Religions and Development
Research Programme

Religions and Development in Tanzania: a Preliminary Literature Review

Edited by Amos Mhina
Philosophy Unit, University of Dar es Salaam
Country Coordinator, Religions and Development Research Programme

The Religions and Development Research Programme Consortium is an international research partnership that is exploring the relationships between several major world religions, development in low-income countries and poverty reduction. The programme is comprised of a series of comparative research projects that are addressing the following questions:

- How do religious values and beliefs drive the actions and interactions of individuals and faith-based organisations?
- How do religious values and beliefs and religious organisations influence the relationships between states and societies?
- In what ways do faith communities interact with development actors and what are the outcomes with respect to the achievement of development goals?

The research aims to provide knowledge and tools to enable dialogue between development partners and contribute to the achievement of development goals. We believe that our role as researchers is not to make judgements about the truth or desirability of particular values or beliefs, nor is it to urge a greater or lesser role for religion in achieving development objectives. Instead, our aim is to produce systematic and reliable knowledge and better understanding of the social world.

The research focuses on four countries (India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania), enabling the research team to study most of the major world religions: Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism, Buddhism and African traditional belief systems. The research projects will compare two or more of the focus countries, regions within the countries, different religious traditions and selected development activities and policies.

The consortium consists of six research partner organisations, each of which is working with other researchers in the four focus countries:

- University of Birmingham, UK: International Development Department, Department of Theology and Religion, Centre for West African Studies, Centre for the Study of Global Ethics.
- University of Bath, UK: Centre for Development Studies.
- Indian Institute of Dalit Studies, New Delhi.
- University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
- Lahore University of Management Sciences, Pakistan.

In addition to the research partners, links have been forged with non-academic and non-government bodies, including Islamic Relief.

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# Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>acquired-immune deficiency syndrome</td>
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<tr>
<td>AKDN</td>
<td>Aga Khan Development Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMNUT</td>
<td>All Muslim Union of Tanganyika</td>
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<td>ATR</td>
<td>African traditional religions</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAKWATA</td>
<td>Baraza Kuu la Waislam Tanzania</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARITAS</td>
<td>Latin word meaning “charity”</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>community-based organization</td>
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<td>CCT</td>
<td>Christian Council of Tanzania</td>
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<td>CPT</td>
<td>Christian Professionals of Tanzania</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>civil society organization</td>
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<td>CSRP</td>
<td>Civil Service Reform Programme</td>
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<td>CSSC</td>
<td>Christian Social Services Commission</td>
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<td>DDH</td>
<td>designated district hospitals</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>EAMWS</td>
<td>East African Muslim Welfare Society</td>
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<td>Ed-SDP</td>
<td>Education Sector Development Programme</td>
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<td>ELCT</td>
<td>Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanzania</td>
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<td>FBOs</td>
<td>faith-based organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>GADP</td>
<td>Government Accounts Development Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>human immune virus/ acquired immune deficiency syndrome</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBDP</td>
<td>Interim Budget Development Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>information technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGRP</td>
<td>Local Government Reform Programme</td>
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<td>LSRP</td>
<td>Legal Sector Reform Programme</td>
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<td>LWF</td>
<td>Lutheran World Federation</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<tr>
<td>NACSAP</td>
<td>National Anti-corruption Strategy and Action Plan</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>NPO</td>
<td>non-profit organization</td>
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<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organization of Islamic Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCB</td>
<td>Prevention of Corruption Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>PER</td>
<td>Public Expenditure Review</td>
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<td>PFMRP</td>
<td>Public Financial Management Reform Programme</td>
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<td>PSRP</td>
<td>Public Sector Reform Programme</td>
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<td>RaD</td>
<td>Religions and Development Research Programme</td>
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<td>REDET</td>
<td>Research and Education on Democracy in Tanzania</td>
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<td>TANU</td>
<td>Tanganyika African National Union</td>
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<td>TCRS</td>
<td>Tanzania Christian Refugee Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEC</td>
<td>Tanzania Episcopal Conference</td>
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<td>TEMCO</td>
<td>Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee</td>
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<td>URT</td>
<td>United Republic of Tanzania</td>
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<td>WCRP</td>
<td>World Conference on Religions and Peace</td>
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<td>WFDD</td>
<td>World Faiths Development Dialogue</td>
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<td>WIPAHS</td>
<td>World Islamic Propagation and Humanitarian Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>YMCA</td>
<td>Young Men’s Christian Association</td>
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1 General introduction - Amos Mhina

In this introduction I provide a background to studies on the position of religions in Tanzania and their contributions to development efforts. Traditionally, the role of religion in development has been viewed as both important and non-problematic. The colonial state generally regarded Christianity, and to a lesser extent Islam, as allies in the modernization process: after all, religious groups provided important services, such as education and health, and pacified colonial subjects by urging them to seek spiritual and material self improvement. The post-colonial state also supported religious organizations: it saw them as development partners that silently provided services to citizens, especially in areas the state was unable to reach.

More recently, however, tensions have surfaced between the state and religious groups in Tanzania. These occurred when the latter started to speak out and engage in advocacy on behalf of the disadvantaged or, in some cases, agitated on behalf of their adherents. State–religion relations have not only become strained, but, as denominations move beyond the traditional role of social service provision, our understanding of the role of religion in development has also become more complex. The Religions and Development Research Programme (RaD) has been set up to undertake a comprehensive study of the contemporary role of religions in development. Its research themes include:

- the relationship between religious values and beliefs and development concepts and practice;
- faiths, governance and development;
- values, religion and public sector reform; and
- faith-based organizations and development activities.

In this introduction I identify some key aspects of recent relationships between the Tanzanian state and faith traditions in the country. This is to provide a context for the papers that follow and to demonstrate the timeliness of the proposed research – state-religious and inter- and intra-religious conflicts; discussion of development priorities and policies; and inequality related to religious affiliation.

The research now under way will allow an in-depth examination of the role of religion in the development of contemporary Tanzania, especially in the light of the recent inter- and intra-religious conflicts that seem to have stolen the limelight. These conflicts are captured in a recent publication on religion and politics in Tanzania (Mukandala, et al., 2006). The book is based on a national survey of
religion and politics carried out by the Research and Education on Democracy in Tanzania (REDET) project based at the University of Dar es Salaam, as well as on a literature review by the authors. Apart from an introduction and conclusion, the book is in four parts, namely African traditional religions in Tanzania, religious conflicts in Tanzania, religion and governance, and religions and access to education and employment.

The study had as its genesis the inflamed religious rhetoric, accusations and counter accusations, threats, riots and deaths witnessed in Tanzania in the 1990s. Consequently, the authors pay much attention to state–religious, inter-religious and intra-religious conflicts. The main objective of the study was to undertake an in-depth and comprehensive investigation of all the major actors and their positions on the conflicts, and on the causes of and possible solutions to the conflicts (Mukandala et al., 2006, p. 5).

The RaD country research will build on this study. It will consider various aspects of religion and development and focus on religious values in people’s understanding of development and wellbeing. It will consider religious positions on policies and reforms, including governance, human rights and approaches to poverty reduction.

Scholars and others involved in the practice of development have recently brought to the fore the question of religion and development in Africa in general, and in Tanzania in particular. They highlight the contribution, or potential contribution, of religion to development. Ellis and ter Haar (2006), Holenstein (2005) Marshall (2005) and the World Faiths Development Dialogue (WFDD, 2002), among others, observe that ideas about development have generally overlooked the role of religion or assumed that religion can be relegated to the sphere of private belief. They acknowledge that religion is a growing force in public life.

The World Faiths Development Dialogue (WFDD), which the World Bank established in collaboration with a number of world religious leaders, including the then Archbishop of Canterbury, sought to advance a positive view of the contribution of religion to development. Ellis and ter Haar (2006), however, caution that policy makers cannot simply add religion or religious institutions to the range of policy instruments at their disposal. Nevertheless, they suggest that the contribution of religions can be encouraged in a number of areas, including conflict prevention and peace building, wealth creation and production, governance, health and education.
Holenstein (2005) argues that religion and spirituality are sources of world views and views of life, that they are forces for cohesion as well as polarization, and that they serve as instruments for political reference and legitimacy. She concludes that development cooperation cannot, therefore, afford to ignore religion and spirituality.

The current contribution of religions can be seen, for example, in the framework of poverty reduction strategies. The WFDD (2002) report on poverty reduction strategy consultations refers to a conference held in Tanzania entitled “The poor will help the poor”, which reached the conclusion that the poor can only help themselves if they are given a chance to do so. The director of WFDD at the time asserted that this was a far wiser message than the one heard from some officials, who seemed to have swallowed whole a free market philosophy that locates the problem in poor people’s lack of imagination and entrepreneurial skills. Religion in Tanzania can potentially contribute to an alternative way of looking at development beyond the hegemonic view of the World Bank and the dominant neo-liberal ideology. A critical examination of the discourse of poverty reduction therefore needs to be part of the research on religions and development.

While there is a need for further research on the contributions to development of both Christian and Muslim religious organizations, the need for research on the impact of religious values on development is even more pressing. In this respect, comparisons between the various religions and the denominations within their faith traditions are likely to be quite revealing.

Some religious leaders are already expressing reservations about the uncritical embrace of neo-liberalism. For example, in June 2002, the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanzania (ELCT), in collaboration with the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), organized a conference under the auspices of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). The meeting issued a statement to the effect that religious representatives in Tanzania challenged Africa’s political leadership to ensure the active participation of their citizens in discussions on the implementation of NEPAD. They especially called for mechanisms to be put in place to curb corruption and to control capital (Afrol news, 2001).

The conference included other religious leaders such as Anglicans and Muslims. Bishop Makundi, representing the Anglican Church of Tanzania, urged the government to avoid indiscriminate privatization of the financial institutions that provide credit to ordinary people and public utilities. The deputy secretary general of the Muslim Council of Tanzania said that if NEPAD were to succeed,
African states needed to have more power with which to bargain for higher prices for their commodities in global markets so that they can improve the returns from their exports of primary products (Afrol news, 2001).

What we are witnessing here is the involvement of different religious groups in consultations about a development agenda that have been largely decided elsewhere by development agencies like the World Bank. Despite NEPAD belonging to the African Union (AU), it came into existence because of the need to meet the aid conditions imposed by powerful Western donor countries. The religious leaders above are trying to add a critical but constructive voice to the process of poverty alleviation. Their long experience of dealing with the development needs of the poor, however, is yet to become fully recognized and utilized. Such experiences can make a contribution that is relevant to both Tanzania and the externally constructed development agenda.

While both Muslim and Christian religious leaders have tried to make a constructive contribution to debates about how to alleviate poverty, there is also a tendency in Muslim circles to complain about the way the government has been marginalizing Muslims. Jumbe (1994), Njozi (2000) and Omari (1998) are only three among a list of writers who are very critical of the government. They claim that every Tanzanian government since the time of Nyerere has discriminated against Muslims, the evidence being that they are rarely given government posts and have fared poorly in education. These perceptions of Muslim marginalization have led to serious confrontations between some Muslims and the government. The situation has calmed a bit recently, but the debate continues within the Muslim community. Some demand a greater share of the national cake for Muslims, while others urge fellow Muslims to make more personal effort to pursue their own development, especially through education.

The latter view is usually espoused by Muslims who are either government leaders or close to the government. This group uses the Muslim *baraza* (a get-together or meeting usually organized to mark a religious festival) as a forum for their ideas – the “Eid Baraza” held after the end of Ramadan, the month of fasting, being one such popular forum. Some Muslims who are critical of the government also espouse their views in certain well-known mosques, especially after Friday prayers.

In the light of such accusations and to appreciate how religions have both contributed to and contested development thinking in Tanzania, it is instructive to examine the post-independence development
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experience. Criticism came not only from Muslims - some Christian leaders also raised concerns, especially with Nyerere, who guided the country through socialism. The arrival of the neo-liberal hegemony after the demise of socialism moved several religious leaders to raise their voices against the way in which the new order marginalized low income people.

These voices express the various religious denominations’ views on what type of development they would now like to see the state in Tanzania pursue. By reviewing the positions religions hitherto took on governance, policy reforms and the provision of social services by faith-based organizations (FBOs), we can better understand the religions’ current positions on development and seek their leaders’ reflections on progress and wellbeing.

The challenge the Tanzanian state faces today is how to set its own development agenda and to pursue its implementation. The various religious communities disapprove of the way the state in Tanzania is uncritically following an agenda set from outside the country. The indiscriminate privatization this entails, for example, is seen to undermine national interests and the wellbeing of ordinary citizens. It is therefore important to examine religious positions on various economic and social development issues that have a bearing on governance and policy reforms.

Contributions to this preliminary review of the relevant literature take up the four research themes outlined above. First, I consider state-religion relationships and religious views on development policies. I sketch the history of state-religion relationships and then outline the views of different religious groups on various key development issues, before identifying some gaps in the available literature. In Chapter 3, Mohammed Bakari explores the relationships between various aspects of politics and governance and the institutionalized religions, emphasizing how interpretations vary significantly between analysts, sometimes depending on their own religious affiliation. Programmes for public sector reform in Tanzania are discussed by Ernest Mallya, paying particular attention to the health and education sectors. He examines the role of religious organizations in health and education service provision and in policy dialogue. Finally, in Chapter 5, Peter Tumainiumungu considers the role of faith-based organizations in development. He discusses definitional issues, identifies some of the key FBOs engaged in development activities, summarises the outcomes of a workshop in which participants from FBOs assessed their own strengths and weaknesses when it comes to dealing with the HIV/AIDS epidemic and identified opportunities and threats for their activities, and identifies some research gaps.
2 State-religion relationships and religious views on development policies - Amos Mhina

1 Introduction

Development in the form of enabling Tanzanian society to achieve and maintain high levels of material and social wellbeing has been elusive over the years. The country saw incremental improvements in the economy and social services in the first decade of independence after 1961, but these eroded after the mid-1970s when the economy became more distributive than productive. When economic growth resumed in the late 1990s, any attempts to redistribute wealth were abandoned and this time the growth benefited only a privileged minority. Rural poverty remains widespread and urban poverty is well entrenched.

This does not mean that there were no well-intentioned efforts to bring development to Tanzania. The first regime believed that its socialist policies would bring development to the majority. When socialism failed, economic liberalism took its place, but the structural adjustment measures designed to stimulate economic growth and revive the economy took no account of equity. The ensuing severe poverty reintroduced social issues into the equation and, as a result, various poverty alleviation strategies were born.

Poverty alleviation essentially seeks to attain basic needs. This is reflected in the eight UN millennium goals proposed by the team led by Sachs (2005), namely: (i) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, (ii) achieve universal primary education, (iii) promote gender equality and empower women, (iv) reduce child mortality, (v) improve maternal health, (vi) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, (vii) ensure environmental sustainability, and (viii) develop a global partnership for development.

The search to attain these goals fits well with the World Bank agenda, which has not gone uncontested. While the attainment of the above goals could significantly improve the lives of people in Africa in general and Tanzania in particular, the ways in which they are pursued need to fit the particular needs of Tanzania. The contribution of different religions and religious organizations to the formulation of relevant policies is critical. It is not enough for religious leaders to be invited to stakeholder meetings at which outsiders have both compiled the agenda and decided on the conclusions beforehand. This literature review therefore has a number of objectives:

i. to outline the views and position of religions in the development policies of Tanzania as they have been pursued from independence to the present;
ii. to consider whether and how different religions and denominations have made a contribution to the conceptualization of development and poverty alleviation;

iii. to identify some examples of the influence of religious teachings on development concepts in general and on conceptualizations of wellbeing and poverty in particular; and

iv. to highlight the objections of some religious groups to the kind of development currently being pursued in Tanzania, as well as differences among various religions and denominations on issues of development.

The overall question is whether and how religions can contribute qualitatively to ideas about human development in an era dominated by the UN millennium development goals (MDGs) and NEPAD’s strategic framework document and action programme (see footnote 1).

2 Relationships between religions and the government and expectations at independence

Just after independence, the government in Tanzania pursued a development strategy that aimed to achieve rapid transformation through modernization. Settlement schemes were established in the rural areas to help progressive farmers break away from their traditional milieu to pursue modernization, and new factories were built in the urban areas. The government was under pressure not only to Africanize government positions but also to improve living conditions for former colonial subjects. Muslims in particular demanded a reduction in the gap between them and their better-educated Christian compatriots. In addition, the trade unions were agitating for higher wages and non-commissioned officers who wanted to be commissioned to become officers were threatening an army mutiny. The pressures from different directions on the new nationalist government were thus enormous and this might have influenced its decision to establish single party rule in 1965.

Some Muslim groups were on a collision course with the incoming nationalist government even before independence. The Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), along with many Muslim supporters, and Nyerere were on course for independence in the late 1950s, but there were, however, some conservative coastal Muslims who opposed TANU. According to Iliffe, the most serious dissent came from the All Muslim National Union of Tanganyika (AMNUT) based mostly in Dar es Salaam. In August 1959 its leaders went so far as to propose that independence should be delayed until Muslims achieved educational equality with Christians (Iliffe, 1979, pp. 551–2).
Nyerere was able to withstand this pressure because his party, TANU, had a very strong mass base, which included Muslims and Christians as well as those who belonged to traditional religions. Among TANU supporters were important Muslim religious leaders in Dar es Salaam and Bagamoyo, including Sheikh Muhammad bin Ramiya of Bagamoyo who urged his followers to support TANU.

Agitation started again after independence under the auspices of the East African Muslim Welfare Society (EAMWS). This movement, which the Aga Khan established in Mombasa, Kenya, in 1945, transferred its headquarters to Dar es Salaam in 1961. It had been set up with a view to promoting Islam and to raising the standard of living of East African Muslims. It concentrated its efforts on building schools and mosques, as well as providing scholarships for Muslims to study abroad. By 1966 it ran 86 schools, including two secondary ones (Tambila, 2006, p. 181).

The government banned the EAMWS in 1968. The events that culminated in that ban reflected both state–Muslim and intra-Muslim conflicts, as well as the divergent views of different sections of Muslims on how to engage with the government. Different Muslim groups sought to wrest the power to control EAMWS from Asian Ismaili Muslims, which was difficult because their organization provided the funds. Until 1968 Aziz Khaki, an Ismaili, held the strategic posts of both secretary general and education secretary general (Tambila, 2006, p. 181), but since 1960 TANU politicians have held the position of president and have also had some of their members on the EAMWS executive committee.

The other rivalrous group opposed the TANU Muslim politicians because they tended to show that some improvements were being made, but they nonetheless appreciated the government giving them space to express their views. They presented Islam and Muslims as being above politics and asserted that they did not require anybody’s permission to express Muslim interests. They were hostile to TANU, sometimes disrespectful of government leaders and sometimes threatened to unleash the power of Muslims against the government. As some members of this group were not Tanzanians, the government reacted by expelling them from the country. Those expelled included their leader, Sheikh Badawy, a prominent Kenyan Muslim scholar (Liviga and Tumbo-Masabo, 2006, p. 154).

Even TANU Muslims, however, were still exerting pressure on the government to deliver on its election promise to increase educational opportunities for Muslims and this led to tension within the TANU administration. An 11-member Muslim committee within TANU, which had been formed after
independence to look into the matter, was dissolved on the grounds that it was mixing religion and politics. In 1964 the president of EAMWS, Tewa Said Tewa, who was also a cabinet minister, was appointed ambassador to China, apparently after a tour of five Muslim countries to solicit funds to build an Islamic university (Liviga and Tumbo-Masabo, 2006). Some saw this as a strategy to marginalize Muslims by preventing them getting aid from rich Muslim countries.

As the government sought to reduce the gap between Christians and Muslims, some Christian denominations lost their schools and big hospitals. By 1965 Nyerere, a Catholic, had nationalized all Christian schools except confessional ones, so that people from all religions could enter them on the basis of merit. Most Protestant Christian schools were already registering Muslim pupils and students. The Catholic Church, however, turned down a request by Nyerere in 1963 to provide education through truly secular schools for Muslims. He had stressed how such a move could help bridge the educational gap between Christians and Muslims (Sivalon, 1995, p. 183).

In the health sector, in 1971 the two biggest Church hospitals, namely the Lutheran Kilimanjaro Christian Medical Centre in Moshi and the Catholic Bugando Hospital in Mwanza, were nationalized and designated referral hospitals. Other hospitals provided services under government guidelines and nineteen of these were designated district hospitals. The Church maintained ownership but the administration of these district hospitals was put into the hands of a government appointed District Medical Officer.

3 Views of religions on government development policies

Writing about the relationship between the Catholic Church and state, Sivalon identifies three phases – the years of harmony (1953–66) when the Church believed in its divine right to provide social services and when both the colonial government and Nyerere (in the 1960s) commended its efforts; the tense years (1967–76) marked by the official promulgation of Ujamaa (socialism) through the Arusha Declaration; and (1977–present) the re-emergence of the Church as a major service provider (Sivalon, 1995).
3.1 Religious views on government development policies during Ujamaa

The second phase of tension during Ujamaa is significant in the context of religious values and development because it gave rise to a debate within the Catholic Church on whether or not to support socialism as a development strategy. When the Arusha Declaration ushered in socialism as the official policy, some bishops feared that Marxism had gained entry to Tanzania and, as everybody knows, Marxists regard religion as the “opium of the people”. In 1970, Nyerere challenged priests to live in villages and questioned their lifestyle of living in religious citadels. When Bishop Mihayo of Tabora had an opportunity to meet the President, he cautioned Nyerere about the words he and other politicians were using to refer to church leaders. He felt that words such as “exploiters” and “parasites” were unwarranted and argued that the contribution various Christian denominations had made to development, education and health, was sufficient proof that they were not parasites or exploiters (Sivalon, 1995, p. 185).

Other members of the Catholic Church, however, argued that Ujamaa was not a threat to the Church. One theologian, Laurent Magesa, called for a rethinking of the relationship between liberation and development and claimed that Ujamaa was in line with the Christian faith (Magesa, 1972, 1987). Essentially, those who supported Ujamaa recognized that it was an African socialism that had nothing to do with Marxism and, because it sought to liberate workers and peasants, it allowed the Church to reach the poor. In fact a significant group who systematically supported Ujamaa had emerged among the Catholic clergy.

Bishop Mwoleka, who became known as the barefoot bishop because of his simple lifestyle, argued that Ujamaa should influence the social life of a priest (Mwoleka, 1969, 1972) and that the African church should Africanize itself. He maintained that the kind of thinking that separates the sacred from the secular was alien to Africans and alienated the Church from the local people and their development. The cultural and spiritual dimensions of African people should, he asserted, guide theological reflection. He believed that development was part and parcel of the Church’s ministry and argued that priests, who are given the mandate to lead the Church, should be on the front line in advocating development if the Church is to have any relevance for African people (Mwoleka, 1969).
It would seem that the Catholic clergy could engage with Nyerere because he was a Catholic. He challenged that Church without being inimical to it and the bishops could talk back to him when they thought that anti-Christian forces within his government were gaining ground.

Other Christian denominations might have been unhappy with the nationalization of their institutions but they toed the line. They were allowed to continue with their activities so long as they did not draw much attention to themselves by engaging in political advocacy. They would, however, play an advocacy role later, after the demise of socialism, the end of the one-party system and the arrival of structural adjustment programmes.

Two contending positions advanced by different Muslim sections have already been identified – a radical confrontational one, and a moderate pro-government one. When it came to views on socialism it would seem that Muslims were divided along class lines. Opposition to socialism accelerated the banning of the EAMWS: the few Muslims who opposed socialist policies after 1967 were mostly of Asian origin and these initially channelled their opposition through the EAMWS, which took a pan-Islamic and pro-capitalist line (Tambila, 2006, p. 181). It has been argued that the majority of the other Muslims did not oppose Ujamaa, self-reliance and the related policies because these appeared to resemble the religious principles of equality, humility and a spirit of sharing (Bakari and Ndumbaro, 2006, p. 341).

Thus, once it was established that Ujamaa was a Tanzanian socialism and that, unlike Marxism, it was not against religion, it received support from ordinary people, both Christian and Muslim, until an economic crisis made it untenable.

### 3.2 Religious views and contemporary development policies

The 1990s ushered in new policies in the form of free market capitalism and liberal politics, the latter being legalized as multiparty rule in 1992. However, Bakari and Ndumbaro have argued that the collapse of socialism left an ideological vacuum that the market ideology could not adequately fill. As a result of the disintegration of the previous national value system, the inequalities and injustices that were once viewed through a class lens under Ujamaa started to be viewed through religious as well as ethnic lenses (Bakari and Ndumbaro, 2006).
The voices of different religious leaders commenting on the government's liberal development policies have been getting louder and louder, mainly because of the increasing disparity between citizens following the introduction of economic liberalization policies.

The Protestant denominations, including Makundi among others, which had not been openly critical of the state, started to come up with statements against the widespread privatization and corruption that appeared to go with it. At the same time, the Catholic bishops’ annual statements were beginning to take issue with the state on a number of policy changes.

While religion can be seen to have had a positive role in achieving development objectives, it has also to be recognized that faith traditions are not always in harmony. Some Muslims in Tanzania have engaged in anti-Christian religious preaching and some anti-Islam Christians have engaged in counter preaching. In 1998, this led to a breach of the peace and some people died outside the Mwembechai mosque in Dar es Salaam as police clashed with Muslim protesters (Tambila and Rubanza, 2006). At a practical level, the conflict supported the establishment of inter-religious forums. One such organization is the Muslim–Christian Commission for Peace, Development and Conflict Resolution, which is made up of the leaders of the Muslim organization Baraza Kuu la Waislam Tanzania (BAKWATA) and several Christian denominations. To date, such forums have largely been concerned with issues of peace; it is yet to be established whether or not they also pursue development goals.

4 Relationships between religious teachings and perceptions of poverty, wealth, wellbeing and development

Religious teachings usually try to find a balance between spirituality and material wellbeing. The emphasis in preaching is generally on spirituality, but sometimes the teachings and people’s priorities may differ. There are also differences within religious denominations that need to be examined systematically in the context of religious teachings and practice in Tanzania. Little has been written on such issues. There have been many conflicts within and between religious denominations, but power rather than different religious teachings is usually the root cause.

The Catholic Church, more than the others, seems to have grappled with issues such as Ujamaa and liberation theology, which criticize structural injustice and call for greater religious engagement in political and economic institutions to ensure equitable development processes.
Such a debate is not easily discernible in the Lutheran Church, at least not in easily accessible writings. An examination of Lutheran religious teachings concerning the relationships between religious teachings and development would be instructive. The Church’s physical and material ascendancy is easily discernible from the photogenic sizes of its Church buildings, especially in Dar es Salaam. However, current Lutheran teaching is poorly documented, particularly since the emergence of conflict within the Church between traditional Lutheran teaching and a new Pentecostal type born-again Christianity. After a number of years of trying to keep this tension out of the Lutheran Church, tele-evangelism seems to have drawn many people to the Pentecostal type of Christianity and the traditionalists seem to be losing their advantage.

It is unclear how much religious teachings influence Muslim perceptions of development, but the radical Muslim view of a state conspiracy against Muslims would seem to be dominant. As Tambila has observed, the majority of Muslims in Tanzania, in fact three-quarters, adhere to the Sufi tradition. This is the Islamic mystic path, which places great emphasis on personal piety as opposed to book learning. It is further claimed that Sufism was originally non-dogmatic and open to indigenous African beliefs and practices. It promoted local adaptation and engendered a spirit of egalitarianism (Tambila, 2006, p. 174).

During the colonial period it also led to conflict with other Muslim sects that were led by more scholarly Arab and coastal ulemas and imams. The bones of contention, however, were not linked to development, but rather to the level of syncretism that could be allowed between Islamic principles and indigenous practices. It is known that Sufism places little emphasis on material gain compared with religious piety and that too is a line of enquiry that needs to be pursued. A recent study in Ruangwa in southern Tanzania by Becker (2006) points to a conflict between the traditional Sufi religious leaders and an apparently radical Muslim group called the Ansaar Sunna. Behind the Islamic rhetoric, the hegemony of the Sunni religious leaders in their claim to a monopoly of religious knowledge, political positions based on the dominance of the incumbent party and their relative economic prosperity are being fiercely contested.

The Ismailis are different from other Muslims with respect to development through their association with the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) which has blossomed into one of the largest, most efficient, cost effective and respected private development agencies in the world (Kaiser, 1996, pp. 55–61). Ismailis are essentially capitalist but also engage in philanthropic work, especially in education.
and health. As shown above, the schools the EAMWS established were largely funded by the Aga Khan Foundation. Tanzanian socialism, however, adversely affected this group and, as Kaiser has shown, following the Arusha Declaration of 1967 and the 1971 Acquisition of Buildings Act, which nationalized real estate and businesses, many Ismailis left Tanzania. In 1995 there were only 4,000 Ismailis left compared with around 25,000 in the pre-1971 period (Kaiser, 1996).

As mentioned above, religions and religious leaders have been involved in current poverty reduction strategies, mostly under the auspices of the World Bank and NEPAD. It is important to capture the different religions’ views on poverty and on how to deal with it. The Catholic Church, for example, has reflected on its experiences of empowering people through poverty reduction.

According to Sichalawe of the Tanzania Episcopal Conference (TEC), religious institutions in Tanzania are called upon to bring good news to the poor through their commitment and dedication to eradicating poverty. These must not just be lofty words; they must find their way into policy making, into choosing priorities in spending public resources and in the way scarce funds are used for the benefit of the greatest number (Sichalawe, 2006).

The Catholic Church’s activities include not only charitable works to help the poor, orphans and handicapped, but also services to promote education, health, vocational training and other forms of economic facilitation. In addition to its traditional church activities in favour of the poor, it is pursing an advocacy approach to poverty alleviation. The advocacy role includes raising awareness among Christian communities about the importance of helping the poor. It has also created Christian Professionals of Tanzania (CPT), a think-tank for commenting on policy making and for providing open forums on public issues. The Catholic Church’s main argument is that economic growth is important but that government policies must balance the market’s liberal economic orientation with social policy that can cater to the needs of lower income groups, who are the majority (Sichalawe, 2006).

Different religions in Tanzania have joined the international advocacy of poverty alleviation and are giving voice to the poor and low-income people. These religions have long experiences of dealing with the poor, reflections on which can, I would suggest, enrich the current struggles against poverty and give them a Tanzanian character.
The traditional African religions’ positions on development are more difficult to discern than those of Christianity and Islam, partly because African traditional religions (ATR) are essentially local in character. They neither claim universality nor seek to spread their religious conceptions beyond the local context (Lawi and Masanja, 2006, p. 82). Consequently, they have rarely tried to influence the state openly through either advocacy or agitation.

ATR is characterized by “integrated religiosity” – there is no separation of religion from other social actions. Modernization drives that seek to transform societal activities have had negative impacts on societies with indigenous belief systems, as modernization often entails abandoning some religious practices. People who remain strictly within ATR are regarded as shunning development. Although a nationwide survey in 2000 found that only 1 per cent of respondents reported themselves as believers in ATR, over half thought that people in their area engaged in practices associated with traditional beliefs and 30 per cent reported that they themselves did so (Lawi and Masanja, 2006, p. 99).

Moreover, in some enclaves, a much higher proportion of the population consider their primary religion to be ATR. In such areas, not only have Christianity and Islam been held at bay, but there is also a general perception that over-zealous government leaders who want to enforce modernization face a hostile reception, which includes being accused of witchcraft. Shinyanga is one such region. Lawi and Masanja quote figures from Booth et al. (1993) showing that in some areas the estimated proportion of households that exclusively practised ATR was between half and three-quarters of the population. In these areas, people not only practised community rituals and libations to ancestral graves, but also frequently consulted healers and witchcraft experts (Lawi and Masanja, 2006, p. 91).

People believing in ATR are sometimes linked to anti-scientific practices, especially the belief in witchcraft, which at times can be very destructive. This happened during the political and economic crisis of the mid-1980s, when the invocation of traditional religious ideas outside their social and political context led to witch homicide in the Mwanza, Shinyanga and Tabora regions (Lawi and Masanja, 2006). A vigilante group known as Sungusungu that had been set up to deal with cattle rustlers after the police had failed to take them in hand claimed that after undertaking some ATR rituals they had been empowered to eliminate witches. The result was that innocent people, especially elderly widows, were murdered.
It needs to be pointed out, however, that such extreme practices are limited to certain areas. Since ATRs are non-hegemonic, the practices can vary from one ethnic group to another. In some areas, members have been able to negotiate between practising traditional rituals and belonging to hegemonic religions in pursuance of modernization. The Chagga of the Moshi area of Kilimanjaro are one such people. Syncretism is an observed phenomenon for both Christians and Muslims in such areas, where many resort to ATR when they seek to achieve advancement in their situation, whether it is a wish to have their business flourish, advancement in a profession or success in politics. While the negative aspects of ATR are mentioned all too often, the positive practices have yet to be investigated systematically.

5 Research gaps

Much remains to be done to establish the links between religious values and teachings and development practices. The first step towards understanding the main values and content of their teachings is to delineate the position on development of religious denominations in the Christian and Muslim family.

Christian denominations need careful scrutiny. Catholics have expressed their position on development more openly than other religious denominations, which need closer examination. Lutherans, Anglicans and other traditional Christian denominations should be examined and compared with the more recent Pentecostal churches whose origins can mostly be traced to the USA. We also need to understand the variations in Muslim positions on development. It is important to distinguish between the more obvious influences on religious groups’ development thinking, some of which come from outside Tanzania, and more subtle influences that are based on religious beliefs more grounded in Tanzania.

Also important to the research is the experience of religious groups in their dealings with the poor, and whether and how these contribute to the formulation of development and poverty reduction policies in the face of the universalized agenda of economic liberalization, poverty alleviation and the achievement of MDGs.
3 Religions, governance and development in Tanzania - Mohammed A. Bakari

1 Introduction

For a very long time (from 1961 to the mid-1980s) the relationship between religion and governance in Tanzania was virtually ignored as a subject for research. Immediately after independence, religion became a very sensitive political issue and the authorities were reluctant to allow it to be included in social research or political discourse. Political leaders saw it as a potentially divisive factor in a newly independent state facing the challenging task of bringing together about 120 tribes and people of different races and religious denominations into a nationally integrated political community. The state, it was believed, should be secular. In academic circles, researchers also shied away from the topic. Quite apart from wanting to support the rulers’ political stance, Marxism was in any case the dominant paradigm at the University of Dar es Salaam (the only university at that time) and other institutions of higher learning from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s and, as such, did not include religion as an analytical category for social science research. Nevertheless, an absence of research and restricted political discourse does not negate the historical reality of important relationships between religion, governance and development.

In this paper I review the existing literature on the relationships between religion and governance in Tanzania from a historical perspective. I focus mainly on the post-colonial era, particularly from the early 1980s, by which time religion had assumed some prominence in intellectual and political discourses. Studies on religion, governance and development in Tanzania encompass many and diverse themes and are inspired by different theoretical perspectives and methodologies. Some question the very nature of the “secular” state, namely the extent to which the state is really independent of religious influences, particularly from the two main religions, Christianity and Islam. Such influences can be discerned not only in constitutions, rules and regulations, laws and policies, but also in the behavioural practices of individuals. This debate will be considered further in Section 3 below.

In part because religion was not supposed to feature in political and even intellectual discourses, there are no up-to-date or reliable figures on the exact proportions of Christians, Muslims and traditional believers in the country. In other words, the demographic strength of one religion compared to others is considered to be a politically sensitive issue. However, it is estimated that about two-thirds of East African Muslims reside in Tanzania and that in Zanzibar they constitute almost 99 per cent of the total...
population (Nimitz, 1980). According to the pre-independence census of 1957, the ratio of Muslims to Christians in Tanzania was three to two. However, the only post-independence census to include a religious category (1967) indicated that Muslims constituted only 30 per cent of the total population versus 32 per cent Christians and 37 per cent pagans or believers in indigenous religions. There is some doubt about the validity of the 1967 figures and many Muslims suspect that they might have been tailored for political motives (Said, 1998).

Religion is an important ingredient in human spiritual and material development. Holenstein (2005) aptly observes that it provides the parameters of world views and views of life. It can provide incentives for both cohesion and polarization. According to her, the universal spiritual principles upon which religion is anchored – “tolerance, compassion, love, justice, humility, sacrifice, trustworthiness, dedication to the well-being of others, and unity – are the foundations of progressive civilization”. On the other hand, it goes without saying that the perversion of religion has been a primary cause of social disintegration, intolerance, hatred, poverty, oppression, warfare and other vices in the history of mankind.

From the above, it goes without saying that major religions have an impact on a state’s system of governance. Governance covers a broad array of institutions and processes – both state and non-state, formal and informal. This array includes institutions that are political, administrative, economic, social and cultural, as well as religious. Religion, along with society’s other value systems and traditions, is an important ingredient when it comes to crafting constitutions, formulating policies, laws, rules and regulations, and developing patterns of compliance and socialization models. Other themes include the role of religion in political mobilization and electoral processes, the contribution of religion to national development, religious resurgence, and inter- and intra-religious conflicts.

Analyses of the relationships between religious groups and the state can be grouped into three. In Section 2, these perspectives will be outlined. In Section 3, I critically assess the debate about the supposedly secular nature of the Tanzanian state. Section 4 deals with the legal basis for religious freedom and Section 5 with religious-based tensions. In Section 6 the evidence on religious dimensions of political mobilisation is reviewed, followed by a short discussion of the overall relationships between religion and national development. Finally, the conclusion includes a number of outstanding research questions arising out of this brief review.
2 The debates: approaches and methodologies

A critical review of the literature on religion and governance in Tanzania shows that different approaches and methods have been used to explain the subject matter. Generally, three broad approaches can be discerned – a standard view, an Islamic view and a Christian view (Heilman and Kaiser, 2002, p. 699).

The standard or official view, which the government in Tanzania backs, is that the colonial rulers were responsible for the present state of the relationship between religion and governance in Tanzania. This was because the colonizers, first the Germans and later the British, structured the society according to social divisions based on race (Europeans, Asians, Arabs and Africans), religion (Christians, Muslims and their respective denominations) and geographical area (cash-crop growing areas or labour reservoirs). When the nationalist movement under Julius Nyerere, the first president and chairman of the ruling party after independence, started to embark on a national integration project by uniting people of different social categories for the anti-colonial struggle, it adopted various nation-building measures and discouraged discrimination of all sorts, including discrimination on the basis of religion. Even the nationalization of schools under Ujamaa (African socialism) was presented as an attempt to create educational opportunities for Muslims, because most of the private schools at that time were run by the Church (Heilman and Kaiser 2002, p. 700). Thus, from this perspective, state–religion as well as Muslim–Christian relations in Tanzania were more or less harmonious from the 1960s to the mid-1980s (Pope John Paul II, 1990, cited in Mukandala 1999; Rasmussen, 1993; Tordoff, 1967).

Muslim commentators have provided a critique of the standard view, arguing that rivalry and conflict have characterized both Muslim–state relations and relationships between the two institutionalized religions in Tanzania (see, for example, Bakari, 2001; Jumbe, 1994; Mazrui, 1988; Njozi, 2000, 2003; Said, 1998). This view, like the standard one, attributes the creation of social divisions to colonial rule. According to the Islamic view, both German and British rule (though to varying degrees) promoted Christianity at the expense of Islam. Documentary evidence from the records of the German and British colonial administrations, as well as from the archives of different church missionary societies, shows that both colonial officials and Christian missionaries considered Muslims in East Africa a threat to their religious and political interests in the region. To combat that threat they often cooperated
in formulating and implementing a wide range of public policies that had the intention and effect of favouring Christians and weakening Muslims (Bowers, 1971; Oliver, 1965; Robinson, 1963; Sivalon, 1990; Soghayroun, 1992). For example, colonial policies created gross disparities in education and employment between Muslims and Christians. These discriminatory policies in turn deepened Muslim resentment and galvanized Muslims to struggle against the colonial rulers, especially in mainland Tanzania (Said, 1998). Since the established Christian churches had already harmonized their relationships with the state, Muslims were generally more active than Christians during the struggle for independence (Said 1998).

However, according to the Islamic view, historical factors dating back to the colonial era only partly explain the current socio-economic and political fate of Muslims in Tanzania. The Islamic view holds that after independence Christians strove to maintain their privileged position, no matter how unfair to Muslims, and Muslims strove to change the status quo. Among other factors, Muslims’ relatively weak educational position contributed and still contributes to their under-representation in public employment, particularly in the higher political and professional posts. In 1993, for example, when the country had a Muslim president, the ratio of Muslims to Christians in top government posts (ministers, deputy ministers, principal secretaries, regional commissioners and district commissioners) was one to six (Jumbe, 1994; Supreme Council of Islamic Organizations and Institutions, 1999). The same pattern could be observed in other high ranking government positions.

The Islamic point of view explains the continued political and economic disparities between the followers of the two main religions in terms of a deliberate and systematic attempt by the post-colonial state, through its policies, decisions and practices, to undermine the development of Islam and the Muslim community. Examples given to illustrate the Tanzanian state’s anti-Muslim stance include banning the EAMWS in 1968 and creating BAKWATA, the state-backed Muslim supreme council of Tanzania. While independent Islamic organizations were banned, the government tolerated a number of independent Christian organizations such as the Christian Council of Tanzania (Heilman and Kaiser, 2002, p. 701). Njozi (2003), for example, claims that the Memorandum of Understanding (1992) between the government of the United Republic of Tanzania and the churches – including the TEC, the Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT) and external church institutions – gave undue advantages to an already privileged religious group. A quite significant fraction of Muslims, who are perceived as critical of the government, share this view. They include prominent Muslim clerics, some academics and
some Islamic organizations opposed to BAKWATA. According to those who support this analysis, the other two perspectives, namely the standard and the Christian ones, usually underplay the importance of various factors present in post-independence politics (Bakari and Mussa, 2004).

The Christian view is antithetical to the Islamic one. It holds that the predicament of Muslims in Tanzania is largely due to internal problems among Muslims. It rejects Muslims’ claim that they are exploited and instead attributes their disadvantaged position to their role in the pre-colonial slave trade and the pre-revolutionary Omani aristocracy in Zanzibar, and their strong participation in the German colonial administration (Heilman and Kaiser, 2002, p 702). The current state of underdevelopment among Muslim communities relative to Christians is explained in terms of the former’s neglect of education and the latter’s strong emphasis on education as the key to success in both the private and public domains. Muslims’ expressions of their grievances are viewed not in terms of claiming political rights and justice, but as attempts to capture the state to advance their religious interests, including the entrenchment of religious extremism by forging links with extremist forces outside the country (Heilman and Kaiser 2002, p 702).

The presence of such diametrically opposed views among significant numbers of followers of the two main institutionalized faith traditions, who each exert considerable political influence, may signal an impending legitimacy crisis in the state over its assumed secular character. The main area of contestation at the moment is not relations between followers of different religions and denominations as such, but rather the state’s relationship with religious communities with regard to allocating and distributing public resources like power, public employment and freedoms. In other words, the discourse that questions the secular state seems to be inspired by both religious and political motives on the part of both Muslims and Christians.

Just as there are different perspectives, so too are different methodologies used. Some studies tend to use extensive quantitative methods, for example, the 1994 and 1999 civic culture surveys (reported, for example, in Mallya, 2006) and the various REDET studies. Other studies are more qualitative (like Heilman and Kaiser, 2002; Njozi, 2000, 2003; and Sivalon 1990). The arrival at different conclusions on a number of issues related to religion, governance and development is partly caused by the application
of different methodologies. These different conclusions are well observed in the chapters in an edited book published by REDET on *Religion and Politics in Tanzania* (Mukandala et al., 2006).

### 3 Questioning the secular state

Whereas democratization and the promotion of economic, civil and political rights were integral to the development of secularism in the Western world, in many post-colonial states like Tanzania, the secularism that was adopted was not, according to critics, “proper”. Instead, it failed to incorporate important ingredients of democratic governance and so could be termed “residual” (Esposito and Voll, 1996). Thus during the first two-and-a-half decades after independence in Tanzania (1961 to the mid-1980s) the state suppressed citizens’ avenues for political association and freedom of expression, including religious ones. This created grievances against the state and feelings of injustice among religious institutions. In Tanzania’s case, the degree of bitterness towards the state was more pronounced among Muslims than Christians (Bakari and Ndumbaro, 2001).

When considering the secular nature of the state, the three perspectives mentioned above advance different views, with the standard and Christian viewpoints seeing the state as secular, both constitutionally and in practice. For example, in 1993, following the Zanzibar government’s decision to join the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the Tanzanian state was under strong attack by those subscribing to the Christian view on the grounds that it was deviating from its secular principles. On the part of Muslims, there is no common view on the secular nature of the state. A large proportion of Muslims support the standard view and are of the opinion that the state is secular and impartial on matters of religion, but a significant fraction, including prominent Muslim leaders, politicians and academics, believe that the Tanzanian state is nominally secular but Christian-dominated in practice. As the debate between the different perspectives continues, it appears that common ground is limited, given that analysts tend to be influenced by partisan/religious orientations. This lack of consensus on the fundamental nature of the state has critical implications for governance and for the future role of the state in promoting national integration, peace and stability, religious harmony and social justice. In particular, according to Kitima (2000, p 186), some Islamic religious communities in Tanzania have expressed unhappiness at the secular juridical system in place and instead advocate creating a semi-secular state, namely one that is influenced by religious laws. According to him, this trend is more pronounced in Zanzibar, where the majority of people are Muslims (Kitima, 2000, p 187).
The authors of some studies feel no need to question the secular nature of the state, but do nevertheless detect religious influences on politics. Of the two major institutionalized religions in Tanzania, Christianity and Islam, many analysts believe that Christianity is more influential in shaping the governance system and policies and, within Christianity, that the Roman Catholic Church is the most influential denomination (Bakari and Ndumbaro, 2001; Kaiser, 1996; Njozi, 2000; Said, 1998; Sivalon, 1990). Bakari and Ndumbaro (2001) ascribe the apparently greater influence of Christianity in general and of Roman Catholics in particular to their well-established organizational structure, centralized and supposedly infallible source of authority, the cohesion of their membership, possession of material and human resources, and good access to the media. Muslims, in contrast, are generally unorganized – or at least their organizational structures are relatively weak and they lack a national organizational body with a generally accepted central authority. Their resource base, material and human, is also relatively weak. Consequently, Muslim organizations are fragmented and generally weak in forging a common front with which to press their demands on the political system. Heilman and Kaiser (2002) observe that neither Christians nor Muslims have much group solidarity, but that the phenomenon is more pronounced among Muslims.

In addition to the organizational and structural advantages of one religion or denomination over the others, Bakari and Ndumbaro (2001) note that a change in the top political leadership also has a bearing on the relative influence of religions on the political system, depending on the religious identity of the leader in question. Under Mwalimu Nyerere, the first president of Tanzania, a significant fraction of Muslims expressed dissatisfaction at the way Muslims and Muslim affairs were handled, allegedly in favour of Christians and particularly of Roman Catholics (Said, 1998). Likewise, under Mwinyi, the second president, Muslims continued to complain against the state, claiming that, though under a Muslim president, government was still Christian-dominated (Njozi 2000). At this time, however, some Christians felt that the president was favouring Muslims, citing a number of indicators such as favouritism in appointments, Zanzibar’s decision to join the OIC, the construction of a number of mosques and madrasas, and large sums of money donated by Muslim countries being channelled to Muslim institutions in Tanzania (TEC, 1993). Under president Mkapa, it was again the turn of Muslims to complain, for they felt that he, like the first president, was spearheading a hidden agenda of entrenching the dominance of Christianity in the Tanzanian state. Similarly, under the current Muslim president, Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, various newspaper articles are reporting an outcry from some Christian quarters that he seems to be favouring his fellow Muslims.
The bottom line here is that there is a strong feeling that whoever occupies the highest office is likely to favour his fellow religious believers. This suggests that religion–state relations present a fundamental problem of governance that has to be addressed soberly. We need to know to what extent these perceptions of favouritism are justified. Moreover, irrespective of whether or not they are justified, the fact that they are felt so strongly suggests that this is a pertinent topic for academic enquiry. In our literature search no study has been found that adequately addresses this issue.

4 Religious freedom and the legal system in Tanzania

A key factor in the relationship between religion and governance in Tanzania is the legal framework. According to Kitima (2000, p 238), independent Tanzania continued the same religious policies as the colonial governments. Thus “religious liberty was legally protected and guaranteed”. However, he also notes that the state has interfered in the internal affairs of some religions (Kitima, 2000). Other studies (such as Bakari and Mussa, 2004; and Njozi, 2003) assert that the legal system in Tanzania does not provide adequate freedom of worship and association, even under the multiparty system that has come into being since 1992. Although the constitution protects freedom of worship, several clawback clauses restrict freedom of religion, including association on a religious basis.

The government requires religious organizations to supply information about their activities to the registrar of societies at the Home Affairs Ministry. For a religious organization to be registered, it must have at least ten followers, and must provide a constitution, résumés of its leaders and a letter of recommendation from the relevant District Commissioner. Some Muslim groups claim that they are also required to submit a letter of recommendation from the National Muslim Council of Tanzania.

The law prohibits preaching or distributing material that might be considered inflammatory or represent a threat to public order. The government occasionally denies permission to religious groups seeking to hold demonstrations if there is a perceived likelihood that the gathering could lead to confrontation or ignite religious tensions.

Ever since independence the government has barred religious organizations from engaging in politics. Politicians, for their part, are prohibited from using language intended to incite one religious group against another, or to encourage religious groups to vote for certain political parties. The law imposes
fines and prison sentences on political parties that campaign in houses of worship or educational facilities. However, the enforcement of this law has been a problem.

The Mufti Law of Zanzibar authorizes the president of Zanzibar to appoint an Islamic leader, or mufti, to serve as a public employee of the Zanzibar government. On Zanzibar the mufti has the authority to approve or deny the registration of Islamic societies and supervise mosques. The Zanzibar Mufti Law was passed in October 2001 in the Zanzibar House of Representatives. Under it the secular government is empowered to supervise and coordinate all Muslim activities, including the mobilization of Muslim resources. All mosques are now under the direct control and supervision of an avowedly secular government. As the chief government agent, the mufti is duty bound to execute anything directed by the secular government. At one time Muslims in Zanzibar were beaten up and taken to court by police officers for praying Eid-al Haj prayers without the mufti’s/government’s permission. The Mufti Law, therefore, is controversial because some Muslim groups believe it gives the Zanzibar government undue influence in religious affairs.

A key aspect of freedom of worship is that religious institutions can enjoy institutional autonomy. According to Bakari and Mussa (2004), there is significant variation in the amount of institutional autonomy allowed to religious organizations between the two main religions. The main Christian institutions, for example, the TEC and the CCT, have continued throughout to operate quite autonomously from the state, whereas BAKWATA, the Muslim national body, was under state control, not legally but in terms of its original creation, leadership recruitment and operations. This differing approach by a legally and presumed secular state to religious organizational autonomy partly explains the existence of the different perspectives on state–religion relations in Tanzania.

5 The upsurge of religious tensions

Since the mid-1980s tensions between Muslims and the state, and to some extent even between Muslims and Christians, have been on the increase. Kaiser (1996), for example, asserts that “Tanzania has begun to witness the demise of social unity.” Forster (1997) notes a similar trend. The manifestations of these conflicts take different forms, including denunciations in the media, Muslim and Christian open-air preaching, formal pastoral letters of protest from bishops and stern warnings from the government (Mukandala, 1999). Generally, state–Christian relations have not deteriorated,
whereas state–Muslim relations have reached violent levels on three occasions in the last ten years (in 1993, 1998 and 2001). In these incidents, violent confrontations between Muslims and the security forces left property damaged and scores of people dead, injured, detained or imprisoned. According to Bakari and Ndumbaro (2001), “the accusations and counter-accusations in the press, the loss of lives and property as well as the iron hand with which the police dealt with religious strife is a clear manifestation of a governance problem in state–religion relations.” Njozi (2000, p 7) argues that: “The conflict in Tanzania is not between Muslims and Christians but between Muslims and the government. The problem is neither inter-religious nor horizontal but political and vertical. In all political regimes, Muslims have pointed out, with evidence, that they are being discriminated against.”

Scholars have tried to identify the various factors that might account for the current upward trend in religious tension in Tanzania since the late 1980s. Bakari and Ndumbaro (2001) attribute it to several factors: the collapse of the governing national ideology, namely Ujamaa, which, with its welfare-oriented policies, used to provide a social bond between people with different socio-economic status; growth in worldwide religious militancy and activism in the 1980s; religious revivalism in Islam and Christianity in Tanzania; the emergence of open-air preaching; and growth in the number of mosques and churches (particularly Pentecostal churches) since the 1980s. In addition, the liberalizing economic reforms introduced in the mid-1980s, they suggest, made it necessary to restructure political and social relations. These reforms created a need to redefine the nature of the state and its relations with society. In the process, new social forces emerged, including some religiously inspired ones. Further, the political reforms that brought multiparty also permitted increased freedom of expression and association, including religious association. The cumulative effect of all these developments in Tanzania is what has led John Campbell (1999, p 106) to talk of “the rise and demise of the Tanzanian national identity” between 1961 and 1986, whereby the civil-territorial model of secular national identity which was being practised in the first three decades of independence is now increasingly under challenge by the notions of social identity based on ethnicity and religion.

Apart from conflicts that have pitted Muslims against Christians, some scholars have examined the nature of intra-religious conflicts within both Muslim and Christian faith traditions. Some of these are explained as ideological, for example, between what are referred to as traditional sheikhs and Ansar Sunna, sometimes referred to as “radical” Muslims (Tambila and Rubanza 2006). In their case study of Mwembechai, for example, in addition to the various other dimensions of the conflict, Tambila and Rubanza (2006) look at the intra-denominational conflicts in which believers of the same religion found themselves in dispute. One Muslim faction in Mwembechai was pitted against the other, with the state intervening to back one faction (the “moderate” one) against the other (the “radical” one). Other intra-
Religious conflicts studied include conflicts in Meru diocese (Nyirabu, 2001) and Pare diocese (Mmuya, 2001). Scholars have given a wide range of reasons for the emergence of intra-religious/denominational conflicts. Within Christian denominations Tambila and Sivalon (2001), cite access to power and resources (material incentives), conflicting interpretations and understandings of beliefs (theological motives), as well as weaknesses in internal decision-making processes.

Whatever the causes of conflict, both inter-religious and intra-religious conflicts have an impact on governance and national development. Enquiring into the causes of state-religion, inter-religious and intra-religious conflict, as well as looking at its impact on society, is therefore another relevant area for research.

6 Religion and political mobilization

Closely related to religion and governance is the pattern of political mobilization and the extent to which religion as a social cleavage influences political attitudes, political parties and electoral processes. To be sure, some sections of the Muslim community have questioned the secular nature of the Tanzanian state, but no political party has so far expressed its intent to establish a religious state in a multi-religious nation. Both Muslims and Christians are now politically organized in conventional political parties with crosscutting (Christian and Muslim) memberships (Bakari and Ndumbaro, 2001). Even in Zanzibar, where the population is predominantly Muslim, no political party has advanced a religious agenda in the ongoing political discourse. What can be inferred from the pattern of party organization and the political agenda of various parties and groups is that none of the parties is religiously based (TEMCO, 1997, 2001). Whether this is due to the legal requirements for the registration of political parties or other factors is open to academic enquiry.

In examining the relationships between religion and governance, electoral behaviour is a relevant factor. The election monitoring reports from the 1995, 2000 and 2005 general elections show that both the ruling party and some opposition parties used religion to mobilize electoral support (TEMCO, 1997 and 2001, 2006). In the election campaigns in 2000, for example, the use of religion was widespread (TEMCO, 2001). This was not confined to mosques and evangelical churches but was also visible in the established churches, though less conspicuously. Thus, it is quite evident that religious cleavages to some extent shape electoral behaviour in Tanzania (Bakari and Ndumbaro, 2001). This factor, according to TEMCO reports, could be observed at all key stages of the election process, from the nomination of candidates within parties through to the campaigns and voting patterns. During
campaigns, for example, some religious leaders have overtly campaigned for a particular political party. However, neither religious leaders nor individual candidates have so far publicly urged people to vote for a particular candidate because of his or her religion.

Despite the use of religion in campaigning, however, the influence of religion on voters’ choices in Tanzania appears to be relatively low (Heilman and Kaiser, 2002; Mallya, 2001). That the results of all three multiparty general elections (1995, 2000 and 2005) failed to correspond significantly with the proportional numbers of Muslims and Christians in the country verifies this assertion. Heilman and Kasier (2002, p 706) identified three aspects of Tanzanian society that discourage or minimize the impact of religion on political mobilization and electoral behaviour – cross-cutting cleavages, parity between group size and strength, and a lack of group consensus. The phrase cross-cutting cleavages implies that religious communities are not exclusive in terms of ethnic identity, geographical boundaries or party affiliation, and this creates a disincentive to organize and mobilize political support exclusively along religious lines. The parity between group size and strength that obtains in Tanzania means that political leaders have to build broad coalitions of Muslims and Christians if they are to win both intra-party and national elections. The lack of group consensus applies to both Muslims and Christians. According to Heilman and Kaiser (2002, p 706), the divisions between and within Christian denominations and Muslim sects are so strong as to render group solidarity virtually impossible.

7 Religion and national development

At independence, as noted above, the country inherited glaring educational disparities between Christians and Muslims. During the early days of independence (1961–66), religious institutions continued to play an active role in social and economic activities. The adoption of statist policies from 1967 to the mid-1980s, however, sidelined religious institutions from political activities and from social and economic development. Religious institutions that engaged in service provision, for example in education and health, were obstructed in different ways and had their properties nationalized. With the introduction of liberalization policies in the mid-1980s, however, the state began to recognize the role of religious institutions in economic and social development. Since then, religious institutions have been playing an increasingly crucial role in national development in various sectors, such as education, health, civic education and caring for orphans. Following the withdrawal of the Tanzanian state from some of its former areas of responsibility, non-governmental organizations, including
religious institutions, have been striving to provide the services previously provided by the state (Ludwig 1999, p 215–16). Christian organizations are, however, relatively better equipped than their counterparts to deliver a range of services. For example, in 1999 the churches were running 83 hospitals, 30 health centres and 450 dispensaries. About 19 of those hospitals were designated as district hospitals (Mhina, 2002). Bakari and Mussa (2004) document the range of services that Islamic philanthropic institutions have provided since the mid-1980s.

It would be helpful to know to what extent religious institutions can promote national development in its broadest sense, as opposed to sectional development for the followers of a specific religion. The literature search, however, failed to yield any study that showed the extent to which services provided by religious institutions benefit the wider public. While religious institutions are providing more and more services, the real impact of this phenomenon on broader issues of development, national unity, equity and social justice are yet to be studied.

8 Conclusions

Although there are very few studies on religion, governance and development in Tanzania, and most of those that do exist have been conducted in the post-liberalization era (since the mid-1980s), it has already become apparent that they adopt different approaches. Some studies, like Religion and Politics in Tanzania (REDET, forthcoming), have relied extensively on quantitative methodologies including country-wide surveys of people’s opinions, while others have relied on qualitative methodologies (Heilman and Kaiser, 2002; Mbogoni, 2004; Njozi, 2000, 2003). In addition, the analysis is often excessively influenced by the religious affiliation of the scholar in question. Consequently, the validity of the conclusions reached by many studies are contested on the grounds that they are subjective and biased. Because different approaches and methodologies have been used and different conclusions have been reached, it has been very difficult to communicate and engage in constructive discourse with scholars and policy makers.

Judging from what we have seen in Tanzania today, as in other African countries, there are clear indications that religion will play a large part in shaping Africa’s development in the twenty-first century. Nonetheless, religion has not so far been accorded its due place in Tanzanian scholarship. For instance, there are no religious studies courses in any of the leading national universities in the
country. Also, because many of the discussions and debates about the relationships between religion, governance and development tend to be inspired by the religious attachments of the analysts involved, it is difficult to establish an objective discourse between followers of different religions and denominations. It is against this backdrop that it becomes imperative to undertake comparative studies on religion and governance in Africa and beyond. In this endeavour, we could also attempt to discern sectors in which religion could play a positive role in governance and development.

This short review of the available literature indicates some thematic areas in which in-depth research could usefully be undertaken. These include interrogating the problematic of the secular state in the context of growing religious revivalism; the legal framework upon which the political system is anchored, including freedom of worship and association; sources of inter- and intra-religious tensions and conflicts, how these have been handled by the state, and the adoption and outcomes of various conflict-resolution strategies; the role of religious cleavage in political mobilization; the role of religious production, wealth creation and distribution; and whether and how public policies and state attitudes towards religions in Tanzania have contributed to the promotion of equity and social justice. Previous research has concentrated almost entirely on the institutionalized religions (Islam and Christianity), even though perhaps a third of Tanzanians consider themselves to have traditional African religious beliefs. Perhaps because ATR is not institutionally organized, its role as a faith tradition or as organized religious groups has not been the subject of study in the same way as the other faith traditions and this constitutes a deficiency to be remedied in future research.
4 Religions, policy and Tanzania’s public sector reforms - Ernest T. Mallya

1 Introduction

One does not need to do extensive research to know that religious organizations play an important role in service provision in Tanzania. The main religious groups were providing social services even before colonization took hold in the second half of the nineteenth century. If one looks deeply into the roles of the state and organized religion, especially in the developing world, one finds that the two have an overlapping agenda in the area of development. Much as institutionalized religion might have had to engage in developmental projects during the initial stages of becoming locally established to woo followers, in the later stages it did not change its agenda much. Religious teaching, secular education and other development projects continued to be the daily business of missionaries. The same applies to local religious organizations today. For the newly emerging governments of independent Africa, development was at the forefront because it served as a banner during the liberation struggles. Newly independent governments had to do something about development. As governments and religious organizations have overlapping agendas, one would want to know if and how they interact when it comes to such important things as policy and service delivery, which come within the government’s mandate. These interactions are at the core of this review.

1.1 Rationale

Religious differences have for a long time been underplayed in Tanzania for political rather than empirical reasons. The divisive politics religion can bring to a country – and examples abound on the continent and beyond – led to the post-independence government trying to make religion as ‘insignificant’ a factor as possible in its attempts to build national unity. The same applied to ethnic differences. These variables were not and are still not included in the national census. In filling out official forms, such as for school entrance, one is not required to mention one’s religion or ethnic group. In 1967, religious schools were nationalized and opened to every Tanzanian, with the exception of seminaries, which had a different purpose in that they were for training people who wanted to become priests or Islamic religious leaders. The mindset within which many Tanzanians operate when dealing with issues such as policy also tends to underplay religion. For this reason, there is hardly any literature available that specifically looks for differences in the ways different religions approach issues or how they go about influencing the government.
However, religion is a significant factor when it comes to distributing political and other goods. While people tend not to use it as a determinant in deciding such things as where to get services or what institution to work for, when it comes to the composition of policy-making bodies like the cabinet, religious feelings definitely play a part in the selection process. One such example occurred when the former president appointed regional parole boards and Muslims complained that many of them (in fact twenty) were comprised solely of Christians and all had a Christian chairperson. They were then recomposed with their religious composition taken into account. Thus when it comes to policy-making, religion may surface strongly. We therefore want to investigate the role of religion in influencing public sector reform programmes in Tanzania.

1.2 Main and specific objectives of the paper

My objective in this paper is to investigate the extent to which religions influence policy in Tanzania, especially at the formulation stage when policy is born. Changes can be made during the implementation and evaluation phases, and therefore policy can be remade or reformulated, but I would argue that the crucial stage is the initial formulation. This is when we would want to know whether religious groups are given an opportunity to have an input into the process and what channels are used, given that policy formulation is part of the government’s mandate. It is nowadays agreed that stakeholders should be given an opportunity to contribute to policy formulation. However, this does not necessarily happen in the developing world and there are typically no mechanisms to ensure that inputs from ‘outside’ the government are included in the final product of the policy-making process.

Public sector reform programmes are currently shaping what governments do in developing countries in general and in Tanzania in particular. Such programmes stipulate what is going to be done in which sector and how it is going to be funded both from inside and outside the country. Public sector reform programmes also have a lot to do with two sectors that are crucial to the achievement of development objectives – education and health – and in which religious groups are important stakeholders.

During the course of this paper, I shall attempt to gauge the size and scope of the involvement of religious groups in education and health and assess in what ways the two institutionalized religions in Tanzania influence the design and implementation of reforms in education and health at both the policy and implementation levels. I shall look at the roles and inputs of the ELCT (Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Tanzania), CCT (Christian Council of Tanzania) and TEC (Tanzanian Episcopal Conference), as well as BAKWATA (Baraza Kuu la Waislam Tanzania), the Aga Khan Foundation, and any other religious forums, as well as those of powerful individuals like the cardinal (Catholics), the chief bishop (Lutherans), the chief sheikh (Muslims) and the mufti (especially in Zanzibar).

In addition, I shall examine the composition of supervisory and advisory sector boards like district health boards and the Higher Education Accreditation Board. I shall try to ascertain the main force behind the denationalization of some institutions (like hospitals and schools) and the decision to return them to their former owners, including religious organizations.

2 Public sector reforms in Tanzania

In the sections below, I shall first look at the Public Sector Reform Programme (PRSP) in Tanzania in general and at the full range of reforms being proposed, including those in the public service sector, before going on to focus on education and health and the role of the two major institutionalized religions in Tanzania – Islam and Christianity – in these two services.

2.1 The Public Sector Reform Programme

Public sector reforms can be looked at against the background of the changing role of the state. The function of the state is to improve the capacity of public institutions to make policy and deliver services in an efficient, effective and accountable manner, and the reforms are carried out in the context of a new public management paradigm. This, among other things, emphasizes restructuring the public sector, particularly through privatization; reducing the size of the civil service; introducing competition, especially through an internal market; contracting out certain public services to the private sector; and improving efficiency, especially through performance auditing and measurement (Kiragu, 2005; Mollel, 2002; Mutahaba, 2005; Therkildsen, 2000). The new public management paradigm therefore covers a range of reforms dealing with core government functions. Since the early 1980s Tanzania has implemented a number of reforms pertaining to politics, the economy and public sector management. The history of public sector reforms in Tanzania can be grouped into four main phases – the post-independence phase (1962–72), the crisis phase (1973–85), the structural adjustment phase (1985–95) and the current phase of comprehensive reform programmes (Kiragu, 2005, p. 2).
The post-independence reforms were designed to respond to three main situations. The first arose from the need to create new institutions and organizations to handle the responsibilities of the new government. It can be recalled that the colonial government mainly concentrated on maintaining law and order in the colony to facilitate its extractive objectives. Second, having created the institutions the state needed to spearhead economic and social development. This entailed setting up new organizational units at the centre, as well as at regional, district, division and ward levels. With the adoption of a socialist ideology in 1967, the public sector needed to be expanded and public enterprises established. By the time the sector was being restructured in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there were more than 450 parastatal organizations in Tanzania. These were a burden on the government in that most were unproductive or only operating with the help of government subsidies, which in turn overstretched the government budget. Third, the state needed to build up a cadre of public service personnel to man its new and expanded functions. At that time, staff in the public service was poorly trained and there were in any case too few of them to handle the tasks to which they had been assigned. Training institutions were created in the 1960s and 1970s to meet the growing demand for human resources.

Three milestone events marked the crisis phase – the abolition of local governments in 1972; the restoration of local government in 1984; and a serious decline in the economy in the first half of 1980 when the government was advised to abandon its Ujamaa policy. The structural adjustment programme (under Mwinyi’s regime) was launched in 1986 with its primary goals being to reduce the role of the state in the economy and to try to reverse the economic decline. There have also been specific sector-wide reforms and various capacity building, good governance and institutional reforms have been implemented alongside the macro-economic reforms. These include the Public Sector Reform Programme (a successor programme to the former Civil Service Reform Programme), the Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP), the Public Financial Management Reform Programme (PFMRP), the legal reform programme, and the national anti-corruption strategy (Kiragu, 2005; Yambesi, 2003). Each will be discussed briefly in turn, before identifying the main challenges the reform programme faces.
2.1.1 The Public Sector Reform Programme (PRSP)

In 1991 the government launched the Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP) as a response to the pathetic situation in the public service (Mollel, 2002). Despite more and more services being needed to serve various sections of Tanzanian society, the economy could no longer sustain its bloated public sector. The policies and systems of management for both financial and human resources were ineffective and outdated. There was no discipline, the system was filled with ghost workers, the wage bill and other public expenditure were out of control and corruption was rampant (Kiragu, 2005, p 4).

However, despite some positive achievements, such as reducing the size of the government workforce from 355,000 in 1991 to 260,000 by 1998, as well as a fundamental review of the role of the state and the functions of ministries, departments and agencies, there was still a lot that needed to be done. When the civil service reform programme ended in 1999, it was replaced by a broader Public Sector Reform Programme, which emphasized a shift from cost containment and structural reforms under the civil service reform programme to capacity and performance enhancement.

The main logic of the reform was to enhance the prospects of making an impact on service delivery. The impetus for this new focus arose from: (a) the need to demonstrate early results; (b) public demands for transparency, integrity and accountability; (c) the shift to a market economy and private-sector led economic growth; (d) the influence of a new kind of public management; (e) the need for public sector reform to support sector-wide approaches; and (f) the pursuit of an integrated systems approach (Kiragu, 2005, p 17). The current Public Sector Reform Programme takes a long-term perspective. It is expected to have three overlapping phases.

(URT, 2003, p. 13).

To date, the programme has had three successful features: its leadership and management have been effective; an incentives and capacity-backed performance management system has been introduced; and in 2000 a bold and pioneering pay reform initiative – a selective accelerated salary enhancement – was introduced. Up to 2005, however, the scheme had been implemented in only four agencies and departments. Although it is still too early to judge the success of selective accelerated
salary enhancement in Tanzania, the scheme has been encountering some problems. These include a failure to stop donors topping-up their own employees’ salaries, for donors have been reluctant to bring their salary levels closer to the donor government, which is important in making salary enhancement work. As a result, the salary rises have not materialized as planned. Third, enhanced salary levels are still below the market value for some classes of professionals such as IT specialists, which suggests the need for additional measures to prevent them leaving the civil service for the private sector (Kiragu, 2005).

Service delivery has improved since the formation of executive agencies. Important areas like tax collection have also seen big improvements and there has been an increase in private sector participation. Twenty services across ten public institutions had been subcontracted to the private sector by 2004 (URT, 2004). Also, with the introduction of an open performance review appraisal system, there has been an increased emphasis on objectivity in assessing employees’ performance. Thus, according to the public sector reform programme 2004 quarterly report, following the formation of executive agencies, service delivery levels increased over and above the levels delivered by the former ministerial departments. However, there are areas where things have not gone as smoothly as hoped. Also, no evidence was produced that service delivery quality had improved (URT, 2005, pp 2–3).

### 2.1.2 The Public Financial Management Reform Programme (PFMRP)

The Public Financial Management Reform Programme was initiated in 1998 to coordinate a number of complementary projects operating within the Ministry of Finance’s divisions, departments and agencies. These included strengthening policy analysis capacity and bringing together the Government Accounts Development Project (GADP) and the Interim Budget Development Project (IBDP). The main aim of this reform programme is to improve financial management and accountability in government (Yambesi, 2003, p 80). The reform through public expenditure reviews (PERs) has enhanced accountability and transparency in planning and budgeting. Capacity building has also resulted in improvements in external resources management (Kiragu, 2005).
2.1.3 The Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP)

The LGRP was launched in 1998 with the publication of a policy paper on local government reform that stated that the idea was to introduce largely autonomous local governments (Kiragu, 2005, p 22; Yambesi, 2003, p 81), the core strategy being decentralization by devolution. It also aimed to empowering local authorities to facilitate the delivery of public services efficiently and to promote participatory development. The Local Government Reform Programme has five components – governance; local government restructuring; finance; human resources development; and an institutional and legal framework. According to Kiragu, a recent comparative analysis of decentralization in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda has observed that the decentralization process in Tanzania has made important strides.

In fiscal decentralization, major steps have been taken towards ensuring that local government authorities are allocated grants in a transparent manner. Also, the government has now approved a formula-based system for allocating resources between local government authorities, which has been implemented for recurrent health and education grants (Kiragu, 2005, p. 24). However, it is still unclear whether or not the Local Government Reform Programme is significantly improving service delivery (Kiragu, 2005, p. 20).

2.1.4 The Legal Sector Reform Programme (LSRP)

The commitment to reform of the legal sector dates back to 1993, when the government established a legal sector reform task force, which carried out a comprehensive review and identified problems and issues in the legal and institutional framework. The Legal Sector Reform Programme was officially launched following the government’s approval of its recommendations (Kiragu, 2005).

The main concerns of the reform programme are personal safety, access to justice, overall efficiency, fairness, and transparency of administration. Also, these reforms intend to speed up the settlement of cases in the primary courts by reducing the shortage of magistrates; promote community-based security arrangements; and rehabilitate the buildings and other facilities of the primary courts (Kiragu, 2005; Yambesi, 2003). Since the country embarked on legal sector reform, some notable achievements have been realized. For example, a commercial division of the High Court has been established; a medium-term strategy to increase access to justice for the poor and disadvantaged
was launched for the 2000–2005 period; and key legal institutions have improved their capacity to deliver human rights and administrative justice. The pace of the reforms has, however, been slow. A number of factors account for this, but the most obvious is the weak leadership of the programme on the part of the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs. That the programme encompasses so many different institutions, including the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, the judiciary, the Law Reform Committee, and the Commission of Human Rights and Good Governance, only exacerbates the problem.

2.1.5 The National Anti-corruption Strategy and Action Plan (NACSAP)

Efforts to address corruption gained new momentum when President Mkapa was elected to office on a popular anti-corruption platform (Kiragu, 2005, p. 28). On assuming office, he appointed a commission, popularly known as the Warioba Commission, to investigate the problem and it submitted a comprehensive report in 1996. The report attempted to make a full diagnosis of the causes, nature and magnitude of corruption in Tanzania and, in 1999, the first NACSAP was adopted (Mutahaba, 2005). The aims of this anti-corruption programme were to initiate comprehensive anti-corruption legislation; pinpoint areas of government activity most prone to corruption and address them; and identify what legal and administrative remedies might provide adequate deterrence. NACSAP focuses on institutional reforms, raising public awareness, increasing transparency and accountability in government business, and the participation of civil society and the private sector in combating corruption and monitoring progress.

Generally, the national anti-corruption programme has four principles. These are (1) prevention, (2) enforcement, (3) public awareness, which includes forging creative partnerships between government, civil society, the private sector and religious organizations in fighting corruption, and (4) institution building (Kiragu, 2005, p 28). Immediate areas of priority action are the rule of law and the legal framework; financial discipline and management; procurement reforms; public education; enhancing citizens’ awareness of and sensitization to their rights; public service reforms; whistleblower and witness protection; and freedom of the press. Since launching the programme, there have been some positive developments. Some of these include the establishment of the Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB), which has opened offices in all regions and districts of the country. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of the NACSAP implementation and of the Prevention of Corruption
Bureau is questioned. Many fewer cases of corruption have been reported and investigated than public surveys suggest. The Bureau reported that it had only received 2,430 complaints in ten years and that there had been only 192 prosecutions and nine convictions (Kiragu, 2005, p. 29).

2.1.6 Some challenges to the public sector reform programmes

The various reform programmes face the following challenges. First, there is the challenge of ensuring coherence among the reform programmes. Each of the programmes was initiated at a different time and in response to a specific problem confronting a particular sector. The initiatives are therefore not linked and may well move in quite different directions.

Second, it is a challenge to create public demand for reform and accountability. There are still no effective mechanisms through which citizens and stakeholders can voice their concerns, and no avenues through which to participate in design of the reforms or influence their results. The now fashionable client service charters are yet to be used as a means of aggregating public demand.

Third, building an affordable, effective and sustainable incentive framework is a challenge. A particular implementation challenge is solving the problem of resistance to change. Some have been resistant to the reforms simply because they are used to doing things in certain ways (URT, 2002, p. 17). A country with budgetary constraints inevitably has difficulty building an effective incentive framework. Therefore a lot is still to be done.

2.2 Sector-specific reforms: health and education

2.2.1 Health sector reforms

Between 1961 and 1990 the government created a solid network of social service facilities, including health centres and dispensaries. Despite its limited resources, it struggled to ensure equal access to free medical services for all citizens. However, while donor assistance made it possible to sustain its commitment to providing free health services to the public (Munishi, 2004a), in the late 1980s donor funding began to decline and the country’s stagnating economy constrained the government’s ability to increase its support to the health sector. This resulted in deterioration in the quality of healthcare services in government-owned units (Munishi, 2004a, p 487). There was also a shift in the way public services were being provided in the country and elsewhere in the world – it was now felt that the state...
should not carry the financial burden alone and that users must contribute something towards the cost of the services they consume.

According to Yambesi (2003, p 85), key areas of focus in health sector reform are:

- the restoration and/or rehabilitation of the existing infrastructure, including the provision of equipment;
- strengthening delivery of a primary health service to enhance efficiency in the referral system;
- providing an enabling environment in which the private sector can offer health services;
- strengthening the legal and regulatory framework to ensure quality and to curb unethical practices;
- promoting health financing arrangements like health insurance for civil servants and community health funds;
- training health staff;
- encouraging community participation; and
- strengthening the national support system for personnel management, drugs and supplies, and the physical infrastructure.

In 1994 the government articulated its vision for reform of the health sector, redefining its role in the healthcare system from that of dominant provider to a facilitator (Yambesi, 2003, p 85). In current thinking, this implies changing functions for the state, including the following:

- creating an enabling environment for private enterprise;
- regulating market failures and managing change;
- guarding institutions and making democracy work by giving substance to civil society (Warioba, 2002).

Until 1990 private practice was limited by 1977 legislation that stipulated which organizations were allowed to own and manage health service units. In 1990, in the aftermath of economic liberalization in the mid-1980s, when the country adopted structural adjustment policies, Tanzania made some fundamental reforms in the health sector. The new policy, which was implemented in 1992, invited more organizations and private individuals to own and manage healthcare units such as hospitals and health centres, pharmacies, diagnostic laboratories and dispensaries (Munishi, 2004b, p 607). The policy reflected a deliberate effort to privatize part of the health sector and encourage the participation of private providers. This policy had two main purposes – to supplement the government’s efforts at a time when the economy was declining and to improve efficiency in service provision (Munishi, 2004a, p 487).
However, the Tanzanian healthcare system has had a history of declining quality of provision and falling morale of both providers and receivers of health services and few of the objectives of the health sector reform have been achieved (Mackintosh, 1998, p 16).

Chaligha (2004, p 155) argues that the synergy of public and private initiatives in the provision of health services has proved positive with respect to health service delivery. He points out that as a result of that synergy the majority of people have some access to health services. About 72 per cent of the population now live within five kilometres of a health facility and 93 per cent within ten kilometre of a health facility. He also points out that there is popular support for the introduction of health insurance schemes (Chaligha, 2004, p 165). Nevertheless, there is still a problem of access to health services in the private sector. One problem, especially for the poor, is that in some or even most cases privatization has meant commercialization and the profit motive taking priority over the quality of professional practice (Munishi, 2004c, p 338). Furthermore, the physical infrastructure is inadequate, and particularly the buildings need repairs. Also, the availability of trained staff is still a major problem in government healthcare units, a problem partly compounded by the brain drain of nurses and doctors to Europe, the USA and countries in the southern African region with higher rates of pay. Related to the above problem, there has been a decrease in local financing of health services and dependency on donors has grown drastically. Also, revenues raised from user fees at the hospital level have been lower than projected. User fees in Tanzania have in general failed to achieve their original objectives of sustainability, improved drug availability, a high quality of care, equity and access for the poor. Government-run primary healthcare facilities face shortages of drugs and supplies

2.2.2 Education and Its reform in Tanzania

In Tanzania modern education is considered to be one of the positive and progressive legacies of Christian mission and colonial rule. For many Tanzanians, during colonial rule education was “the primary route to a more secure life, to relative influence and affluence, and to the benefits afforded by the colonial situation” (Samoff, 1987, p 333). The value of education has remained the same, many years after independence. Education has a highly social, political and economic role. It enhances individual and family mobility, it has a socializing effect on those who experience it, it transmits skills, and it enables those who have it to influence political affairs (Court, 1979, p 212).
The history of formal education in Tanzania can be divided into four partly overlapping stages, three of which fall into the period before independence – traditional education, Islamic education, colonial education, and post-colonial education (Gillette, 1977, p 27). The last has variants: modern (worldly) education spread by Christianity and the post-Arusha Declaration education that kept being modified as different governments and regimes have come in and out of power.

Modern education came with the Europeans. The Holy Ghost fathers were the first missionaries to arrive and, after initially founding a settlement in Zanzibar in 1863, they moved to Bagamoyo on the mainland in 1868 (Kaniki, 1979, p 88). Five other missionary groups were operating in Tanganyika by the time of its annexation by the Germans in 1884 (Iliffe, 1979, p 84). Local communities were suspicious of the missionaries in the first instance, but later, with the onset of colonial rule and the introduction of a cash economy, which posed new pressures as well as opportunities, parents willingly sent their children to mission schools.

Cameron and Dodd note that provision of education under colonialism depended much on race and gender, and that the school system that emerged was highly segregated on both counts (Cameron and Dodd, 1970, p 104; Hall, 1975, p 29). Not only was it availed to the beneficiaries with these biases but it was also provided in amounts that did not suffice (Hall, 1975). Because of the predominance of mission schools before and during the colonial period, at independence Tanganyika inherited an education system that retained significant religious and racial overtones. It also showed major inconsistencies in the opportunities it made available in different parts of the country, depending on where and by whom Christianity had been accepted.

With independence, the government took several steps to bring the education system under its control. First, between 1961 and 1967, it initiated moves to curb the educational influence of the churches. Second, the central government stripped local authorities of their powers to collect school fees, undergo financial auditing and initiate development planning, thereby depriving them of the financial capacity to run new locally initiated educational projects. Third, the central government started to take the initiative in areas where local authorities were precluded from acting (Morrison, 1976, p 95). Alongside these steps, there were three further adjustments (Hall, 1975, p 30) – racial distinctions were eliminated and integration measures taken, the curriculum was changed, and an effort was made to increase enrolment.
After 1967, when the Arusha Declaration announced Tanzania’s socialist path to development, education was restructured along socialist lines. As the key policy objectives of the Arusha Declaration were to make Tanzania socialist and self-reliant, an educational philosophy was introduced. *Education for self reliance*, the most important educational document since independence, set down principles of education that not only conformed to Tanzania’s socialist goals but were also intended to serve as a revolutionary influence in the creation of socialists (Hall, 1975, p 31). This type of education was intended to remedy:

- the elitist approach to who received education;
- schools that were ‘islands’ for a few people rather than part of society;
- education that was bookish and provided by educated people; and
- the exploitative relationship between those getting education and their communities (Nyerere, 1967, p 5).

This policy led to increased enrolment and, with a supporting policy of universal primary education from 1970, there was a massive expansion in the education sector to accommodate the huge numbers of children seeking places in schools, especially at primary level. Literacy levels rose and Tanzania was considered a success in Africa in the 1970s and 1980s in terms of this indicator, despite its ailing economy. The key positive landmarks resulting from these initiatives were an increase in the number of schools and in the enrolment of students (Mutakyahwa, 1999). The achievements of the 1970s could not, however, be sustained through the 1980s and the country experienced difficulty financing and managing its education services. Because of economic problems, the country had to abandon its development strategy that sought to achieve growth and equity. As the economy deteriorated further, performance started to decline and reversals were recorded in the education sector. Illiteracy started to rise rather than fall, schools were poorly equipped and teachers became dissatisfied with the salaries they were being paid, which were indeed very low.

In 1995 a new education and training policy designed to decentralize education was introduced to guide the provision of education. According to Yambesi (2003, p. 86), an education sector development programme (Ed-SDP) has been developed in response to the inadequate quality and quantity of education services at all levels. He states that the reform generally aims to raise enrolment, improve quality, optimize the use of available resources and reinforce the capacity to manage schools at the grassroots level. Priority actions within the Ed-SDP include: improving the learning and teaching
environment, promoting equality of access, improving literacy rates, rationalizing tertiary and higher education to enhance efficiency and effectiveness, and strengthening science and technology programmes (Yambesi, 2003, p 86).

Since the launch of the education reform, there have been some positive developments, such as increasing enrolment rates following the abolition of school fees in primary schools and a decreased gender imbalance in schools and colleges. In 1997, for instance, 44 per cent of the students in secondary schools and 21 per cent in universities and colleges were female, whereas in 2004 this ratio had risen to 50 and 29 per cent respectively (Kassimoto, 2005). However, the extent to which the reforms have achieved their quality objectives is unclear, for there have been some claims that, especially at primary school level, they mainly focus on quantity rather than quality.

2.2.3 Challenges facing education and health reforms

Most privately owned health service units are located in urban areas (Munishi, 2004c, p 346). Private providers tend to locate their health service units in areas with higher per capita incomes. This tendency has denied health services to the majority of the population who live in rural areas. A lot still needs to be done to ensure balanced access to health services between urban and rural areas.

Corruption is still rife in the health sector. Bribery seems to threaten equity in obtaining services, especially for people unable or unwilling to comply with the slogan “no money, no care” (Kaijage and Ruge, 1999, p 261). A decentralization policy has been in place for a number of years, though the financing of health services and the management of resources has remained centralized (Munishi, 2004b, p 626).

All resources allocated for district health services still come from the central government. The capacity of local governments to generate their own resources that could be used to finance health services is low because the government controls all the important tax bases. Given this situation, the government faces a difficult task in convincing district authorities to accept decentralization as a means of providing better and more efficient services (Mushi and Katunzi, 2004, p 179).
The developments taking place in the Tanzanian health sector show a healthy mix of public and private providers, as well as a funded healthcare system. Some advocate that commercial and public providers should be thought of as two totally independent sectors, in which case the public policy challenge would be to provide some basic primary and preventive healthcare while leaving the rest to an emerging private sector (Mackintosh, 1998). Another policy challenge in a liberalized healthcare system, as outlined by Mackintosh, would be to try to encourage ethical and professional ways of working and to stimulate the growth of institutions that would sustain them with a clear sense of direction over time. The reforms in Tanzania do not go as far as this in either intention or practice.

With regard to the education sector, there is a mismatch between efforts to increase enrolment and efforts to train teachers and build facilities that will lead to quality education. There is also a problem with transition rates from primary level to secondary level, from secondary level to high school, and from high school to tertiary level. There are too few universities to cater for the many secondary school leavers who qualify for further education, despite the government having liberalized the sector to allow private universities to operate.

3 Religion and public sector reform in Tanzania

3.1 State–religion relations in Tanzania

In this section we look at state–religion relations in general and at religion and service provision in particular. There is also a short sub-section on the efforts of the two major religions to influence reforms and the direction of policy in Tanzania in the aftermath of the country’s return to multiparty politics. Bakari and Ndumbaro (2001) discuss the role of religion in service provision in Tanzania in the context of a state–religion interface. State–religion relations in Tanzania have passed through three stages – pre-colonial, colonial, and post-independence, with the latter divided into a pre- and post-liberalization phase. Although the Tanzanian state is constitutionally secular, the authors note that from independence to date religion has played a significant role in the non-political domain (Bakari and Ndumbaro, 2001), with both Christian and Islamic organizations continuously engaged in economic, social and educational projects. Although almost all civil society organizations were politically restricted during the single-party era, religious organizations did not seem to be touched much by this restriction because some of the basic principles of Ujamaa were so close to religious teachings on equality, modesty and the spirit of sharing (Bakari and Ndumbaro, 2001).
observes, in many countries (Tanzania included) religious groups have had an important input into the policy process because in many instances the state and religious groups have had an overlapping agenda with respect to developmental issues. However, it is also noted that religious leaders have from time to time come into conflict with the state over policy issues, “which include population control methods and divorce when it comes to the Christian religion and marriage and inheritance laws in Islam”.

3.2 Religious provision of health and education services

While Ministry of Health figures showing patterns of health facilities provided from 1961 to 1997 fail to distinguish between religious and secular voluntary agencies and are incomplete, they nonetheless demonstrate the important role of voluntary agencies, the bulk of which are Christian, in providing hospitals, and the increasing role of the private sector in the 1990s, especially in the provision of dispensaries and hospitals (see Tables 1–3).

The Christian denominations have played a key role in the provision of health services. In southern Tanzania, for instance, all the major hospitals – Ndanda in Mtwara, Nyangao in Lindi, and Peramiho and Litembo in Ruvuma – belong to the Roman Catholic Church. In 1990, the churches in Tanzania owned 68 non-profit making hospitals, or 40 per cent of the total (see Table 1) (Chaligha, 2004, p 155); two of the four referral hospitals belong to Christian churches – Bugando in Mwanza to the Catholics and KCMC in Kilimanjaro to the Lutherans. There are also teaching hospitals attached to the two church-owned universities – Saint Augustine University of Tanzania (SAUT) and Tumaini University. The other two referral hospitals, Muhimbili and Mbeya, are government owned. A fifth referral hospital under construction in Dodoma is also being church financed. The government’s policy to return some of the facilities that were nationalized in 1967 (especially hospitals) to their original owners led to an increased number of private-for-profit hospitals, while the number run by religious organizations remained more or less the same during the period under consideration.
Table 1: Number of hospitals in Tanzania 1961–97

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ownership</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1997</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>77 (44%)</td>
<td>66 (32.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary agencies*</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>85 (48.6%)</td>
<td>83 (40.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public corporations</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>9 (5.1%)</td>
<td>8 (3.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private-for-profit</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>4 (2.3%)</td>
<td>48 (23.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>175</strong></td>
<td><strong>205</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The bulk of these are Christian organizations


Table 2: Number of health centres in Tanzania 1961–97

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ownership</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1997</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>265 (96.0%)</td>
<td>273 (85.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary agencies*</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>8 (2.9%)</td>
<td>16 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public corporations</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2 (0.7%)</td>
<td>11 (3.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private-for-profit</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1 (0.4%)</td>
<td>18 (5.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>276</strong></td>
<td><strong>318</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The bulk of these are Christian organizations


Furthermore, the missions own and manage about 450 dispensaries, which normally charge moderate fees (Chaligha, 2004, p.155), though the poor are sometimes exempted on humanitarian grounds (Table 3). The number of dispensaries owned by public corporations had declined by 1997 because of the restructuring of the parastatal sector. Many of the more than 400 parastatals have been sold to private entrepreneurs, commercialized, dissolved, or entered into joint venture arrangements with investors. This trend has continued, so there are probably far fewer dispensaries run by public corporations than there were in 1997. The private-for-profit total went up significantly because of the liberalization policy that allowed private individuals and organizations to start dispensary services with the consent of the relevant government body. Medical doctors have also
been allowed to open private dispensaries, health centres and hospitals as a way of increasing their incomes and reducing the likelihood of them moving to other countries. Many did open such facilities, especially the more affordable dispensaries.

### Table 3: Number of dispensaries in Tanzania: 1961–97

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ownership</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1990 (19.4%)</th>
<th>1997 (29.3%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>2218 (71.1%)</td>
<td>2303 (51.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary agencies*</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>604 (19.4%)</td>
<td>675 (15.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public corporations</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>260 (8.3%)</td>
<td>185 (4.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private-for-profit</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>36 (1.2%)</td>
<td>1313 (29.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>3118</strong></td>
<td><strong>4476</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The bulk of these are Christian organizations


Around independence Muslims, through the EAMWS, also played a major role in providing social services in Tanzania. For instance, the EAMWS has concentrated on building schools and mosques and providing scholarships. Shiite Muslims, especially the Ismaili followers of the Aga Khan, have also established schools, hospitals and libraries. Out of a total of thirteen university, two are church owned and one is Muslim.

### 3.3 Influence of religious organizations on education and health sector reforms

With the economic hardships the government was facing in the 1970s and 1980s, some institutions that were nationalized in 1967 reverted to their former owners, which included the two main institutionalized religions. Since this automatically increased the religious organizations’ role in service provision, it also implied a need to ensure that they participated in making key decisions in the relevant areas. This reinforced the grip of religion on some key sectors like education and health. The government has also entered into partnerships with religious groups in turning some religious property
into government facilities, as with the designated district hospitals (DDHs). Under this scheme, where the government does not have a district hospital, the religious organization in question allows the government to convert one that it owns into a district hospital.

There is no doubt, therefore, that the major religions are key players in the public sector, especially in the provision of health services and education. They would, therefore, be expected to be interested in knowing what was happening in these two sectors, especially at policy level. They are indeed interested in the ongoing reforms in the public sector. To a great extent, religious organizations seem to support the public sector reforms, partly because they address issues that are close to religious principles, such as equality, access, transparency and collective responsibility. For instance, faith-based organizations insist on equal access to health and education services, while the reforms have also introduced primary education development programmes that place much stress on improving the quality of and providing free access to primary education.

Another area in which the two seem to agree with each other is on addressing gender imbalances by increasing female students’ enrolment in schools and colleges. Faith-based opinion also supports giving more opportunities to female students. For instance, Kilaini (2004, p 20) points to the initiatives of the Catholic Church in providing education to women. Also, in the statements of the CCT of 1995 and of the ELCT, these organizations insisted on the importance of equal opportunities for all citizens irrespective of their colour, race and gender.

Faith-based organizations have been influencing health and education reforms in a number of formal as well as informal ways. Religious organizations like BAKWATA, CCT, ELCT and TEC have issued public statements about their positions on a range of socio-economic and political issues. For instance, in 1994 ELCT issued the Bagamoyo Statement in which the issues raised were, among others:

i. That “in order to be meaningful, political and economic reforms should contribute to the improvement of lives of the citizens, reduce the gap between the rich and poor and bring hope to the people to live” (ELCT, 1994, p. 15) (my emphasis).

ii. In concluding, the statement emphasized that the “church will continue to have an overt and close relationship with the government”, observing the following:
- accountability;
- transparency and openness;
- human rights;
- non-misappropriation of people’s property;
- true democracy;
- the rule of law;
- respect for the constitution; and
- unity of the country.

Furthermore, in 1995 the CCT pointed out its position on the prevailing situation in the country. Its statement touches several politico-administrative and social areas including politics, the economy, trade liberalization, bribery and corruption, social services, education, health, elections, statehood qualities, and the constitution. On education, that statement noted the following:

i. That for a quite long period of time education had been neglected by the nation. It therefore called for more attention to be paid to the education sector. Specifically, the statement pointed out that the Ministry of Education and Culture’s budget had been inadequate for ensuring the quantity and quality of educational services. The members of the CCT therefore urged the government to give more priority to the education sector.

ii. That some of the facilities that had been nationalized were in disrepair and, it recommended, should be returned to their former owners so that they could be rehabilitated.

Given that the government (being the main financer of the health sector) suffers from financial shortages, there have been various measures to try to raise funds for the sector. One of these initiatives has been the introduction of cost-sharing through a user fee (Kaijage and Ruge, 1999, p 253). Cost-sharing in health services has not received any significant challenge from faith-based organizations. The only argument from religious organizations has been that user fees should be properly managed to ensure that the cost does not exclude those who are unable to pay. Another reason why religious organizations might support user fees is that there has been a decline in the amount of financial support these organizations are getting from their sister organizations overseas. Cost-sharing is accepted on the basis that it facilitates the delivery of health services to the public and acts as a supplement to inadequate financial resources following the continuing decrease in financial assistance from abroad.
Faith-based organizations have also been influencing reforms through advocacy, lobbying and meetings. On advocacy, these organizations have been putting forward positions on a range of issues through various means such as the mass media, particularly the newspapers and radio stations. Some Christian-owned newspapers include *Kiongozi, Msemakweli, Mwenge*, whereas the Muslim-owned ones include *Al-nuur and Al-huda*. Radio stations include, Radio Tumaini, Radio Maria, Upendo Radio, WAPO Radio and Sauti ya Quran (Moslem).

Furthermore, consultative meetings have been held between policy makers and religious leaders. Top government officials, such as the president and the prime minister, are sometimes invited to open these meetings and workshops at which a number of socio-economic and political issues are addressed. Such meetings serve as a forum through which to lobby for such things as subsidies and tax exemption for imports meant to support the services religious organizations offer to the population, to urge policy makers to incorporate religious values and principles in state activities and to recognize FBOs as development partners. These organizations have also been meeting with other bodies, such as parliamentary committees, in which they lobby decision makers to accommodate their positions on different societal issues.

Another area in which religious organizations played an important role was in the first multiparty elections held in Tanzania in 1995. Elections provide one variable for gauging levels of good governance and are therefore an area in which key stakeholders want to make a contribution. The major religions stipulated what kind of president they would like to see accede to power (CCT, 1995; ELCT, 1994) and identified some burning issues the government had, in their view, failed to address and that the president elected under the multiparty framework should take on board. One such issue was corruption, a social vice which, according to the religious organizations, the government had failed to contain and from which the common man suffered a lot.

### 4 Some suggested research areas and gaps

The above review of work on public sector reform in Tanzania, the role of religious organizations in providing health and education services and the interactions between FBOs and government with respect to service delivery and sectoral reform shows a number of un- or under-researched areas. Two main and a number of secondary research questions are listed below.
1. To what extent and how does the Tanzanian government engage with or respond to religious organizations in the course of reform? To answer this question it would be necessary to look at:

   a. relations between the religions and relevant government ministries; and
   b. the official as well as unofficial avenues used for communication between the two parties, including parliament and parliamentary committees, social services committees, the papacy, the Shura of imams, and whatever local government forums are available.

2. What difference does the influence of faith traditions and religious organizations make to the reform of education and health services?

   a. Do religious bodies have any say in curricula development?
   b. Do the faith-based organizations have a reform agenda of their own, and who is at its centre?
   c. What sanctions do the religions have if the government does not listen to them? Have such sanctions been applied in recent years in Tanzania and what was the outcome?
   d. Are some services more “sensitive” in the eyes of religious organizations than others and why?
   e. How successful have attempts to win the government to religious views and priorities been?
5  The development activities of faith-based organisations in Tanzania - Peter Tumainimungu

1  Introduction

Faith-based organizations (FBOs) have over the years provided important social and developmental services in Tanzania. Their contribution in the fields of health, education and caring for the disabled has been significant. Christian organizations in particular have been very active in the provision of social services. The dominance of Christian schools, for example, has meant that some prominent Tanzanian Muslims have attended such schools (Ishumi, 2006, p 434). Islamic philanthropy has also, however, been visible in areas with a large Muslim presence.

The purpose of this paper is to review the literature on the activities, values and performance of FBOs in Tanzania. Specifically, my intention is to:

- identify various writings on FBOs in Tanzania, including whatever empirical studies have been undertaken, along with their aims and methodology; and,
- from the reviewed literature related to FBOs, point out the main findings, identify the conceptual and theoretical issues, and examine the FBOs' changing relations with the state and their development activities.

It is important to note from the very beginning that the use of the term FBO in referring to the activities of religious organizations is not universal. In Tanzania such organizations were for a long time referred to as voluntary agencies. We need therefore to deal with some definitional issues at the outset. The problem is twofold. First, some bodies claim to be FBOs but have no direct (functional) link to a particular religious authority. Thus, the principles and religious beliefs of the leaders of a particular FBO are taken to determine the criterion for its inclusion rather than its affiliation to a larger religious organization. Second, however, given that some FBOs have direct links with the structure and operation of their religions, there is an issue of how to distinguish social services provided by an FBO from those services provided by a church or mosque, in short from clerical services.

2  Definitional and taxonomical issues

One definitional problem arises from the link between FBOs and civil society more broadly, for it is thought to be difficult to grasp the concept of an FBO outside the context of civil society and civil society organizations. The same applies to many other bodies operating in society today, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community-based organizations (CBOs), and non-profit organizations (NPOs). Arguably, they are all part of civil society and indeed some use the term civil society organizations interchangeably with NGO or similar terms.
There is, however, a definitional problem in the meaning of civil society, not only as it applies to Tanzania but also in its historical context. For example, there is no consensus on the meaning of ‘civil society’ between classical/traditional philosophers like John Locke, Thomas Hobbes and Jean Jacques Rousseau (Gonsalves, 1989, pp 363–5) and those of the Liberal and Marxist schools. I believe that Bratton’s definition of civil society helps us to understand the concept. He holds that civil society is a public realm between the state and the family; that it is distinct from political society, for example as represented by political parties; and that it is a theoretical rather than an empirical construct. In other words, it cannot be directly observed because it is a synthetic conceptual construct that encompasses the wide variety of forms of popular action that occur in the public realm (Bratton, 1994, p 55). The above elaboration allows us to comprehend a definition of civil society he gave in an earlier study, in which he defined civil society as “an arena where manifold social movements and civil organizations from all classes attempt to constitute themselves in an ensemble of arrangements so that they can express themselves and advance their interests” (Bratton, 1989, p 417).

In principle, therefore, FBOs should be regarded as part of civil society, which is wider. In the concept of civil society, however, the ideas of public domain and civic community are very important. Thus purely clerical or military organizations, which are by their nature exclusive, are not considered to be part of civil society. It is unclear whether the Tanzania government was using that logic when it distinguished FBOs from purely preaching organizations. The government position is that only religious organizations that are engaged in developmental activities can be registered as FBOs; those that engage only in preaching and religious training do not qualify. The logic for this is probably that, by engaging in development activities, FBOs are likely to involve lay people and other citizens.

FBOs can also be other things. They are NGOs in that they do not belong to the government. Therefore, if NGOs are expected to play an important role in society, one might expect FBOs to perform similar tasks to NGOs. FBOs are also mostly non-profit organizations (NPOs). In these times when the non-profit sector is given greater prominence, FBOs may be considered important actors in it. Few if any FBOs aim to maximize profit or distribute profit to their members. In general, most are philanthropic and run mostly by volunteers or professionals who are not maximizing their incomes.
Concretely, when it comes to Tanzania we can see that FBOs can be part of civil society, and are also a type of NGO and a type of NPO. A number of qualifications will, however, have to be made. In an examination of civil society organizations (CSOs), DFID (2000, p 3) observes that, broadly speaking, there are two types of CSO that can act in a pro-poor fashion. The first is involved in delivering services and maintaining access for poor people to basic health, education, water, finance and other services. The second is concerned with three main activities, namely:

i. raising awareness among poor people of their civic, political and legal rights and responsibilities;
ii. equipping poor and disadvantaged groups to participate effectively in democratization and decision-making processes; and
iii. advocating on behalf of poor people to increase their influence on government policies and practices.

Based on the above characteristics, DFID (2000, p 2) identified the following categories of CSOs as “interest groups” with different degrees of accountability to their membership:

i. NGOs, both national and international;
ii. religious organizations;
iii. professional associations;
iv. trade unions;
v. cooperatives;
vi. voluntary and self-help groups;
vii. organizations representing socially excluded groups such as women, and people with disabilities;
viii. political parties;
ix. the media;
x. CBOs;
xii. legal and human rights groups; and
xii. research and advocacy organizations.

In the second category DFID (2000, p 4) identifies the following types:

i. human rights organizations;
ii. legal aid organizations;
iii. democracy organizations;
iv. church organizations;
v. media organizations;
vi. anti-corruption organizations/governance;
vii. independent research groups; and
viii. political parties

FBOs are found in both categories: they are referred to as religious organizations in the first and as church or mosque organizations in the second. Thus it follows that FBOs can be considered part of civil society when they engage in issues to promote the collective public good and when they operate within the broader civic community. FBOs are not part of civil society when they operate exclusively in the interests of the adherents of the faith tradition with which they are associated, although their functions may still be valuable. It is reiterated that purely and exclusively clerical organizations are not part of civil society because their members have to obey the religious authorities. Only when individuals act as lay people can they express their civic free will.

The same applies when one is considering whether FBOs can be regarded as NPOs. In other words, can religious organizations engaged in profit-making activities be regarded as FBOs? Profit-making bodies in this case refer to capitalist organizations engaged in activities aimed at maximizing profit. Most FBOs, both Christian and Muslim, engage in non-profit activities; they can make a modest profit to ensure their survival, but most are not even doing that because they mostly serve under-privileged and vulnerable members of society. FBOs are therefore distinguished from other NPOs by the values and principles governing them and by their orientation and affiliation with specific religious faiths.

The question that comes up here is whether we can draw a line between an FBO and the religion that gives rise to it. Some religious leaders believe it is neither possible nor desirable to separate the two because that might undermine the spirituality of the whole enterprise. Sometimes the distinction might be blurred because religious leaders are the people involved in administering an FBO. Most FBOs, however, are given a certain degree of autonomy to ensure their efficiency and effectiveness and many extend their services to people who do not belong to the faith with which they are associated. Even when they are not serving members of other religions, most of those involved appear to believe that they are likely to be more effective when they serve their beneficiaries as lay members and when they can make good use of lay leaders and professionals.
The government is suspicious of the recent proliferation of preaching organizations, especially those that operate outside churches and mosques, and especially those that insult other religions. For an FBO to be registered, the Tanzanian government requires it to be engaged in development activities. This suggests that the government wishes to encourage religious organizations to engage in development activities, in the spirit laid down since colonial times. The government appears to be more comfortable with the service delivery role of FBOs than with their advocacy role.

3 A preliminary identification of some FBOs engaged in development

Much of the literature consulted fails to consider FBOs specifically and directly, but deals rather with FBOs in relation to their work in civil society, often in conjunction with NGOs and the non-profit sector. DFID, for example, commissioned a study in 2000 to look at civil society organizations. The study, which was focused on the most vulnerable members of society, was commissioned with a view to providing background information for a new programme to provide financial support to NGOs. The selected case studies were meant to address issues related to the changes taking place in Tanzanian civil society. They included discussions about the challenges faced in the areas of governance and policy engagement, as well as what approaches best supported the most vulnerable (DFID, 2000, p ii). FBOs are referred to as being part of civil society, as NGOs and as part of the non-profit sector, which, as indicated in the discussion above, is justified so long as the boundaries are known.

A comparative study undertaken by Johns Hopkins University (1996) addresses a number of issues that pertain to the non-profit sector in Tanzania. FBOs are seen as an important part of that sector, especially in the provision of traditional social services such as health (Salamon with Solzolowski, 2004).

Robinson also looked at FBOs as part of the non-profit sector. In a report presented in three volumes introducing the subject in the three countries of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania, he examined the challenges facing the non-profit sector in responding to changes in the national and international political and economic landscape (Robinson et al., 2004).

The DFID study identified three main church organizations in Tanzania:
i. the CCT (Christian Council of Tanzania), which is an umbrella group of 14 different Protestant churches spread throughout Tanzania;
ii. the TEC (Tanzania Episcopal Conference), which is the organization of the Catholic Church; and
iii. the ECLT (Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanzania), which is the largest church under the CCT umbrella (DFID, 2000).

All the above church organizations have departments that deal with social, economic and political matters. There are also many FBOs of varying sizes and effectiveness linked to these religions. CARITAS, for example, is linked to the Catholic Church, while the Tanzania Christian Refugee Services (TCRS) is linked to the Lutheran Church. Churches belonging to the above umbrella organizations place a high premium on engaging in development activities. In comparison with what is known about the above organizations, there has been very little written on the new types of churches, including those engaged in tele-evangelism.

Other non-Christian religions, including the different Muslim denominations, also have FBOs. There are many Muslim philanthropic FBOs spread throughout the country, but partly because the Muslims do not have a unanimously accepted umbrella organization, even though the majority of Muslims in Tanzania are Sunni, they are limited in scope. BAKWATA, which the government helped establish, is contested. The Shia Muslims, who are mostly Tanzanians of Asian origin, have FBOs which are effective given their limited numbers. The Aga Khan Trust, the Al Muntazir organization, and World Islamic Propagation and Humanitarian Services (WIPAHS) are cases in point. They are mostly engaged in the provision of education and health services. Yet other non-Christian, non-Muslim faiths include the Bahai and the Hindus.

While FBOs easily qualify as NGOs, because they are affiliated to religions they are also mostly non-profit making. In this sense, for example, we distinguish the Aga Khan Trust, which is a philanthropic body, from the profit-making enterprises found within the Aga Khan Foundation. The question of whether all FBOs qualify as belonging to Tanzanian civil society can be repeated here. This time the issue is that some are affiliated to foreign groups and get a considerable amount of their support from outside the country. Getting assistance from outside the country does not, however, disqualify them from being part of civil society so long they remain controlled by Tanzanians.
While most FBOs are involved in the provision of health services and education, some are also engaged in food relief, and in providing assistance and funding for housing and economic activities. Examples of these include BAKWATA, the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), CARITAS and the Tanzania Christian Refugee Services (Mhina, 1998, p. 99).

### 3.1 Social services provided by selected FBOs

Some FBOs are significant in the delivery of social services. We give the following examples:

**CSSC**: The Christian Social Services Commission (CSSC) is an ecumenical body established in 1992 to facilitate the provision by the churches in Tanzania of social services with a focus on education and health. It is the largest ecumenical body in East Africa, with a network of more than 80 dioceses and provinces that own and manage about 40 per cent of health and education services in the country. CSSC’s membership is limited to the Christian CCT and the TEC.

The CSSC is certainly one of the most important and effective service provision FBOs in Tanzania, as its programmes indicate:

- **Joint programme**: the Joint Churches and Government Programme for Sustainable Development in Social Services in the Health and Education sectors is the oldest programme at CSSC.
- **Construction and rehabilitation**: this facilitates improvement of provision of health and education services through construction and rehabilitation of facilities, including provision of staff houses.
- **Health Care Technical Services**: aims to improve health services through maintaining medical equipment. The project raises an awareness of the importance of planned preventive maintenance of facilities, establishes healthcare technical service (HCTS) centres and provides technical expertise to the centres and hospitals.
- **Revolving Drug Fund**: this programme facilitates improvements in the availability of medicine and raises awareness of good drugs management.
- **Science Teaching Innovation Programme**: this programme aims to ensure the availability and sustainability of teaching and learning materials and innovations in teaching methodologies.
- **Capacity building**: through this initiative, the CSSC aims to bring the management capacity of key persons from church facilities up to date with sectoral reforms in the provision of social services.
- **The global fund project**: the CSSC is one of the lead sub-recipients of the Global Fund to fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria in Tanzania. The commission manages and oversees the implementation of project activities carried out by FBOs.

- **Other ongoing programmes/projects:** the CSSC also facilitates a number of other short-term programmes/projects in collaboration with various partners. Also, through its consultancy and development division, the CSSC avails its in-house competence to churches and their social institutions, NGOs, government and other organizations. Available consultancy expertise includes architectural, quantity surveying, civil engineering, social and economic analysis, planning and implementation, management and legal services.

Apart from this Christian ecumenical body, there are a number of non-Christian religious organizations providing social services. Two examples follow:

**BAKWATA:** the main Muslim umbrella organization, which, despite being contested by a number of Muslims, provides education and to a limited extent health services. It is also active in various educational and empowerment programmes for entrepreneurship and in HIV/AIDS prevention, care and treatment.

**The Aga Khan National Council of Tanzania:** through its development agency, the Aga Khan Foundation, this provides for both profit and non-profit activities. The latter include basic health programmes through Aga Khan health services, which works in close cooperation with the Ministry of Health, NGOs and world bodies such as the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS (UNAIDS).

### 3.2 Other development activities of selected FBOs

The DFID study shows that more recently FBOs have been involved in other activities such as advocacy and attempts to influence public policies, either as individual organizations or in partnerships between and among themselves. For example, according to the study conducted during the 1995 elections, it was noted that over 40 per cent of respondents in the evaluation exercise identified the church (or mosque) as their principal means of acquiring civic education information (DFID, 2000, p 7). To enable them to provide the new type of services, religions have established FBOs or organized activities within their own religious departments as well as working with inter-religious umbrella organizations. The following examples can be given:
TEC conducts civic education and awareness raising activities through its FBO, CARITAS, and its justice and peace secretariats. These are present in all nineteen of its dioceses. It is currently involved in a civic education project in 350 schools (both Catholic and Protestant), for which it has disseminated a textbook. The Catholic Church also has lay organizations, two of which are the National Council of Catholic Laity and the Christian Professionals of Tanzania, which have been involved in the provision of civic education and commenting on policy issues.

BAKWATA has so far not been involved in any large-scale civic education but has been involved in many inter-religious fora that attempt to influence public policy.

WCRP-Tanzania Chapter The World Conference on Religions and Peace, Tanzania Chapter, had its origins in the WCRP-International, which is a multi-religious organization. It is a large worldwide coalition of representatives of religious communities which seeks to assist religious communities to mobilize their unique moral and social resources in cooperative actions for peace. It is dedicated to promoting cooperation among the world’s religions for peace, while maintaining respect for religious differences. It is accredited to various UN organizations and has members in more than a hundred countries and chapters in more than forty countries.

WCRP was formally registered in Tanzania in 2000. It claims to be committed to the development of a peaceful country in which religions practise respect and tolerance, and contribute in practical ways to the equity and security of all people. WCRP/Tanzania hosted its first significant public event, World Religion Day, on 16 January 2000. More than seventy participants from Muslim, Christian, Hindu, Bahai, Buddhist and Zoroastrian religious communities attended the meeting. Its board of trustees is drawn from ELCT, CCT, BAKWATA, TEC, the Council of Muslim Institutions in Tanzania, the Buddhist community and the Great Peace Journey Faith. Through its capacity development and the resource mobilization of its key constituencies, it claims to facilitate the empowering of Tanzanian civil society. In reality, however, it is mainly a peace building rather than a development umbrella FBO.
3.3 FBOs and development activities in Tanzania: self-assessment

To understand the nature of the environment in which the FBOs that deliver social services operate in Tanzania, it might be useful to take note of some observations made by participants in a workshop conducted by the WCRP-Tanzania Chapter, which brought together various FBOs to discuss their participation in service delivery activities (WCRP-Tanzania Chapter, 2003, p 10).

Taking as an example the ability of FBOs to address the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the participants discussed the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats to FBOs in Tanzania. Some of these views are summarised below.

i. Strengths of FBOs

- A big weapon is that FBOs have faith in human rights;
- most religions have a system of sexual education and morality, the point is to use such systems;
- Islamic and Christian bodies are prepared to allow every mosque and church to give HIV/AIDS education and assistance;
- religions possess comparative advantages that can lead to effective results. These include their human resources; an institutional infrastructure and channels of communication that reach from every village up through national and international structures; their spirit of voluntarism; moral authority; a tradition of speaking out on issues of concern; and long experience of caring for vulnerable people;
- religious organizations have credibility and engender trust; and
- FBOs have boards to deal with HIV/AIDS in most religious communities. These boards need to enhance different capacities and levels of education, counselling, care and support for families.

ii. Weaknesses of FBOs

- There is little support from the government. Governments need to take in and involve religious bodies directly;
- the government is not giving enough priority to faith traditions other than Christianity and Islam;
- the loss of social culture has made it difficult for the religious community to implement ideas and mobilize parents to speak about sexuality;
- faith communities can be judgemental, so stigma is rife;
- foreign religions come with their foreign cultures and this can destabilize local cultures, which have a great contribution to make to society;
not enough research has been done on customs and traditions;
faith communities have policies for dealing with orphans but there is little implementation;
the world globalization of popular secular culture, the rise of commercialism and mass marketing
hinders the power of religious bodies to reach people and effect change; and
there is dishonesty in the use of resources set aside for HIV/AIDS.

iii. Opportunities for FBOs

The national HIV/AIDS strategy recognizes the efforts made by religious communities;
there are mechanisms and structures in place to involve religious organizations at the district level;
policy allows religious leaders to get involved in the dissemination of policies and state laws, for example
through consultations on poverty reduction policies, HIV/AIDS policy and local government reforms;
religious organizations are credible in the eyes of both local and international communities;
religious communities have governance structures that are acceptable down to the household level;
there is networking between religious bodies and the government; and
policy gives FBOs a mandate to plan and implement their own programmes.

iv. Threats to FBOs

FBOs and governments hold different views on sources of infection, use of condoms and erosion of
marital ethics;
the government perceives FBOs as lacking in capacity;
there is no cooperation between religious organizations and the medical fraternity or professional
organizations;
people are unwilling to listen to or hear what the FBOs are saying;
the commercial media promote pornographic advertisements and alcohol; and
there has been a violation (or erosion) of African culture in that the extended family and child-bearing are
being devalued.

4 Conclusion and main research gaps

FBOs can be part of civil society, they are NGOs and they are mostly non-profit organizations, but they
are distinguished from other organizations by the values and principles governing them and by their
orientation to and affiliation with specific religious faiths. They play an important role in development.
They are likely to continue delivering social services, but they are also likely to increase their advocacy
role and their quest to influence policy.
Following the above review of literature related to FBO issues in Tanzania, a number of research gaps can be identified.

i. To help understand the level of performance of FBOs in relation to other non-profit organizations and variations between FBOs of different denominations, assessments are needed of their performance, including the characteristics and outcomes of their service delivery and developmental activities, and their capacity to operate strategically by developing organizational and institutional plans;

ii. A more systematic examination of whether FBOs have taken on new development and advocacy roles beyond the provision of traditional services is needed, including the reaction of the government to the new, more proactive role of FBOs;

iii. Also needed is a study of the types and outcomes of the development activities of religious groups and congregations that have not established separate FBOs.
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development is a vision and strategic framework for Africa’s renewal. It arises from a mandate given by the Organisation of African Unity to the five initiating heads of state (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa) to develop an integrated socio-economic framework for Africa. In 2001 the OAU (now the African Union) approved the framework document. The partnership’s objectives are to eradicate poverty, place African countries on a path towards sustainable development, halt the marginalization of Africa in the globalisation process and ensure its full and beneficial integration into the global economy, and accelerate the empowerment of women. It has produced an agreed programme of action based on the principles of good governance, African ownership and leadership, anchoring the development of Africa on its resources and the resourcefulness of its people, partnership amongst African nations and between Africa and its international partners, integration, building competitiveness, and harmony with internationally agreed goals (e.g. the Millenium Development Goals). Its key priority action areas include good governance, developing regional infrastructure, food security and agricultural development, and ensuring that the MDGs for health and education are met www.nepad.org

Even in the national population census, religion has been excluded as a category since 1967.

According to Sivalon (1992), church leaders asked Nyerere to ban the EAMWS and after that, in 1969, many sheikhs who opposed BAKWATA were secretly arrested. See also Said (1998) and Westerlund (1980).

Whereas in Zanzibar Kadhi courts have existed from the colonial times to date and are now entrenched in the Zanzibar Constitution (Article 99), though their jurisdiction is limited to Muslim law governing personal matters such as marriage, divorce, inheritance and waqf, on the Mainland the Kadhi institution was abolished in 1963, when the native courts and Kadhi courts were integrated with the ‘superior’ courts (those which were exclusively for Europeans and Asians) to constitute a single tier court system. On the mainland, therefore, Muslim personal matters are within the remit of the regular Magistrate’s courts, but when an issue requiring Islamic knowledge arises, it is normally referred to the Muslim National Council (BAKWATA) for an expert opinion. There has been a persistent demand by Muslims on the Mainland to reinstate the Kadhi courts; and in previous general elections the issue was incorporated into the ruling party’s manifesto.

Though Mallya (1997, p 244) claims that Zanzibar has been inclined towards establishing a religious state, his evidence, namely joining the OIC, is by no means conclusive.

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