Religions and Development
Research Programme

Engaged yet Disengaged: Islamic Schools and the State in Kano, Nigeria

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The Religions and Development Research Programme Consortium is an international research partnership that is exploring the relationships between several major world religions, development in low-income countries and poverty reduction. The programme is comprised of a series of comparative research projects that are addressing the following questions:

- How do religious values and beliefs drive the actions and interactions of individuals and faith-based organisations?
- How do religious values and beliefs and religious organisations influence the relationships between states and societies?
- In what ways do faith communities interact with development actors and what are the outcomes with respect to the achievement of development goals?

The research aims to provide knowledge and tools to enable dialogue between development partners and contribute to the achievement of development goals. We believe that our role as researchers is not to make judgements about the truth or desirability of particular values or beliefs, nor is it to urge a greater or lesser role for religion in achieving development objectives. Instead, our aim is to produce systematic and reliable knowledge and better understanding of the social world.

The research focuses on four countries (India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania), enabling the research team to study most of the major world religions: Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism, Buddhism and African traditional belief systems. The research projects will compare two or more of the focus countries, regions within the countries, different religious traditions and selected development activities and policies.

The consortium consists of six research partner organisations, each of which is working with other researchers in the four focus countries:

- University of Birmingham, UK: International Development Department, Department of Theology and Religion, Centre for West African Studies, Centre for the Study of Global Ethics.
- University of Bath, UK: Centre for Development Studies.
- Indian Institute of Dalit Studies, New Delhi.
- University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
- Lahore University of Management Sciences, Pakistan.

In addition to the research partners, links have been forged with non-academic and non-government bodies, including Islamic Relief.

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Key words: Islam, Muslim, Kano, Nigeria, education, reform
Summary

Madrasas (Islamic schools and seminaries) have been the focus of reform in most Muslim majority countries during recent decades. Post-September 11, concern has heightened in some countries. Reasons for state intervention vary but the usual explanation points to the modernizing ambitions of the secular elite in post-colonial Muslim states who, led by a vision of modernization and nation-building, have aimed to reform religious schools to bring them in line with the demands of modernity. In particular, the reforms have typically sought to introduce secular subjects into the curriculum to enable graduates to compete for jobs in government and the wider economy, pay and train some or all teachers, improve buildings and teaching materials, and, through curriculum reform, create a religious leadership that will propagate a more liberal interpretation of Islam.

For example, the South Asian states of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have made active but generally not very effective attempts to reform madrasas. In contrast, the State government’s engagement with Islamic schools in Kano, one of the most populous Muslim states of northern Nigeria, has been essentially tolerant of traditional religious authorities. Drawing on interviews with key informants from the State government, Muslim leaders and informed observers, this study examines the aim and content of attempts to reform various types of Muslim primary and secondary education, by encouraging the adoption of curricula containing both secular and religious subjects and providing other types of support. Unlike elsewhere, in Kano, the State government has not intervened in the higher levels of Islamic education.

In Kano, where the population is mainly Muslim, traditional and most government leaders are Muslim, and the State government has recently adopted Sharia law, the study shows that

- Demand for Islamic education continues to be strong
- Demand for a curriculum containing secular as well as religious subjects comes from both religious teachers and parents
- State support for Islamic schools, in the form of curriculum development, training and pay for some teachers, improved teaching materials and some financial support is generally welcomed
- Higher religious education has been left in the hands of religious scholars.
Comparison of the Kano State situation with the South Asian countries enables us to identify the attributes of states and religious elites that make states seek to increase their control over religious authority:

- The modernization agenda of post-colonial states is a critical factor shaping reform, but the exact nature of state intervention is determined by the political character of the religious elite. In Kano, Sufi groups, leaders of which avoid direct engagement with politics unless Islam itself is perceived to be under threat, are dominant. In contrast, in South Asia, revivalist Islamic movements that actively advocate capturing state power are dominant, leading to relationships between the state and religious leaders that are more often antagonistic.

- The formalization of religious education in South Asia since colonial times, compared to the informal nature of religious schools in Kano, made state intervention more feasible in the former.

These findings push the boundaries of existing debates to show that states’ relationships with religious leaders and schools are interactive and responsive, countering the current tendency to explain reform attempts solely in terms of the modernizing ambitions of post-colonial governments.

The research shows that development planners who are currently attempting to encourage state-led madrasa reforms in many countries can design more realistic policies by

- improving their awareness of the historical and institutional factors shaping state relationships with religious groups in Muslim countries
- making more realistic assessments of the nature of reforms a state is likely to initiate and the likely responses to these reforms from the religious elite.
1 Introduction

The Islamic schooling system has been subjected to state-led reform in most Muslim countries during recent decades. In South Asia, in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, the state has attempted to reform madrasas through the introduction of secular subjects, although with varying degrees of success. Turkey presents a more extreme case of reform. Soon after the declaration of the Republic of Turkey on 29 October 1923, Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk), the Republic’s founder and first president, abolished the madrasa system in Turkey, replacing it with a School of Theology and thirty-three schools for training religious officials (Hefner, 2006). Since madrasas produce Islamic scholars who exercise informal authority in society by virtue of being the custodians of Islam, the state’s attempt to control them has generated much concern. What has driven the states of many Muslim countries to reform madrasas and how the religious elite have responded to these attempts is thus of considerable interest.

The main explanation of educational reforms, what Berkey (2006) calls the ‘basic plot line’, is that colonial expansion and the state-supported Western education system of schools and universities that was established under colonial rule gradually eroded the political and economic relevance of madrasa education. While under the Muslim states, officials were trained in madrasas, under colonial rule certificates secured in Western educational institutions became the route to securing employment in both the bureaucracy and the formal private sector. The madrasa system, however, did not come to a complete end during the colonial period. Instead it became focused purely on other-worldly aspects of Islamic education. Post-colonial rulers, who aspired to indigenize government and modernize their economies, found this other-worldly focused madrasa education to be in need of reform.

Since September 11, state-led attempts to reform madrasas have received a further push in some countries, especially Pakistan, due to the alleged links between madrasas and Islamic mujahadeens. This paper, while acknowledging the modernizing ambitions of post-colonial rulers, advances a responsive rather than static interpretation of states’ intervention in Islamic schooling. It shows that, while post-colonial states might have shared their modernization ambitions, the nature and extent of their intervention in the Islamic education system was (and continues to be) determined by the political ambitions of the religious elite. An awareness of the historical and institutional factors shaping state relationships with religious groups in Muslim countries can help development planners, currently attempting to encourage state-led madrasa reforms in many countries, to design more realistic policies. A better understanding of institutional factors can lead to a more realistic assessment of the
nature of reforms a state is likely to initiate and the response these reforms are likely to receive from the religious elite.

The paper starts by presenting a brief account of the history of state-madrasa engagement in the Muslim world. It then describes the methodology adopted and explains the reasons for focusing on Nigeria and within Nigeria on the Islamic government of the State of Kano. Section four maps the Islamic schooling system in Kano and the nature of engagement between the State and the Islamic schools. Section five then presents an analysis of the factors shaping the State’s relationship with the Islamic schools in Kano. Throughout the study, comparative references are made to experiences of state-madrasa relationships in South Asia, based on prior studies conducted as part of this project in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. The focus, however, is kept on Kano, as the details for the other countries are available in separate country studies (Bano, 2007a, 2007b; Nair, forthcoming).

1.1 A brief history of state-madrasa engagement

Islam places great emphasis on acquiring Islamic knowledge by the study of the Qur’an and the Hadith (the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings). The ulama (religious scholars) exercise high moral authority within Muslim societies by virtue of their role in interpreting religious texts. The result is that there has been close interaction between madrasas and the state in Muslim societies. Cognizant of their influence among the public, and at times also due to genuine respect for Islamic learning, the traditional elite in Muslim societies patronized madrasas partly to gain respect within their society and partly to ensure that the religious scholars continued to provide moral credibility to the regime (Hefner, 2006). Examples of state support for madrasas exist from the eleventh century Seljuq dynasty in Iraq to the Mughal empire in India where, until the advent of colonial rule, madrasas were the institutions for training the elite and government officials.

This mutual co-existence of state and ulama has, however, been severely challenged in the post-colonial period. Colonial rulers brought with them modern western educational institutions in the form of primary and secondary schools, colleges and universities. The certificates and degrees issued by these educational institutions became the route for securing employment within the formal private sector and the government. This reduced the economic and political importance of Islamic education imparted in madrasas, which prior to introduction of these western educational institutions were the
officially supported platforms for grooming the elite. The result was that over time madrasas became marginalized, as their qualifications lost relevance for securing any employment outside the religious sector and students from upper income groups moved to the secular schooling system. The post-colonial rulers in these societies often inherited the modernization vision of their colonial masters, viewing madrasas as backward institutions much in need of reform (Bano, 2007b; Hefner and Zaman, 2006). Reform focused on introducing secular subjects within the madrasa curriculum in order to help madrasa students acquire the relevant skills to secure employment outside the religious sector. It was also thought to be important to promote new Islamic scholarship within the madrasas, to enable their future graduates to interpret the Islamic texts in the light of the needs of contemporary Muslim states and societies. This gave impetus to the initiation of state-led madrasa reforms in many countries. These reform efforts have had different outcomes, but in general they have “challenged received traditions of Islamic knowledge, created new knowledge-elites apart from the ulama, and deepened the debate over the social meanings of Islam” (Hefner, 2006).

Given the focus in the existing literature on studying the motives for state reform in countries that have tried to implement madrasa modernization or reform programmes, it is interesting to study a context where, despite a similar colonial history, the post-colonial elite has not attempted to regulate madrasas. Such a comparison can refine the analysis and help in identifying the relative importance of various factors that shape states’ attempts to reform religious authority. Nigeria is a constitutionally secular federal country, in which some of the Muslim majority states have adopted Shari’a law. These Islamic State governments present such an opportunity; here, despite British rule, the post-colonial state, as discussed below, has not attempted to extensively reform or regulate madrasas, despite the fact that the Islamic education system in these States has produced rulers, religious reformers, judges, administrators, clerics and scholars, and thus has been very influential.

Nigeria is also of interest because it is the most populous country in Africa and has the largest Muslim population in the sub-continent. At the time of independence in 1960, it had an estimated population of 50 million, of which close to half were Muslims (Hunwick, 1992). It was a federal state with three regions, North, West and East. The North was the largest in area and contained two-thirds of the Muslim population. Current figures of religious distribution are difficult to obtain because more recent censuses have either been unreliable or have not gathered any data on religious affiliation (see, for
example, Hunwick, 1992, on the 1991 census). Today, the northern region has been divided into several states. This study focuses on Kano, which was historically the largest of the seven Hausa states, under the control of one of the most powerful of West Africa’s Muslim dynasties. Kano city is the oldest city in West Africa; its written history dates back to 999 AD, when the city was already several hundred years old.

Islam came to Hausaland in the early 14th century through a group of traders and clerics during the reign of Ali dan Tsamiya (1349-1358), who converted to Islam under the Wangarawa Muslim ulama from Mali (Adamu, 2003). The Wangarawa ulama belonged to the Maliki school of Islamic law, which to date remains the school adhered to in Kano. Historically significant emphasis has been placed on Qur’anic learning within Kano society. The tradition of learning to recite the Qur’an properly and its memorization has a long history in the region and is referred to as the Tsangaya schools. The Tsangaya system originated in the reign of Mai Mali Gaji (1503), who encouraged and supported the establishment of such centres in many areas in order to spread literacy. The rulers of the time found it an honour to host such schools. At the beginning of the 19th century, the Fulani Islamic leader Usman dan Fodio led a jihad (struggle) against Kano, removing its Hausa king and reforming the government and religious authority. Since then the Fulani emirs have remained the traditional leaders of Kano, a tradition that continues to date. British forces captured Kano in 1903 and made it the administrative centre of Northern Nigeria, although the focus eventually shifted to the neighbouring urban centre of Kaduna. Kano State was established on independence and divided in 1991 to establish the State of Jigawa. According to the 2006 census, the current population of Kano State is approximately 9.4 million.

The Islamic schooling system in Kano is thus very old. Even today, there is a high demand for religious education, with the result that the Islamic is larger than the secular schooling system: out of the total 3.7 million people in the age group between 5 and 21 years of age, over 80 per cent are estimated to attend some form of Islamic school, either in addition to attending a regular school or as their sole educational experience (KSFRN, 2008).
1.2 Methodology

The research studied the relationships between the state and the Islamic schooling system in Kano through interviews with State government officials, the leaders of the religious schools and other informants. Fieldwork was conducted in Kano city during early 2008. The purpose of the study was to understand the dynamics of state-madrasa relationships in Kano in order to understand why the state in Kano, unlike the majority of states in other Muslim countries, has made no attempt to control the religious schools and thus the production of religious scholars. Given that understanding this relationship required first an understanding of the working of the Islamic schooling system in Kano in its own right, the study adopted a qualitative approach in which the emphasis was on gathering a range of perspectives on the dynamics of state-madrasa relationships. The study therefore focused on interviewing key government officials, the religious leadership, and experts within the academic and journalistic community who understand the Islamic schooling system in Kano and its relationships with the State government.

The primary method of data collection was in-depth interviews. To map the Islamic schooling system, interviews were conducted with senior religious scholars and fieldwork was conducted in different Islamic schools to develop a detailed understanding of these schools. Observations from these visits and extracts from the interviews, which are blended into the text throughout, were critical in understanding the complexity of the Islamic schooling system in Kano, the reasons for the high demand for Islamic education and the dynamics of state-madrasa relationships.

In order to gain the perspective of government, the four key government agencies with links with the Islamic schools were identified: the State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB), the Ministry of Education, the Office of the Special Adviser to the State Governor on Education and Information Technology and the Sharia Commission. All these institutions operate at the State level, with SUBEB and the Ministry of Education taking their policy guidelines from the federal government. Interviews were conducted with senior officials within these departments to map the nature of their interactions with Islamic schools.

Finally, interviews were conducted with prominent academics, journalists and public intellectuals, who were in a position to comment on the evolution of the state in Kano and its relationship with Islam, in
order to obtain independent observations of the political, economic and social factors that have influenced the dynamics of the state’s engagement with Islamic schools in Kano as we see it today.

In order to contribute to existing debates on state-madrasa relationships in Muslim countries, the report makes continuous comparisons with factors that shape state-madrasa relationships in South Asia identified during the course of studies carried out in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh as part of this project.
2 The Islamic schooling system in Kano and the state

In order to understand the factors shaping the interaction between the state and the Islamic schools in Kano, this section documents the Islamic schooling system in Kano and the points of interaction between the state and these schools.

2.1 The Islamic school system in Kano State

For much of Islamic history the system of madrasa education has remained very informal, revolving around loose networks of teacher-student relationships in which the teacher chose the specific books for a student, keeping his interest and competence in view. The student’s competence on graduation was judged by the name of his teacher rather than a degree certificate. It was only in the 19th century under the colonial rule that the madrasa system in South Asia moved towards a formal education system with a fixed curriculum, central examinations and issuance of degree certificates. Central to these reforms was the Deoband madrasa tradition, which emerged in Deoband (India) in the late 19th century (Metcalf, 1982) and currently represents the largest network of madrasas in South Asia. In Kano, on the other hand, the Islamic schooling system is still very informal and is thus quite complex. Whereas in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, madrasas are organized like schools and the bigger madrasas can provide education from primary to masters or research degree level in one building, the Islamic education system in Kano is divided into three distinct streams: Qur’anic, Islamiyya and Ilimi. Of these, the first two deal with children in the primary and secondary school age groups, while the Ilimi schools normally start with adult students aged 16 and above.

There is extensive demand for Islamic education in Kano. Many students in the urban centres of Kano State go to secular schools in the morning but supplement this with attendance at either a Qur’anic or an Islamiyya school in the evening, some attending both. The Qur’anic schools focus on the recitation and memorization of the Holy Qur’an, while the Islamiyya schools focus on Tafseer (translation and elaboration of the Holy Qur’an). In addition to this group of children who combine secular with religious education, some children just gain an Islamic education and do not attend a secular school. A higher proportion of rural children come in the latter category, for multiple reasons. There has traditionally been strong resistance to secular education because of its assumed association with missionaries and colonization: the seeking of secular education, as was repeatedly mentioned in interviews with malams (Islamic scholars) as well as government officials and academics, was considered to be ‘asking for hell.’ There are, however, many other socio-economic factors at play in creating demand for
Islamic education, which are not embedded in an inherent resistance to secular education. Further details on the three streams of Islamic education are provided in the following sub-sections.

2.1.1 Qur'anic schools

The tradition of learning to recite the Qur’an properly and its memorization has a long history in Kano going all the way back to the 15th century. The primary reason for the demand for Islamic schooling is the great influence of Islam in the region. Historically, great emphasis has been placed on Qur’anic learning within Kano society. In Kano alone in the late 15th century there were an estimated three thousand malams (Clarke, 1978). The 2003 census of Islamic schools conducted by the Office of the Special Adviser to the Governor on IT and Islamic Schools estimated that 14,335 Qur’anic schools were functioning in Kano State. Today, there are two forms of Qur’anic schools: Modern Qur’anic and Traditional Qur’anic (Tsangaya). These are also referred to as day schools and boarding schools respectively. The modern Qur’anic schools are housed in school-like buildings and run classes for a fixed time. The focus of these schools is purely on Qur’anic instruction. They are a relatively recent innovation, having started around the 1960s, and are (for reasons explained below) mostly concentrated in the urban areas, with children attending as day scholars.

The traditional Qur’anic school is known as Tsangaya (literally study centre) in the Hausa language. Yahya (2005) views Tsangaya as:

A system of instruction in which both the teacher and the students travel out of their places of origin, and sometimes remain there, for the purpose of learning, mastering and memorizing Qur’an, ready and prepared, in the process, to face the hardships and tumults of life.

Tsangaya schools follow an informal teaching cycle in which the teaching hours can vary from season to season and the number of students varies greatly: some have as few as five students, while others have as many as 500. The teachers in these schools are not paid. In this system the child is completely handed over to the malam, to live mostly in the Tsangaya, outside the parents’ community or place of residence. This type of Tsangaya has three variations, depending on the location of the school: the bush, the suburbs or the town. The mobile Tsangaya is based on a belief that a student cannot fully concentrate on Qur’anic studies if he stays in his hometown, so to gain higher knowledge, it is considered good for children to travel eastwards, because that is the direction of Mecca, which is
viewed as the home of all learning (Yahya, 2005). Though apparently informal, the Tsangaya system has its own formal code for recording religious learning. Qur’anic education is imparted in six stages: *Babbaku* (alphabet reading), *Farfam* (word formation), *Haddatu* (memorization), *Sanka* (completion), *Satu* (writing on a slate) and *Rubutu* (writing on paper).

The Tsangaya system originated in the rein of Mai Mali Gaji (1503), who supported the establishment of such centres in many areas to encourage the spread of literacy. As noted above, at the beginning of the 19th century, the Fulani Islamic leader Usman dan Fodio led a *jihad* against Kano, removing its Hausa king and reforming the government and religious authorities. Since then the Fulani emirs have been the traditional leaders in Kano and have continued to encourage this system of education. Thus, to the present day, there is considerable emphasis on the recitation and memorization of the Qur’an. There is, however, a widespread consensus in the government, NGOs, community and media that over time the standards in Tsangaya system have deteriorated, leading to the problem of *Almajari*. Although originating from the term *Hijra*, referring to the Prophet Mohammad’s migration from Medina to Mecca, and initially reflective of the movement of Tsangaya students in search of knowledge, the term today has become synonymous with begging. On moving to the cities, many of the students within the Tsangaya system start to beg for survival. These children then become vulnerable to crime and other hazards on the streets of a big city. Changing socio-economic conditions have increased their vulnerability.

Until as late as the 1970s and 1980s, Tsangaya students who arrived in the cities were, as a sign of respect, given shelter and food by city people. Growing economic pressures have led to the withdrawal of this support mechanism, especially provision of shelter, with the result that begging has become the main survival strategy for many of the Tsangaya pupils in the urban areas. The bush and suburban Tsangaya are relatively better off, as in these locations the *malam* and the students can often survive by farming or undertaking other jobs, such as tailoring. Many respondents explained that such activities also build useful survival skills among the children. The town Tsangaya schools are viewed by the state as well as the NGOs to present the biggest challenge to child welfare. In the view of the representatives of the state and NGOs interviewed during the fieldwork, they also present the toughest challenges to reform. Since these schools are mobile, many of them move from one State to another. The result is that many of the *Almajari* in Kano are not even indigenous to Kano State. The
Tsangaya system is also the one in which the parents and teachers present the toughest resistance to change.

2.1.2 Islamiyya schools

The Islamiyya schools are a more recent innovation than the Tsangaya or Ilimi schools. This school system came about during the 1950s as exposure to the Islamic schooling system of other countries made some Sufi scholars in northern Nigeria realize the need to develop a schooling programme that bridged the gap between the Qur’an and the Ilimi systems (the former focusing purely on the Qur’an and the latter specializing in religious studies). The Islamiyya system of schooling aimed to introduce basic Islamic teachings (tafseer) to students in order to shape their day-to-day lives. It was also partly inspired by the desire to benefit from western methods and teaching aids (teaching in classes with blackboard, desks, exercise books, etc.) and combine Islamic and western education in one school.

As Shaikh Qaribullahi Nasir Kabara, the current head of the Qadiriaya Sufi order in Kano explained,

> My father, Shaikh Muhammad Nasir Kabara, played a central role in establishing the Islamiyya schooling system in Kano. He argued that in each and every mosque there should also be a school. He came up with the slogan of 'our mosque our school'. He was the first Islamic scholar that worked on integration of the western and Islamic subjects.

Shaikh Muhammad Nasir Kabara had come across this idea when he visited a school in Khartoum, Sudan, in 1955. Impressed by what he saw there, on his return home he opened one of the first Islamiyya schools in Kano. In addition to travelling Sufis and scholars, these schools were supported by young political activists, mostly former teachers in government schools, and rich traders who sought a contemporary form of Islamic education for their children (Reichmuth, 1989). Since then the model has spread dramatically within Kano State, with over 4,650 Islamiyya schools recorded in 2003.

Islamiyya schools thus represent a modernized schooling system with a formal school structure, where the wooden slate for writing is replaced with books used for translation and commentary by the teacher. Whereas Qur’anic schools deal only with recitation and memorization of the Qur’an and do not cover teaching of routine Islamic practice, Islamiyya schools deal with other Islamic subjects. The Islamiyya schools are also more structured than the Qur’anic schools. Also, while Qur’anic schools
are more local, Islamiyya schools are often established by leaders of the three dominant Islamic traditions in Kano: Qadiriyya, Tajjania, and Izala. This, however, does not mean that they are exclusionary; rather they admit students from all the traditions. There are two types of Islamiyya schools: Islamiyya Primary (also referred to as Islamiyya Integrated) and Islamiyya General. The former implies that these schools have accepted a State-approved mixed curriculum, which includes secular subjects in addition to religious ones; the latter refers to schools that teach only the religious curriculum.

During the interviews, all the government and civil society stakeholders repeatedly argued that there is high demand within Kano society for the continuous learning of Islamic principles, in order to shape everyday life practices in accordance with Islam. This is the basic explanation for the demand for Islamiyya schools, which mainly focus on *tasfeer* (interpretation and translation of the Qur’an). In addition to providing Islamic knowledge, because of their afternoon and evening shifts, Islamiyya schools also provide a way of keeping children usefully occupied after their regular school hours.

### 2.1.3 Ilimi schools

Ilimi schools are ancient institutions of higher religious learning in Kano, where a senior Islamic scholar teaches the students using books on various Islamic subjects. No formal certificate is awarded at the end of the studies. When a student is considered to have acquired adequate knowledge in the given field, the teacher gives him an *Ajaza* (permission) to open his own school. The Ilimi schools mainly focus on adult students wanting to increase their Islamic knowledge, either with a view to becoming future Islamic scholars or simply as part of a life-long process of Islamic learning. There are estimated to be more than 4,150 Ilimi schools in Kano.

### 2.2 Interaction with the state: the contact points

Education in Nigeria is a joint responsibility of the federal and state governments. The federal government primarily leads in policy and planning, with the implementation of education programmes being the responsibility of the State governments and Local Government Education Authorities. Many parastatal agencies work under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. For example, the body responsible for primary education in Nigeria is called the State Universal Basic Education Board.
(SUBEB), which is a federally approved structure with branches in each of the States but responding to federally determined guidelines.

After the withdrawal of the British, the State government in Kano did not make any conscious attempt to engage with Islamic schools, but their growing number led it in the 1980s to consider proposals to support these schools. This led to a policy by which SUBEB can consider supporting Islamic schools through the provision of teachers and free teaching materials. This policy decision was supported by the federal government, which had been trying to identify means to support these schools. The Qur’anic schools that choose to register with the State government are called Tahfeez Primary Schools, while the Islamiyya schools opting for affiliation are called Islamiyya Primary Schools. Both types of school are required to teach the State-approved integrated curriculum, consisting of 50 per cent secular and 50 per cent religious subjects.

The government bodies responsible for extending this support to Islamic schools have constantly changed. In 1980, a Board was established to look into the issue of Arabic and Islamic education. It was set up as a separate department within the Ministry of Education at the State level and was called the Islamic Education Department. In 1991, this Department was changed to the Directorate of Religious and Chieftaincy Affairs, which was responsible for looking into teaching of Arabic and Islamic subjects from the primary to the tertiary levels. During this time all forms of Islamic schools that chosen to register with the government, including Islamiyya Primary and Islamiyya General schools, were brought under the supervision of the Directorate, which was also made responsible for teacher recruitment and salaries.

In 1995, under military rule, the Directorate was replaced by a Primary and Secondary Education Board, with a remit to look into the affairs of Islamiyya Primary schools. The Islamic Education Department within the Ministry of Education was left to look after the Arabic and Islamic Schools. In 1999, there was another shift and an Islamic Education and Social Affairs Board (IESAB) was formed to replace the previous system. Kano was the fourth and largest Nigerian State to adopt Sharia in 2000. The State government has since tried to promote religious values in society through the institutions of the Sharia Commission and Hisba Board. Starting from 2003, under the present administration, anything pertaining to Arabic and Islamic Education under the IESAB was brought
under the Sharia Commission. Thus, all Islamiyya and Qur’anic schools are required to register with the Sharia Commission. However, in order to secure formal government assistance in the form of teachers of secular subjects, these schools also have to register with SUBEB, as only SUBEB retains the authority to provide formal teaching support. The Sharia Commission only has a mandate to occasionally distribute books to selected Islamiyya and Qur’anic schools and to provide support in the form of floor mats or other such basic utility items. Due to these repeated changes in the structure as regimes have changed, not much has been achieved in terms of actual intervention in Islamic schools. The current government has, however, been trying to interact more actively with them. The activities of the Sharia Commission, SUBEB, the Office of the Special Adviser to the Governor on Education and Information Technology and the Agency for Mass Education will be explored further in the following sub-sections.

2.2.1 The Sharia Commission

The Board of Islamic Education and Social Welfare within the Sharia Commission is one of the main government agencies currently dealing with the Islamic school system. The primary role of the Sharia Commission is to produce a syllabus for Islamic subjects taught within Islamiyya Primary and Tahfeez Primary schools. It also has a set budget to support Islamic schools, whether or not they opt for the integrated curriculum. The exact support can vary from giving financial support to purchasing land for construction of a school, enabling a school to obtain land from the Ministry of Physical Planning, supporting the construction of school buildings, and providing educational materials to schools. Importantly, the Sharia Commission does not limit its support to Islamiyya Primary or Tahfeez Primary schools, but rather engages with the entire range of Islamic schools. Any Islamic school seeking support is required to register with the Commission. Currently, 10,198 schools are registered, representing only 40 per cent of all schools (see Table 1). Before registration, the Sharia Commission conducts an inspection of a school to assess its teaching facilities. It also hosts occasional three-day training sessions in subject content for teachers from the Islamic system and for head masters in school management. It maintains a budget for supply of text books and other support materials. During 2007, the Commission was given Naira 9,126,150/= to purchase and distribute essential textbooks and other school working materials, including exercise books, chalk, water containers, plastic kettles and plastic mats, to Qur’anic and Islamiyya schools. Seventy per cent of the books and other school working materials were distributed to local governments through the Sharia Councils of
the 44 Local Government Authorities (LGAs) for onward distribution to Qur’anic and Islamiyya schools in their domains. Thirty per cent of the books and other materials were to be distributed through the Commission on request. The SUBEB is responsible for appointment and payment of salaries of teachers appointed to registered Islamiyya schools.

Table 1: Number of schools registered with the Sharia Commission

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<th>School Types</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Islamiyya Nursery</td>
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<tr>
<td>Islamiyya General</td>
<td>3,396</td>
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<tr>
<td>Islamiyya Primary</td>
<td>446</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qur’anic General</td>
<td>6,070</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qur’anic Primary</td>
<td>187</td>
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<tr>
<td>Model Qur’anic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tahfeezul Qur’an</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arabic Secondary</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qur’anic Secondary</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,198</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data provided by Board of Islamic Education and Social Affairs, The Sharia Commission.

2.2.2 The State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB)

The other government authority responsible for engaging with Islamiyya schools is the State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB), which is mainly concerned with the Islamiyya Primary schools. SUBEB performs some core functions vis-à-vis these schools, as well as the teaching of Islamic subjects within regular primary schools. It is responsible for the registration of Islamiyya Primary schools: in order for a school to gain recognition, it has first to register with the relevant Local Government Education Authority. SUBEB is also responsible for appointing government teachers to Islamiyya Primary schools for teaching secular subjects including maths, basic science and English, and for their training and capacity building.

2.2.3 Office of the Special Adviser to the Governor on Education and Information Technology

This is a specially designed interventionary office and does not have a specific schedule. The Office is established at the discretion of the State Governor, who is elected for four years and defines the nature of interventions that he wants executed through the Office of the Special Adviser. The Office has
undertaken much work trying to introduce secular subjects in the curriculum of Islamiyya and Quranic schools. Some of its activities, for example occasional training sessions for teachers in Islamiyya and Qur’anic schools, have overlapped with the activities of the Sharia Commission and SUBEB. It has also helped some Islamiyya schools construct school buildings, especially in the rural areas. The Office’s existence, however, is entirely tied to the tenure of the current Governor and a new Governor could decide not to continue with it. Normally the role of such Offices is advisory, but in this case the Governor has chosen that it be partly concerned with implementation.

2.2.4 **Agency for Mass Education**

In addition to these four core agencies that currently engage with the Islamiyya Quranic and Tsangaya Education (IQTE) system, another government body that plays a role in Islamic education is the Agency for Mass Education. This agency establishes adult literacy centres, many of which impart Islamic education among other subjects taught. It is currently working on a pilot programme to enable students to gain entry into Qur’anic schools and to enable such schools to teach secular subjects and vocational skills.

2.3 **Nature of the contacts between the State and madrasas**

As can be gathered from the details above, the Kano State government has supported measures to introduce secular subjects within Islamiyya schools, especially during the last twenty years. More recently, under the Office of the Special Adviser to the Governor on Education and Information Technology, measures are afoot to reform the Tsangaya system, which had remained untouched under previous governments, although given the challenges the efforts are moving at a slow pace. Apart from general work on sensitization of parents to seek secular education for their children and the *malams* to support the parents’ demand for secular education, the Office of the Special Adviser has focused on experimenting with models in which Tsangaya schools are provided with buildings by the government and the State bears the cost of feeding pupils so that they can focus exclusively on their education. Currently, the model is being tested on a very small scale in a few villages. In terms of integrating secular subjects into these schools, the current programme maintains that it is best to start with Islamic subjects, as currently these schools only teach the recitation and memorization of the Qur’an, and to gradually move towards the introduction of secular subjects later.
Given that the State government in Kano, as in South Asia, is supporting attempts to introduce secular subjects within the Islamiyya and Qur’anic schools, how have the governments differed in their attempts to introduce a more integrated curriculum containing a sizable secular education content in the Islamic schooling system? The answer rests in understanding the differing reasons for reform in the two contexts. Reform measures in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh were initiated to make madrasa students more employable, although an equally important target was to create a religious leadership that would propagate a more liberal and modernized interpretation of Islam. Thus a major intention was to give rise to a new class of reformed ulama (Bano, 2007b; Hefner and Zaman, 2006).

The State’s engagement with Islamic schools is marked by two major differences. While in South Asia, the state is trying to reform madrasas across the board, up to the highest level of Islamic education, in Kano, the State is focusing on Islamiyya and Tsangaya schools alone and is not attempting to intervene in the Ilimi schools, which are the schools for higher Islamic learning and for training Islamic scholars. It is the students of these Ilimi schools that influence the public interpretation of Islam in Kano, yet the State has not felt the need to reform them. As Dr Galadanchi, the Adviser to the State Governor on Islamic school reforms elaborates, "the Ilimi schools have been doing their work very well and the state has no need to reform them." Thus, the State is generally satisfied with the system for educating senior Islamic scholars in Kano, unlike the situation in South Asia, where a primary motive of the reform has been to produce a new breed of Islamic scholars. This difference reflects a more harmonious relationship between the State government and Islamic scholars in Kano than in South Asia.

This is also reflected in the response of those schools that are the target of reforms in the two contexts. In Kano, during the interviews with government officials and the malams of Islamiyya schools, the indications were that there is no resistance from within the Islamiyya schools to integrating secular subjects in the curriculum. The limitation to integration is mainly the lack of resources on the part of the State government, which does not have the financial or administrative capacity to provide enough teachers of secular subjects to all the Islamiyya schools. In the experience of the SUBEB staff, the malams of the Islamiyya schools themselves are viewed as being open to the idea of introducing secular subjects. On the other hand, across South Asia, government reform programmes have received serious resistance from the madrasa leadership, with the result that in
Pakistan the reform programme has hardly made any inroads into the madrasas (Bano, 2007b). In India, the leading madrasas have refrained from engaging in the reform programme. In Bangladesh, despite the rise of Aliya (state-supported) madrasas, real religious authority remains in the hands of the Qomi madrasas, who refuse to adapt to the government curriculum (Bano, 2007a). The argument of the ulama in South Asia is that they are willing to integrate subjects up to matriculation level (equivalent to O-levels) but after that they believe that they need to retain a focus on specialization in the Islamic texts.

The states of the South Asian countries, on the other hand, argue for integration of secular subjects up to the higher levels. The ulama in turn have argued that this will lead to madrasa graduates who are neither specialists in modern subjects nor in the Islamic texts. In the case of Kano this dilemma is averted. The focus of state intervention has always been on the Islamiyya schools, which operate at the primary and secondary levels, and in which the religious scholars who established them had from the very beginning the intention of providing integrated education, combining Islamic and modern subjects. Thus, in Kano the State is supporting what the religious scholars themselves had set out to do, rather than running counter to their wishes. The Islamiyya schools do not aim to produce religious scholars. Instead, their main aim is to provide sound religious education to shape the behaviour of ordinary members of society in line with Islam, while they gain their regular education. Thus, interviews with heads of the Islamiyya schools and senior religious scholars show that, by helping them teach secular subjects in Islamiyya schools, the State in Kano is supporting the aspirations of the heads of the schools and community members, rather than forcing a modernization agenda on them. The malams of Tsangaya schools have, however, shown more ideological resistance to the adoption of secular subjects in their curriculum.

The final test of the differing approach of the state towards the Islamic schools is reflective of the way in which the whole issue of Islamic learning is treated within the broader education debate in the two contexts. In the South Asian context, the debate all along has been about introducing secular content into madrasa education to attune students to the needs of the modern day. In Kano, on the other hand, due to the strong demand for Islamic education, a prominent feature of the debate has been developing an integrated system, with equal emphasis on teaching secular and religious subjects. Thus, while there are attempts to introduce secular subjects in Islamiyya schools, there is also an equally live debate about moving the State schooling system towards an integrated model whereby
State schools place equal emphasis on religious and secular education. This is visible in the views of the Special Adviser to the Governor on Education and Information Technology:

Much of the current attempts at reform have focused on integrating secular subjects in Islamiyya schools. What we as a Muslim society ideally need is to adopt a more systematic approach at developing an integrated curriculum for State schools, which are capable of meeting both the religious and secular demands of the society. This will help reduce the multiple schooling systems that operate in Kano today (whereby some students visit a Qur’anic as well as an Islamiyya school in the evening).

This support for developing an integrated curriculum was expressed during interviews with different stakeholders, even within the Ministry of Education.

Recognition of the importance of Islamic education within the State system in Kano is also reflected in secondary level education policy. Though the State primary schools currently do not offer an integrated curriculum, the Ministry of Education does run Islamic and Arabic Secondary schools and senior and junior Tahfeez Secondary schools. These schools are managed by the Arabic and Islamic Education Department in the Ministry of Education. According to a senior government official of the Department, there are an estimated 95 male and 83 female Junior Islamic and Arabic Secondary schools. The total number of Tahfeez Secondary schools is estimated to be 10. Students come to these from Islamiyya as well as secular schools through a common entrance examination. The students receive a Senior Islamic Studies Certificate for Education (SISCE) after six years of education, and many of them become teachers in Islamiyya Primary schools, while some go on to study law.

Thus, there is a clear difference in the emphasis placed on the value of Islamic education in the two contexts. While in South Asia, the push has been towards secularization or modernization of the madrasas and the education of religious scholars (Bano, 2007a), in Kano the attempt has been to develop an integrated system of education that gives equal emphasis to secular and religious subjects at the primary and secondary levels, leaving higher religious education purely in the hands of the religious scholars. This in turn is reflective of the differing levels of comfort between the state and the religious scholars in the two contexts. The question of interest then is what explains the differences in the approach of the state towards the religious elite and to reforming Islamic schools in the two contexts. Is it the nature of colonial rule, the aspirations of the post-colonial leadership, the state’s ability to assert its agenda, or the characteristics of the religious scholars?
3 Engaged yet disengaged: factors shaping state intervention

This section attempts to analyse the characteristics of the state and the religious elite in Kano, to identify the factors that help explain the State government’s accommodating attitude towards Islamic schools and the religious elite, in contrast to the more reformist agenda of the South Asian states. Since one key explanation for states’ attempts to reform madrasas has been their colonial past, this section starts with a focus on the nature of colonial rule in Kano.

3.1 Colonial rule in Kano

In South Asia, colonial rule led to major displacement of the madrasa education system. Prior to colonial rule, madrasas were the places of higher learning. The British brought with them a Western education system, so that over time qualifications from Western institutions dictated access to the formal economy. Under colonial rule, the madrasas also lost access to state donations, a practice which was common under Mughal rule. Thus, during colonial times, madrasas in South Asia were effectively marginalized (Nizami, 1983).

The nature of British rule in Kano differed from that in South Asia in two particular respects: the duration of colonial rule was much shorter (barely 60 years as opposed to over 200 years in South Asia), and by the time British arrived in Nigeria they were less interested in spreading Western education on a large scale. There were two main reasons for the British lack of interest in spreading mass education in Kano. First, the British experience in South Asia had taught them that mass access to Western education led to the rise of an educated class resistant to British rule and thus was not conducive to British interests. The British experience in India, Egypt and even southern Nigeria had convinced them that education beyond elementary school only heightened native restlessness. The British political officers wanted to maintain the status quo and avoid the production of disgruntled intellectuals who were responsible for anti-British activities in such places as India, Egypt, and Lagos (Tibenderana, 1983; Hefner and Zaman, 2006).

Second, in northern Nigeria, where the British had to face the Northern Emirates, the legacy of the Sokoto Caliphate established by the great religious reformer Sheikh Uthman Dan Fodio in the late 18th and early 19th century, the culture was overwhelmingly Islamic. The people and the emirs had come together to resist the British invasion. The Emirates were determined to defend dar al-Islam (homeland of Islam), despite the fact that between 1897 and 1903 the British had succeeded in
imposing their rule over the whole of northern Nigeria. Nevertheless, the stiff opposition faced by the British made them realize the need to take the religious values of the people into consideration. This had multiple effects, a major one being that they preferred to govern Kano through indirect rule rather than largely displacing the old institutions of governance. It also made them cautious of giving the impression that they were displacing the Islamic institutions of learning.

The other result was that British officials did not give the missionaries a free hand to propagate Christianity and open up mission schools in Kano, as they did in other colonies, including southern Nigeria, because they did not want to face unnecessary resistance. During the colonial era in Northern Nigeria, from 1903 to 1960, the Western education system was considered by many Muslims to be an instrument of counter-cultural and religious ideology (Clarke, 1978). The colonial government was anxious to settle for peace in order to have secure access to continue the extraction of natural resources (Danmole, 1990). Based on these considerations, the British political officers were very reluctant to support applications by missionary societies wishing to establish stations and schools in their area of jurisdiction. Therefore, unlike India, where Western education spread on a mass scale, only limited numbers of Western schools opened in Kano, normally catering to the elite (Tibenderana, 1983). The result was that the Islamic schooling system under British rule was not as severely challenged as in South Asia.

In addition, because the period of colonial rule in Kano was much shorter than in India, Western educational institutions did not reach the same level of refinement. In Kano, changes in education provision came slowly, with the gradual establishment of a few modern government schools for boys and later for girls, as well as teachers' colleges. Even then, to increase public acceptance of these schools, Islamic subjects were included in the curriculum. The teachers were almost always the product of the traditional Qur’anic schools and the syllabus emphasized memorization of the Qur’an and Hadith, Fiqh, the articles of faith and moral education (Lemu, 2002), which also limited the power of Western educational institutions to displace the Islamic schooling system.

Nevertheless, as in India, these Western educational institutions, despite their limited numbers, did suck the elite out of the Islamic education system. Realizing that their children could only preserve their positions if they acquired the education brought by the British rulers, most members of the elite
enrolled their children in modern schools established by the British (Tibenderana, 1983). However, access was not widespread for ordinary people.

One other difference in the nature of colonial rule in the two contexts was that, while in some states in India the colonial rulers tried to reform the madrasas - the introduction of Aliya Madrasas with provision for teaching secular subjects, as witnessed in Calcutta in 1896 being one example - no such effort was made in Kano. According to a Colonial Government report on Northern Nigeria in 1919, the government did not interfere in the indigenous Qur’anic schools in which Arabic and Ajami was taught and the Qur’an formed the curriculum. It estimated that at the time there were 25,000 malams with over a quarter of a million pupils. These Qur’anic schools were said to have produced a literary class known as malamai (Islamic scholars), persons learned in Arabic, the teachings of the Qur’an and commentaries. From this group came the officers of the Native Administration, the judges and other officials needed by the colonial administration. According to Clarke, 1978, the report concluded: “They are a very influential class, some of them very well read in Arabic literature and law and deeply imbued with the love of learning’. [Moreover, he continued] At the time of independence in 1960, there were an estimated 50,000 Qur’anic malams in Northern Nigeria, 27,000 Qur’anic schools and 2,777 Ilimi schools with 36,000 pupils in Northern Nigeria in 1965” (Clarke, 1978).

Thus, the limited duration of colonial rule, and British reluctance to spread Western education on a mass scale in Kano meant that colonial rule did not threaten madrasa education to the extent it did in South Asia. Neither did the colonial state make direct interventions to reform madrasas as it did in some parts of India. The difference in British policies in the two contexts had differing consequences for Islamic schooling systems. In India, due to greater threats to their survival, the madrasas initiated a major process of internal reform, which among other changes led to the formalization of madrasa education. In Kano, on the other hand, the Islamic schools never faced intense pressure to radically reform their working to survive the competition from Western educational institutions. The significance of this difference to understanding state-madrasa relationships today is discussed in Section 3.4. Despite the differences, one important commonality in the two contexts, however, was that the post-colonial elites of Kano and South Asia were trained in British educational institutions, arguably sharing similar notions of modernization. Why these post-colonial elites responded differently to the Islamic schooling system and to the religious elites in the two countries is a worthy query.
3.2 The nature of the state

As noted in Section 2, there is a clear difference in the reasons the post-colonial state set out to engage with Islamic schooling in the two contexts under study. In both India and Pakistan, the post-colonial elite shared the secular mindset of the colonial elite, with its emphasis on modernization. In both these countries and later also in Bangladesh, the debates about reforming the madrasas were about producing more employable graduates and a new breed of religious scholars who would present a more liberal interpretation of Islam, to counter the hold of the traditional ulama (Bano, 2007b; Hefner, 2006). In Kano, the State government never demonstrated such ambitions. Looking at the differing nature of the state's response to religious scholars in the two contexts, the primary explanatory factor appears to be the extent of political involvement of the religious elite, followed by the constitutional provisions governing the establishment of religious political parties.

The important feature about the nature of the state in Kano is that, due to the overwhelming Islamic influence in Kano society, the ruling elite from the time of the Islamic emirates through the colonial period to the present day has tried to work with Islamic institutions rather than reform them or show hostility towards them. Historically, there has been a close relationship between the political elite, i.e. the Emirs of Kano, and the religious elite. The emirs were independent rulers with sole responsibility for their emirates. For them religion was not an issue of contention, as Islam dominated most of the emirates and any pre-colonial non-Muslim populations followed African traditional religions, which did not pose any serious challenge to the emirs and Islam (Danmole, 1990). During the colonial occupation, local people and the religious elite had gathered around the emir to fight the Christian invaders. Islam was thus a unifying force. In this context, as discussed above, the British themselves preferred to control the state through existing institutions under indirect rule rather than bringing about major reforms to Islamic governance institutions.

The rallying of the religious elite with the emir to resist western colonization continued until the independence of Nigeria in 1960. In the 1950s, the two main political parties that led the movement against colonial rule in Kano – the Northern Elementary Progressive Union (NEPU) and Northern People’s Congress (NPC) - had strong support within the religious elite. NEPU was popularly known as a left wing party and was formed by Malam Abba dan Maikwaru, a prominent follower of the Tijaniyya Sufi order. The aim of the party was to fight for the right of Talakawas (the deprived) and
emancipate them from the oppression of the colonial masters and traditional rulers. In the beginning, the party drew most of its elite from the Islamic educated classes but later these were joined by members of the western educated elite. On the other hand, members of the Qadiriyya Sufi order joined the NPC. However, this involvement of the religious elite in political parties did not last beyond the colonial period.

After independence, the Sardauna of Sokoto, Ahmadu Bello, as Premier of the Northern Region, sought to make Islam the unifying force in the North. He had received both Islamic and Western education. From 1915-1917, he attended the Qur’anic School at home, where he learnt the Qur’an, Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and Sunna of the Prophet (Sayings and practice of the Prophet). After that he moved on to Western educational institutions: between 1917 and 1926 he attended the Sokoto Middle School and between 1926 and 1931 he was at the famous Katsina Training College, the precursor to Barewa College. Despite his Western education, he was known as a devoted Muslim and argued for religious tolerance: the motto he chose for the North was ‘work and worship’. In his Christmas message broadcast in 1959 he stated *inter alia*:

> Here in the Northern Nigeria we have people of many different races, tribes and religions who are knit together to a common history, common interest and common ideas. The things that unite us are stronger than the things that divide us. I always remind people of our firmly rooted policy of religious tolerance. We have no intention of favouring one religion at the expense of another. Subject to the overriding need to preserve law and order, it is our determination that everyone should have absolute liberty to practise his belief according to the dictates of his conscience.

He tried to support, reorganize and reform all the existing Muslim institutions and to bring them under the control of his government. In 1961, he founded the Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI), a semi-official organization whose aim was to promote Islamic educational work and to strengthen the position of Islam in the non-Muslim parts of the North (Reichmuth, 1989). His assassination in 1966 brought these activities almost to a standstill. After the Civil War and the transformation of Nigeria into a federation of smaller states, Islamic education became less and less a concern of the government. Even in the northern States, it was mainly left in private hands.

The political parties that became active in Kano after the 13 years of military government by General Olusegun Obasanjo, which ended in 1979, had no association with any religious groups. Also, the
leading party in the north, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) (led by northern Muslims) had to try to appeal beyond the north. Under constitutional provisions, in order to elect a president, it had to win at least a quarter of the votes in two-thirds of the states. The NPN could not, therefore, campaign as a Muslim party (Bienen, 1986). However, because of the influence of Islam in the north, it retained the support of the Muslim elite and preferred to form good links with them rather than trying to control their power, especially since the religious elite was not in any way challenging political authority.

On the other hand, in the South Asian context, in Pakistan and Bangladesh, Islamic groups actively sought state power in the post-colonial period, thereby presenting political competition to the secular elite. Even in India, Islamic political parties like Jama’at-i-Ulema were important players in determining which mainstream party captures the Muslim vote.

Comparison of the two contexts also highlights that prolonged colonial rule in India had led to the emergence of a Muslim elite which had become secularized and devoid of much of its Islamic heritage. Due to the long period of colonial rule, by the time of partition, the Muslim elite trained in Western institutions had often lost its religious orientation. Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, and General Ayub Khan, the first military ruler, were both very secular in their mindset, and had received very little formal religious education. At the same time, the religious elite became very active in politics in the form of Jama’at-i-Islami in Pakistan and Bangladesh and Jama’at-i-Ulama in Pakistan and India. This meant that the religious institutions, including madrasas, were the base for recruiting workers and voters for the religious political parties.

The combination of a secularized post-colonial elite with an active religious elite trying to check the secularization agenda, whether through direct party politics or the use of other political platforms, has thus resulted in greater friction between the two sides and greater attempts on the part of the state to reform Islamic education institutions rather than support them in the South Asian context. In the case of the post-colonial elite in Kano, on the other hand, while it was also trained in British institutions, many of the leaders, like the Sardauna of Sokoto, Ahmadu Bello (as noted above) had had both religious and Western education. Thus, the limited duration of colonial rule and the overwhelming Muslim influence in Kano meant that the indigenous post-colonial elite was more able to take the religious elements with it than its counterparts in India and Pakistan.
The other factor that shaped the differences was that Nigeria does not have an official state religion. The secular nature of the Nigerian state was established at independence in 1960. The constitution requires of political parties that: "(e) the name of the association, its symbol or logo does not contain any ethnic or religious connotation or give the appearance that the activities of the association are confined to a part only of the geographical area of Nigeria (D-Political Parties)". The result was that no Islamic party rose to compete with the State government in Kano.

This has had two impacts. One, unlike South Asia, the State government has not had the need to curb the power of Islamic political parties. Two, the State, being in secular (military or party) hands, has been cautious about interfering in religious schools for fear that it might be seen as biased towards or against a particular religious group. This was also found to be the case in India where, as opposed to Pakistan and Bangladesh, the state has been more cautious about interfering in madrasas for fear of being viewed as persecuting the minority Muslim population. With the passage of Sharia law in 2000, the government in power in Kano has been more open in addressing the issue of Islamic school reforms, because it is able to present them as a means of supporting Islamic schools rather than reforming them. Similarly, in the post-September 11 context in Pakistan, where the state also claims Islamic credentials and so does not fear being labelled as anti-Islamic, it has been able to confront the madrasa leadership because it does not fear being labelled as anti-Islamic.

The key argument developed here is that the reason for different state responses to reforming Islamic schools is the differing levels of political activism on the part of the religious elites. In Kano, the religious elite did not actively seek to gain State power in the post-colonial state. In South Asia, where the religious elite sought to gain state power more actively, the state developed a greater interest in reforming Islamic schools, which act as the power base of the traditional ulama. Within South Asia, India shares this feature with Kano, but still the relationship between the state and madrasas in India suffers from tenser undercurrents than in Kano, mainly because of the legacy of distrust between the Muslim minority and the majority Hindu-led government inherited from partition. A closer examination highlights that the key difference in states’ approaches to Islamic schools does indeed rest in the political aspirations of the religious elite, which are determined not by constitutional provisions, but by their approach to politics. Thus arguably the key determinant of religious political activism is not whether or not the constitution permits religious political parties, because the religious elite has many
other ways of influencing the state using the platform of the mosque and the moral authority it enjoys within society. The question is therefore what makes the religious elite in one context less prone to using these political platforms to either gain state control or influence state policy than in others. The next section addresses this issue.

3.3 Characteristics of the religious elite

As outlined in Section 1.1, Islam came to Hausaland in the early 14th century Islam (Adamu, 2003). Brought by the Wangarawa ulama from Mali, who belonged to the Maliki school of Islamic law, Islam in Kano is part of the Sufi tradition rather than the ulama tradition of South Asia. Two Sufi brotherhoods are dominant: the Tijjaniya and the Qadiriyya. It is not certain when the first Tijjaniya Sufi order was introduced, but it became the most popular sect when Sheikh Ibrahim Nyass came to Kano, during the time of Emir Abdullahi Bayero in the 1950s.

Qadiriyya is one of the four Sufi orders to emerge from Mesopotamia around the 12th century, soon spreading from Iran both eastwards into India and westwards into North Africa. During the 18th century, some of the Sufi groups fell under the influence of Wahabyya, a reform movement that sought to rid Islam of what is regarded as illegitimate innovation, such as the worship of saints, and to encourage strict adherence to Sharia. The spirit of reform spread to North Africa, leading to establishment of new orders, which rejected some of the practices of the existing Sufi groups. Tijjaniya was an important Sufi order to come out of this context.

The Sufi and revivalist movements (puritanical Islamic movements arguing for a strict literal interpretation of the texts) have a key difference in their approaches to engaging with the state. The former believe in focusing on individual piety and developing an individual connection with God; the latter believe in establishing God’s order in this world. Sufism is the name give to the mystical movement within Islam; a Sufi is a Muslim who dedicates him or herself to the quest for mystical knowledge (Kabara, 2004). The emphasis of Sufism on purifying the heart and its focus on individual wellbeing has been made clear by many authors. According to Ibn Taymiyah, “Sufism is the science of realities and states of experiences. A Sufi is that person who purifies himself from everything which distracts him from remembrance of Allah.” Imam Nadwai, another scholar, argues:
The specifications of the ways of the Sufis are five: to keep the presence of Allah in heart in public and in private; to follow the Sunnah of the Prophet by action and speech; to keep away from dependence on people; to be happy with what Allah gives you, even if it is little; and, to always refer your matters to Allah, Almighty and Exalted.

According to Shaikh Qaribullah Nasir Kabara, the current head of the Qadiriyya Sufi order in Kano:

Ilm al-tasawwuf (the science of Sufism) came into being to preserve and transmit a particular aspect of shariah - that of ikhlas or sincerity. It was recognized that the Sunna of the Prophet was not only words and actions, but also states of being: that a Muslim must not only say certain things and do certain things, but must also be something. It likewise forbids us such inward states as envy, malice, pride, arrogance, etc. Sufism is most concerned with the purification of the heart.

The Sufi, according to Kabara, draw upon the saying from the Qur’an: “He has succeeded who purifies himself” (Qur’an 87:14).

In the Sufi tradition, groups of students gather around individual sheikhs to learn the discipline of Sufism from them. While such tariqas or groups, past and present, have focused on different ways to realize the attachment of the heart, the focus of their worship remains dhikr, remembrance of Allah. They argue that the greater struggle or holy war is al-jihad al-akbar (struggle with one’s own nafs or self), in contrast to the lesser struggle (al-jihad al-asghar), which is against injustice and oppressors in the world. The result is that the Sufi tradition has kept a distance from politics, apart from the periods of anti-colonial struggle when Islam itself was viewed to be under threat. This trend is also traceable in Kano. During colonial rule, in the 1950s and early 1960s, the members of the Tajjaniya Sufi brotherhood were associated with the Northern Elements’ Progressive Union and members of Qadiriyya with the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) (Bienen, 1986) to fight against the Western colonizers. This active engagement of the Sufi brotherhoods in politics, however, did not continue in the post-colonial period. Rather, prior to and after the end of the colonial rule, the Sufi brotherhoods have maintained close cooperative ties with the Emirs.

As the head of the Qadiriya Sufi order explained,

It is the Sufi training that has kept the state away. The training here is not in search of worldly power. We can accept anyone as leader as long as the leader does not touch the aqida (belief). Further, the followers of the Sufis cut across the political parties and the
Sufi leadership cannot deny some members because of their political affiliation. So the Sufi orders remain neutral towards the government.

Noting other reasons from staying away from direct engagement in politics, he further added: “It is important to remember that leaders of Sufi orders are regarded as ‘fathers’. Even as presidential candidates they come to us for blessing. We cannot deny any one of them.” According to him, this approach is the primary reason that the State government has not ventured to reform the Islamic schools: “Government does not bother to manipulate the schools because they were opened under the doctrine of the Sufi orders. So they cannot be tampered with because people will not accept it. So whatever the Sufis have brought, the government will not see it as dangerous.”

Malam Uba Safiyane, a senior scholar from the Tajjania Sufi order, placed similar emphasis on Sufism in explaining the state’s distance from regulating Islamic schools:

Sufis are not forbidden to enter into politics. They can interact with rich, poor or royalty. The only condition is that whatever transaction is undertaken it is only for Allah…. [He further added] It is fine for a Sufi to enter into politics if you know you are strong enough and know that worldly affairs will not overcome you. Then you can enter. Prophet Mohammad had advised Abu Haneefa not to enter politics because in Prophet’s assessment Abu Haneefa had a weak personality. Therefore, individuals have to be very careful before they opt to seek political power.

On the other hand in South Asia, the revivalist movements, with their emphasis on reform of the state, dominated the public discourse on Islam in the colonial and post-colonial period. The ulama in South Asia also organized themselves into religious political parties. The result was that, while the majority of madrasas remained independent, it is also true that many madrasas were opened under the banner of the religious political parties – both Jama’ati-Islami and Jama’at-i-Ulama (the two main Islamic political parties in South Asia) maintain extensive madrasa networks. For the Muslim revivalist movements, or tijdid (renewal, rejuvenation) as Muslim reformers often describe them, reform is seen as a conscious and intentional effort to achieve social, religious, cultural, political or economic change with respect to a society or specific aspects of social life. These movements have often focused on education as a core issue and have supported translation of religious texts into vernacular languages (Loimeier, 2003). They have used religious platforms to express political protest and to delegitimize political authority that they conceive of as ‘unjust’. Often, Islamic reform movements opposed to the
established traditions of Islamic scholarship, in particular the Sufi brotherhoods, are critical of both the colonial and post-colonial secular state, and are characterized by anti-establishment positions (Loimeier, 2003).

The fact that the ulama tradition has a stronger disposition to gain state power in order to implement the word of God is also supported by the fact that the rise of the Izala tradition (a reformist tradition) in northern Nigeria has been accompanied by the growing involvement of its members in politics. The reformist tradition started in the 1950s with Abubakar Gumi (1922-1992), who was the Grand Qadi of Northern Nigeria during British colonial jurisdiction in the 1950s and 1960s. He inspired an Islamic reform movement, the Jamaat Izalat al-Bida wa-Iqamat as-Sunna or Yan Izala (Loimeier, 2003). Since its foundation in 1978, the Izala has become famous for its harsh critique of many of the practices of the Sufi brotherhoods. It has strong links with Saudi Arabia and is often viewed as a Wahhabi movement. It also actively advocates engagement in political processes. In 1978, Gumi was reported to have stated in an interview that: “politics was more important than prayer” and that Muslim men should allow their women to vote and “to mix” in public, especially at the time of an impending election, for “…… if this is not done, even to the point of letting unbelievers predominate, then what is our position?….. It is a necessity that every man takes his women and children above the age of eighteen to register so that we can predominate over the Non-Muslims” (Loimeier, 2003). However, the need to achieve Muslim unity in order to enhance the chances of Muslim politicians winning elections forced Gumi to develop a more accommodating attitude towards the Sufi brotherhoods, realizing that criticizing the Sufi orders would damage Muslim unity in the north.

Izala’s attitude towards political engagement can also be seen in its organizational form. While Sufi groups work as civic organizations under the leadership of traditional ulama, Izala began by adopting a clear modern organizational form, replete with elected officers, written constitution and formal registration as a legal entity. Izala also led the way in establishing clinics and small businesses, integrating Islamic and modern subjects into schools, and propagating its tenets through the modern media, including newspapers, radio, television, and audio and video cassettes (Umar, 2001).

The educational background of the leaders of the two traditions also varies. Whereas the Sufi ulama, championing Islamic traditionalism, were educated in the traditional paths of Islamic education, both Abubakar Gumi and Ismail Idris, the two most influential leaders of Izala, were educated at the Kano
School of Arabic Studies - the first modern Islamic school in Northern Nigeria. Izala has taken a lead in establishing Islamiyya schools, where most members of Izala receive Islamic education together with secular education. Thus, seen in a comparative context, it appears that whether the religious leadership of a country will engage in politics is determined by whether it is associated with Sufi orders or revivalist ulama. This in turn has a major impact on the nature and extent of state intervention to regulate the power of the religious elite and reform Islamic schools, which are the sources of their moral authority.

3.4 The informal nature of religious schooling

One other factor that also seems to have an impact on shaping state intervention in madrasas is the level of formality of the religious schools. As opposed to the rise of formal madrasa structures during colonial rule in South Asia, the higher level Islamic schools in Kano, i.e. the Ilimi schools, to date remain very informal, adopting a model whereby a student gains education from one malam, who selects the appropriate text for the student to study. This has had three implications: one, the high level of informality makes state intervention more difficult; two, the informality results in distance from politics, as the informal networks formed around one teacher remain confined to twenty to thirty students at any given point in time, and are thus less conducive to developing a political following than the large madrasas in South Asia, which can have up to 6,000 students at any point in time and may also have sister organizations; and three, the lack of provision for paying regular salaries to the teachers in the Ilimi schools, in contrast to the established tradition of paying fixed salaries to teachers in the South Asian madrasas, has meant that in Kano imparting religious education cannot become a profession - the scholar has to engage in other professional activities to secure his regular income. This emphasis on earning one’s living through another profession reduces the ability of the religious elite to engage in political activity, as the dual load of teaching as well as pursuing some income generating activities leaves little time to engage in politics.

In Kano the Ilimi schools in which the religious elite is trained have remained informal until today. Students gather around one Shaikh and read from a book. There is no set syllabus. On completion of one book, the Shaikh introduces a further one. There is no degree certificate at the end. When the teacher feels that the student has acquired sufficient knowledge, the teacher gives him an Ajaza, i.e. permission to open his own school. Historically, this system of education is not unique - madrasas of
the 13th or 14th centuries did not have the corporate identity or centrally coordinated administration of early universities in the west (Hefner, 2006). They did not have any examinations, formal curricula, degrees or college governance. In fact, until well into the modern period, the pursuit of religious knowledge in Muslim societies was an individual exercise in which students sought out master scholars for personalized instruction. Over the course of his academic career, a student might study with several teachers and at several different madrasas. His eventual professional standing depended not on a degree awarded by a particular university, but on the reputation of his teachers and the line of scholars from which they descended. Even in South Asia, until the 16th century such an informal system of teaching operated, although some religious families had built up a high reputation and attracted large numbers of students.

In many parts of the Muslim world, however, the informal system gave way to a more formalized structure, often during colonial rule in response to the challenge posed by Western educational institutions (Hefner, 2006). In South Asia reformist ulama set up madrasas to rival the British education system (Metcalf, 1978). In the process they adopted features of the formal system, including a set curriculum, formal degrees and centralized classes. The Deoband tradition, which today has the largest network of madrasas in South Asia, is a central example of this (Metcalf, 1978). As discussed above, reformist movements tend to organise more formally than the Sufi traditions and at the heart of the Deoband tradition were reformist ulama.

In Kano, the two main reasons for not moving towards the formal system again appear to be linked to the relatively shorter duration of colonial rule. First, as noted above, the British education system did not get so entrenched in northern Nigeria as to seriously challenge the Islamic education system. Secondly, the religious elite in the Sufi tradition had less inclination to adopt formal teaching structures than their revivalist counterparts in India. As Shaikh Qaribullahi Shaikh Nasir Kabara, the leader of Qadiriyya order, explained,

The main difference in formal and informal systems is the level of certification. The informal is solely for the purpose of scholarship while the formal is often in search of a salary. Knowledge is really in the informal sector. This is also the Sufi training. …[He further argued] Kano is a centre of commerce. People can't fix hours. In informal system, sessions are flexible. This gives Ilimi schools the edge over the formal schools as people can join them at a time that is convenient to them.
In addition, in the Ilimi schools in Kano, the teachers do not enjoy any regular financial support from the public because imparting knowledge of the Qur’an is regarded as a virtue and an act of worship. Teaching, it is argued, is to be done for the sake of Allah and if a teacher accepts a fee it means that he has exhausted his rewards in the hereafter. Thus in this system, knowledge is not regarded as an act of worship, the acquisition of which only stops with death, rather than an occupation. A teacher supports himself with small fee contributions from students and through self-employment, for example, tailoring. A student aiming to become a teacher at the same time learns the occupation of his family, for example farming. The teaching in Ilimi schools, therefore, is not professional. This again is different from South Asia, where formalization of the madrasa system has led to the introduction of proper (although basic) salaries. This security of income also provides more time to engage in political activity than is possible for teachers in Ilimi schools, who in addition to their teaching also have to earn a living. Thus, the formalization of the madrasa system in South Asia, in contrast to the continued informality of Ilimi schools in Kano, has impacted on both the ability of the religious elite to engage in politics and the ability of the state to push a reformist agenda, as it is more feasible to design a reformed curriculum for a formal Islamic school than for one that has no formal curriculum to begin with.
4 Conclusion

This paper has highlighted that the nature of state interaction with the Islamic schooling system is not shaped by the reforming agenda of the state alone. Rather the extent and nature of state intervention depends on the tendency of the religious elite to engage with politics. The paper has argued that the dominance of the Sufi brotherhoods in Kano, as opposed to revivalist groups in South Asia, has led to a harmonious relationship between the state and the religious elite; while states in South Asia confronted with reformist ulama have made greater attempts to reform madrasas. In Kano, rather than reforming the madrasas, the State government has tried to support the Islamic schooling system at the primary and secondary levels, while leaving the higher learning institutions, the Ilimi schools, which train scholars, untouched. Further, unlike in South Asia, in Kano the State government is more inclined to evolve an integrated system of education with an equal balance of secular and religious education as a way forward within state schools, whereas in South Asia the focus has been on secularizing the madrasa curriculum.

The significance of the Sufi versus reformist movements in determining the extent of the religious elite’s intervention in politics is also visible from the fact that, even within Kano, the rise of the Izala movement since the 1970s has led to greater engagement of reformist ulama in politics. As a result, the state has been taking greater interest in engaging with the Islamiyya and Quranic schools, as is visible in the attempt of the current state Governor to establish a Special Adviser’s Office on this issue.

The paper has also highlighted other factors that determine the nature of state interaction with religious schools. In doing so, it has pushed the limits of existing debates by bringing out a responsive rather than static interpretation of state intervention in Islamic schools. It has shown that, while most post-colonial states shared modernizing ambitions, the nature and extent of their intervention in the Islamic schooling system has been determined by the extent of political ambitions of the religious elite. This suggests that if the influence of the Izala school of thought continues to grow in northern Nigeria, the number of religious scholars who support the capture of state power by Islamic groups is likely to grow. The constitutional ban on religious political parties, the nature and duration of colonial rule and the level of formality of religious schools are other key factors shaping state intervention in Islamic schools. A better understanding of the historical and institutional factors shaping state relationships with religious groups in Muslim countries should lead to a more realistic assessment of the nature of reforms a state is likely to initiate and the response these reforms are likely to receive from the religious elite. Such awareness might help development planners, currently attempting to encourage state-led madrasa reforms in many countries, to design more realistic policies.
Notes

1 I would like to gratefully acknowledge excellent support from Nasiru Wada Khalil and Ahmad Yahya during fieldwork in Kano. I would also like to thank Richard Batley, Carole Rakodi and an anonymous reviewer for their insightful comments.

2 Politics in Kano State cannot be fully understood without considering federal politics, since politicians and military leaders from the northern states of Nigeria have vied for control of the federal government since independence, and there have been struggles between the federal government and the State governments over the allocation of federal revenue (the main source of revenue for the States), policy autonomy, the role of religion and the status of the (supposedly secular) constitution. Such a wider analysis is beyond the scope of this study, but see Nolte et al (forthcoming). Sharia law has been introduced in 12 Muslim majority or Muslim-controlled States since 1999, including Kano State in 2000, with wide popular support from Muslim residents but (sometimes violent) opposition from the Christian minority.

3 Due to limited resources, no attempt was made to conduct interviews with federal government officials in the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja.

4 Data from 2003 Census of the Islamic Schools in Kano, conducted by the Office of the Special Advisor to the Governor on Education and Information Technology.

5 Data from 2003 Census of the Islamic Schools in Kano, conducted by the Office of the Special Adviser to the Governor on Education and Information Technology.

6 £37,400 at the average exchange rate for the last quarter of 2007 £1 = Naira 244 http://www.cenbank.org/rates/exrate.asp?year=2007

7 In this respect, the position of ulama in both the South Asian and Kano contexts is similar: they are open to reform and the integration of secular subjects at the primary and secondary levels but not beyond.

8 Though the responses of madrasas to state intervention have differed in the three South Asian countries, the push from the states to reform madrasas has been the same.

9 Citation on Sir Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokot, By Professor Iya Abubakar, Former Vice-Chancellor, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria http://www.arewa-online.com/sardau.html

10 The formation of religious political parties is prohibited by the Nigerian constitution (see Nolte et al, forthcoming).

References


# Appendix 1

## List of interviewees

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<td>Saka Aliyu</td>
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<td>Kano</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Abdulla Uba Adamu</td>
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<td>Kano</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Sani Idris Baba</td>
<td>Director of Islamic Education, Department for Islamiyya and Qur’anic Schools, Sharia Commission</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Malam Aliyu Ismaila Diso</td>
<td>Chairman of Media Committee of the Special Adviser on Education and Information Technology</td>
<td>Kano</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Dr Bashir Galadanchi</td>
<td>Special Adviser on Education and Information Technology</td>
<td>Kano</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Alhaji Nuhu Gudaji</td>
<td>Secretary General of Council for Qur’anic and Islamiyya Schools (CQIS), Sharia Commission</td>
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<td>Dr Yahya Hashim</td>
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<td>Director, Centre for Human Rights in Islam</td>
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<td>Leaders of the Qadiriyya Sufi order in Africa</td>
<td>Kano</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Mustapha Ahmad Kura</td>
<td>Deputy Director, Islamic Studies, State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB)</td>
<td>Kano</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Malam Sani Lawan</td>
<td>Ilimi school</td>
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<td>Malam Mohammad Ibrahim Kyare</td>
<td>Ilimi school</td>
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<td>Dr Raufu Mustapha</td>
<td>University of Oxford</td>
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<td>Dr Mohammad Nabate</td>
<td>Senior Government Official &amp; a senior member of Qadiriyya Sufi order</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Malam Dabasi Saeed</td>
<td>Head of Tsangaya school</td>
<td>Outside Kano</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Malam Uba Safiyan</td>
<td>Senior Tajjaniya scholar</td>
<td>Outside Kano</td>
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<td>Alh. Abubakar Tanko</td>
<td>Director of Educational Resource Centre, Ministry of Education</td>
<td>Kaduna</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>Ahmad Yahya</td>
<td>Head of a local research institute</td>
<td>Kano</td>
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