and key decision-makers; and commitment to democratic reform.

4.5 The Advisers

As with the reform of other sectors of government, SSR design should be based on knowledge and expertise. While the design teams should have the requisite expertise, there will invariably be gaps and the teams should be willing to seek advice from other specialists. The specialists who serve as technical advisers might be members of a governmental body (e.g. the department of finance); a civil society organisation (e.g. specialists on change management); or an international body (e.g. the International Committee of the Red Cross).

Technical advisers should be distinguished from political advisers to the president and ministers. The political advisers might not be experts on security but they have an intimate knowledge of the goals and policy orientation of their principals. They also have direct access to the principals and it therefore makes sense for the design teams to liaise closely with them.

SSR design teams might be willing to accept assistance from foreign experts who play a supportive role but they resent foreigners who are overbearing, condescending or try to take control. As illustrated by the case study on Liberia, they also resent foreign advisers being thrust on them by donor governments (see chapter 12). It is inappropriate for a donor to contract foreign advisers to help domestic actors without the consent of these actors and it is inappropriate for foreign advisers to have no accountability to the local actors they are meant to support.
Some donor governments have dedicated SSR posts. The officials who fill these posts occupy pivotal positions in relation to local ownership. They liaise with domestic actors, are able to build trust over time, acquire knowledge of local dynamics and can play advisory and facilitating roles. They also help to shape the SSR policies and strategies of their own government, give advice to their colleagues and might be influential in the allocation of funds for SSR projects. Their sensitivity to the need for local ownership is paramount.

4.6 The Interested Parties

The interested parties are bodies that should be consulted during the design process because of their interest in the security issues under consideration. They can be divided into two categories: official entities and civil society groups. The former should be consulted for the sake of efficient and effective government and the latter should be consulted for the sake of democratic governance and broad local ownership. Vertical and horizontal inclusivity of this kind can also help to build an SSR community and ensure that reforms survive turnovers of political leadership and the vicissitudes of transitional politics.

The official bodies that constitute interested parties are those with a direct interest in an SSR initiative because of their statutory functions. For example, the department of finance has an interest in security reforms with major budgetary implications; the department of public administration has an interest in reforms with significant implications for the service conditions of state employees; and the office of the state law adviser has an interest in the drafting of legislation. The SSR design team should consult these bodies and afford them an opportunity to comment on early drafts of its work.

The interested parties in civil society can cover a wide range of entities, including professional associations; trade unions; private sector organisations; universities and policy institutes; community groups; religious groups; women’s organisations; human rights campaigners; etc. Their interest in an SSR initiative might be ethical, political, financial, professional or associational (i.e. acting on behalf of their members). Their involvement in SSR design is a prerequisite for broad local ownership and the legitimacy of the outputs.

Civil society can be consulted in various ways. As described in the case studies on Guatemala, South Africa and Sierra Leone, the government or parliament can invite the public to make written submissions on security issues and the outputs of the design team; invite oral presentations at public hearings; and convene public debates, consultative workshops and research oriented seminars (see chapters 11, 13 and 14).
Political parties and civil society organisations that represent a particular constituency – such as trade unions, women’s organisations and veterans associations – can use these consultation opportunities to advance the interests of their constituency. In this fashion the actual and potential beneficiaries of SSR seek to shape the emerging reforms to their advantage. However, those categories of people who are most insecure and vulnerable tend to be least organised and least equipped to articulate their concerns and needs. This problem is addressed in chapter 5.

Chapter 14 illustrates the guidelines presented above with a practical example of SSR design from South Africa. It outlines the different stages of the design process and highlights some of the benefits and limitations of consultation with parliament and the public.
5. THE BENEFICIARIES OF SSR: CITIZENS AND VULNERABLE GROUPS

This chapter focuses on citizens and vulnerable groups as the primary beneficiaries of SSR. It presents an overview of the strategies for meeting their security needs, offers a local security survey for identifying and addressing the needs of poor communities, and indicates some specific areas in which donor funding could improve the security of vulnerable groups.

5.1 Overview

SSR should serve the interests of citizens in four ways. First, it should ensure that the security services respect human rights and are not themselves a threat to citizens. Second, it should lead to the government and the security services becoming more responsive to the security concerns of citizens. Third, it should enhance public safety by raising the efficiency and effectiveness of the security services and related institutions. Fourth, it should attend to the needs of the most vulnerable groups in society.

In many respects the extent to which a state provides for the security of citizens and vulnerable groups lies outside the realm of SSR. It depends primarily on macro factors like the constitutional dispensation; the level of development; the strength of the state; the government’s ideological orientation and overall policy priorities; the strength of civil society; and the nature and intensity of security threats.

Security and SSR are constrained by these macro factors. For example, weak states may lack the means to provide adequate security to people in rural areas; governments that represent the interests of big business are unlikely to devote substantial resources to the security of working class communities; and it is hardly conceivable that the security sector will be more democratic and people-centred than the wider political system.
On the other hand, because the security sector tends to be conservative and requires some secrecy, it is often much less accountable, responsive and people-centred than other sectors of the state. This is the challenge that SSR is intended to address.

In the best of political circumstances, citizens and the political parties and other organisations that represent their interests can influence security policy and the allocation of security resources in various ways, including public advocacy, lobbying the executive and parliament, participating in public consultation processes and mobilising voters during elections. In the worst of circumstances where little or none of this is possible, the potential for people-centred security reform is exceedingly low.

Even in relatively favourable conditions, and certainly in the worst, vulnerable groups might be extremely insecure but lack the organisational and other means to influence security policy. Without a strong voice, and often as a result of prejudice, they are neglected in government’s security priorities and resource allocation. Such groups might include women, children, the elderly, minorities, rural communities and working class people.

The following strategies would help to shape SSR and security policies so that they meet the needs of citizens and vulnerable groups:

- The development of a national security vision that emphasises the principles of human security, respect for human rights, the rule of law and the accountability of the security services (sections 3.1 and 3.2).
- The inclusion of these principles into the constitution and legislation so that they have a binding status (section 3.4).
- The design of security reforms and policies in an inclusive and consultative manner that takes seriously the issues raised by citizens and vulnerable groups (chapters 4, 11, 13 and 14).
- Enhancing the capacity of citizens, vulnerable groups and their organisations to lobby for reforms that serve their interests and to participate in public debates on security (sections 5.3, 7.3 and 7.5).
- The design and administration of local security surveys aimed at identifying and addressing the security needs of poor communities (section 5.2).

All of these strategies are likely to entail political struggles among groups with different interests and ideological perspectives. Donors cannot fight battles on behalf of actual or potential beneficiaries but they can help to build the expertise and organisational capacity of local actors that are committed to progressive reform (chapter 7).
5.2 Local Security Survey

This sub-section presents a template for a local security survey that could be used to identify and contribute to meeting the security needs of poor communities. The underlying assumption is that security threats vary markedly from one place to another and from one group to another. The government’s security policies, priorities and allocation of resources should reflect these differences and be informed by local as well as national dynamics.

The survey is thus a tool for giving effect to the principle of responsive government. Ideally, it should be commissioned by a governmental authority – such as a provincial government department, a city council or a district police commissioner – for the purpose of security decision-making, prioritising, deployment and resource allocation at the local level. In countries where government is unresponsive to the needs of the poor, the survey could be initiated by NGOs for the purpose of policy advocacy, public campaigning or programme design.14

Certain donors have shown an interest in such surveys and are willing to fund them. However, the process must be owned by domestic actors and must be geared principally to meeting their needs. In addition to funding, local actors might require some assistance in survey design and analysis.

The surveys should be conducted through interviews with individuals, focus groups or community organisations in a manner that allows for a conversation and not simply the completion of a questionnaire. A representative sample of respondents should be selected and their gender, age, ethnicity and location should be recorded so that the subsequent analysis can identify specific threats and vulnerabilities in relation to different groups.

The survey presented below is an illustrative template. For use in the field it should be adapted to reflect local conditions, concepts and language. It can also be adapted for different purposes. For example, it could focus more closely than at present on policing priorities and conduct; alternatively, the focus could be broadened to cover state institutions other than the security services (e.g. the departments of transport, education and justice). It could have a wide geographic scope or be utilised more narrowly by an enterprising police station commander to cover his/her area of jurisdiction.
The survey would be a worthwhile tool for monitoring the progress of SSR programmes and projects if it initially provided baseline data and were repeated subsequently at suitable intervals.

**Survey template**

- What are your greatest needs in terms of safety and security?
- What are the threats to your safety and security:
  - in your home?
  - in the neighbourhood where you live?
  - in the place where you work?
  - in the fields?
  - in the school?
  - during the day?
  - at night?
  - when you travel?
- What can the government and the security services do to improve your security in each of the above places?
- Who are the greatest threats to your security? What do these individuals or groups do to you?
- Do any of the security services protect you and your community from harm? If so, which security services do this and how do they do it? What could they do to provide better protection to you and your community?
- Are there any non-governmental organisations that protect you and your community? If so, which organisations do this and how do they do it? What could they do to provide better protection to you and your community?
- Are any of the security services a threat to your security? If so, which security services and what do they do?
- Which security services do you trust the most, and for what reasons?
- Which security services do you trust the least, and for what reasons?
- Who do you call for help if you are very frightened or have been hurt by someone? Does the person/organisation you call respond quickly and to your satisfaction?

### 5.3 Donor Support for Vulnerable Groups

The ways in which SSR can target and benefit vulnerable groups obviously differ among countries. Given the wide range of situations and the diversity of vulnerable groups and security threats, the most pertinent generalisation is that donor governments should be responsive to local requests and sensitive to local conditions rather than attempt to deliver pre-packaged programmes.
Moreover, if donors are serious about supporting vulnerable groups, it is not sufficient that they contract consultants to do surveys and assessments of local needs. They have to get out and meet representatives of these groups, listen to their concerns and build relationships of trust over time.

Depending on the circumstances, donors can provide financial support to the following:

- **Organisations that represent vulnerable groups.** Such organisations would include, for example, women’s organisations that address rape and sexual abuse through survivor support programmes or public awareness and advocacy campaigns. Donors are often willing to support the projects but not the core costs of these organisations. This makes no sense where the organisation’s viability depends on core funding.

- **Cross-organisational programmes that address security problems.** For example, in some countries there might be a need for donors to support school programmes that raise children’s awareness of the dangers of joining gangs.

- **Special units or projects within the security services.** In countries where the government is sympathetic to the needs of vulnerable groups, donors could support initiatives such as child protection units in the police; gender sensitivity training for security personnel; juvenile rehabilitation programmes in prisons; and child care facilities for women prisoners.

- **Public consultation processes.** These processes are not very expensive but they require funds that might not be available domestically. Donors can support vulnerable groups by, for example, covering the costs of workshops in rural areas or enabling women in rural areas to attend workshops held in cities. Donors could also fund consultation processes that are specifically designed to maximise the participation of vulnerable groups.

- **Capacity-building.** The obstacles to vulnerable groups being assertive about their security needs include lack of power, lack of expertise and lack of confidence. Donors can help to raise the voice of these groups by funding their efforts to acquire expertise in security matters.

- **Local security surveys.** Donors can provide financial support for the design and administration of the security surveys discussed in section 5.2.
• **Meeting security needs.** Donors can provide funding to meet security needs that emerge from public consultations and surveys. Some of these needs can be met through relatively modest amounts of money. For example, proper street lighting around train stations and in the streets of working class communities might make women and other commuters less vulnerable to criminal activity after nightfall.
6. OBSTACLES TO SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Donor officials frequently express frustration at the slow pace of SSR in partner countries. They fail to appreciate the difficulties of security reform and their crude and incomplete analyses undermine local ownership and the process of reform. Their strategies for pursuing SSR and addressing the obstacles ought to be based on a comprehensive and accurate analysis. This chapter examines the four main obstacles to SSR and then presents a diagnostic framework for analysing the obstacles in a given country.

6.1 Overview of Main Obstacles

In post-conflict societies and democratising countries where SSR is on the agenda, donors tend to attribute the slow pace or lack of reform to incompetence and/or political resistance. This is invariably an incomplete and crude perspective. It ignores the inherent difficulties of SSR and fails to distinguish between ideological, personal, organisational and structural obstacles to change. Such distinctions are crucial because different types of obstacle have to be addressed through different strategies.

The dangers of incomplete and crude analyses are that donors apply inappropriate pressure on the partner government; they push the government to move more quickly than is sound; they patronise local actors and try to solve problems on their behalf; and they fail to see opportunities to play a useful role. These problems lead to both a failure to promote local ownership and a direct undermining of local ownership.

The first obstacle is that major security reform is immensely complex. A large number of policies might have to be transformed; many of these policies might have to be changed more or less simultaneously rather than staggered sequentially; the required changes are likely to be substantial and radical given the undemocratic and militarist nature of security policy previously; and the reforms will require significant changes in organisational structure and the expertise, skills, disposition and behaviour of staff.

For example, defence transformation in South Africa entailed the integration of government and guerrilla armies, the establishment of a civilian Defence Secretariat, and the drafting of new legislation on the armed forces, civil-military relations, arms exports, military trade unions and mercenaries. It also entailed a dramatic reorientation of military posture, doctrine and operations; training and education programmes; institutional culture; human resource policies; the military justice system; defence expenditure and procurement; and the role of the parliamentary defence committee.
Managing such complex transformation would tax the strongest and most experienced of governments. It can be overwhelming to a weak government that lacks cohesion, has little or no experience in running a state, has limited resources and is buffeted by volatile transitional politics.

The second and related problem is one of capacity. Good governance in the security sector and other spheres is not simply a matter of adhering to democratic principles. It also requires efficiency and effectiveness in performing the functions of the state. Many developing countries lack the skills, expertise, infrastructure and resources to meet the welfare and security needs of citizens. Without the requisite organisational capacity, the principles of democracy cannot be operationalised and insecurity will remain pervasive.

By way of example, adherence to the rule of law presupposes the existence of a competent and fair judiciary, police service and criminal justice system; the expectation that police respect human rights is unrealistic if they have not been trained in techniques other than use of force; and illegal trafficking in small arms will not be stemmed through legislative and policy measures if the government is unable to control the movement of people and goods across its borders.

A failure to reform the security sector might consequently be due to a lack of capacity rather than a lack of will. This is especially the case in weak states and war-torn societies where the government does not have the expertise to design and implement SSR. The deficit in expertise relates not only to advanced skills such as threat analysis and force design but also to more basic functional skills like planning, management and co-ordination.

Building capacity in these and other areas is a long-term endeavour. It should be treated as a high priority by donors that take local ownership seriously. Without adequate capacity, security reforms cannot be undertaken and the security of citizens cannot be ensured. Chapter 7 presents proposals for building local capacity for SSR.

The third problem is resistance to change. Democratisation and demilitarisation always generate opposition from conservatives and other groups whose values and interests are threatened thereby. In addition, substantial policy and organisational transformation is intrinsically threatening and gives rise to resistance and conflict in all circumstances. Resistance, inertia and confusion are inevitable when security officers are expected to implement (and sometimes design) new policies that are completely at odds with their training, experience and worldview.

For strategic purposes, however, it is necessary to abandon simplistic notions of ‘lack of will’ and discern more carefully, in each situation, the reasons for resistance to
change. By way of example, the absence of political leadership for reform is different from explicit political opposition to reform; opposition that is expressed openly is different from surreptitious and conspiratorial efforts to subvert reforms; and ideological opposition to democratisation is different from a psychological discomfort with change. These different problems clearly require different strategic and tactical responses.

Fourth, demilitarisation and democratisation of the security sector are most difficult to pursue in the conditions of instability and insecurity that characterise many post-conflict countries. In these conditions, political leaders and security chiefs are preoccupied with operational matters and consider transformation a low priority. A context of high insecurity also makes it easier for conservatives to win support for the argument that democratisation and demilitarisation will impair the state’s ability to deal with security threats. The higher the level of instability in the national and regional arenas, the less likely it is that anti-militarist reforms will be introduced.15

None of the difficulties outlined above is conducive to ‘quick fix’ donor solutions or the simple replication of Western models. The democratic norms that donors take for granted are truly radical in societies emerging from authoritarian rule, and the organisational capacity that is enjoyed by donor governments is largely absent in developing countries. Security reform is a slow, uncertain and painful process that can usefully be supported by donors if they are patient and responsive to local actors. It cannot usefully be pursued by donors who bully local actors or undertake SSR on their behalf.

### 6.2 Obstacles to SSR: A Diagnostic Tool

The table presented on the following pages is intended to facilitate a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the obstacles to SSR in a given country. It identifies different types of problem that require different strategies, distinguishing between internal political obstacles, external political obstacles, capacity problems, and contextual and structural obstacles. The point is not that external actors should tackle every obstacle but that they should have a sophisticated understanding of the blockages and constraints.
The tool should be used as a *framework for analysis* rather than as a checklist. Each of the problems listed in the table should be considered in terms of the extent to which it exists, and in what forms and with what severity, rather than in terms of a binary ‘yes’ or ‘no’; in many countries undergoing SSR, all the problems are likely to exist to at least some degree. Equally important is the need to investigate the links between the various problems and to differentiate between causes, symptoms and exacerbating factors.

The framework should be used in conjunction with a broader analytical tool, such as DFID’s *Drivers of Change* or *Strategic Conflict Assessment*.16

**A] Internal political obstacles**

- Resistance to reform
  - from different actors
    - political leaders (i.e. president; ministers)
    - senior officials (i.e. civil servants; security officers)
    - non-official actors (e.g. retired politicians and security officers; bosses of organised crime)
  - for different reasons
    - ideological (i.e. political opposition to democracy)
    - personal (i.e. maintaining positions of power, influence, prestige and patronage)
    - financial (e.g. corruption; concern about job losses; opposition to capital budget cuts)
    - patriarchal (e.g. insensitive to gender violence; discriminate against female members)
    - organisational (e.g. fear of change; inertia; conflict)
- Lack of leadership for reform
  - at the political level
    - president / prime minister
    - ministers
    - parliamentarians
  - at the level of civil servants
    - senior civilian officials
    - senior security officers

**B] External political obstacles**

- Donors and other external actors competitive and working at cross purposes
- Donors and other external actors pursuing partisan political agendas
- External actors promoting counter-terror measures that prevent or weaken democratic reform
- Donors and other external actors imposing solutions and undermining local ownership
- Donors and other external actors fuelling corruption
- Neighbouring states interfering in domestic politics

**C] Capacity problems**
- Lack of staff (i.e. too few officials dedicated to SSR design and planning; weak or non-existent civilian departments in the security sector)
- Lack of knowledge (e.g. of comparative SSR experience; democratic security models; methods of operationalising these models)
- Lack of functional skills (e.g. planning; budgeting; financial control)
- Lack of advanced skills (e.g. threat analysis; force design; developing doctrine; drafting legislation; gender security)
- Lack of equipment and financial resources (e.g. computers; communications equipment; vehicles; low salaries)

**D] Contextual and structural obstacles**
- Weak institutions of democracy and absence of a democratic culture
- Weak state (i.e. lacking authority, power, capacity and resources)
- Underdevelopment (i.e. general lack of skills, funds and infrastructure)
- Weak security institutions and powerful informal security networks
- Internal security threats (e.g. violent crime; gangs; militia; warlords)
- External security threats (e.g. hostile relations with other states; spill over violence)
- Regional instability and insecurity
7. ENSURING SUSTAINABILITY: DONOR SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY-BUILDING

This chapter presents five capacity-building proposals that donors could support in the interests of local ownership. Each proposal contains a summary description, statement of purpose, motivation and outline of organisational arrangements. The proposals cover the following topics:

- research support for parliamentary committees that deal with security;
- security policy and planning units in government;
- a small grants scheme for civil society activities that focus on security;
- drafting security legislation; and
- comparative SSR exchange and study.

States cannot provide adequate security to citizens, maintain professional security services and engage in security sector reform unless they have the capacity to do these things. New democracies and post-conflict countries typically lack this capacity. Capacity here refers both to material resources and to people with the requisite knowledge and skills.

Where governments lack the expertise to perform certain SSR functions, such as developing doctrine or drafting legislation, external actors might be tempted to fill the breach and assume these functions. This is not an effective strategy. Local actors resent external solutions of this kind, they have little commitment to the resultant product and they remain ill-equipped to perform the functions in question. There is no prospect of sustainable SSR unless domestic actors have the capacity to ensure sustainability.

7.1 Research Support for Parliamentary Committees

Description
Donor support for the provision of research capacity to parliamentary committees that deal with security, principally the committees responsible for defence, policing, intelligence, correctional services and justice.

Purpose
To equip these committees with greater knowledge of technical issues, international norms and comparative international experience so that they are better able to engage in informed debate, perform a critical oversight function and promote a progressive security agenda.
Motivation

Donor governments working on SSR in new and emerging democracies tend to focus on the executive, the security services and civil society. As has occurred in Liberia, they neglect parliaments on the grounds that parliamentarians are corrupt or that the parliaments in question have little or no influence (see chapter 12). Instead of attempting to address this problem, the donors contribute to perpetuating it.

Parliaments in emerging democracies are potentially vital institutions. Even if they do not have real decision-making power, they can be forums for transparency, open debate and the provision of information on government policy and spending. They can thereby contribute significantly to executive accountability and checks on executive power.17

If there is even a semblance of open debate in parliament, opposition parties and courageous MPs can raise the profile of, and shed light on, security issues that would otherwise lie outside the realm of public knowledge. Parliamentary debate can thus help to create the political space for broader public discussion on security. Parliamentary consideration of security legislation and budgets, and question time in parliament, are key opportunities for this.

It is true that parliaments in many emerging democracies lack influence and coherence. There are at least four reasons for this: there is no tradition of robust parliamentary debate; the executive might want to prevent parliament from becoming an effective institution; parliamentarians might have no commitment to the public good; and parliamentary committees might lack expert knowledge. The current proposal addresses the last of these problems.

By way of example, a parliamentary defence committee cannot have a fruitful discussion on military doctrine and force design if MPs have no expertise on these topics (see section 14.6). Similarly, the committee’s ability to comment meaningfully on military spending is greatly reduced if its members are unable to analyse a defence budget. MPs may end up deferring to military officers and endorsing their proposals uncritically. The net result is that defence policy remains stuck in a militarist paradigm and parliamentary oversight is severely compromised.

Organisational arrangements

Research support for parliamentary committees could take different organisational forms depending on the country circumstances. First, donors could provide funding for two competent researchers to be appointed to each of the committees that deals with security. The researchers would be parliamentary support staff and their appointment, supervision and reporting would follow parliament’s administrative procedures.
The researchers would prepare background papers and distribute useful documents on topics under consideration by the committees. They would also meet requests for information and analysis from the committees and individual MPs; refer MPs to relevant academics, institutes and specialist websites; organise seminars; and, if funding permits, commission research from specialists.

Second, if MPs are keen to have research support but the option of creating parliamentary research posts is politically or bureaucratically too difficult, the posts could be established in an NGO. The researchers would perform the same functions as those outlined above but would be employees of the NGO rather than parliament. In this case it would be useful to set up a commissioning and review committee comprising MPs from different political parties.

Third, and more generally, donors should support NGO programmes that provide security information and analysis to parliamentarians.

The organisational options outlined above could be pursued by donors working on SSR in a given country. It would also be worthwhile for a donor, such as the EU or an EU member state, to set up a cross-country programme that provides funding for research support to parliamentary committees dealing with security. This would enable the donor to facilitate the sharing of comparative information and experience among parliamentarians interested in security reform.

**Focus of research and information**

Parliamentary committees dealing with security should have three types of knowledge that could be provided by capable researchers:

a. **An understanding of key concepts, terms and technical issues.** For example, a defence committee should have an adequate understanding of doctrine, posture, armaments, collective security, common security, confidence- and security-building measures, etc.

b. **Knowledge of comparative experience.** For example, a policing committee is better able to review draft legislation and executive policy on community policing and public order policing if MPs are aware of the approaches taken in democratic countries elsewhere.
c. **Knowledge of relevant international law.** Parliamentary committees that deal with security should be aware of the relevant international law, such as the Geneva Conventions and the prohibitions on torture.

In new democracies, knowledge of international norms and comparative experience can serve to highlight the viability of non-militarist and democratic alternatives to conservative thinking on security. For example, transparency on defence spending and arms transfers might be considered inconceivable in an emerging democracy whose military activities were previously steeped in secrecy. Yet exposure to the United Nations Arms Register and the published defence budgets of other countries could make the prospect of greater transparency seem less heretical and alarming.

**Caveat**
The aim of this endeavour is not to reproduce the parliamentary system or parliamentary research system of donor countries. The aim is to build parliamentary research capacity *in a fashion appropriate to the partner country*.

### 7.2 Security Policy and Planning Units

**Description**
Donor support for the establishment and functioning of security policy and planning units in partner governments.

**Purpose**
To build the partner government’s capacity to conceptualise, design, plan, manage, co-ordinate, monitor and evaluate security sector reform, and thereby to enhance the quality and effectiveness of reforms.

**Motivation**
In new democracies and post-conflict countries there is often no civilian office and little civilian capacity in government for conceptualising, designing, planning, managing, co-ordinating, monitoring and evaluating SSR programmes and projects. Where political leaders are willing to embark on security reform, there is a need for one or more civilian units that comprise officials with the necessary expertise to do the technical work.

In the absence of such units, there might be insufficient co-ordination, continuity and momentum; in the absence of the requisite expertise, SSR will be sub-optimal; and in the absence of civilian leadership, security policy might remain the preserve of security officers. The establishment of civilian policy and planning units is thus a key security
sector reform in its own right. It can strengthen civilian governance of the security services and be a crucial vehicle for driving and sustaining SSR.

The staff of the units need two sets of skill and knowledge. The first relates to sectoral expertise on policing, defence or prisons etc. The second set of specialised skills, the importance of which is underestimated by local and external actors alike, relates to the following policy and planning functions:

- strategic analysis;
- policy formulation;
- strategic planning;
- translating strategic plans into operational plans and programmes;
- organisational design;
- human resource management;
- change management;
- monitoring, evaluation and adaptation; and
- budgeting.

Organisational arrangements

A policy and planning unit should exist in each of the departments that deals with security (i.e. police, intelligence, defence, etc). Where a government seeks to affect comprehensive sectoral-wide SSR, a high-level security policy and planning unit might also be required in a central location (e.g. the office of the president, prime minister or national security adviser).

Functions of the policy and planning units

The functions of the policy and planning units would include the following:

- undertake research on SSR and democratic security models in other countries;
- prepare strategic options and plans for SSR;
- prepare draft policies and legislation;
- undertake and support briefings and consultations within the security services, elsewhere in government and with parliament and civil society;
- liaise with local and foreign experts;
- perform an SSR co-ordination within government; and
- perform a liaison and co-ordination function with donors that want to support SSR.
These functions should be performed under the direction of a senior official (e.g. a director-general, minister or national security adviser).

**Composition**
The units should have a mixture of civilian officials and security officers. They should be headed by civilians, not because civilians are necessarily more democratic and anti-militarist than security officers but because of the need in a democracy to assert civilian authority over the security services. The units should include security officers because of their technical expertise and because their involvement would help to ensure acceptance of proposed reforms by the security chiefs. To the greatest extent possible, the staff appointed to the units should be committed to democratic reform.

**Donor support**
The policy and planning units would typically have a range of needs that donors could help to meet:

- Computers, communications equipment and other office equipment.
- Skills training, which could take place through study visits to other countries, attendance at courses available locally and abroad, and short- or long-term secondments.
- Knowledge relating to technical issues and comparative experience. Donor support could be provided for seminars, study visits, a research budget and attendance at local and foreign universities and security academies. It would be especially useful to enable the staff of the units to learn about security policy and planning systems in other countries.

**Caveats**
Security policy and planning units in post-conflict countries and new democracies are unlikely to be strong politically. Their mandates are not secure and their work is bound to be unsettled by political machinations within and around the state. Even if their establishment is supported by political leaders, the units will encounter resistance and might struggle constantly to win approval for reforms. The units will also be organisationally weak. For some considerable time after their formation, they might be unable to absorb substantial support to build their capacity.

In these circumstances there is a danger that donor governments provide the wrong kind of support and provide too much support. Donors must be patient, refrain from pressurising the units to make hasty progress, and avoid burdening the units with externally driven proposals and requests. Instead, they should be responsive to the units’ requests and allow the units to set the pace.
7.3 Small Grants Scheme for Civil Society

**Description**
Establishment of a small grants scheme for civil society activities on security and SSR.

**Purpose**
To enable greater public participation in debates on security and SSR and to promote civil society perspectives on these topics.

**Motivation**
Civil society participation in debates on security is a matter of right and an intrinsic aspect of democracy. The point is not that civil society is inherently progressive and supportive of SSR but rather that citizens and their organisations have a basic right to express their views on security.

In established democracies, public engagement with security issues helps to ensure that government is answerable for its security decisions, is held accountable for the actions of the security services and is responsive to the security concerns of citizens. In emerging democracies, civil society’s engagement with security issues is indispensable to progress in this direction. It is vital if security is to be brought out of the dark corridors and become a public good. In addition, as has been demonstrated in Guatemala and South Africa, progressive academics and activists can be influential in shaping SSR through research, advocacy and support to government (see chapters 11 and 14).\(^\text{18}\)

**Organisational arrangements**
In developing countries the majority of civil society organisations are unable to raise large sums of money, and donors tend to favour elite NGOs that are headed by well-educated professionals. In order to broaden civil society involvement, the application and reporting requirements of the small grants scheme should not be onerous.

The application form should be no more than four pages. It simply needs to cover the following:

- The aims and activities of the applicant’s organisation.
- The activity for which funding is sought.
- Possible follow-up activities.
- The expected benefits of the activity in relation to security reform.
- Brief biographical information on the people who will implement the activity.
- A budget with explanatory notes.
The donor brochures that promote the small grants scheme should provide the OECD DAC’s perspective on SSR (section 2.2) as well as an illustrative list of activities that could be funded (see below).

In assessing the applications, donors should not set the bar too high. It is not essential that every successful application has a major or long-lasting impact. In the early stages of a new democracy, it is not even essential that all the applications are of a high quality. What is important is that there are a multitude of constructive civil society initiatives on security. The cumulative effect is a significant contribution to democracy and SSR.

Donors should be especially supportive of activities that raise the voice and contribute to addressing the security needs of women, poor communities and other marginalised and vulnerable groups. Section 5.3 provides an indication of these activities.

The small grants scheme could be established by a single donor or a group of donors. It could have a global scope but decision-making on grant applications should be decentralised since donor representatives in-country generally have a better grasp of local dynamics than their colleagues in foreign capitals.

**Activities**

There is no need to have a fixed list of activities that would be eligible for funding. An illustrative list would include the following:

- Facilitation of dialogue and confidence-building among different actors.
- Public opinion and security needs surveys.
- Research and publications.
- Specialist resource centres.
- Conferences, workshops and seminars.
- Radio and other media productions.
- Public advocacy.
- Policy support to the executive and the legislature.
- Training for civil society, security personnel and parliamentarians.
- Monitoring the conduct of the security services.
- Establishing local and international SSR networks.
- Attending or developing academic courses or training programmes.

**Larger grants**

This proposal is intended to encourage a multiplicity of civil society activities, hence the emphasis on small grants. Nevertheless, there are many worthwhile civil society programmes – such as the establishment of an SSR website, a new academic course or a series of training workshops – that might require larger amounts.
7.4 Drafting Security Legislation

**Description**
Donor support for building domestic capacity to draft security legislation.

**Purpose**
To develop the skills of local actors involved in preparing security laws and to help ensure that these laws are consistent with democratic norms and the standards of sound legislation.

**Motivation**
The introduction of security legislation that is consistent with democratic norms is a key component of SSR. It is essential to efforts to entrench the rule of law, establish the primacy and accountability of the official security institutions, and ensure that the durability of reforms is not dependent on a few individuals (section 3.3).

Two types of expertise are needed to draft such legislation. First, the drafters must have an understanding of the ways in which security matters should be addressed in legislation that complies with democratic principles. Second, the drafters must have the technical skill to prepare laws that are comprehensive, precise and unambiguous. In developing countries undergoing SSR, one or both types of expertise might be lacking.

**Organisational arrangements and donor support**
Donor governments can either provide funding for local actors to acquire the requisite expertise or they can arrange for legal experts from their own country or elsewhere to assist local actors that want such support.

Specialist training would be very useful for government officials whose functions include drafting legislation; these officials are typically located in the ministry of justice or the legal divisions of other government departments. In addition, basic training could be provided to parliamentarians and members of civil society groups that focus on SSR. This would enhance their ability and confidence to scrutinise draft security legislation, identify problems and propose solutions.

**Caveat**
Donor governments should not attempt to reproduce the security legislation of their own country. The aim of this endeavour is to equip local actors to write legislation that they consider appropriate to their situation.
7.5 Comparative Exchange and Study

**Description**
Donor support for efforts by domestic actors involved in security reform to learn about the SSR experience and the security models and laws of democratic and democratising countries elsewhere.

**Purpose**
To build the knowledge, expertise and confidence of local actors engaged in SSR and contribute to the promotion and adoption of democratic models and processes.

**Motivation**
Throughout this chapter, reference has been made to the importance of comparative knowledge. Local actors involved in designing and implementing security reforms can find it immensely helpful to study relevant processes, outputs and outcomes from other countries (see further chapter 11 on SSR in Guatemala). Comparative exchange and study have three types of benefit:

- There is the **technical benefit** of learning about the details of progressive security models and methods. There might be strong support in a country for the concept of community policing but little idea on how to operationalise the concept. Similarly, a government might want to establish a civilian defence secretariat but be unclear about its structure and relationship to military headquarters.

- It is **politically advantageous** for local actors who advocate and design SSR to be aware of democratic security practices elsewhere. This knowledge is useful in their struggles against conservatives and in their efforts to win public and parliamentary support. In countries emerging from authoritarian rule, efforts to establish robust mechanisms of accountability, transparency and oversight in the security arena might appear less ‘crazy’ and ‘irresponsible’ when viewed in the light of comparative experience.

- There is considerable **psychological benefit** to local actors in overcoming a lack of knowledge and sense of ignorance about security matters. Feeling ignorant leads to inertia and a lack of knowledge contributes to the domination of domestic actors by external actors. Comparative exchange and study can embolden local actors and enhance both the prospect and the quality of local ownership.
Organisational arrangements and donor support

Comparative exchange and study can be pursued through many types of activity, including:

- seminars, conferences and workshops;
- internships and fellowships;
- networks and associations;
- study visits;
- academic and policy research; and
- attendance at courses offered by foreign universities and security academies.

There is no need for donors to be prescriptive about which activities should be undertaken by local actors or about which local actors should be involved in the activities. The participants could include parliamentarians, academics, civil servants, security officers, women’s groups, human rights organisations, etc. There is utility in having programmes and events with mixed audiences as well as with discreet audiences such as parliamentarians from different countries.

Nor should donors be prescriptive about which countries constitute the focus of comparative study and exchange. People involved in SSR can learn equally from emerging democracies and long-established ones, as well as from colleagues in the same region and those in other regions. South-South exchanges can be particularly productive because of similar structural conditions and because they tend to be conducted on a more equal footing than North-South exchanges.

In addition to providing funding, donors can stimulate local interest in comparative exchange and study and can play a facilitating role where this is required.

Caveat

The emphasis of donor support should be on comparative study and exchange. Donors should avoid promoting assiduously the security models of their own countries. This provides limited opportunity for learning and leads to resentment among local actors, whereas exposure to a variety of models is empowering.
8. INSTITUTIONALISING LOCAL OWNERSHIP IN DONOR GOVERNMENTS

Much thought has been devoted to the incentives and pressures that might encourage politicians and security officers in emerging democracies and post-conflict countries to implement security reforms. Little thought has gone into the incentives and pressures that might encourage donor governments and their officials to abide by the principle of local ownership of SSR. The officials are under no pressure to do so and they are not held to account if they ignore the principle.

This chapter contains proposals to institutionalise the principle of local ownership in donor governments by including the principle in their funding, evaluation, reporting and other bureaucratic procedures. The aim is to make the principle part of the institutional culture and regular practice of these governments. To this end, the proposals present local ownership and capacity-building as key objectives and result areas rather than simply as means to achieving other objectives.

8.1 Internal Funding Procedures

The OECD DAC policy commitment to local ownership of security sector reform should be incorporated into the administrative forms that are used by donor governments to establish and fund SSR programmes and projects. When donor officials apply for inception funding or renewed funding for an SSR programme or project, the application form should include the following requirements:

1. Describe the ways in which this programme/project will promote local ownership of SSR, and provide Objectively Verifiable Indicators (OVIs).

2. Describe the ways in which this programme/project will build local capacity for security or SSR, and provide OVIs.

3. Describe the involvement of local actors in the design of the programme/project. If no local actors were involved in the design, explain the reasons for this.
4. Indicate which local actors support the programme/project. If no local actors support
the programme/project, explain the reasons for this.

5. Indicate which local actors will be involved in implementing the programme/project.

6. Describe the ways in which the programme/project will enhance the security of
citizens in general or vulnerable groups in particular.

7. If local ownership is impossible because of the circumstances in-country:
   - describe these circumstances and the obstacles to local ownership;
   - describe the ways in which the programme/project will contribute to addressing
     these obstacles; and
   - indicate how local ownership could be built over time.

Including these requirements in a log frame application form or similar document used
by donor governments would help to ensure that local ownership is not neglected. It
would compel government officials to think seriously about the general imperative of
local ownership and its practical application in partner countries.

8.2 Programme and Project Evaluation

The Output to Purpose Review or other evaluation form used by donor governments
when assessing their SSR programmes and projects should have a section on local
ownership. This section should include the following:

1. Describe how this programme/project has promoted local ownership of SSR and
   indicate progress towards the achievement of the designated OVIs.

2. Describe the ways in which the programme/project has built local capacity for
   security or SSR and indicate progress towards the achievement of the designated
   OVIs.

3. Describe the ways in which local actors have been involved in implementing the
   programme/project.

4. If local ownership was impossible because of the circumstances in-country:
   - describe these circumstances and the obstacles to local ownership; and
   - describe the ways in which these obstacles could be addressed in the future.

5. Describe the ways in which the programme/project enhanced the security of citizens
   in general and/or vulnerable groups in particular.
6. Describe your learnings in relation to local ownership and highlight any lessons that might have general applicability.

If the sixth question were answered in a comprehensive and critical fashion, it would provide excellent material for research and policy development on local ownership of SSR.

### 8.3 Other Avenues for Institutionalising Local Ownership

Other ways to institutionalise the principle of local ownership of SSR in donor governments include the following:

**Criteria for allocating funds.** Local ownership and capacity-building should be among the foremost criteria that donor governments use when evaluating in-house funding proposals on SSR. There should be a general presumption against funding programmes and projects that do not meet these imperatives.

**Policy statements.** When donor governments issue policy statements on SSR, they should not merely assert their commitment to the principle of local ownership. The statements should include a proper description of the strategies that are being used or will be used to give effect to that commitment.

**Pledge to recipients of donor support.** The OECD DAC donors should formulate a pledge to support local ownership of SSR, publicise the pledge and include it in their funding contracts and partnership agreements with domestic actors.

**Annual reports.** All annual reports that cover donor support for SSR – whether prepared for departmental purposes, parliament or the public – should include a proper account of activities undertaken in support of local ownership and capacity-building.

**Capacity-building for donor officials.** There is a need to educate donor officials on the rationale and strategies for local ownership and capacity-building. Educational events should take place within donor governments, targeting in particular the departments and agencies that are least supportive of local ownership. They could also take place at a more centralised level under the auspices of the OECD DAC.
8.4 Minimising Disruption and Harm

Donor support is always a double-edged sword. Whatever the intended and actual benefits of that support, the infusion by strong actors of large sums of money into a fragile environment inevitably creates a range of problems:

- Donors offer their local employees salaries and per diems that are way above the local rates. This generates resentment and conflict in the partner government and can lead to the best qualified people leaving domestic organisations to work for donors.
- Donors often want a partner government to establish separate project management units and accounting systems for the projects they fund, inhibiting the development of sustainable government systems.
- National directors spend more time managing international relations and project relations than managing their other functions and their own staff. The reporting requirements of donors are onerous and detract from attending to local needs.
- Skilled local staff are pulled out of domestic systems for donor project activities, such as project planning and evaluation.
- Many of the NGOs that spring up in response to funding opportunities have little legitimacy and are really expressions of private enterprise.
- All of the above is aggravated by a lack of donor co-ordination and co-operation, particularly where donors pursue divergent policies and partisan political agendas.19

Given the imbalance of power and resources between external and domestic actors, these problems are unlikely to be eliminated. Yet they can be mitigated if donor governments and officials are sensitive to the negative effects of their funding and are willing to grapple with those effects. At all stages of the project cycle, from design to evaluation, donors should be asking whether their efforts are strengthening or undermining local capacity and the establishment of a viable state.
9. AFGHANISTAN CASE STUDY: THE LEAD NATION APPROACH

By Emma Sky

This case study focuses on security sector reform in Afghanistan, a process that has been driven by foreign actors with insufficient co-ordination, domestic ownership and local capacity-building. The case first describes the context and the ‘lead nation’ approach to SSR, and then considers the negative consequences of the lack of local ownership. At the time of writing (October 2006), it seems highly unlikely that the international approach to SSR will lead to national institutions and security forces capable of maintaining security in Afghanistan.

9.1 Context

After twenty-five years of conflict, the fall of the Taliban in 2001 marked a new era for the people of Afghanistan. Considerable progress has been made in the country, including the holding of elections for the President, the lower house of the National Assembly and provincial councils; the formation of a new Afghan National Army and reform of the Afghan National Police; the demobilisation and disarming of thousands of combatants; and the return of two million refugees.

The new era has been heavily influenced by the international community. The US helped the Northern Alliance and other Afghan militias to overthrow the Taliban and then armed and funded local commanders who captured and held territory after the Taliban and al-Qaeda fled the American air offensive. Barnett Rubin notes that “some of these commanders used the money and arms they received to invest in drug production and engage in land grabs, predation, political intimidation, and ethnic cleansing – a major source of insecurity for Afghans”.

Having dismembered the Taliban regime in Kabul, the US-led coalition turned its efforts to defeating the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the south and east of the country. Concerned about incurring casualties, the coalition chose not to put troops on the ground but rather to fight the war by proxy, using mainly Pashtun warlords. The empowerment of warlords has created an additional barrier to the current government’s ability to exercise control, particularly in the south and the east. NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) now seeks to enforce the rule of law in the south, the first serious attempt to do so since the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

There has been no comprehensive peace agreement assuring the losers that they have a stake in the new Afghanistan. The government’s Programme Takhim Sulha offers amnesty and safe passage home to Taliban living in Pakistan, providing a
reconciliation process of sorts. It attempts to treat the Taliban as a broad coalition of disparate elements rather than a homogeneous grouping of global jihadists, which tends to be the approach taken by coalition forces. The Programme targets what the government calls ‘first-generation’ Taliban, distinguishing them from the ultra-conservatives who are closer to al-Qaeda. However, the overtures to the Taliban have been handled secretly by US and Afghan intelligence agencies, creating suspicion rather than confidence, and have not always been co-ordinated with other strategies.

At the time of writing, there is growing violence in the south and east of the country. The violence stems not only from Taliban but also from warlords who feel that their livelihoods are threatened by ISAF and the extension of the central government’s authority into their fiefdoms.

9.2 Security Sector Reform

Security sector reform, intended to build domestic capacity to ensure security throughout the country, was heralded as the principal strategy for creating the conditions that would enable the withdrawal of international military forces from Afghanistan. SSR became the flagship of the Bonn Process, emanating from the Bonn Agreement of 2001 which provided a framework for the international community to assist Afghans establish a legitimate government.

At a major donor conference in Tokyo in 2002, the Group of 8 (G8) established a five pillar approach to SSR, tying donors into the process by allocating lead nation roles as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SSR pillar</th>
<th>Lead Nation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
<td>US</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
<td>Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>Judicial reform</td>
<td>Italy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Counter-narcotics</td>
<td>UK</td>
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<tr>
<td>Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration / Disarmament of Illegally Armed Groups</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Some progress towards meeting SSR objectives has been made in certain areas, such as reform of the Ministry of Defence and the army, but in other areas progress has been woefully inadequate. According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, opium cultivation increased by 59% in 2006, with the $2.7 billion drugs trade accounting for over a third of the economy. None of the estimated 1,800 illegally armed groups has been disbanded, preventing the state from exercising control over its territory and having a monopoly on the use of force.
The justice sector remains characterised by weak capacity, poor infrastructure, unqualified personnel and rampant corruption. The police are heavily associated with crime and corruption, heightening the sense of insecurity. This is a major challenge that is being addressed, but with only limited resources.

The government is faced with the formidable challenge of having to reform and build its security sector, which is a long-term endeavour, while at the same time having to fight an insurgency. Yet too often members of the international community have put the achievement of targets set in their national capitals ahead of building Afghan capacity.

9.3 Lack of Afghan Ownership of SSR

The lead nation approach undermines the nascent government of Afghanistan in numerous ways, with foreign countries shaping the SSR agenda, determining priorities, controlling virtually all the resources and setting the timeframe. The lack of Afghan ownership and its implications are set out below.

No common vision of security

There is no common understanding and vision of security. Most significantly in this regard, there is no agreement between the government and the international community, nor any consensus within the international community, on the causes of instability and the measures that should be taken to attain stability. At a popular level, Afghans view security and the carrying of weapons quite differently from the international community and sections of government. Fighting and arms are a way of life, required by the high level of insecurity.

The official position measures security in terms of the number of attacks on the international military forces and Afghan security forces rather than in terms of the security and perceptions of citizens. This is particularly problematic as the insurgents seek to drive a wedge between the government and the population by demonstrating that the government cannot protect its people.

Prior to October 2006, when NATO took control of most of the US forces in Afghanistan, the US-led coalition and NATO/ISAF each had its own security plans. The coalition has been conducting internal defence operations and fighting the ‘global war on terror’ while NATO/ISAF has been engaged in peacekeeping. Neither approach was fully co-ordinated with the activities of the Afghan security services.
No Afghan leadership

The lead nation approach has prevented the Afghan government from playing a leading role in crafting security reforms and determining security priorities. For example, the international community has prioritised the disarming of illegally armed groups and the strategy was designed chiefly by Japan and the UN. The government was prepared to go along with this as long as the coalition provided the necessary enforcement support, but the coalition has now withdrawn its offer of support and the government is stuck with a policy it cannot implement.

The illegally armed groups are estimated to number 1,800, none of which disbanded during the period of voluntary disarmament. The government has limited capacity to enforce their dissolution. It is also concerned about destabilising the country, especially in light of the insecurity in the south, since it cannot fill the security and power vacuum that would follow disarmament.

In order to win popular support for the struggle against narcotics, high profile prosecutions are required. These would signal to the Afghan people the resolve and authority of the new government. To take this forward, though, the government needs to be much stronger and to have built a broad consensus on governance and security. This is an essential buffer against the political turmoil that might result from prosecuting senior officials involved in the opium trade.

A non-Afghan model

The lead nations are seeking to implant a Western liberal democratic model on Afghanistan without regard to the circumstances, capacities and traditions of the country. While the semblance of a democratic state has been created through the holding of elections, real democratic trends have yet to take root. As Barnett Rubin notes, the election of representatives is a means to ensuring accountable provision of public services; if the state is incapable of providing those services, however, “elections can lead to kleptocracy rather than democracy, and many Afghans fear that this process is already under way”.\(^\text{23}\)

Corruption is endemic, with no accountability mechanisms in place. Since only eighteen per cent of the financial support given to Afghanistan by donors is controlled by the Afghan government, the donors need to audit their own processes while encouraging the government to do the same. Afghan officials voice concern that international organisations continue to employ people who the government considers to be corrupt and immoral.
In order to obtain resources from the international community, the government was obliged to present an ambitious national development strategy that it is unable to implement. The strategy focuses on disarming militias and eradicating opium at a time when the Afghan security forces cannot provide security to citizens and when people have no alternative livelihoods. The international community is pressurising the President to remove warlords, sometimes destroying the only system of security that works. In the absence of viable official security forces, the resulting power vacuum is filled by criminal elements.

It is only Afghans who can determine the best way of creating and maintaining security in their country. The security forces have an important role to play but politics is more important. It is through political pacts that stability will be achieved. Afghan society is remarkably complex and it is difficult for outsiders to understand how it functions, with arch-enemies becoming allies overnight. The pragmatism of the ‘Afghan Way’ should not be underestimated.

**Questionable resource allocations**

The vast bulk of international funding for Afghanistan has been spent on security operations and the security services. For stability to be achieved, however, people must experience improvements to both their security and their quality of life. There has been little enhancement of the latter. The development community is failing to deliver. This might be due to a lack of funding or a lack of security, or both, but it is also relevant that this community tends to measure progress in terms of disbursing funds rather than attaining development outcomes.

There is no assessment within the national fiscal process of where the resources for security and SSR should be targeted. Instead, each lead nation allocates to its pillar the funds it can raise from its national capital. This has resulted in most of the funds going to the US-led Afghan National Army (ANA). The police service and the justice sector are woefully under-resourced. The US is able to allocate resources to ANA salaries, leading to soldiers being paid substantially more than police. This has generated protests from the police.

Ali Jalali, the former Afghan Minister of Interior, describes the problem as follows:

> Although building the police in post-conflict societies is a more urgent need than the army, little international attention has been paid to the development of the Afghan National Police (ANP). And yet the police have been at the forefront of fighting terrorism, illegal border incursions, the illicit drug trade, warlords and organized crime…. As a result, the ANP has lost far more men than the ANA, Coalition Forces and ISAF in fighting insurgency and criminal activity across the country in the last four years. Had the police been better trained, equipped, and armed, they would have suffered less and made greater contributions to stability operations.24
Financially unsustainable approach
The lead nations are building a sizeable army and police service. ANA force levels are at 27,000 and are expected to reach around 50,000 within two years. Frustrated at Germany’s lack of progress on the police pillar, the US has launched a development programme that aims to deploy a trained, better-paid and fully equipped police force with 62,000 members by the end of 2008.

For the foreseeable future, however, the Afghan government is unlikely to be able to maintain these forces from its resource base. Nevertheless, the US expects it to pay military salaries from the national budget in 2006/2007. According to the World Bank, the ANA cost thirteen per cent of GDP in 2004/2005, with total security spending at seventeen per cent of GDP.25

The lead nations tend to manage the funds for their respective pillars directly or through contractors rather than through the Afghan government. The government is therefore unable to determine a realistic resource allocation for security and defence, let alone for the different components of the security sector, on the basis of current expenditure.

Inadequate linkages between the pillars
There are no effective mechanisms for integrating the different aspects of SSR. Despite general acknowledgement of areas of overlap and the importance of sequencing and co-ordination, the donors tend to work in isolation from each other. This can result, for example, in a particular province being pushed to eradicate poppy fields, disarm militias and remove its police chief all at the same time.

An important study on security reform in Afghanistan observes that while SSR was meant to be a state-building exercise organised in five discrete pillars, these pillars “have often operated as stovepipes – narrowly constraining each SSR initiative, isolating them from effective coordination with related SSR initiatives, and isolating these initiatives from other reconstruction programs”.26 The authors add that “some donors have displayed limited leadership in both the design of their programs and their attempts to solicit and shape the involvement of other states”.27

In a paper on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegation (DDR) in Afghanistan, Simonetta Rossi and Antonio Giustozzi make similar comments:

Reintegration problems were …clearly due to the limitations of the international agencies involved and the lack of proper participation by the Afghan stakeholders, namely local and central government organisations, local communities and NGOs. Co-ordination mechanisms were not established or properly implemented between the international agencies involved in DDR.28
The government’s Office of the National Security Council has been given responsibility for co-ordinating SSR initiatives. It has been trying to generate real Afghan engagement with the security reform process as the international actors have only a token Afghan presence in their SSR activities. The government’s attempts to establish a strategic SSR Co-ordination Committee have not been adequately supported by the international community.

**Insufficient attention to capacity-building**

The lead nations have concentrated on training and professionalising the enforcement elements of the Afghan security services. Insufficient attention has been paid to building the capacity of the civilian and uniformed components responsible for management. Similarly neglected have been the structures and staff responsible for exercising civilian control over the security services and the use of force. Without effective ministries of interior and defence, the government will not be able to deploy its police and military to achieve its objectives.

In addition, some of the lead nations have been providing technical assistance in areas where they do not have the competence, comparative advantage or relevant experience. The justice sector, for instance, is poorly served by Italy, which has far less experience and expertise than the United Kingdom in relation to safety, security and access to justice programmes in post-conflict countries.

There is too much reliance on foreign military officers and former military personnel providing technical assistance. These people have little development experience and are oriented towards solving problems themselves rather than facilitating local participation and developing local capacity. Inappropriately, moreover, the points of reference for their solutions are usually the institutions of their own country. The long-term use of large teams of contractors further inhibits the building of domestic capacity.

**Inadequate support for oversight mechanisms**

As noted previously, the lead nations focus too narrowly on their individual pillars. There is insufficient support for parliamentary and civil society oversight of the security sector and the international community’s involvement in that sector. Without effective oversight mechanisms, Afghan citizens have no means of holding their security services to account and the security services do not have a strong sense of accountability. Nor do citizens have any forums to make their voices heard in order to influence security policy.

**Donor rivalries**

The lead nations guard jealously the relations they have built with particular ministries and often have significantly different policy orientations. The US contributes far more resources than any other donor but has major disagreements with other lead nations.
on the way to approach issues such as counter-narcotics strategies and the development of the police. The disputes and rivalries lead to duplication, friction and the inefficient use of scarce resources. They also reduce the Afghan government’s confidence in the foreign actors and their support.

**Absence of a regional approach**

Certain SSR issues are best addressed within a regional framework and need strong leadership from the Afghan government. The fight against narcotics, for instance, requires interdiction and other intelligence-led activities to identify and remove the intermediate elements in the demand-supply chain, such as the processing plants, the drug-lords and the promoters and facilitators of the narcotics industry. All of this requires the government to engage its neighbours, agree on a regional strategy and set up co-ordination mechanisms. The international community can support but cannot lead co-operation of this kind.

### 9.4 Conclusion

The current international approach to SSR is unlikely to deliver national institutions and security forces capable of maintaining security in Afghanistan. This bodes ill for the people of the country, the authority of the new government and the tenuous processes of achieving stability and consolidating democracy. It also poses a big challenge to the international community, which has based its exit strategy on successful security reform.

Greater progress on SSR requires a fundamentally different relationship between the government and the international community. The government should be in the driving seat and international actors should support rather than lead SSR. The international community should accept a pragmatic, long-term Afghan approach to security reform, which will require substantial international resources managed by the government and monitored by the donors. As Ali Jalali states succinctly:

> The post-Bonn strategy should ensure more Afghan ownership, making the Afghan government the ‘lead nation’ with the donor countries acting as ‘supporting nations’ for Security Sector Reform.²⁹

With the signing of the Afghanistan Compact at the beginning of 2006,³⁰ and the subsequent establishment of the Joint Co-ordination and Monitoring Board co-chaired by the government and the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, there is an opportunity to apply this new approach. The Board and its committees will only be of long-term benefit if they work through national ministries and government agencies rather than establish parallel consultancy groups staffed by foreigners. International support for *Afghan-led* SSR is critical to success.
By Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe

This case study focuses on the governmental Commission responsible for the demobilisation and reintegration of former soldiers in Ethiopia after the fall of the Mengistu dictatorship in 1991. It describes a nationally owned programme that succeeded because of its flexibility, responsiveness and creative use of domestic resources. The donor community lacked this flexibility and responsiveness and was consequently less supportive and helpful than required.

10.1 Context

In May 1991 a coalition of rebel movements overthrew the military dictatorship of Mengistu Haile Mariam who had ruled Ethiopia for seventeen years. In July a national conference involving these movements, opposition parties and civil society organisations was convened in Addis Ababa. The conference discussed and approved the Transitional Charter of Ethiopia, which set out the basic principles and rules of governance for a transitional period of two years. During this period a transitional government would oversee the drafting of a new constitution.

The Charter recognised the need to create professional armed forces that reflected the ethnic diversity of the country. Mengistu's army was patently unsuitable to form the basis of the new military and was disbanded. The transitional government decided that the army of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) would constitute the national army in the transition period and that the new defence force would also include suitable members of the other liberation movements and professionally qualified officers from the previous army.
The transitional government established the Commission for the Demobilization and Rehabilitation of Former Army Members and War Veterans. This body was responsible for demobilising soldiers from the former regime and the liberation forces and for collaborating with the Ministry of Defence in selecting officers for the new defence force.

The demobilisation and reintegration programme covered more than 300,000 ex-servicemen from the former regime; 30,000 war veterans; about 50,000 members of the EPRDF coalition; and roughly 20,000 members of other opposition forces. If these former soldiers were not handled carefully and became disgruntled and hostile, they could pose a significant threat to stability. The Commission’s mission was thus critical to the country’s transition to a peaceful and democratic society.

10.2 The Constraint of Limited Resources

One of the greatest challenges facing the Commission was the problem of chronically insufficient resources in relation to its mandate. It was responsible for planning, managing and supporting the demobilisation and reintegration of over 400,000 people in a very poor country shattered by civil war. The war had led to widespread destruction of infrastructure and had generated a huge number of refugees and internally displaced people who were now returning to their places of origin with literally nothing to enable them to begin a normal life.

Moreover, the transitional government had barely taken office and was far from establishing a basis for generating revenue. The Commission was one of many entities that comprised the national peace and reconstruction endeavour, and had to share the government’s limited resources and capabilities with a range of equally important ventures.

The government was dependent on foreign debt and aid, and the Commission had to compete with other programmes for donor funds. In addition, as discussed below, donors were reluctant to support certain of the rehabilitation and reintegration activities planned by the Commission. This led to delays in implementing some of its projects and to the cancellation of other projects.

10.3 The Problem of Mistrust

At the start of the process, the former members of Mengistu’s army were extremely suspicious of demobilisation as they expected retaliation. The ex-combatants from the liberation forces were also mistrustful. They compared their situation with that of comrades who had been employed by the government or retained in the new army, and felt that they had been used and thrown away. The mistrust impeded demobilisation and reintegration initiatives.
In order to build trust, the Commission put a great deal of effort into explaining to the former soldiers the necessity for demobilisation and the benefits of the reintegration programme. Other strategies included the encouragement of media coverage of reintegration projects and plans; treating the beneficiaries equitably while also trying to accommodate their different needs; and mobilising community support for reintegration activities.

10.4 Domestic Flexibility and Donor Resistance

The Commission had limited organisational capacity at the time of its formation and relied heavily on UNDP and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) for technical assistance in project design. The initial reintegration project document was strongly influenced by their views. The key strategies included the creation of vocational skills training centres; training ex-soldiers in marketable skills; setting up physical rehabilitation centres for disabled veterans; and linking the disabled veterans’ reintegration to their physical rehabilitation.

As the process unfolded, the Commission realised that there were serious problems with these strategies:

- The creation of the envisaged training centres was an overly ambitious undertaking that required disproportionately vast resources and lay beyond the Commission’s capacity. It was also a long-term endeavour that did not meet the immediate needs and urgency of the situation.
- A blanket approach to training everyone in certain trades was not going to be productive. Instead, the skills training had to be tailored to individual circumstances.
- The reintegration of disabled combatants could not await their physical rehabilitation. Building the necessary capacity to rehabilitate such a large number of people was a long-term enterprise that was not feasible and did not meet immediate needs.

In light of these concerns, the Commission adapted the original plans. The vocational training programme was diversified into a range of mini-projects that took account of capacity constraints and utilised existing formal and informal resources and opportunities in a creative manner. In the case of the disabled veterans, a ‘family support strategy’ was adopted to facilitate their reintegration.
These changes were not supported by UNDP and the ILO, which insisted that they had already gone a long way in mobilising international resources for the reintegration plan; revising the plan at this stage could create too many difficulties. When the Commission’s efforts to convince the organisations failed, it decided to proceed with its revisions to the programme and forgo support from the agencies.

10.5 Reorientation of Conscripts

The majority of former soldiers were conscripts who had served in the unpopular ‘national service’ system of the Mengistu government. They resented having been conscripted and their anger was compounded by the way in which the system had been implemented by local authorities. Problems of nepotism, bribery and mismanagement had been rampant. Taking account also of the propaganda to which the conscripts had been subjected, their demobilisation in the absence of satisfactory reorientation posed the danger of widespread violence.

The Commission designed a reorientation programme to address these concerns, explain the scarcity of resources and urge the conscripts to have realistic expectations of reintegration support. Given the limited resources at its disposal, the Commission decided to use existing military training camps for the programme. It informed the conscripts that they would be eligible for support if they reported to the camps and participated in the programme.

Some members of the international community mistakenly viewed this approach as amounting to assembly in concentration camps; others objected on the grounds that it might lead to chaos and riots in the camps. They wanted the reorientation effort to take place in a decentralised fashion after the soldiers had been demobilised and had returned to their communities. When the Commission concluded that the centralised option was less risky and destabilising, the donors failed to provide support to ensure order in the camps. They also pressurised the Commission to shorten the length of the programme and compromise on planned activities.

Despite the pressure from donors and the rough conditions in the camps, the Commission stuck to its work plan and repatriated the ex-soldiers to their communities after the successful completion of the reorientation, registration and screening stages. The soldiers had calmed down considerably by then and appreciated that their plight had been caused by the previous regime and not the transitional government. This success laid the foundation for the reintegration activities that followed.
10.6 Decentralising to Local Level

The massive task of reintegrating several hundred thousand soldiers into civil society required the involvement of many government departments. To this end, the government set up an inter-ministerial task force chaired by the Commission. In order to ensure responsiveness to local conditions and optimal use of local capacities, the functions of the task force were devolved to the lowest administrative level. At this level the committees included community leaders. The Commission outlined a core programme that the committees could adapt according to the situation on the ground.

The further motivation for decentralisation related to the diversity of the beneficiaries of reintegration: they included ex-combatants as well as officers and conscripts from the defeated army, with a mix of urban and rural backgrounds and with different ages, skills and years of service. It was necessary to design diverse projects to meet their needs and this could best be done at the local level within the general parameters set by the Commission.

Reintegration packages for soldiers returning to sedentary farming were given to communities in proportion to the number of returnees they would have to accommodate. The local committees were responsible for distributing the packages and allocating farming land to the soldiers. As expected, the committees’ assessment and management of needs was much closer to reality than anything the Commission could have achieved at a centralised level.

The Commission organised a revolving loan fund for small-scale projects to be undertaken by soldiers returning to urban areas. The fund was managed by the Development Bank of Ethiopia, which had a wide distribution of branches throughout the country. The prospective beneficiaries were invited to organise themselves into groups of seven to fifteen people and submit a project idea. The Bank was expected to help them develop their idea and to finance projects that were feasible.

The Commission and the Bank agreed that the ex-soldiers would not be asked for collateral as the Commission would bear the risk of failure in relation to loan repayment. It was further agreed that the Bank would receive five per cent of the cost of each project in return for its technical support and loan administration.

Hundreds of small-scale projects were financed through this scheme and a significant number of the loans were paid back and recycled. In addition to recycling funds to a greater number of people than would have occurred through one-off grants, the scheme encouraged financial discipline among former combatants who might have squandered cash hand-outs soon after their disbursement.
10.7 Resettlement as a Component of Reintegration

The reintegration of ex-combatants from the EPRDF was especially challenging. Many of them had joined the liberation army at a young age and their experience was limited to combat, soldiering and communal military life. Moreover, most of them came from a war-torn region that offered few opportunities for work. The government viewed their reintegration as a vital issue for the security of the country. It was also critical for the internal stability of the new defence force since the EPRDF combatants now serving in this force were paying close attention to the fate of their demobilised comrades. The region from which most of the demobilised fighters came was a vast and sparsely populated lowland with little development and infrastructure. As a result, the regional authorities wanted to attract and resettle farmers from the overpopulated highlands. In collaboration with the Ministry of Defence, the Commission sought to complement this initiative with a plan to resettle ex-combatants on a voluntary basis. Five thousand former fighters agreed to participate in the scheme.

The donors refused to support the resettlement, arguing that the scheme was not a DDR project but a bid by the Ministry to set up a reserve army. The exception was GTZ, the German development agency, which provided substantial funding that allowed the government to carry out the programme. Roughly 7,500 hectares were cleared by the new settlers with the help of the army, three harvests of cotton were produced and the profits were used to build infrastructure. In the fourth year, land and farming implements were distributed to the settlers and the Ministry was able to end its engagement.

The resettlement programme succeeded in reintegrating the ex-combatants and promoting the development of the area. It laid the foundation for the resettlement of other farmers who were later moved to the region in order to boost the government’s food security efforts.

10.8 Conclusion

The demobilisation and reintegration programme was considered successful not only by the government of Ethiopia. Several international organisations conducted evaluations and reached the same conclusion. The World Bank, USAID and GTZ contracted international consultants to review the programme and they rated it as highly successful. Most importantly, there is no better witness for the programme’s success than the peace and stability that prevailed after the demobilisation of a huge army.
11. GUATEMALA CASE STUDY: INTER-SECTORAL DIALOGUE ON SSR

By Bernardo Arévalo de León

This case study focuses on a series of interventions aimed at promoting and facilitating inter-sectoral dialogue on SSR in the post-conflict setting of Guatemala. The interventions were part of a well designed process that also developed the capacity of civil society actors to advance democratic reform of the security apparatus. The following account provides a brief description of the context; identifies the projects and activities that were part of the process; discusses the outputs and outcomes; and identifies some lessons.

The case highlights the potential of research-based dialogue to overcome resistance to security reform and civil society involvement in that reform.

11.1 Defining the Problem: Promoting SSR in a Post-Conflict Society

In 1999 the Guatemala Programme of the Latin American Faculty for Social Sciences and the Guatemalan Institute for Peace and Development requested the International Peacebuilding Alliance (Interpeace), an organisation that supports local actors in post-conflict societies, to help them develop a dialogue platform that could overcome the stalemate that had arisen in relation to military reform.

One of the Peace Accords of 1996, the Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and the Role of the Military in a Democracy, contains a number of commitments on the transformation of the state security apparatus from its authoritarian and counter-insurgency orientation to a disposition consistent with the values and needs of a democracy. By 1999 it was evident that there were serious gaps in the implementation of this Agreement. As reported by the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA), advances had been in forming the new National Civilian Police but very little progress had been made in transforming the armed forces and the intelligence services.

The stalemate was due to several factors:
The weakness of the civilian political leadership in terms of its capacity to negotiate with the armed forces the design and implementation of the necessary reforms.

Resistance to transformation from the armed forces as a result of misinformation, mistrust and ideology.

The marginalisation of the issue on the public agenda because of a lack of understanding and interest from political parties, government officials and the media.

The weakness of concerned civil society groups in terms of their capacity to influence the agenda on security reform and negotiate substantive proposals with government and political parties.

The promoters of the idea of a national dialogue were convinced that the polarisation and social disarticulation induced by the war, which still permeated public and political debate, precluded a constructive discussion of security transformation through existing channels. There was a need to establish a neutral ‘meeting space’ where such a discussion could take place.

The process was therefore conceived not as a political negotiation between adversaries but as an inclusive research-based dialogue among pro- and anti-reform actors. It would be designed to enable a collective exploration of the nature and mechanisms of state security in a democratic society; encourage the participants to overcome resistance, indifference and technical limitations; and facilitate the building of a new consensus on the aims, principles and methods of security in a democracy.

11.2 The Initial Project: The Role of the Military in a Democratic Society

In association with Interpeace, and with the support of UNDP, USAID and the governments of The Netherlands and Norway, the Guatemalan organisations designed an inclusive policy dialogue that they named ‘Towards a Security Policy for Democracy’ (POLSEDE). The plan was to gather relevant government officials, military officers, civil society organisations, researchers and political activists in a process structured around a political strategy and the methodology of participatory action research.

In order to make the initiative as unthreatening as possible, the dialogue would have several distinctive features: an open agenda, to be defined by the participants; approval of resolutions and proposals by consensus; and the non-binding nature of final recommendations.
When the organisers met with the government officials in charge of implementing the Peace Accords, the officials recognised the potential of the dialogue to support their own efforts, overcome the stalemate and get the issue of military reform onto the political agenda. The government committed itself to full engagement and asked the organisers to meet with representatives of the armed forces. The organisers then had a series of meetings with a high-level military commission, established by the Minister of Defence for this purpose, and highlighted the special features of the dialogue. The commission eventually agreed to participate, after which the organisers invited NGOs, independent experts and political activists to join the initiative.

Between 1999 and 2002 POLSEDE functioned as a neutral forum with the participation of five governmental institutions, including the military; thirteen civil society organisations, including NGOs, universities and research centres; and a group of key personalities that included independent experts, political activists, retired military officers, private sector figures and indigenous leaders.

The organisational structure of POLSEDE comprised three main components:

- a co-ordinating team in charge of general management, facilitating the dialogue process and co-ordinating research;
- a plenary forum that discussed and approved the house rules, the research agenda, the formation of working groups and the final recommendations; and
- six working groups set up to conduct research on the issues identified in the agenda.

Thirteen plenary meetings were held. Institutional representation was regularly at the level of deputy minister or director general in the case of government, and director or co-ordinator in the case of civil society organisations. After agreeing on the goals of the initiative and the house rules, the plenary approved a research agenda with five key issues that would be explored in thematic working groups.

Participation in the working groups was open to all organisational and individual members of the plenary. Each group was assigned a researcher who provided substantive and methodological support to the research process and transcribed the group’s deliberations and decisions into technically sound documents. Over a period of twenty months, each group held an average of 42 sessions, ranging from three-hour meetings to two-day seminars. Reports on their work were regularly discussed by the plenary for validation, guidance and, at the end of the process, final approval.
The research team comprised researchers and experts from national academic institutions, NGOs and government bodies. In addition, international consultants were occasionally hired to meet the needs of the working groups on issues such as intelligence reform, police investigations, etc. The following events, which included foreign experts, were organised in order to acquire thematic expertise and a comparative perspective:

- An International Conference on Military Functions and Democratic Control, comparing military reform processes in Spain, Chile, Argentina and El Salvador from the perspective of military officers, academics and politicians from each country.
- An International Seminar on the Experience of Intelligence Reform and Development of Supervision and Control, with state and civil society experts from Eastern Europe, Spain, Argentina, South Africa, Canada and the US.
- A Basic Course in Defence Policy with experts from Nicaragua, Mexico, Chile, Spain, the Hemispheric Centre for Defence Studies and MINUGUA.
- A Seminar on Security Sector Reform in Impaired Democracies, with experts from Chile, Argentina, Peru, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Spain, the US, Canada, The Netherlands and UNDP.

At the end of the project, the participants were able to reach consensus on recommendations ranging from the principles and methods of democratic security to specific operational proposals for intelligence reform. The twelve documents developed by the working groups and approved by the plenary were then integrated into four composite proposals. The proposals covered the following:

- Framework for consideration of the military question.
- Proposal for the redefinition of the role of the armed forces.
- Proposal for reform of the security system.
- Proposal for reform of the intelligence system.

The composite proposals were published and presented at a public ceremony where the participant institutions and individuals reiterated their commitment to the consensus. The delegates also identified the need for a mechanism to continue inter-sectoral discussion and collaboration on security issues. To this end, they created the Guatemalan Network for Democratic Security comprising four government institutions, twelve NGOs and academic centres, and fifteen individual members. The steering committee was composed of government and civil society representatives. The Network has sustained its activities up to the present day.
11.3 Follow-Up Initiatives

**POLSEC: strengthening public security structures**

As the POLSEDE project was ending, civil society organisations and governmental institutions expressed an interest in applying a similar approach of participative policy dialogue to the area of policing and public security. Although the restructuring of the police and other civilian security services did not have the ideological overtones of military reform, it was nevertheless beset by problems like the absence of a coherent and comprehensive strategy for institutional reform and a lack of thematic expertise on certain issues.

In 2002 the Guatemala Programme of the Latin American Faculty for Social Sciences and the Association for Security in Democracy, together with Interpeace and UNDP, established a forum for intersectoral research and debate on strengthening the civilian security apparatus of the state. Funded by the UN Foundation, USAID and The Netherlands, the forum was named ‘Towards a Citizen Security Policy’ (POLSEC).35

Fourteen state institutions and nineteen civil society organisations were invited to engage in a participatory action research process based on an adaptation of the POLSEDE strategy and structure. The process began with an international seminar offering comparative perspectives on public security. High-level representatives of the participant institutions thereafter met five times at plenary level. They agreed on the house rules and research agenda; formed three working groups that held an average of twenty meetings over twelve months; and approved the final recommendations of the groups.

The recommendations for institutional reform covered the following:

- Proposal for the creation of a Security Ministry.
- Proposal for the establishment of an academy for integrated training of public security personnel.
- Proposal for a community policing strategy.
- Proposal for the restructuring of the Public Prosecutor’s Office.
- Proposal for operational collaboration between the National Civilian Police and the Public Prosecutor’s Office.
- Proposal for the unification of forensic services.

After the public presentation of the proposals in 2003, POLSEC entered into a second phase, which is still underway at the time of writing, supporting municipal authorities in the use of participatory strategies for public security planning and co-ordination.
FOSS: strengthening civil society capacities

POLSEDE demonstrated the positive role that civil society organisations can play in promoting democratic reform of the security sector. It also set up effective channels of communication between these organisations and governmental bodies. Civil society’s capacity to sustain this effort depended on its ability to remain a relevant and useful interlocutor for state institutions responsible for the design, approval and implementation of reforms.

In 2003 Interpeace obtained funding from USAID, the UK and Sweden to strengthen the capacities of NGOs and academic institutions. This initiative was called ‘Strengthening of Civil Society Organisations on Security Issues’ (FOSS). It remains active and has several components:

- The development of strategic plans for the participant organisations to promote democratic security through common goals and activities, and to build their specialisation around specific issues (e.g. community policing, defence budget monitoring, small arms, military reform, etc).
- The establishment of a Programme for Studies in Democratic Security, a small grants scheme that allows participating institutions to strengthen their thematic expertise through research and training.
- Support for the Security Advisory Council, a state board comprising civil society representatives who provide advice on security matters to the President and Vice-President of the Republic. The Council’s formation in 2004 was achieved through a process mediated by Interpeace.
- The creation of a Liaison Office in Congress, through which specialist civil society organisations engage in lobbying and participate in policy making processes by providing technical advice on security oversight and legislation to parliamentary committees and political parties.
- Provision of methodological guidance for the dialogue process launched by the government to prepare a road map for the establishment of a National Security System, and support for the implementation of the road map.

11.4 Outputs and Outcomes

Concrete products

POLSEDE and POLSEC produced policy proposals on a variety of issues. The proposals were prepared by representative working groups and consensually approved by civil society organisations and governmental institutions at plenary level. In order to avoid the acrimonious posturing associated with political negotiations, it was agreed at the outset that the recommendations would not be binding on the parties.
Nevertheless, the consensual nature of the proposals led them to influence SSR directly and indirectly.

For example, the composite proposals that emerged from POLSEDE were assigned the status of official working documents for the dialogue process that the Ministry of Defence convened in 2002 to develop a White Paper on Defence Policy. The proposals on intelligence reform generated by POLSEDE and POLSEC formed the basis for draft legislation on the national intelligence framework and creation of the General Directorate for Civilian Intelligence.

FOSS has achieved intersectoral collaboration in policy formulation processes of the legislature and the executive and in the establishment of democratic security institutions. For example, in 2005 the Liaison Office in Congress co-ordinated a series of seminars and workshops through which civil society groups supported the legislative agenda. These activities were instrumental in the finalisation of legislation creating the General Directorate of Civilian Intelligence and in rejecting authoritarian legislation on youth gangs.

In 2006 the government adopted the proposed framework for constructing a National Security System, previously agreed to by government representatives and civil society organisations at events co-ordinated by FOSS.

In addition to these tangible products, the approach of Interpeace has led to important outcomes with a wider effect on the development of a democratic security sector and culture. These outcomes are discussed below.

**More knowledge, shared understandings**

The participatory action research method of the dialogue processes avoided adversarial negotiations and enabled the participants to pursue a substantive exploration of the technical dimensions of security issues. The intensive nature of the process, the involvement of academic institutions and the guidance of researchers ensured that relevant, up-to-date information was discussed by all the participants and used as the basis for collective decisions.

The consensus style of decision-making facilitated the internalisation of information and the emergence of shared understandings, giving rise to a strong basis for collective action. Initiatives like those of the Liaison Office in Congress and the dialogue process to set up a National Security System recognised the technical capacities acquired by civil society groups and legitimised their role as partners of the state in policy formulation.
Skills and attitudes for dialogue
The intersectoral working groups that engaged in an intensive research-driven process over a significant period of time generated a collaborative spirit among actors that were previously highly mistrustful and resentful of each other. Differences of opinion and personal and organisational apprehensions have not disappeared, but they have been sufficiently transformed that they no longer preclude constructive dialogue and collaborative action.

The cumulative experiences of POLSEDE, POLSEC and FOSS have made interaction between concerned civil society and the governmental authorities responsible for the security sector a productive venture. This has been most evident in the participative dialogue processes convened by the Ministry of Defence, the Secretariat for Strategic Analysis and other government bodies.

Mechanisms for dialogue and social networks: a policy community
The Interpeace approach has facilitated the forging of common goals, shared understandings and improved capacities for dialogue on security issues among a range of actors from different walks of life. As a result, it has fostered the emergence of a dedicated social network. The participants in the dialogue discovered the benefits of intersectoral co-operation and felt a need to establish more permanent mechanisms for contact and collaboration. A new policy community is emerging, committed to public debate on security and to the promotion and adoption of security policies based on democratic principles.

The political, technical and social capacities instilled in key actors through the successive initiatives have greatly strengthened the ability of Guatemalan society to deal with its SSR needs and obstacles in a progressive and effective manner. This is very significant in a national context marked by an incomplete consolidation of democracy and the persistence of authoritarian enclaves, and in an international context characterised by a securitised political agenda and militarised responses to perceptions of insecurity.

11.5 Emerging Lessons
In an environment of unconsolidated democratic institutions, weak political elites and a lack of awareness of the importance of security reform, civil society based initiatives can be instrumental in promoting and keeping SSR on the national agenda.

- Specialist NGOs and academic institutions in Guatemala have become partners of the state to the point that they are now invited to participate in policy formulation processes.
By sustaining interaction across the state-society divide through various projects over several years, pro-reform actors on both sides were able to develop a working relationship. Pro-reform officers formed partnerships with civil society actors, strengthening their hand in overcoming indifference and resistance within the state.

The design of the process as a research endeavour allowed for the gradual emergence of common goals and understandings, and contributed to a more objective and less ideological approach to the issues.

A flexible process-oriented strategy enables responsiveness to changing needs and opportunities and has a cumulative effect through successive activities.

Without follow-up events, the impact of the initial proposals of POLSEDE would have been muted. Some of these proposals found their way into legislation because of the subsequent processes of POLSEC and FOSS.

A sustained engagement allowed the organisers to identify the changing strengths and weaknesses of the participants and take appropriate action. For example, FOSS activities were designed to prevent the conflicts of interest and personality clashes among civil society actors that had became evident during POLSEDE.

As with any endeavour that seeks transformation in uncertain or changing social contexts, each intervention had successes and failures in relation to its objectives. By maintaining their presence and being committed to a process rather than a project, the organisers were able to apply the lessons learned from each experience and refine their strategies accordingly.

Designing and running SSR programmes on the basis of domestic institutional and individual capacities – with external actors providing technical and political support only at the request of local actors – can build local expertise, improve political skills and foster a clear sense of ownership. This greatly enhances the legitimacy, sustainability and impact of products and processes.

The Guatemalan identity of the SSR projects enabled local actors to engage in open discussion on politically sensitive issues. Any perceived foreign interference would have been resisted. For example, the POLSEDE discussions on the operational implications of a democratic security concept helped overcome the resistance of the armed forces to MINUGUA’s call for the fulfilment of the Peace Accord agreement on military re-deployment.
The participants have been willing to commit themselves to the products of a common effort. Democratic security concepts fleshed out during the dialogue have begun to permeate security discourse and laws, and policy proposals have been used as key inputs in policy-making processes.

The research-based nature of the process, focusing on specific themes and sustained over an extended period, served as an on-going training programme that developed the technical and political capacities of local institutional and individual actors and thereby heightened their effectiveness as agents for SSR.
12. LIBERIA CASE STUDY: OUTSOURCING SSR TO FOREIGN COMPANIES

By Adedeji Ebo

This case study considers the critical issue of local ownership in reforming the security sector in Liberia. It describes the main developments over the past three years, identifies lessons and makes recommendations to donors. The SSR process is still underway at the time of writing (September 2006) and it is premature to draw definitive conclusions. Nevertheless, a number of instructive lessons are clearly evident, particularly in relation to foreign companies contracted to do security reform.

The case study illustrates some fundamental principles regarding local ownership of SSR after a period of protracted conflict:

- Local ownership entails donor support for programmes and projects initiated by local actors rather than local support for donor programmes and projects (see section 1.3). Local participation in externally driven initiatives is not synonymous with local *ownership*. Ownership relates to the source of the security vision that is adopted and implemented.
- Security reform after protracted conflict must be transformative if the security services are to regain the trust of the populace. Local ownership as defined above enhances the prospects of successful transformation since it creates the foundation for legitimacy, accountability and sustainability.
- New security structures are not sustainable without a collective vision of national security and a reform process that accommodates competing demands and interests within society. The vision is best defined locally on the basis of domestic initiatives, albeit with external support. If the process is externally driven, the basis for legitimacy is severely undermined.

12.1 Background: The Transitional Phase

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in Accra in August 2003 marked the end of the Liberian civil war and created the framework for reform in the transitional period between 2003 and 2005. Part Four of the CPA is devoted to security sector reform.
The National Transitional Government of Liberia did not undertake a comprehensive security review, but some initial SSR steps were taken. In the defence sector, for example, the Defence Advisory Committee of the Ministry of National Defence held a consultative workshop that recommended the formation of a 6,500 strong force to be known as the Liberian National Defence Force.

The CPA established a transitional parliament that could have overseen security reform and ensured public participation in the process. Parliamentary oversight turned out to be minimal, however. The reasons for this included the legislature’s lack of credibility and limited mandate prior to elections, coupled with the questionable records of certain parliamentarians. Allegations of corruption and malpractice within the parliament were rife and some senior members were suspended for fiscal and administrative improprieties. The transitional assembly was consequently a missed opportunity to lay the basis for effective parliamentary oversight of the security sector after the war.

In August 2005 the Ministry of Justice and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) hosted a National Dialogue on Security Sector Reform in Liberia. The dialogue was facilitated by a group of NGOs, namely the African Security Sector Network, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the Conflict, Security and Development Group at Kings College London.

The dialogue was a significant attempt to establish the foundation for a security review. Broadly representative, it was attended by heads of the security institutions, parliamentarians, civil society representatives, women’s groups, the press and senior UNMIL personnel. The overall goal was to bring voice and accountability to the creation of an inclusive, locally-driven SSR process. The specific objectives were as follows:

- to put the notion of democratic control of the armed forces and other security forces on the pre- and post-election agenda;
- to explore approaches to, and mechanisms for, a collective broad-based vision of security; and
- to contribute to the promotion of local ownership of the post-conflict reconstruction process.
The dialogue also turned out to be a forum for reconciliation, providing “an opportunity to address various entrenched animosities in Liberia between armed struggles and civil disobedience, between reconciliation and justice, between the security forces and the civilian population, and between immediate security needs and long term governance imperatives”. The participants called for a sustained dialogue on the security review process and asserted strongly the importance of local ownership:

While the international community and other external actors may be available and ready to assist, Liberians have the primary responsibility for reform of, not only the security sector, but the entire post-conflict reconstruction process.

12.2 SSR in a Democracy

The inauguration of an elected government in January 2006 marked the start of the next phase of SSR and provided a much awaited opportunity for a comprehensive security review. However, this review and the reform of the security architecture to date have entailed a multiplicity of actors operating in a fragmented manner. The process needs urgently to be co-ordinated and synergized.

Article VII of the CPA provides that “the parties also request that the United States of America play a leading role in organizing this [armed forces] reform programme”. The newly elected Liberian government of President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf upheld this provision, and the US Administration subsequently outsourced major SSR functions to American private security contractors.

Dyncorp International was contracted to restructure and train the military, and is also charged with vetting and recruiting members of the armed forces; Pacific Architects and Engineers is responsible for specialised training, equipment, logistics and base services; and the US State Department administers a $95 million training package. The Pentagon decided that the Liberian army would have 2,000 soldiers. This figure was based on a technical review and projection of what Liberia could sustain financially. It does not reflect a Liberian consensus and is thus contested.

In May 2006 another American private entity, the RAND Corporation, submitted to the Liberian government a commissioned report entitled ‘Making Liberia Safe: Transformation of the National Security Sector’. The Rand team consulted Liberians but did not include any Liberian nationals. The report is not (and does not claim to be) the outcome of a comprehensive security review. Many stakeholders as well as interlocutors like the UN hope that the document “will form the basis of a national dialogue on security sector reform in the country in the coming months”. At the time of writing, a national debate on the RAND report had yet to commence.
As discussed further below, civil society and the legislature have expressed frustration at their marginalisation in SSR developments and have been critical of the lack of information, consultation, transparency and accountability in relation to the SSR activities of external actors.

### 12.3 The Legislature

The Liberian legislature believes that it has not been adequately involved in the SSR process and is therefore unable to perform its oversight function properly. Dyncorp has not acceded to parliament’s request to appear before it. According to a prominent parliamentarian, the standard response has been that such requests should be directed through the US State Department. The only identifiable role of the parliamentary committee on national security has been an inspection visit to military sites, facilitated by the Ministry of Defence.\(^45\)

The marginalisation of parliamentarians in the SSR process might be linked to the precarious position of the ruling party, which has only eight out of the sixty four seats in the House of Representatives and four out of the fifteen seats in the Senate.\(^46\) The impression that certain prominent members of the legislature have questionable records is a carry over from the transitional parliament’s credibility crisis, and might also be contributing to the new parliament’s marginal role in SSR and post-conflict reconstruction more generally.\(^47\)

### 12.4 Civil society

Civil society groups have been unhappy about their lack of involvement in the security reform process and in the work of Dyncorp in particular. According to one civil society leader:

> Civil society has not been involved in any meaningful sense in security sector reform in Liberia. In fact, not only is civil society not involved, there is no public debate on these matters. Dyncorp activities are shrouded in secrecy. We have been trying for almost a year to obtain a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding that resulted in Dyncorp’s appearance in Monrovia but so far we cannot get that document in spite of the high level access we have in government. We are led to believe that since we are not paying for any of these reform undertakings, we cannot participate in the process and we need only be grateful to those who are paying the cost.\(^48\)
Another civil society leader put the problem as follows:

During the early stages of Dyncorp’s operations in Liberia, they attempted to engage civil society regarding their mission. However, some civil society organisations had problems regarding Dyncorp’s past activities in other countries. Hence, some conflict arose, which I believe could have prompted Dyncorp to marginalise civil society organisations.49

Nevertheless, civil society has become increasingly visible and vocal on reform initiatives. In March 2005, for example, a conference of over a hundred groups set up the National Coalition of Civil Society Organizations in Liberia (NACCSOL) in order to “broaden civil society input into the reform process”. 50

In January 2006 the Liberia National Law Enforcement Association (LINLEA), in collaboration with the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), held a conference at which 81 civil society organisations called on government to set up an Independent Technical Advisory Committee on SSR (ITAC) to review the existing recommendations on security reform. They proposed that ITAC comprise three government experts, three experts nominated by civil society and three international experts. The conference resolved further that “the over-reliance on international actors such as RAND and Dyncorp has been frowned upon, and the call for a review of the process is seen as a way forward to get civil society involved in the process with an equal voice”.51

In March 2006 LINLEA and the ICTJ organised a workshop on ‘Civilian Oversight of the Civilian Security Sector’. Thereafter the Working Group on Security Sector Reform was launched with the aim of enhancing civil society input into the SSR process. It comprises representatives of LINLEA, the Foundation for Human Rights, the Centre for Democratic Empowerment, the Liberian Federation of Labour Unions and the Civic Initiative, with the ICTJ as an international consultant.52

According to a LINLEA source, the Working Group was formed because of the government’s inconsistent position on the proposal to set up the ITAC. The government nominated two officials to discuss the proposal with civil society groups but the talks were not fruitful. It was made clear to the groups that “it would be difficult to bow down to civil society’s views because the international community have already developed their own plans and have committed a lot of resources to the process”.53

External funding for SSR has polarised civil society. A number of people feel that some of the external actors have questionable track records and are therefore not suitable to lead the reform process. Others believe that Liberians cannot hold the moral high ground because the US is committing substantial resources to the process and is unlikely to cancel contracts already signed with private security contractors.54
12.5 The Governance Reform Commission as a Driver of Change

The CPA created the Governance Reform Commission (GRC) with a mandate to promote principles of good governance and sound public sector management. The body was retained and invigorated by the elected government, and its new leadership under Professor Amos Sawyer has interpreted its mandate to include SSR. Sawyer has emphasised the importance of “dialogue among various sectors and the process of ensuring that all sectors, including the military, are brought under a common governance framework, as an essential condition for local ownership”.

At the end of April 2006 the GRC hosted a ‘Consultation on SSR with Heads of Security Institutions and Ranking Members of Parliamentary Committees on Defence, Security and Foreign Affairs’. It has since been mandated by the government to review the RAND report and provide policy advice on the evolution of a new security policy for Liberia. It is emerging as the driver of a participatory and democratic security reform process.

The GRC has observed that “the proliferation of initiatives on the security sector may have its drawbacks in terms of pre-empting national consensus and ownership”. It places a premium on Liberian and regional initiatives and has been working closely with the African Security Sector Network, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Ghana and other partners.

12.6 Lessons

It must be stressed that SSR in Liberia is still young and on-going. Hard conclusions are premature but the following lessons are apparent at this early stage of the unfolding process:

- The outsourcing of SSR to foreign private sector companies can undermine local ownership and the legitimacy of the process and its outputs.
- Local actors need to be differentiated as they do not constitute a homogenous set of actors. The concept of local ownership should be deconstructed to expose the multiplicity of local actors, interests and levels of capacity, authority and autonomy.
- It is necessary to distinguish between a state-centred approach to SSR and a society-centred approach, the former being the case in Liberia. The legislature, civil society, the media and professional associations ought to be included in the process.
SSR is focused too narrowly on the police and the military. Other bodies that should be covered by reform programmes include the National Security Agency, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Ministry of National Security, the National Fire Service and the Drug Enforcement Agency. There is an asymmetrical power relationship between local actors and donors. Despite nicely worded policy statements, donors often put themselves in the driving seat of reform, enabled and propelled by their power, finances and political leverage over the partner country. Local actors need to organise, co-ordinate, co-operate and articulate a common national vision in order to engage donors. If domestic actors are not assertive about their security vision and policy preferences, then externally driven initiatives are likely to be adopted by default.

A democratic and democratising security review and reform process can only emerge from a collective national vision of security that is based on locally generated responses to locally generated questions. External actors can facilitate and support this process but they cannot legitimately articulate the partner country’s security vision.

12.7 Recommendations to Donors

- **Begin by supporting a national security dialogue.** In post-conflict situations where there is no common security vision, a national security dialogue is a useful starting point. The dialogue should be consultative and participatory, involving all major stakeholders (e.g. the security institutions, the oversight bodies, the ministries of finance and justice, civil society and the media). It can be facilitated and supported by external actors. Such a process would help to identify drivers of change, facilitate trust and provide opportunities for reconciliation between various stakeholders. Most importantly, it would create the basis for legitimacy.

- **Support the creation of indigenous capacity for security analysis.** Donors should support NGOs, scholarships, bursaries and activities that focus on security analysis, research and policy formulation. This would contribute to building a domestic constituency for more broad-based, better informed and therefore more effective democratic oversight.
• **Ensure adequate mechanisms for oversight of private security companies engaged in SSR.** If donors are serious about accountability, transparency and other democratic principles in the security sector, they must apply these principles to the security companies they contract to do SSR. They must take measures to facilitate oversight of these companies by the partner government, parliament and civil society. This would contribute to local confidence in the companies. Parliament should be informed of the main terms of agreement between the donor government, the partner government and the private security company, and the company should be obliged to report regularly to the relevant parliamentary committees.

• **Develop guidelines for 'good conduct' by foreign security companies contracted by donors to do SSR.** The development of policy and operational guidelines could be initiated and co-ordinated by the OECD Development Assistance Committee.

• **Support the enhancement of parliamentary capacity.** In the interests of democratic governance, donors should support efforts to strengthen parliament’s oversight of the security sector. Relevant programme activities would include training of parliamentary staff; sensitisation and training of parliamentarians through exchange visits and seminars; and other activities that enable lively and productive parliamentary debate.

• **Support decentralisation of the security sector for legitimacy and early warning.** Given Liberia’s highly centralised security architecture, there is a need for considerable decentralisation. A good model in this regard is Sierra Leone, which has created provincial and district security committees (see chapter 13). Decentralised security institutions located in the interior of the country can serve as an early warning mechanism for the government.

12.8 Conclusion

Donors have good intentions and are not unaware of the importance of local ownership. No donor sets out deliberately to confiscate ownership of the reform process. Nevertheless, the unequal power relations between local and external actors, the institutional interests of donor governments and entrenched mindsets of a superiority complex combine to generate reform trajectories that undermine local ownership.

To date, there has been no comprehensive security review based on Liberian initiatives and vision. There are enthusiastic and credible civil society initiatives that have the potential to become the basis for local ownership but they are not yet adequately plugged into the government’s reform framework.
13. SIERRA LEONE CASE STUDY: LOCAL OWNERSHIP OF THE SECURITY SECTOR REVIEW AND TRANSFORMATION PROCESSES

By Brig (rtd) Kellie Conteh

This case study focuses on the comprehensive security sector review and transformation process conducted in Sierra Leone after the end of the civil war that ravaged the nation in the 1990s. The key features of the review were its broad consultation with government bodies and the public, its developmental approach and its close links to the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.

13.1 The Imperative of Security Sector Reform in West Africa

A cursory look at recent developments in West Africa would substantiate the claim that it is one of the world’s most unstable regions. While other areas of Africa have had their share of crises, the challenge of meeting numerous security threats has been particularly arduous in West Africa. The region is still in the throes of uncertainty and instability, even as some notable national efforts and collective responses are being designed and painfully implemented.

The chronic instability is due to a combination of regional dynamics and domestic deficiencies linked to historical and current mismanagement of the military, poor governance and weak state capacities. The high incidence and cost of instability and violence will only be reduced through collective will and sustained endeavours to carry out far-reaching transformation of the security environment across the region and within individual states.

In the majority of West African countries, the past decade has witnessed varying degrees of transition from authoritarian patterns of governance to more participatory systems. Democratisation has led to significant improvements in the daily interactions between the security services and civil society but it has not always resulted in a purposeful and systematic reform of the security sector. In some situations of democratic transformation of the political system, little attention has been paid to much needed reform of the security apparatus.
13.2 Requirements for SSR

On the basis of the Sierra Leone experience, the essential requirements for successful SSR can be said to include the following:

- A clear statement by government on the principles that will guide the management of the security forces.
- A coherent security policy, defined as early as possible in the reform process.
- A policy framework for managing transformation and the relationship between the security forces and the civil authorities.
- A policy environment that is transparent and participatory.
- Accountability of leaders at all levels.
- A reform agenda and process that are locally owned and driven. This is especially relevant where the reform programme is largely funded from external sources.

After establishing the framework and principles, the areas of major reform should include the following:

- Building the capacity of parliamentary oversight committees and other civil management and oversight bodies.
- Managing critical human resource issues confronting the security forces.
- Re-professionalising the security forces. This includes separating civil policing and external defence functions and reorienting the intelligence services to protect the state and its population rather than political elites.
- Preparing the security forces for new roles and tasks.

These are not freestanding activities on an SSR 'to do' list but must be embedded in a wider framework of democratic governance. In order to ensure legitimacy and address underlying societal rifts, reform processes must be participative, inclusive and responsive to the needs of the population. It is also important that efforts are sustainable, long-term and geared towards building the capacity of security actors and their oversight bodies. The principles of local ownership and sustainability are critical where the international community is involved and able to impose external views and approaches.
13.3 The Rationale for a Security Sector Review in Sierra Leone

Over a period of twelve years Sierra Leone and its people experienced the devastating and tragic consequences of failures in its security services. Since the end of hostilities in 2001, the government and its international partners have worked to secure peace, disarm combatants and rebuild governmental institutions and the shattered remnants of the security sector.

The presence of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), with its 17,000 troops, helped to provide the time and space to begin reconstructing the security forces and their governance structures. There are on-going development and capacity-building programmes directed at the justice sector, the police, the armed forces, the Ministry of Defence, the Office of National Security and other governance bodies.

Against the backdrop of UNAMSIL’s planned withdrawal by the end of 2004, and recognising the need to address the long term security of Sierra Leone and its people, the government initiated a security sector review. After a few years of sometimes uncoordinated reform, it was necessary to take stock of progress and validate an SSR strategy.

It was also relevant that the report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was expected at this time, and its recommendations were to be fed into the review process. In addition, the outcome of the security review would contribute to the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) being prepared by the government to inform its development policies and secure much needed debt relief. A key objective of the PRSP process was to make difficult choices about the use of scarce resources.

The security sector is large and costly. While no-one would want to put the country and its people at risk by under-funding the sector, it had to compete for a share of the budget with other priority sectors like health and education. This meant ensuring that what was spent on security provided value for money. The security review was intended to answer questions such as: are resources allocated in the right way? Do we need to spend more on one part of the sector and less on others? Are we utilising the resources efficiently and effectively?
Perhaps the most compelling reason for the security review was obvious to everyone who had lived through the horrors of the war: security is the foundation for development. Development can only succeed where a country is secure within its borders and its people are free from fear and violence. To achieve this, the security services have to be efficient, appropriate and affordable. This was a primary aim of the review.

13.4 Setting up the Security Review

President Kabbah commissioned the security review in order to evaluate the threats to progress in Sierra Leone as it recovered from war and to design a co-ordinated national security structure informed by a robust national security policy. The review consequently had the following objectives:

- To evaluate the main threats to the political, social and economic development of Sierra Leone as UNAMSIL withdrew.
- To identify relevant institutions to counter these threats.
- To develop appropriate and affordable strategies to combat the threats.

The President directed the Vice-President to oversee the review, which was led by the National Security Co-ordinator on behalf of the National Security Council. A secretariat from the Office of National Security (ONS) managed the process. It was supported by the UK government’s Department for International Development (DFID) and Defence Advisory Team, which provided in-country advice to launch the process and thereafter continued to advise the ONS. The secretariat formed a Working Group comprising key stakeholders from civil society and government ministries and departments.

The Terms of Reference outlined the necessity for SSR and the requirements of the review, including consultation with the widest possible range of stakeholders in government and civil society. The Terms of Reference guided the Working Group and were of interest to the media, which were encouraged to monitor and report progress, generate public interest, participate in the debate and evaluate the outcomes.

The stakeholders with whom consultation was sought included governance and oversight mechanisms, including parliamentary committees and executive bodies like the National Security Council; the ONS and the Central Intelligence and Security Unit; government departments such as Internal Affairs, Justice, Defence, Foreign Affairs and Finance; the military, the police, prisons, customs and immigration authorities; the judicial system, including the Anti-Corruption Commission; the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; and civil society organisations.
13.5 Process

The review entailed the following main steps:

- the development of a strategic vision for Sierra Leone;
- an identification and assessment of threats to this vision;
- a review of the national policy framework;
- an evaluation of security and intelligence agencies, ministries and departments in terms of the gaps between their existing capabilities and their required capabilities; and
- transformation strategies and recommendations for the future.

The Working Group conducted a series of workshops in the three provinces and Western Area of Sierra Leone. The participants were drawn from all the districts and included civil servants, local administrators, traditional rulers, representatives of students’ and teachers’ bodies and members of other civil society groups. The aims were to share information, engage in dialogue, generate options, achieve consensus and refine outcomes.

The views expressed at the workshops were collated and the following emerged as the people’s vision for Sierra Leone:

- good governance;
- improved revenue generation and control of resources;
- improved social services;
- improved political will;
- quality education;
- developed agriculture; and
- improved infrastructure/communication.

The threats to this vision were identified as follows:

- lack of political will;
- institutionalised corruption;
- lawlessness/indiscipline;
- subversion/coups;
- bad governance; and
- uncontrolled immigration.
The Working Group then convened a series of workshops to develop a security policy framework. The workshops identified options for building institutional capabilities to counter the threats; considered the overall security architecture required to curb the threats; identified where co-ordination was required between the institutions; and explored how best to achieve that co-ordination. It was also agreed that effective mechanisms should be put in place for appropriate oversight and governance of the security sector.

Change management principles were formulated in light of the vision, threat analysis and policy framework, and different organisational designs and costings were evaluated. The results were used to prepare plans for restructuring and strengthening the bodies that comprise the security sector.

13.6 Outcomes

In addition to focusing on ways to improve co-ordination between the security and intelligence organisations, the review recommended expanding the statutory members of the National Security Council’s Co-ordinating Group to include state actors that were not traditionally involved in security matters. This was intended to enhance oversight and governance of the security sector.

Most significantly, the review provided a platform for considering security as a development issue. The assumption was that the review’s findings and proposals would contribute to the government’s central objective of reducing poverty through the implementation of the PRSP. The government’s strategy for poverty reduction had to recognise that sustainable development could not be obtained without a safe enabling environment. The government consequently had to have in place a security apparatus capable of protecting the people and the state once UNAMSIL and other foreign security support withdrew or downsized. The review and the PRSP were thus integrally linked.

The inextricable connections between governance, security and development were captured in the following passage from the PRSP of April 2005:

Good governance, consolidated peace and a strengthened security sector are key elements of the enabling environment for delivery of services for attainment of food security, creation of employment opportunities, human development and economic growth.

The formal outcome of the review was the Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme, based on a series of inter-agency consultative meetings involving the relevant ministries, departments and agencies. The Governance Reform Secretariat,
the Development Assistance Co-ordination Office and UNAMSIL provided support to develop a comprehensive and prioritised implementation framework.

The aim of the SSR Programme is to transform and improve the institutional capacity of security sector ministries, departments and agencies through the following strategies:

- policy and legislative reform;
- training of personnel;
- provision of adequate logistics;
- establishment of effective inter-agency partnerships;
- effective oversight mechanisms;
- rehabilitation and reconstruction of facilities;
- community ownership and participation in security related matters (via provincial and district security committees);
- curbing cross-border smuggling and illegal trafficking;
- conflict prevention; and
- poverty reduction through the creation of an enabling environment for post-conflict economic recovery and sustainable development.

The Programme is thus consistent with the government’s priority of poverty reduction, the PRSP and the country’s transition from a post-conflict reconstruction phase to an era of mainstream development.

13.7 Conclusion

The long-term benefits of the security review and transformation processes are expected to include better trained and more professional armed forces; the establishment of a Ministry of Defence under joint civilian and military management; impetus to the achievements of the ONS and the Central Intelligence and Security Unit; a professional and well-motivated police force; and enhancement of the output and efficiency of the bodies that constitute the security sector.

Nevertheless, stakeholders have expressed concern about three issues in particular: funding and sustainability of the SSR programme; effective monitoring and oversight mechanisms; and local ownership of the reform and transformation processes.

The UK government has made a significant contribution to SSR through the provision of personnel, equipment and cash. It is uncertain whether the government of Sierra Leone will be able to sustain the capacity and standards that have been achieved with this support. The funding gap that will arise when British and other donor assistance is
exhausted might have a knock-on effect on other reform processes unless there is a clear plan to deal with the problem.

There is cause for concern about the quality of oversight. Institutions such as parliamentary committees do not yet have a robust capacity to maintain oversight as they are inexperienced, under-funded and lacking in practice. The importance of this is heightened by the creation of state security and intelligence structures such as the Office of National Security which, if not properly managed, could fall prey to misuse.

Finally, it must be noted that the long term success of security reform efforts in Sierra Leone will depend on an improvement in the overall governance environment, improved co-ordination of SSR activities, and public confidence in the security sector.
14. SOUTH AFRICAN CASE STUDY: INCLUSIVE SSR DESIGN AND THE WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE

By Laurie Nathan

The South African White Paper on Defence of 1996 is an example of a well-designed and consultative SSR initiative. The following account focuses on the drafting, consultation and decision-making components of the design process. It comments briefly on the Defence Review that followed the White Paper and concludes by identifying some lessons that might be relevant to other situations.

14.1 Mandate, Principles and Aims

Shortly after South Africa’s first democratic election in 1994, the Deputy Minister of Defence initiated the process of developing a White Paper. He appointed a chief drafter, established a drafting committee and approved its terms of reference. The terms of reference included the design and management of the consultation and decision-making processes.

The drafting committee comprised senior members of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and the newly formed civilian Defence Secretariat. The chief drafter was a researcher and policy activist who enjoyed the confidence of the Deputy Minister. For the purpose of the White Paper, he reported directly to the Deputy Minister.

The drafter began by preparing a set of principles on ‘defence in a democracy’, an earlier version of which had already been approved by the new ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC). Once endorsed by the Deputy Minister, the principles constituted the overarching vision and political mandate for the White Paper.

The aims of the White Paper were defined as follows:
• To bring defence policy into line with the new Constitution and democratic
dispensation, the post-apartheid security environment and the priorities of
the Mandela government.
• To provide a high level policy platform for a Defence Review, a new Defence
Act and departmental programmes for transforming the Defence Force.
• To forge a national consensus on defence policy and thereby confer legitimacy
on the policy and the SANDF.
• To inform citizens and other governments of Pretoria’s new defence policy.
• To serve as a confidence-building measure in Southern Africa.

14.2 First Draft and Internal Consultations

Following the Deputy Minister’s approval of the principles and chapter breakdown, the
chief drafter wrote the first version of the White Paper. The drafting committee
comprising senior officers and civil servants discussed the document on the basis of
their functional positions, technical expertise and mandates. They obtained their
mandates and instructions from their immediate principals (e.g. chief of the navy, chief
of the army, chief of operations, etc).

The committee maintained a detailed record of its meetings, decisions, consultations
and feedback. It paid particular attention to recording its reasons for rejecting proposals
from senior officials and, later, from the parliamentary defence committee. The Deputy
Minister received regular reports from the committee and provided guidance to the
chief drafter on contentious issues.

In the nature of South Africa’s negotiated settlement, the drafting process was
characterised by strong differences of opinion on many topics (e.g. transparency,
regional security, military doctrine, affirmative action, arms exports, etc). The drafting
committee was expected to resolve these disputes on the basis of the Constitution,
the principles of ‘defence in a democracy’, and speeches by the Minister of Defence
and the President. Where the committee was unable to reach consensus, the matter
was referred to the Deputy Minister or the Minister for a decision.

In this fashion the first version of the White Paper went through several iterations
before being approved by the Chief of Defence Force, the Secretary for Defence and
the Deputy Minister.
14.3 Public Consultation

In June 1995 the Minister tabled the draft White Paper in Parliament and called for public comment. He published adverts in daily newspapers inviting feedback from interested parties. Responses were received from soldiers, officers, veterans, the defence industry, defence analysts, environmental groups, political parties, religious bodies and anti-militarist and human rights organisations. The consultation was intended to enhance the quality of the White Paper and contribute to building a national consensus on defence.

On the basis of the submissions, the drafting committee amended and added to the White Paper. Here too major disagreements were referred to the Deputy Minister and the Minister. The ministers dealt with the disputes in various ways: they solicited the opinion of experts (e.g. constitutional lawyers and the International Committee of the Red Cross); presided over departmental debates; convened public seminars; referred matters to the parliamentary defence committee; and issued rulings.

The drafting committee benefited greatly from its own discussions with governmental and non-governmental experts. By way of example, international experts on non-offensive defence influenced the South African position on military doctrine and posture; local and foreign human rights organisations influenced the policy on arms exports; US military officers provided useful guidance on affirmative action and equal opportunity; the International Committee of the Red Cross provided advice on international law; and local NGOs shaped the White Paper’s chapter on land and the environment.

The consultation process culminated in the next draft of the White Paper, which was approved by the Deputy Minister, the Chief of the SANDF and the Secretary for Defence.

14.4 The Parliamentary Defence Committee

In late 1995 the Minister presented the revised White Paper to the parliamentary defence committee. Over a period of several weeks, the chief drafter took the committee through the document section by section, explaining the rationale for its provisions, answering questions and recording the amendments proposed by the MPs. Some of the political parties asked the drafter and technical experts to brief and assist their parliamentary caucuses.

Given the ruling party’s commitment to national reconciliation, the ANC chairperson of the defence committee consistently behaved in a non-partisan fashion. Whenever contentious issues arose, he sought to forge a multi-party consensus rather than rely on the ANC’s majority in the committee. There were numerous angry exchanges but
the committee failed to reach consensus and was obliged to go to a vote in only one instance (relating to the official language of the Defence Force).

14.5 Final Approvals

In January 1996 the Minister published the next version of the White Paper, which incorporated the views of the parliamentary committee. The draft released in March included the Minister’s response to these views as well as new submissions from the Department of Defence. The April draft included further comments from the parliamentary committee. In May the penultimate version was presented to Cabinet, which made several amendments to the document.

In the political struggles around these and earlier drafts of the White Paper, the ministers sought to maintain a balance between different and sometimes conflicting imperatives. They had to ensure that the document was technically sound from a military perspective; conformed to constitutional principles; captured the values and priorities of the new government; honoured the government’s commitment to national reconciliation; and enjoyed the support of senior officers, the majority of whom were apartheid-era officials.

In May 1996 the Minister tabled the final version of the White Paper for debate and approval by Parliament. As a result of the extensive consultation and the non-partisan approach adopted by the Minister and the chairperson of the parliamentary defence committee, all the political parties in Parliament voted to approve the White Paper without amendment. Every party stated that the Minister had attained a national consensus on defence.

14.6 The Defence Review

The transformation agenda contained in the White Paper was so far-reaching in its scope and orientation that it required more detailed planning and a comprehensive review of the SANDF. In June 1996 the Minister launched the Defence Review, which aimed to determine, in sufficient detail for operational and budgetary purposes, South Africa’s military doctrine, posture, structure and materiel requirements over the next decade.

During the drafting of the White Paper, the Minister had not been fully convinced of the utility of public consultation, believing it to be something of a waste of time and money. Yet the consultations had proven to be extremely beneficial and had earned the Minister much praise in Parliament. He therefore set up Defence Review working committees that comprised MPs and civil society analysts as well as senior officers and civil
servants. He also convened provincial workshops and two national consultative conferences that drew interested parties ranging from the defence industry to pacifists.

Parliamentarians and civil society groups were again influential on many issues but their limitations were cruelly exposed during the critical discussion on force design. This topic was technically too abstruse for laypeople without military expertise. There was consequently little informed debate around the offensive force design recommended by the SANDF. Parliamentary approval of this force design led to a controversial arms acquisition programme that included the purchase of warships and combat aircraft at a cost of over US$5 billion. The acquisition programme was inconsistent with the White Paper’s emphasis on a non-offensive defence posture and its pledge to contain military spending in favour of socio-economic development.

14.7 Lessons

The preparation and finalisation of the White Paper were time-consuming, complicated and frequently adversarial because of the number of actors involved in the consultation and decision-making processes and because the interests and values of these actors were often diametrically opposed. Nevertheless, the effort bore dividends: the White Paper enjoyed public acclaim; it marked a decisive break with apartheid-era defence policy; it conferred legitimacy on the SANDF; it was supported by all political parties; and it provided the platform for transforming the armed forces and civil-military relations over the next decade.

The positive results were partly due to a favourable environment that included a relatively strong state, democratic system and civil society. In the same environment, however, the White Paper on Intelligence of 1994 had no significant short- or long-term impact. It contains a fine set of principles, emphasising human security and democratic norms, but it has not contributed to the transformation of the intelligence services.

The different impacts of the defence and intelligence white papers in the same context highlight the importance of leadership, good process and public engagement. Five differences stand out in this regard:

- Whereas the defence paper contains viable policies, the intelligence paper does not progress much beyond principles, values and norms. It does not provide sufficient guidance on objectives and strategies and is thus too abstract for implementation.
The defence paper was drafted by a team of officials, involved numerous decision-makers at departmental level and resulted in a collectively acceptable resolution of conflicting interests and values. The intelligence paper, on the other hand, was prepared by a single drafter with little departmental debate and the intelligence services consequently had no sense of ownership.

The drafting and subsequent implementation of the defence paper were championed and overseen by the Deputy Minister for Defence. At that time there was no post of Minister for Intelligence, the portfolio being held by the Minister for Justice who paid little attention to the intelligence community. The Deputy Minister for Intelligence was preoccupied with the integration of apartheid and ANC intelligence services at the expense of developing an agenda for transformation.

Whereas the defence paper was subject to extensive public and parliamentary scrutiny and debate, the intelligence paper was published without any public and parliamentary engagement.

In the 1990s a range of progressive civil society organisations, many of them with specialist expertise, were involved in policy research and advocacy on defence matters. By contrast, civil society was largely silent on intelligence, tacitly viewing it as lying outside the realm of public debate. In early 2006 South Africa was rocked by an intelligence crisis that finally provoked a public debate on methods, control and oversight.

The experience of defence transformation in South Africa illustrates that major SSR is a protracted endeavour. In the relatively favourable circumstances of South Africa, the official pillars of defence transformation – the Defence White Paper (1996), the Defence Review (1998) and the Defence Act (2002) – took eight years to erect. In the less favourable conditions of other post-conflict countries, the construction of the transformation edifice could take much longer. Donors that push for rapid results compromise the quality and legitimacy of the outcomes and undermine the democratic process.
NOTES


2 On DFID’s programmatic focus on SSR, see DFID, Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform, Department for International Development, London, 2004.


4 For rich collections of SSR material, see the websites of the Bonn International Centre for Conversion (www.bicc.de); the Centre for Defence Studies, Kings College London (http://cds.ipi.kcl.ac.uk); the Centre for International and Security Studies, York University (http://ssr.yciss.yorku.ca); the Centre for Security Sector Management, Cranfield University (www.ssronline.org); the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (www.dcaf.ch); the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria (www.iss.co.za); and the UN International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (www.un-instraw.org).

5 This experience is summarised in the Bio at the end of the book. I am grateful to the following people for extremely useful feedback on earlier drafts: Bernado Arévalo de León (UNDP); Nicole Ball (Centre for International Policy); Alan Bryden and Adedeji Ebo (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces); Mark Downes (OECD DAC); Eboe Hutchful (African Security Sector Network); and Graham Thompson and Julia Compton (DFID). I also benefited from feedback on work-in-progress presented at DFID seminars on 18 January and 14 June 2006.


9 OECD DAC, Security System Reform and Governance, pg.11.


11 The website of INSTRAW, www.un-instraw.org, has a special focus on gender and SSR.

12 The defence white paper can be viewed at www.dod.mil.za/documents/documents.htm; the intelligence white paper can be viewed at


19 This list of problems was raised with the author by DFID officials in June 2006.

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The Afghanistan Compact, launched at the London Conference in late January 2006, provides a framework for continued international support over a five-year period to assist the Afghan government meet specific benchmarks in security, governance and development.  
Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe was a liberation fighter in the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front and served on its Central Committee for twelve years. Between 1991 and 1997 he headed the Commission responsible for demobilisation. He was an elected member of the constituent assembly that ratified the new constitution in 1995 and has served on the boards of public enterprises. He has an MBA from the Open University of London and an MPA from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He is a lecturer at Addis Ababa University and a consultant on peace and security (mgeberhiwit@yahoo.com).  
Bernardo Arévalo de León is a Guatemalan diplomat and social scientist. His previous posts include Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador to Spain. He is currently Director of the UNDP/Interpeace Joint Program Unit for Participatory Strategies for Peacebuilding and Development. He has been involved in SSR dialogue processes since 1999 and has published several books and articles on civil-military relations and security reform. He serves on the Steering Committee of the Latin American Security Network and the Advisory Council of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.  
For information about Interpeace (previously WSP International), see www.interpeace.org.  
The acronym POLSEDE derives from the Spanish Hacia una Política de Seguridad para la Democracia.
35 The acronym POLSEC derives from the Spanish Hacia una Política de Seguridad Ciudadana.
36 The acronym FOSS derives from the Spanish Fortalecimiento de Organizaciones Sociales Especializadas en Seguridad.
37 Dr Adedeji Ebo is a Senior Fellow and Co-ordinator of the Africa Working Group at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. He was previously Associate Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science and Defence Studies at the Nigerian Defence Academy.
45 Author’s interview with member of the Standing Committee on National Security, House of Representatives, 31 August 2006.
46 Jaye, ‘President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf’, pg. 3.
48 Author’s correspondence with civil society source, 26 July 2006.
49 Author’s correspondence with civil society source, 27 July 2006.
50 Author’s interview with member of LINLEA, 29 August 2006.
52 Author’s interview with member of LINLEA, 29 August 2006.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
Professor Sawyer, the former Interim President of Liberia, spearheaded the consultative constitution drafting process. He argues that reforms must be achieved through a broad participatory process and must draw on local knowledge. See Jaye, ‘President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf’, pg. 22; and Amos Sawyer, Toward Democratic Governance in Liberia, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 2005.

GRC press release issued on 4 April 2006.

Ibid.


Brig (rtd) Kellie Conteh is the National Security Co-ordinator in Sierra Leone. In 1995 he retired from military service, having attained the position of Force Commander of the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces. In 2000 he was recalled to government service and led the security sector review described in this case study.


Laurie Nathan was the drafter of the White Paper on Defence. Further biographic details appear at the end of this book.

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Laurie Nathan is a Visiting Research Fellow with the Crisis States Research Centre at the London School of Economics and a Research Associate in the Department of Environmental and Geographical Sciences at the University of Cape Town (UCT). Between 1992 and 2003 he was Executive Director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution at UCT. In this period the Centre was involved in programmes to transform prisons, the police, the military and the intelligence services in South Africa.


Between 1995 and 2002 he served on the Civic Education Monitoring and Advisory Committee of the Department of Defence. In 2006 the Minister for Intelligence appointed him to serve on the Technical Committee and the Steering Committee of the Civic Education Programme for the civilian intelligence services in South Africa.

In 1994 Laurie was appointed by President Mandela to serve on the Cameron Commission of Inquiry into Arms Trade. In 2001 he was commissioned by the parliamentary defence committee to redraft the National Conventional Arms Control Bill, and commissioned by the Department of Defence to redraft the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines Bill.

He has served on the Editorial Advisory Board of the *South African Journal of International Affairs*; the Editorial Committee of *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*; the Carter Centre’s International Council for Conflict Resolution; the Advisory Committee of the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch; the Expert Advisory Group of the UNDP Democratic Governance Practice Network; and the Critical Review Panel of the *Implementation Framework for Security System Reform*, OECD DAC (forthcoming).
In 1999-2000 Laurie was an adviser to the Foreign Minister of Swaziland in his capacity as the Chair of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee in Southern Africa. Laurie was the principal drafter of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (2001).

In late 2005 Laurie was an adviser to the Palestinian security services and the Ward Mission on the preparation of a Palestinian White Paper on Safety and Security. In the first quarter of 2006 he was a member of the African Union mediation team that facilitated negotiations on the Darfur conflict. In 2006 he was appointed to serve on the Ministerial Review Commission on Intelligence, established by the South African Minister for Intelligence.
IMAGE ACKNOWLEDGMENTS AND CAPTIONS

Cover and page 50: Cape Town, South Africa, 21 May 2004. President Mbeki takes the national salute on arriving at Parliament to present his State of the Nation address. © Eric Miller / Galbe.Com


Page 17: Kigali, Rwanda, 8 November 2002. Major General James Kabarebe, Rwandan army chief-of-staff, salutes the national anthem in Parliament during a ceremony at which the new Constitution is presented. © Marco Longari / Galbe.Com


Page 36: Mvurwi, Zimbabwe, February 2002. Members of the Zanu PF youth brigade perform their drill at a rally for President Robert Mugabe. The ruling party has used the youth brigade as a reserve army and instrument of repression. © Daniel Gopal / Galbe.Com


Page 68: Kisangani, Democratic Republic of Congo, 23 March 2006. United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan receives a poster commemorating eight Guatemalan peacekeepers who died while serving with the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. © Eskinder Debebe / UN Photo

Page 79: Monrovia, Liberia, 30 January 2007. An all-women police unit from India arrives in Liberia to join the UN peacekeeping force. © Andre Ramasore / Galbe.Com


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