Violent Conflict and its Aftermath in Jos and Kano, Nigeria: What is the Role of Religion?

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Centre for Conflict Management and Peace Studies, University of Jos, currently on leave as Secretary to the Government of Plateau State, Nigeria.

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The Religions and Development Research Programme Consortium is an international research partnership that is exploring the relationships between several major world religions, development in low-income countries and poverty reduction. The programme is comprised of a series of comparative research projects that are addressing the following questions:

- How do religious values and beliefs drive the actions and interactions of individuals and faith-based organisations?
- How do religious values and beliefs and religious organisations influence the relationships between states and societies?
- In what ways do faith communities interact with development actors and what are the outcomes with respect to the achievement of development goals?

The research aims to provide knowledge and tools to enable dialogue between development partners and contribute to the achievement of development goals. We believe that our role as researchers is not to make judgements about the truth or desirability of particular values or beliefs, nor is it to urge a greater or lesser role for religion in achieving development objectives. Instead, our aim is to produce systematic and reliable knowledge and better understanding of the social world.

The research focuses on four countries (India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania), enabling the research team to study most of the major world religions: Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism, Buddhism and African traditional belief systems. The research projects will compare two or more of the focus countries, regions within the countries, different religious traditions and selected development activities and policies.

The consortium consists of six research partner organisations, each of which is working with other researchers in the four focus countries:

- University of Birmingham, UK: International Development Department, Department of Theology and Religion, Centre for West African Studies, Centre for the Study of Global Ethics.
- University of Bath, UK: Centre for Development Studies.
- Indian Institute of Dalit Studies, New Delhi.
- University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
- Lahore University of Management Sciences, Pakistan.

In addition to the research partners, links have been forged with non-academic and non-government bodies, including Islamic Relief.

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Religions and Development
Working Paper 69

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ISBN: 978 0 7044 2886 7

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This document is an output from a project funded by UK Aid from the UK Department for International Development (DFID) for the benefit of developing countries. The views expressed are not necessarily those of DFID.
Acknowledgements

The leader of the Nigerian research team was Shedrack Best, who wishes to record his appreciation of the roles played by other members of the team, which was made up of:

- Professor Habu Galadima of the Department of Political Science, University of Jos, who led the research assistants in Jos, organized interviews with Muslim informants and helped to put together drafts of the Jos city report.
- Professor Sati Fwatshak of the Department of History and International Studies, University of Jos, for his assistance with field research in Jos, particularly with Christian informants, and in assisting with the preliminary report for Jos.
- Dr. Mohammed Kuna of the Department of Sociology, Uthman Danfodio University Sokoto, Nigeria, for serving as the lead researcher for Kano and helping with writing the preliminary report for Kano city.
- Mr. Mahmoud Muhammad Lawan of the Department of Political Science, Bayero University, Kano, who conducted interviews and held Focus Group Discussions with Muslim FBOs and individuals in Kano.
- Mrs. Katherine Hoomlong of the Centre for Conflict Management and Peace Studies, University of Jos, who assisted with the content analysis of the media coverage of the violent conflicts in Jos.
- Mrs. Fatima Angela Ibrahim, Centre for Information Technology and Development, Zumunchi Building, Kofar Kabuga, Kano, who was a research assistant on the media and other secondary sources of data in Kano.
Summary

This study examined protracted inter-religious conflict in Nigeria, focusing on recent violent episodes and their aftermath. Because much of the violence has been urban and because the violence itself and subsequent recovery and reconstruction are strongly influenced by contextual factors, the research was conducted in two cities: Kano in northern, predominantly Muslim Kano state (1999 and 2004), and Jos, the capital of Plateau State, in the religiously mixed Middle Belt (2001 and 2008).

Hostility between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria has deep historical roots and is linked to politics characterized by struggles between the northern and southern states over access to federal power and resources, inequalities in access to opportunities and different views about legal regimes. Over the last thirty years, the frequency of violence with a religious dimension appears to have increased. It pits Muslims against Christians and Islamic sects against each other. The study used secondary sources, including the media, semi-structured interviews with a wide range of informants and focus group discussions to ascertain the role of religion in the causes, triggers and consequences of the violence.

To some extent, use of the ‘federal character principle’ since the 1980s to ensure a balance between ethnic and religious groups in federal offices and attempts to increase inter-faith dialogue and cooperation have had positive results. However religious revivalism and competition, formal democratization, shrinking state resources, growing poverty and inequality, and international influences, have contributed to the increasing salience of religion in politics and the periodic degeneration of political and religious competition into violence. It is difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle the role of religious, ethnic and indigene/settler differences in explaining conflict, but it is clear that the failure of the state to manage diversity and prevent violence (and its complicity in some instances) has contributed to the changing geography of violent clashes and the apparent increase in their frequency in recent years.

The ineptitude, partiality and violence of the security forces, especially the police, has further undermined people’s confidence in them, and state responses to underlying problems, reconstruction and the desire for justice have been unsatisfactory. Relations between communal groups in urban areas have deteriorated under the pressure of increased poverty and inequality, youth marginalization and aggressive religious revivalism. However, rather than differences in religious doctrines being the cause of violence (except in some intra-Muslim clashes), religion appears to have been
instrumentalized by the powerful in both cities. There are more similarities in the characteristics of conflict and violence between the two cities than differences, despite their different histories, ethnic and religious composition, party politics and economic trajectories. Underlying apparently religious conflicts in both are majority/minority struggles over access to political power and economic competition.

For example, the violence in Jos appears to be primarily about control over local government, especially in Jos North, which is contested between indigenous and settler groups, although the conflict has become polarized along religious lines. In addition to competition between Muslims and Christians, hosts/indigenous and migrants/settlers, social dynamics in both cities are complicated by other rivalries. The triggers of individual violent episodes differ. Official, media and residents’ accounts tend to focus on the perpetrators of violence, often blaming it on foreigners, almajirai (religious students) or Yandaba (youth groups). However, these appear to be scapegoats – there is a reluctance to identify the instigators: those who foment religious conflict and violence, manipulate identity in their own interests, and recruit Yandaba and similar groups as perpetrators.

In protracted social conflict, the potential for further violence depends on, for example, whether physical security can be ensured, the state and social institutions can prevent conflict escalating into violence, and fear and hostility persist. The research demonstrated that in Kano, and particularly in Jos, these conditions (and increased residential segregation) are more likely to presage further violence than lasting peace.

The Federal and State governments both played roles in restoring order and providing funds for relief, although they are not always neutral. However, they have not brought the instigators or perpetrators of violence to justice; tackled poverty and inequality; addressed contradictory conceptions of citizenship; or created effective and accountable local government structures.

Some religious actors are instigators or perpetrators of violence, but religious organizations also (out of necessity) provide sanctuary, immediate relief and limited assistance with the rebuilding of everyday lives. Most prioritize their own members and the reconstruction of religious buildings, both of which may exacerbate religious antagonisms. Their peace building efforts are limited. Secular NGOs also
play roles in relief, reconstruction and peace building, reaching out to people in need regardless of religion, but their activities are small scale and dependent on external resources.

There is some evidence that since 2004 in Kano, relationships between communities have started to mend and some neighbourhoods are becoming more ethnically and religiously mixed. However, conflicts continue and the likelihood that they will erupt into violence again depends largely on whether government acts to reform the security forces and promote good governance. Inter-religious violence has erupted again in Jos and there is a growing fear that the city may become trapped in a cycle of violence and vengeance.

Conflict in both Jos and Kano is underlain by historical trends and deep contradictions, which can only be addressed through long term initiatives. However, it is also possible to identify issues that can be tackled by policy makers, development actors and religious bodies in the shorter term:

- FBOs and NGOs can play important roles in conflict transformation but can only supplement the efforts of the state, which must drive the process by supporting victims, punishing perpetrators, improving coordination of relief efforts, and instituting measures to prevent future violence.

- Following assessment of existing initiatives, support is needed for local institutions engaged in improving access to education and livelihood opportunities and building bridges between increasingly segregated communities.

- Security sector reforms and efforts to curtail the spread of small arms and light weapons should be stepped up.

- The reports of official commissions of enquiry should be published and their recommendations acted upon, including reforms to the judicial system to ensure that instigators and perpetrators are brought to justice.

- In the longer term
  - Democratic and electoral processes must provide a level playing field for different political actors and a means of ensuring accountability.
  - Constitutional changes are needed to resolve the contradictions between citizenship and indigeneity, and between state secularism and the integration of religion in the state.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>Christian Association of Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSJE</td>
<td>Christian Foundation for Social Justice and Equity</td>
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<tr>
<td>COCIN</td>
<td>Church of Christ in Nigeria</td>
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<td>CWF</td>
<td>COCIN Women Fellowship</td>
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<td>CWO</td>
<td>Catholic Women Organization</td>
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<td>ECWA</td>
<td>Evangelical Churches of West Africa (see also TEKAN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPRT</td>
<td>Emergency Preparedness and Response Team</td>
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<td>FBO</td>
<td>Faith-Based Organization</td>
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<td>FCS</td>
<td>Fellowship of Christian Students</td>
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<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus group discussion</td>
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<td>FGN</td>
<td>Federal Government of Nigeria</td>
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<td>FOMWAN</td>
<td>Federation of Muslim Women’s Association of Nigeria</td>
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<td>GRA</td>
<td>Government Residential Area</td>
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<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
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<td>JDPC</td>
<td>Justice, Development and Peace Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIBWIS</td>
<td>Jama’atu Izalatil Bidi’ah Wa’ikamatisk Sunnah</td>
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<td>JNI</td>
<td>Jama’atu Nasril Islam</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPRM</td>
<td>Justice, Peace and Reconciliation Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGA</td>
<td>Local Government Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>LUCODA</td>
<td>Lutheran Community Development Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOPOL</td>
<td>Mobile Police</td>
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<td>NEMA</td>
<td>National Emergency Management Agency</td>
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<td>OLA</td>
<td>Our Lady of Apostle Hospital</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>Peoples Democratic Party</td>
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<td>PFN</td>
<td>Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLASEMA</td>
<td>Plateau State Emergency Management Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>RURCON</td>
<td>Rural Development Counselors for Christian Churches in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEKAN</td>
<td>Tarayyan Ekiisiyoyin Krista a Nigeria (Fellowship of Christian Evangelical Churches of Nigeria) (see also ECWA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAPNET</td>
<td>West Africa Peace Network</td>
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<td>WIPNET</td>
<td>Women in Peace Network</td>
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1 Introduction

Conflict is endemic to society and many features of social and political organization seek, not always successfully, to provide ways of handling it to realize its creative potential and prevent it from degenerating into violence. This research focuses on violence because of its anti-developmental effects – increasing mortality, displacing and impoverishing its victims, destroying property, disrupting service delivery systems and livelihoods, placing extra demands on emergency health services and preoccupying decision-makers. Frequently, episodes of violence are not once-off occurrences; they are episodic and repeated, leading to complex and long-lasting changes in social, economic and political systems and physical living arrangements.

In religiously plural societies, conflict and violence often have a religious dimension, whether they occur between adherents of different faith traditions or rivals within a faith tradition. Religion may play a role as a marker of identity, a mobilizing device, a basis for rationalizing violent behaviour or a source of values on which to base peace-building and reconciliation. The relationships between religious and other key actors, especially in the state, are complex. Religious leaders may play important roles in instigating or preventing violence, and in either sustaining bad feeling or attempting to prevent a re-occurrence. The various organizational forms associated with religious traditions may provide a basis for mobilization, give humanitarian assistance during the emergency, assist longer term recovery and build peaceful (or confrontational) relationships in the longer term.

The research reported on in this paper was part of a comparative international project that compared the role of religion in recent episodes of communal violence and their aftermath. The study was concerned with identity-based conflict within countries, not international conflict or civil war. The majority of violent episodes in such conflicts occur in urban areas, although they are by no means confined to cities. While there has been a significant amount of work on the role of religion in violent conflict and there is much discussion of peace-building and conflict resolution, there is relatively little empirical work on the immediate and longer term aftermath of violent conflict, let alone analysis that focuses on the role of religion and religious organizations during this period. The empirical work in 2008/9 compared the aftermath of episodes of violent conflict between faith traditions (Christians and Muslims in Nigeria, Hindus and Muslims in India) and within a faith tradition (Sunni and Shi’a Muslims in Pakistan). The occurrence and nature of episodes of violence and the subsequent trajectories of recovery and reconstruction of social relationships are strongly influenced by contextual factors, and
so the case studies were carried out in two cities in each country: Jos and Kano in Nigeria, Ahmedabad and Mumbai in India (Gupta, 2010, 2011), and Gilgit and Jhang in Pakistan (Waseem, 2010).

Like most countries, violent conflict is part of Nigeria’s history: conflicts over access to resources, including land, cattle, slaves and oil; conquests that sought to spread Islam, especially the 19th century dan Fodio jihad; the Biafran civil war of 1967-70; and many protests that have resulted in riots and the destruction of property. Competition between different identity groups is part of the fabric of Nigerian society, and rivalry between Muslims and Christians (and between different groups within the two faith traditions) has deep historical roots. Over the last thirty years in northern Nigeria, it has often taken the form of urban riots, pitting Muslims against Christians and Islamic sects against each other (ICG, 2010). It appears that the frequency with which violence occurs has increased over the last decade or so, and that it is increasingly likely to take the form of clashes between Christians and Muslims. There is growing concern about its damaging effects on those affected; the threat it poses to the achievement of development objectives because of the diversion of resources to relief and reconstruction and its deterrent effect on investment in key city economies; the danger that repeated clashes will increase rivalry and tension, feeding a vicious circle of religious conflict; and ultimately the potential for religious violence to destabilize Nigeria’s fragile democracy.

A high proportion of the outbreaks of violent conflict with a religious dimension have occurred in urban areas. In many cases, the violence is episodic and outbreaks are interspersed with periods of relative calm, although tensions continue and the apparent calm may be disrupted by another outbreak of violence. When violence occurs, the social and economic links between residents are disrupted or permanently fractured. People are displaced, property destroyed, business operations and daily life upset and social relationships damaged. A broad distinction can be made between the violent episode itself, the immediate post-conflict period, in which order needs to be restored and humanitarian relief provided, a period during which some physical reconstruction occurs and life returns to ‘normal’ (at least for some of those affected), and a longer period during which social and economic relationships may be restored or restructured and attempts made to build a lasting peace and prevent further outbreaks of violence.
There has been a considerable amount of research on the role of religion in violent communal conflict in Nigeria but, like elsewhere, very little on the aftermath, especially over the longer term. Analysis has focused on the causes, dynamics and consequences of violence, with an emphasis on its political and socio-economic dimensions, but has not examined the roles played by religious organizations. The aim of this project was, therefore, to analyse recent episodes of communal violence in two Nigerian cities, in order to develop a better understanding of the roles of religion and religious organizations in the violence and its aftermath.

As noted above, contextual factors at both the national and local levels are important in explaining the characteristics and dynamics of conflict and violence. They are also potentially important influences on what happens in the immediate and longer term aftermath, and so two cities with different histories and religious composition were studied:

- Jos is the capital of Plateau State in Nigeria’s Middle Belt. Until recently regarded as a tolerant and tranquil city characterized by harmonious relations between different social groups, the frequency and severity of violent clashes has increased in recent years. Several clashes occurred in the first decade of the 21st century, in particular in 2001 and 2008.
- Kano, the capital of Kano State in the north of the country, has a longer history of periodic violence, although it has been relatively peaceful since the mid-2000s. Particular attention was paid to the last serious clashes in 1999 and 2004 and the period since then.

The research had four objectives:

i. To examine recent episodes of communal violence in Jos and Kano, within the wider national, State and local contexts, in order to improve understanding of their causes, characteristics and consequences.
ii. To analyse and compare the coping strategies of residents affected by the violence, including the social and religious networks and resources on which they were able to draw.
iii. To analyse whether and how those affected have been able to resume patterns of living, working and daily interaction similar to those prior to the episode(s) and, if not, how and why those patterns have changed.
iv. To identify the actors and organizations that played a role in the immediate and longer term aftermath of the violent episodes under study, examine their intentions, the roles that they played and the outcomes of their actions, with respect to
   - the restoration of calm, provision of relief, assistance in reconstruction, and contribution to longer term peace-building
the roles of faith-based vis-à-vis other actors and organizations, including the state and non-religious civil society organizations.

The main research team was based in Jos, where the recent violence was fresh in the minds of residents. This made it relatively easy to find informants, although memories were raw and the atmosphere tense, so the researchers had to proceed with care. In contrast, in Kano, because of the time that had elapsed since the most recent violence, not only had respondents’ memories faded, but also, despite the efforts of the research team, it proved more difficult to find appropriate informants, so less new empirical information is available on that city. This report therefore concentrates on Jos, discussing Kano in less depth for comparative purposes.

1.1 Methodological approach

The research team leaders from India, Pakistan and Nigeria, together with coordinators based in the University of Birmingham (Gurharpal Singh and Carole Rakodi), jointly identified the aim and objectives of the research and agreed the methodological approach to be adopted, while allowing the country research teams some latitude to adapt both of these to the contexts in which the research was carried out. A review of the international literature was undertaken and shared with the lead researchers during a joint planning meeting, in order to provide the teams with a shared conceptual base, operational definitions of key concepts, a critique of available theoretical frameworks, and insights into methodologies used in similar studies (Ornnert, 2008).

A review of the literature on communal conflict and violence in urban areas in Nigeria was carried out and concurrently, potential locations for the research were scoped (Best, 2009a). Early in 2009, a methodology workshop was held for the research personnel involved in the collection of secondary and primary data in Jos and Kano.

Only limited secondary materials and other data were available, and their reliability was often questionable, so the study relied primarily on the collection of primary data using qualitative methods to develop an understanding of what had happened during the crises and the years since, informants’ points of view and the activities of relevant organizations. A series of semi-structured interviews with
key informants were carried out, in addition to a review of newspaper articles published just before, during and after the episodes on which the study focused.

In Kano, secondary materials including academic publications, the reports of public enquiries and NGO reports, were available. These provided information on the roots, causes and courses of the conflict episodes, and newspaper reports provided (contradictory) information on the volume, source and degree of assistance rendered to the victims. Interviews were carried out with 21 faith-based organizations (ten Muslim and eleven Christian), mostly located in Sabon Gari, the most diverse neighbourhood in Kano, but operating throughout the city (see Appendix). In addition, some key informants from the security and aid agencies were interviewed, mainly in the Bukavu Barracks, the Central Police Station, the Red Cross, the Kano State Emergency Management Agency, the Hisbah group, and A Daidaita Sahu (which is charged with enforcing Shari’a). The researchers drew also on informal conversations with the key informants and other individuals, as well as their own knowledge of the city and memories of the violence.

In Jos, primary data collection also relied on individual and group interviews with informants from a variety of religious and non-governmental organisations and the State Emergency Management Agency, as well as with residents affected by the violence. Most were carried out in January 2009 (dates for the exceptions are given in the text) (see Appendix 1).

The respondents were briefed about the objectives of the research and its possible implications. They were told that their views would be treated with respect and assured that the report would not be used adversely against them in any way. They were informed that the results of the study would be shared with them and other interested actors, in order to explore the implications for policy and practice, including ways of preventing future violent episodes and organizing more effective humanitarian support for those affected. They were advised that the study was intended as a contribution to a much needed dialogue between people and organizations across faith lines. In practice, a renewed outbreak of violence in January 2010 meant that the situation was too tense and unstable to hold the planned policy workshop. The findings were, however, presented at a seminar in London on 1st June, 2009; on 6th April, 2010 at the conference of the Nigerian Anthropology and Sociology Association in Zaria; and on 14th December, 2010 at the Nigerian Religion and Development research programme’s dissemination conference in Abuja.
1.2 Organization of the paper

The causes, characteristics and consequences of violent episodes, the identity of key actors and organizations, and the roles they play during and after the clashes can only be understood by locating the episodes in a wider context and within a longer time frame. The international literature, Nigerian research and accounts of individual violent episodes are drawn upon to develop an understanding of the broader characteristics of conflict and violence in Nigeria and of perceived changes in the nature and frequency of violence in recent years, particularly its tendency to be inter-religious. An overview of the characteristics of and trends in urban communal conflict in Nigeria is presented in Section 2, to provide a context within which to examine the nature of conflict and violence in Jos and Kano.

Background information on the two cities is provided in Section 3, together with a chronology of violent episodes in recent decades and a more detailed account of the episodes on which the research focused. The political, economic, social and religious characteristics that have given rise to rivalry and conflict are discussed, along with the immediate triggers for particular episodes. The ways in which residents and businesses in the cities were affected by the violence and the coping strategies they adopted are described in Section 4.

Key actors and organizations linked to the state at federal, State and local levels, which might have been expected to play key roles in restoring order, providing relief, reconstruction and long term development and conflict prevention, are identified in Section 5, along with the roles they played and the views of informants on their motives and effectiveness. Section 6 focuses on the roles played by non-state organizations, focusing primarily on religious organizations of different types. Finally, in Section 7, the conclusions of the study are summarized and some possible implications for policy and practice identified.
2 Conflict and violence in Nigeria: characteristics and trends

Nigeria is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country with boundaries inherited from the colonial period. As Osaghae and Suberu (2005) point out, diversity does not necessarily result in conflict, so it is necessary to examine how identity formation and mobilization processes work – which identities are politically salient, how they become salient, and how they are related to each other. Osaghae and Suberu define identity as “any group attribute that provides recognition or definition, reference, affinity, coherence and meaning for individual members of the group, acting individually or collectively” (2005, p 5), noting that identities are constructed, related to each other, and so mutually reinforcing. Those that link identity and territory, they suggest, are more likely to generate conflict and violence – they are the identities that are most commonly assumed by citizens for political purposes and are implicated in day-to-day competition and conflict over resources and privileges, as well as contestations over citizenship. The relative size, location and expectations of Nigeria’s ethnic and religious communities are key to understanding political and inter-community relationships in the contemporary period, but these can only be understood by referring to the pre-colonial and colonial periods.

The first part of this section will sketch some aspects of the wider political, economic, social and religious context. It will then suggest that the competition and conflict between different identity groups that periodically erupts into violence can be broadly grouped into three categories: ethno-regional, intra-religious and inter-religious. None of these are ‘pure’ categories: as the discussion will reveal, there are ethnic and religious dimensions to many of the conflicts. However, some may be regarded as primarily ethnic or intra-religious. As noted above, recent trends appear to include a tendency for longstanding rivalry to erupt into violence more frequently than in previous decades, changes in the geographical distribution of violence with religious dimensions, and an increased likelihood that violence will be inter-religious. In Section 2.3, some of the possible reasons for these trends will be discussed. Conflict and violence in city settings can only be understood within this wider context - both individual episodes in each city and similarities and differences between the cities, which will be analysed in Section 3, are related to the history of the cities and their regions; their political, socio-economic and religious composition; and their location in the wider political economic and religious landscape.
2.1 Nigeria: the political, economic, social and religious context

Nigeria today “presents a complex of .... crisscrossing and recursive identities, of which the ethnic, religious, regional and sub-ethnic (communal) are the most salient and the main bases for violent conflicts” (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005, p 7). These identities have historical, geographical and political origins. A large number of ethnic groups can be identified in the country, varying widely in size: the numerical dominance of Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba groups (originating and geographically concentrated in the northern, eastern and western regions respectively) has had important political effects. Not only did these groups develop powerful political structures that enabled them to dominate other ethnic groups, their regional hegemony was recognized by the British colonial government, which adopted a policy of indirect rule that, in particular, reinforced the political dominance of the northern emirates. The distribution of ethnic groups in different geographical regions, with different resource bases and economic structures, is overlain by a geographical distribution of religious groups that is not identical. Both have changed over time, with changes in the national political economy, evolving trade patterns and significant volumes of migration.

Traditional beliefs and practices associated with ethnic groups and local communities (often termed African traditional religion or religions) predate the spread of both Islam and Christianity, although today the proportion of people claiming their religion as ‘traditional’ has shrunk to 1 per cent (Pew Forum, 2010). Historically, indigenous religion influenced both Islam and Christianity, although the attitudes of many Muslims/Christians and the colonial government towards it were rather hostile (Mbahirin, 2006, p 76, 78). Today almost all Nigerians are Muslim or Christian, with roughly equal numbers of each, although in the absence of census figures, the figures are contested. However, many of both faiths continue to follow some traditional beliefs and practices.

Islam is the oldest of the foreign religions. Most scholars claim that it arrived in Nigeria from the north, in association with trans-Saharan trade, during the 11th and 12th centuries, becoming well established by the 15th century, following the conversion of rulers of the Borno empire and later the Hausa kings. Thus Islam took root initially amongst ethnic groups in the north of the country, as well as among the Yoruba of south western Nigeria as a result of trading links with Mali. Resistance by ethnic groups in the Middle Belt and the more southerly parts of the country slowed its expansion between the 16th century and the early 19th century.
“The second phase [of Muslim expansion] started as a revivalist revolution at the dawn of the nineteenth century: a Fulani preacher, Shehu Usman dan Fodio, led a jihad [struggle] initially aimed at purifying Islamic practices in the region and ultimately at installing a new righteous leadership” (ICG, 2010, p 3; see also Takaya, 1987). Between 1804 and 1808, the despotic Hausa kings (by then ruling over fourteen states) were replaced with Fulani emirs, and the overarching Sokoto Caliphate established (Falola, 1998, p 25). This was the beginning of Islamic theocracy in Nigeria, although most people supported dan Fodio because he preached against oppression and injustice and because of the social and economic improvements that resulted (Enwerem, 1995, p 21-22). Although the older Islamic kingdom of Borno contested the Sokoto Caliphate’s expansion, the latter was able to expand Islam and extend the rule of Shari’a law while maintaining a feudal system in which communities paid tithes to the emirs, who in turn paid tribute to the caliph (ICG, 2010).

From their traditional settlement areas in the northwest, the Hausa and Fulani first moved south in large numbers during the 19th century. Where they made permanent conquests, not only did Islam spread among the subjugated groups, the latter also gradually became absorbed into the Hausa/Fulani culture and ethnic group. In the conquered areas, “Part of the population was abducted to the north, so that the sultanate [caliphate], by the end of the nineteenth century, had millions of slaves: between 25 and 50 percent of the total population” (Harnischfeger, 2004, p 439). Slaves provided labour for the plantations on which the caliphate’s prosperity was partly based and “memories of that time still haunt relations, especially between the Fulani and the smaller groups the raiders plundered” (ICG, 2010, p 4; see also Ayu, 1987; Falola, 1998). Also during the 19th century, a Hausa/Fulani jihad destroyed the Oyo Empire and several other ‘pagan’ kingdoms in Yorubaland, consolidating Islam and turning the northern part of Yorubaland into an emirate.

In 1807, British subjects were prohibited from participating in the trans-Atlantic slave trade, and through most of the 19th century, the British government sought to prevent the trade through a naval blockade, despite the continued supply of slaves from the interior. Eventually, in 1861, it established a foothold in Lagos, from which it extended control to the remainder of the coastal region. Gradually, explorers and traders penetrated the interior and exports of palm oil and kernels replaced the export of slaves. In 1900, northern Nigeria was declared a protectorate, and negotiations with the (by then weakened) emirs persuaded most of them to accept colonial rule. The existing political and legal system provided the basis for indirect rule of the Northern Protectorate (Crowder, 1966), but the
capital was shifted from Sokoto to Kaduna and the powers of the emirs constrained. In addition, the scope of Shari’a law was reduced, by restricting it first to civil cases, and then to family law, under the jurisdiction of Islamic judges (Alkali) and a Shari’a court of appeal (ICG, 2010).

The area under the jurisdiction of the Northern Protectorate included the Middle Belt, enabling the further spread of Islam, although Muslims constituted only 6 per cent of the Middle Belt’s population by 1931 and 10 per cent by 1952 (Clarke, 1982, p 228). Islam also spread in the east of the country through trade (Mbahirin, 2006, p 83). In these areas, Muslims were concentrated in the towns and cities and were more scattered in the rural areas.

Overall, therefore, “The Sokoto Caliphate has an important but ambiguous place in northern Nigerians’ heritage” (ICG, 2010, p 4). On the one hand, it is a source of pride, community and cohesion - it demonstrated and continues to operate a form of Islamic governance (the caliph, the emirs and their successors). On the other, it lost power when it came under colonial indirect rule and, in addition, some see it today as “the locus of a northern Muslim establishment that serves its own interests” (ICG, 2010, p 4).

The colonial government’s policy of protecting the Hausa-Fulani rulers and the Muslim identity of the Northern Protectorate reinforced the reluctance of minority ethnic groups to convert to Islam and predisposed them towards conversion to Christianity, which spread in the Middle Belt as well as in the southern regions. In addition, colonialism brought economic and demographic changes. A rail link between Lagos and Kano was completed in 1912, bringing increased potential for cash crop agriculture. In 1914, the Northern and Southern Protectorates were amalgamated, although they retained separate regional administrations. These developments encouraged an influx of migrants from the south to take advantage of the new economic opportunities, although integration was hindered by religious differences and the British strategy of avoiding potential inter-group tensions by encouraging residential segregation (ICG, 2010).

Today, many more Nigerian Muslims are Sunni than Shia, but sectarian divisions are less important than in other parts of the Muslim world – a Pew Forum sample survey in 2009 showed that nationally 38 per cent of Muslims identified themselves as Sunni, 12 per cent as Shia, 3 per cent as Ahmadiyya.
but 44 per cent as ‘just Muslim’ (Pew Forum, 2010). Sufism, the mystical branch of Islam, which is organized through orders or brotherhoods (tariqa), has traditionally been widespread and influential. The Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya brotherhoods, with large numbers of followers, especially in the northern states, are the oldest and most important (Olupona and Falola, 1991, p 39) and relations between them are sometimes tense (Paden, 2005). They sought “to forge a strong Islamic community through such activities as the sponsorship of Quranic schools, and … demanded more secular schools that catered to Muslims” (Falola, 1998, p 31). However, despite the development of colonial and post-colonial secular governance institutions, the Islamic injunction that religion and government cannot be separated means that many Muslims continue to regard politics (in particular Islamic governance) as the best medium through which to address social and economic issues.

There is some evidence that Nubian and Coptic Christians arrived in the Benin Kingdom around the 15th century from the north (Kenny, 1979, p 172). The first European groups to make contact were the Portuguese, who monopolized trade along the coast until 1650, when Dutch, English and French traders broke their monopoly (Dzurgba, 1991, p186). The Portuguese brought the Catholic faith to the Benin and Warri areas in the 15th and 16th centuries (Burns, 1963). However, according to Mbachirin (2006, p 98), “Christianity did not take serious root in Nigeria until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. …chaplains accompanied traders not just to minister to them but to also convert Africans. They established mission stations at trading posts”, paving the way for both the expansion of trade and Christianity and the establishment of colonial rule. However, the coming of Christianity to Nigeria was not just the work of European missionaries - pioneer missionaries who made an even wider impact were freed slaves.

The missions that arrived in Nigeria can be grouped into three main categories: Catholics, Protestants and Pentecostals. Many were concentrated in the south of the country, although a few targeted the north, despite the restrictions placed on missionary activities by the colonial government as part of its agreements with Muslim rulers (Crampton, 2004; Kastfelt, 1994; Turaki, 1993). The largest Protestant mission in the north, established in 1893, was the Sudan Interior Mission, which resulted in the establishment of the association of Evangelical Churches of West Africa (ECWA) (Mbachirin, 2006). Although the primary purpose of the missionaries was to spread Christianity, evangelism had wider social, economic and political aspects (Mbachirin, 2006). Education, to enable Africans to read the
bible, develop technical skills, improve their farming methods and run churches themselves, was the most important, although missionaries were not permitted by the colonial government to establish schools in the Muslim north. Missionaries also established various other institutions to aid them in their work, which benefited Africans, including health facilities and printing presses (Dzurgba, 1991, p191).

Not only did the missions train Nigerians in much of the country in a wide variety of occupations, from clerks to doctors, they played major roles in health care and social welfare provision and had enormous influence on Nigerian Christians’ entire way of life (Mbachirin, 2006; see also Oyeshola, 1991, p 44). Education enabled Christians to seek employment in the colonial administration, learning the administrative skills that later gave them the self-confidence to ask for political self-government. Although there was a long tradition of Islamic education in northern Nigeria, which had produced the officials that ran the Caliphate and emirates, their knowledge and skills did not match those required by the colonial administration. The colonial government initially turned to the missions to train Muslims, but fear of Christians’ conversion agenda deterred Muslims from attending mission schools and the northern rulers and religious establishment resisted this approach. This led the government to establish secular schools, reducing the monopoly of mission schools over ‘modern’ education. Nevertheless, the lower quality of public than church schools resulted in fewer Muslims gaining the skills required to access jobs in the colonial government and the formal sector.

Initially, the North attempted to postpone self-government and independence, fearing that its educational disadvantage and lack of representation in governance institutions would lead to domination by the South. However, in the run-up to independence, a significant political party was formed in the region, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC). This was a “…predominantly Hausa-Fulani elite organization led by Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna (…Sultan) of Sokoto and a descendant of Usman dan Fodio. Although the party’s younger and more radical elements…broke away to form the NEPU [Northern Elements Progressive Union], it was the NPC that led the region when the country gained independence in 1960” (ICG, 2010, p 6) and, moreover, became the dominant force in the coalition running the Nigerian federation.

Following independence, the priority for the main faith traditions was to re-negotiate their relationships with the new government. In addition, the mainstream Christian denominations sought to establish
autonomy from their mother churches. Southern Nigerians, who, apart from some in the south-west, were mostly Christians, generally envisioned national integration and development in line with Western models of democracy and modernization, while many northern Nigerians favoured an Islamic state model (Nolte et al, 2009). In practice, a secular constitution ostensibly separated religious affairs from the state, safeguarded religious freedom and prohibited religious political parties.

From the outset, relationships between the state and the faith traditions were complicated. In the Northern Region, Premier Ahmadu Bello pursued a ‘northernization’ policy in regional and local government (which had initially been staffed largely by better educated Christians) and promoted Islam as a basis for unifying the peoples of the region (ICG, 2010; Turaki, 1993). For example, the NPC made extensive use of religious symbolism (Best, 2001), the Premier forged links with the wider Muslim world (especially Saudi Arabia) and he also used his political position to establish and fund the Jama’tu Nasril Islam (JNI) (Society for the Victory of Islam), which aims to spread Islam and create an Islamic state (Paden, 1986; Olupona and Falola, 1992, p. 38; Udoidem, 1997). However, the NPC’s political and religious agenda led to the first of a series of military coups. This coup, in January 1966, during which Ahmadu Bello and several northern leaders were killed, was led by Christian Igbo officers from the Eastern Region. Between 1966 and 1999, Nigeria was under a succession of military regimes, which were, like the first post-independence government, dominated by northerners, whose strength in the army had long been seen as a way of compensating them for their relative under-representation in the civil service.

In response to the Civil War that followed the coup (1967-70), the three regions into which the country had been divided were broken up into a federation of twelve states (subsequently increased to 36). During the 1970s, the dominant development ideology was one of state-led development and the federal government had ample revenue from oil to distribute to State governments and tackle educational inequalities by increased government investment in education, including taking over schools (and other social facilities) owned by religious (mainly Christian) organizations. Despite this, and the growth of Muslim organizations providing education (such as the Ansar-ud-deen), the educational disadvantage of Muslims persists today, resulting in high unemployment, particularly amongst young (male) Muslims. The churches are still important education providers, despite the government’s refusal to restore their privileged position, which continues to be a sore point.
By the 1980s, falling oil prices, rapidly growing indebtedness, and state failure to achieve industrialization, reduce poverty and provide services resulted in economic crisis and growing resistance to authoritarian rule. Like most indebted countries, economic liberalization, marked by a typical set of structural adjustment policies, resulted in reduced investment, a shrinking state sector, higher prices, rising unemployment and increasing poverty. As opposition to authoritarian rule grew and opportunities opened up for non-state organizations in development and service delivery, large numbers of new civil society organizations were established. This was also a consequence of the preference of donors for direct funding of NGOs rather than government, reflecting changing development ideologies in terms of the role of the state, as well as donor concerns about poor governance. Eventually, economic liberalization was followed by political liberalization, and in 1999, democratic government was restored. Despite many challenges, including election rigging and political violence, there have now been four elections (1999, 2003, 2007 and 2010) to the various levels of government (the presidency, national assembly, senate, State governorships and assemblies, and local governments) (HRW, 2007; ICG, 2010).

By the 1990s, many were attributing Nigeria’s problems of poor governance and persistent poverty to the failure of the Western development paradigm, in both its state-led and structural adjustment guises (Falola, 1998, p 31). With the economic shift to dependence on oil, services and imports, northern cash crop producers had been hard hit. For example, the decline in cotton production exacerbated rural poverty and led to collapse of the associated textile industry. Declining markets for agricultural products and droughts led to increased rural-urban migration from the thirteen affected states, eleven of which are in the north, and in turn to rising urban unemployment (ICG, 2010). Following the disastrous rule of northern General Sani Abacha (1983-98), democratization was viewed as a chance to secure moral and political renewal. Already, state creation had changed the dynamics of regional power and undermined traditional/religious rulers, especially in the north. Democratization altered the dynamics further.

As noted above, in the years before independence, the colonial government had reduced the remit of Shari’a to personal and family law, but Muslims believe that freedom of religion means that they should be free to adopt Shari’a law for criminal matters. Although some northern Nigerian Muslims are driven primarily by a quest for political power, many look back to the pre-colonial caliphate and emirates as
an alternative model of governance and even today regard these institutions as a source of traditional/religious leaders who provide an alternative to the discredited post-independence military and secular leadership. Economic decline, high levels of poverty, a feeling that the north of the country had seen few benefits from oil revenues and democratization formed the context in which the Zamfara State governor initiated a campaign for the ‘restoration’ of Shari’a, an initiative that…instantly found wide resonance with many Muslims. For the clerics, it was an opportunity to restore a religious and moral heritage (and position of social power) suppressed after colonial conquest. Common people saw Sharia as an instrument for achieving a just, safe, compassionate and less corrupt society. For the political elite, having lost its hold on the federal government, Sharia was potentially an instrument for regional self-assertion” (ICG, 2010, p 16).

While the military governments had been able to keep the desire of the northern States to adopt Shari’a law at bay, the restoration of democracy in 1999 was followed by a succession of State governments adopting a Shari’a legal regime. Between 1999 and 2002, to the alarm of Christians, twelve states re-introduced Shari’a criminal law and a full court system, although only two have applied the law fully.

2.2 Broad categories of communal competition and conflict

The introduction above has sketched a political and religious historical context characterized by rivalry between groups, but has referred to only a few of the most important violent conflicts. This section will focus more specifically on conflict, examining in particular the instances when conflict has become violent. The conflicts with which this analysis is concerned are: (1) intrastate; (2) based on ethnic, religious or cultural identities that differentiate groups and communities; (3) drawn out, with no clear beginning or end; and (4) urban-based. As many analysts have pointed out (for example, Fetherston, 2000; Nathan, 2001), conflict is an inherent and inevitable characteristic of everyday life and all societies, but its escalation into violence is not. Conflict arises over differences in interests and goals and over the unequal power positions of groups. Where sound institutional mechanisms exist to manage these differences (for example, parliaments and other arenas for dialogue and debate), they are unlikely to result in violence. Violent conflict arises if institutional mechanisms are either not in place to begin with or fail to support peaceful ways of addressing social conflict.
Useful frameworks for understanding communal violence in general (and the role of religious agency in particular) are still few and far between, and, at times, hidden in more normative analysis or case studies. While there is a wealth of country-specific literature, the theoretical grounding of much of it is not explicit. However, Azar’s ‘protracted social conflict’ framework is useful for the analysis in this paper (Azar, 1990).

Based on over 60 examples of conflict revolving around communal identity in countries as diverse as Lebanon, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Northern Ireland, Ethiopia, Israel, Sudan, Iran, Nigeria and South Africa, Azar identifies three key aspects of episodic violence in a context of drawn out intra-state conflict: preconditions (which he terms genesis), dynamics and outcomes.

- Of the four linked clusters of preconditions (communal content, human needs, governance and the role of the state, and international linkages), Azar suggests that communal content is the most significant in determining the likelihood of conflict (although not necessarily violence) (Azar, 1990, p 7-12). Communities are defined as politicized groups defined (and mobilized) around shared communal identities based on real or perceived ethnic, religious, linguistic or other cultural identity characteristics. ‘Communal content’ refers to the level of political activity within multi-communal societies, which depends on the history of inter-group rivalry and colonial conquest. The basic human needs that people seek to satisfy through the formation of identity groups, he suggests, include security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation. Tension (based on grievances) arises when physical scarcity of goods results in their uneven distribution between different groups, resulting in a sense of injustice and discrimination based on identity. Failure of the state (or other authority) to redress grievances is the third precondition for violence, especially where the state experiences a crisis of legitimacy due to the monopoly of power by dominant groups, which feeds the fears of marginalized groups. Finally, Azar suggests that the responses of the state are not solely determined by endogenous factors (political power configuration and/or regime type), but also by the fourth condition, international linkages (for example, economic dependency or political/military client relationships with stronger states), which may induce a state to pursue certain policies over others.

- While preconditions are necessary for outbreaks of violence to occur during longer term conflicts, they are not sufficient to generate violence. Analysis of process dynamics aims to identify the factors that trigger violence. Triggers can be trivial events, but lead to the collective recognition of individual grievances, often expressed through some form of protest that links the trigger event to other issues - for example, communal security, access to resources and the need for acceptance. Azar identifies three
main process dynamics: (1) communal actions (political actions by communal groups), (2) state actions (how states respond to communal political action) and (3) built-in properties of the conflict (strategies/organizational capacities of states and communal groups, historical patterns of interaction between actors, and the nature of communication between them).

- Azar identifies four main outcomes of violence, which may generate or reinforce protracted social conflict: (1) deterioration of physical security (reinforced by the destruction of physical and social infrastructure), (2) institutional weaknesses (including erosion of both state capability and the social fabric, which hinders the management of conflicts before they escalate into violence), (3) psychological ossification (resulting in a vicious cycle of fear and hostility) and (4) increased loss of communal control over community members and their lives. All of these, he asserts, contribute to the breakdown of cooperation between communal groups, contributing to the unique characteristics of protracted social conflicts. Unlike more classically understood conflicts, in protracted social conflict there are no clear winners and losers – instead, all the parties involved can be adversely affected. Moreover, protracted social conflicts do not have clear start and termination points, because without the satisfaction of basic needs, latent conflicts will continue to exist even in the absence of violence, with the potential to turn violent through the cycle of causal factors and dynamics outlined above.

Protracted social conflicts characterized by episodic violence in the Nigerian context can be broadly divided into three types: ethno-regional, intra-religious and inter-religious. However, as the analysis will reveal, the distinctions between these categories are not clear and there are many links between them. Azar’s framework is useful for analysing both specific episodes of violence and the factors that appear to explain the increasing frequency of clashes in recent years, which are discussed in Section 2.3.

### 2.2.1 Ethno-regional political competition and conflict

To emphasize the inter-connectedness of ethnic, regional and religious identities in Nigeria and the fact that they are often mutually reinforcing, they are sometimes compounded or hyphenated as ethno-regional or ethno-religious (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). As discussed above, ‘regional’ refers to the geo-political division of Nigeria into three main regions, each dominated by one of the three main ethnic groups (Hausa/Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba). However, a closer look at the terms ‘ethnicity’ and ‘religion’ is necessary.
Green (2004) identifies three main ways that analysts define ethnicity, which he terms the ‘ordinary language’, ‘quantoid’ and ‘interpretivist’ approaches. Analysts who adopt what Green terms the ‘ordinary language’ approach (for example Horowitz, 1985) use the term ethnicity indiscriminately to mean all minorities and/ or identity groups mobilized on the basis of race, religion, class, tribe or culture. Arguably, this is not a useful approach. Even some who write extensively on the subject often fail to provide a definition of the terminology they use (for example Crighton and Mac Iver, 1991; Fox 1999, 2004), instead making implicit assumptions about its meaning. In addition, such a broad definition can obscure important distinctions between different types of identity.

The second approach identified by Green is the ‘quantoid’ approach, whereby analysts try to construct a universal definition of ethnicity (for example, Paul Brass, Donald Horowitz and Anthony D. Smith). Green divides these into two extreme camps: the essentialists/ primordialists (who believe that ethnic groups are “ancient and immemorial and thus given facets of social life”) and the instrumentalists/ modernists (who argue that “ethnic groups are a product of modernity and, more specifically, the creation of modern elites for their own purposes”) (Green, 2004, p. 7; see also Young, 2007). Horowitz and Smith, Green suggests, fall in between these two extremes. Horowitz understands ‘ethnicity’ as ascriptive group identity based on race, language, religion, tribe or caste, but distinguishes between ranked and unranked ethnic systems. In the former ethnicity and social class are merged, while they are not in unranked systems (Horowitz, 1985; Smith, 1986). Paul Brass (1991) the definition to incorporate – in addition to supposedly objective attributes (language, territory, religion, etc) - subjective feelings (how a group defines itself) and behaviour (the ways in which group members behave and interact with each other), an aspect that is also emphasized by Young: “primordialists capture one important dimension: the inner attachments and emotional ties central to identity. The ethnic subject tends to perceive, experience and perform identity in essentialised terms” (2007, p 250). Nevertheless, like most other analysts, Brass prioritizes objective attributes, although he stresses that these are dynamic. Smith’s definition of ethnicity is based on a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, aspects of common culture and links to a homeland, but includes neither religion nor language (Smith, 1986).8

Thirdly, Green identifies an ‘interpretivist’ approach, in which analysts accept a variety of definitions, depending on their respondents’ understanding of the term. Studies using this approach “…show that
African ethnicities have evolved or even transformed over the last century or two” (Young, 2007, p 250).

Analysts’ conceptions of ethnicity influence their understanding of ethnic identity as ascriptive and fixed or changeable. Many stress that people change their ethnic identification in response to oppression or opportunities, that definitions of and boundaries around ethnic groups that were historically porous can be hardened by state enumeration and resource allocation policies, as well as the influence of missionaries and anthropologists, and that ethnicity can be manipulated for political and other ends (Chabal and Daloz, 2006; Chazan et al, 1988; Magubane, 2000; Suberu, 2000; Young, 2007). For example, Young notes that,

Although suggestions that contemporary ethnicity is a colonial invention are a vast exaggeration, the colonial state was a prime actor in the social construction dynamic…. [It] imposed a tribal template upon its new domain, and developed its own identity codification, seeking simplification, regrouping apparently similar entities, and rewarding collaborating intermediaries (2007, p 25).

These authors also suggest that, while ‘ethnicity’ is to an extent based on biological and cultural markers of identity, ethnic groups are not necessarily homogeneous or coherent, because their members have other ties and affiliations based on socio-economic class, religion, gender and so forth (Chabal and Daloz, 2006; Chazan et al, 1988; Hawthorn, 1993).

The plasticity of the concept of ethnicity in the Nigerian context is illustrated by the lack of agreement on the number of ethnic groups in the country, with estimates varying from around 200 to 500 (HRW, 2007; ICG, 2010; Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). It is generally accepted that ethnicity is the most basic and politically salient identity in Nigeria, with Nigerians more likely to define themselves in terms of their ethnic affinity than any other identity (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005), although in the core Islamic areas of the north, religion appears to be more salient. However, the number of distinct ethnic groups depends on the criteria used, even those that are given a single label are far from homogeneous, and “ethnic identities and boundaries, including myths of common origin, are fluid and subject to continuous construction and reconstruction” (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005, p 9). In addition, self definition is as important as external definitions when it comes to mobilization, with people sometimes being able to opt for a particular ethnic identity depending on the power relationships and majority/ minority dynamics in play.
Initially the colonial state was divided into two regions (Northern and Southern), which were administered separately even after the two units were amalgamated in 1914. In 1946, a three region structure was introduced. As noted above, the ability of the numerically dominant Hausa/Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba groups to dominate the Northern, Eastern and Western regions respectively has consistently led to competition for control at the national level. With the Hausa/Fulani dominated Northern Region containing over half the country’s population and two-thirds of its territory (including much of the Middle Belt, with its smaller ethnic groups), the regional structure was inherently unstable. The majoritarian basis of post-independence politics had roots in the colonial regional structure, with the emergent elite being regionalized from the outset. In the 1960s, they employed “…strategies of ethnic mobilization and exclusionary politics to establish hegemonic control of the regions” (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005, p 12; see also Ibrahim, 2000). These resulted in a wave of ethnic identity conflicts, many provoked by minorities' resentment of their incorporation into majority-dominated regions. Although the regions were abrogated in 1966, ethnic majoritarianism as a means of securing political control had already been established. It was associated with the exclusion of ethnic minorities from the political process and discrimination against them, as well as contestations over the nature of citizenship, in particular a distinction between the citizenship rights of ‘indigenes’ and ‘non-indigenes’ (see below).

Hausa/Fulani and Igbo in Kano State have clashed repeatedly over a long period – early clashes occurred in 1953 over the attempts by southern political parties to hold anti-colonial and pre-independence rallies, reflecting the opposition to independence of northern politicians, who feared that an end to British rule would mean domination of the north by the more developed south. They also demonstrated local resentment of Igbo economic domination, for example in petty commerce (ICG, 2010, p 6), although as will be discussed further below, recent clashes have increasingly taken on a religious dimension.

As noted above, the first coup in 1966 was led by Igbo officers from the Eastern Region. In addition to Hausa/Fulani officers, officers from northern minority groups were killed. “The shared anger over the killings and the common fear of southern domination led to a rare closing of ranks between the Hausa/Fulani and minorities; their officers jointly staged a counter-coup in July 1966” (ICG, 2010, p 8), putting Gowon, a compromise leader from the Middle Belt, in power. Over the next four months, reprisals by
northern mobs resulted in the deaths of thousands of southern migrants in the North, mostly Igbo, forcing them to flee. Partly in reaction, the Igbo-dominated Eastern Region seceded from Nigeria in 1967, resulting in a three year civil war fought in the south eastern part of the country. Despite their economic and commercial success since the end of the civil war, Igbos continue to feel politically marginalized and threatened by the other main ethnic blocks, the Hausa/Fulani and Yoruba, although these are not always united.

The Hausa/Fulani have not been able to make common cause with the Kanuri, a historic ethnic group in the far north east. In addition, although “[a] history of fear and suspicion of the aggressiveness and hegemonic intentions of their Yoruba and Igbo neighbours led to political co-operation between the Southern Minorities and the Hausa/Fulani elite in the 1960s” (Ibrahim, 2000, p 57), this alliance has not been maintained. Empowered by the creation of new states, the political efforts of the southern minorities since the 1970s have mainly focused on obtaining more equitable access to resources, especially oil.

Between the end of the civil war in 1970 and the 1980s, relative stability was achieved through

- reinforcement of the central state
- the breakup of the regions into 12 states in 1967 (and then 19 in 1976, 21 in 1987, 30 in 1991, and 36 in 1996), making the federation more balanced
- the availability of oil revenue to fund State budgets
- the introduction of innovative statutory mechanisms of ethnic conflict accommodation, including the federal character principle and the inter-regional distribution requirement for the election of the federal president. These were embodied in the 1979 Constitution for the Second Republic, which ended the first phase of military rule (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005; see also Nolte et al, 2009).

Subsequently, the threat of secession or break up has receded, not least because all politicians and parts of Nigeria want a share of oil revenues. Because the proliferation of states was accompanied by increased centralization of power, the main political contest since the 1970s, whether between military factions or between elected governments, have been over control of the federal government, in particular the office of the President (Ibrahim, 2000; see also Ukiwo, 2003).
In 1996, the country was divided into six geo-political zones for the purpose of sharing and rotating federal power and resources. However,

To a large extent, the zones reinforce the old regional cleavages: the Southwest and Southeast are coterminous with the Yoruba core of the old West and Igbo core of the old East respectively; Northwest covers and so-called ‘core-North’; Northeast is the core of the old ‘Borno axis’ of the North; North central encompasses the old Middle Belt…; and South south covers the old league of Southern minorities” (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005, p 12).

Although the new zones have political salience, their ethnic referents mean that the basic regional divisions remain strong.

While the military rulers prevented conflict by authoritarian rule, soon after the restoration of democracy in 1999, clashes between Hausa/Fulani, who had previously regarded the Igbo as their main rivals for national political power, and Yoruba groups occurred in Lagos in the wake of the transition from northern-dominated military rule to a Yoruba-led civilian administration, sparking off reprisals in Kano and elsewhere:

…the rising tension in relations between the Hausa/Fulani and Yoruba substantiates the proposition that perceived loss of political power is an incentive for ethno-political conflict. Groups that feel they have lost out become touchy, and strategise and mobilise to recapture power (Ukiwo, 2003, p 123; see also Osaghae and Suberu, 2005).

As well as jostling over economic and political power, many conflicts between the larger and smaller ethnic groups and between smaller groups concern access to land and resources, for example in the Middle Belt and southern parts of the country, including the Niger Delta (see, for example, Albert, 1999; Alubo, 2006; Best, 2004). Occasionally, these erupt into violence, and sometimes religious differences between the groups give them a religious tinge. Nevertheless, “…while religion and education played an important role in structuring political competition in the early postcolonial years, …the political impact of religion was widely perceived as less problematic for Nigeria than that of ethnicity and regionalism (Nolte et al, 2009, p 12).
‘Indigeneity’ or ‘non-indigeneity’ provides another way of defining identity. Like ethnicity, it has deep historical roots and is associated with geography. However, it also has some constitutional underpinning and has gained salience in recent years, as competition for national and local political power and resources has increased. Nigeria’s constitutions base national citizenship on ancestry. For example, the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (sections 25-32) accords citizenship to all those who originate from a community indigenous to the country, defined as being born in Nigeria before independence (1 October 1960) and/or with parents or grandparents who belong or have belonged to an indigenous community (FGN, 1999). Citizenship conveys equal rights and responsibilities on all Nigerians. However, entitlement to citizenship is defined in terms of belonging to a particular ancestral community, with the result that those who move away from the geographical location with which that community is associated become ‘non-indigenes’ in their new area of residence, even after several generations. Traditionally, ‘sons and daughters of the soil’ had first or exclusive access to the resources (especially land), rights and privileges of an ancestral locality, community, town or state (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). To these, other privileges have been added, such as preference in political appointments, access to jobs in the public sector and security forces, scholarships etc.

States…were given the right to favour their indigenes when it came to the use of agricultural land, or the distribution of jobs, educational opportunities and health care. In this respect, states and even local government areas have functioned not just as administrative units but also as guardians of ethnic territory (Harnischfeger, 2004, p 442).

Very occasionally, where religion trumps ethnicity, in-migrants, for example some Muslims in the far north, have been absorbed into the ethnic identity of their host community. In addition, not all governments implement the indigeneity criterion rigorously. Nevertheless, the contradiction inherent in the constitution provides a potent basis for identity formation and conflict.

People define themselves as ‘indigenes’ against others: ‘non-indigenes’, ‘settlers’ or ‘migrants’, claiming privileged access to resources and political office on this basis. Longstanding contestations occur over which group is indigenous and therefore perceives itself as entitled to certain privileges. These are fiercest between majority and minority groups, as in Taraba, Nassarawa and Plateau States, rather than where one group overwhelmingly dominates political processes. They are complicated by the conflicts and migratory movements that have resulted in changing patterns of
settlement, not only during the colonial and post-colonial periods but for many centuries before, stimulated by wars or natural disasters as well as economic opportunities. Historically, in-migrants to historic urban centres were often allocated distinct areas in which to live, a practice that was continued by the colonial administration (see below).

While helping to create a more stable federal structure than the original regions, the creation of more states and local government areas has also increased the number of arenas in which claims to resources can be made and amplified the pressures on state resources, leading to increasing conflict over access to resources and political power, as well as a sharpening of communal identities (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005, p 9).

2.2.2 Intra-religious competition and conflict

Religion may be defined in substantive or functional terms, although some definitions combine elements of both (Furseth and Repstad, 2006). Substantive definitions focus on what religion is. These often equate it with a belief in a transcendental or supernatural reality and/or (a) spiritual being(s), the sacred, religiosity (which is signified by the beliefs held and practices in which adherents engage), and affiliation with a religious organization. For example, Ellis and Ter Haar (2004, p.5) suggest that religion in the African context is characterized by “belief in the existence of an invisible world, often thought to be inhabited by spirits that are believed to affect people’s lives in the material world”, which predated but continues to interact with the text-based monotheistic belief systems of Christianity and Islam. In contrast, functional definitions are concerned with what religion does (i.e. the role it plays in the construction of people’s worldviews and social cohesion). Through its interplay with other dimensions of social organization and difference, such as class, gender or ethnicity, religion influences beliefs, behaviour and social organization: people’s sense of personhood, their social relationships and wider socio-political dynamics. The characteristics of these interactions and whether they have positive or negative results are open to investigation. Critics of purely functional definitions consider that they may lose sight of what distinguishes the sacred from the secular or profane – they fail to take account of “religious truth claims” (Flood, 2006, p. 49). Whaling (1986), for example, considers that any definition of religion must include both functional and substantive elements. He conceptualizes religion as having a number of common elements: a religious community or organization, ritual and worship, scripture and myth, concepts of the sacred, spirituality, ethics, and social and political involvement.
Beyond these, he suggests that it is characterized by a belief that there is a transcendent reality (the supernatural, sacred or divine) and also a mediating focus or channel that enables human beings to connect to that reality.

The content of religious belief and practice has always been contested between and within faith traditions, giving rise to divergent tendencies and organizational splits. The form and expression of such conflicts is strongly influenced by the historical context in which they occur and the substantive roles played by religious people and organizations in society and politics. Sometimes organizational fragmentation, for example, into Christian denominations, has occurred without violence, and umbrella organizations have emerged to manage conflict, encourage cooperation, and strengthen the hand of religious groups in negotiations, for example with the state. However, other intra-religious tensions have periodically given rise to violence.

As noted above, the organizational form that Islam took in Nigeria included both the theocratic states of northern Nigeria and the Sufi orders (or brotherhoods), especially the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya. Tensions between these groups increased during the late colonial era:

As the ruling aristocracy in Sokoto (predominantly Qadiriyya) aligned with the colonial rulers, its members were increasingly accused of collaboration, amassing power and wealth and condoning decadent Western influences. In reaction, leaders in different parts of the region began to align with Tijaniyya, attracted by the brotherhood's apparent anti-colonial and anti-Western stance. Initially the tensions between the two orders were confined to scholars and the political elite (ICG, 2010, p 6).

However, by the 1940s, the growth of the Tijaniyya (which was linked to the Kano emirate) into a more influential mass movement fuelled competition between them, with the rival northern political parties competing for their allegiance. In Sokoto, adherents of the two orders clashed several times in the mid-1950s. An important part of Ahmadu Bello's agenda was to unite Muslims across the north by, inter alia, adopting a government policy of Northernization (Turaki, 1993), conversion campaigns (Paden, 1986), and founding the JNI, based in Kaduna and now the largest Muslim umbrella organization\(^2\), and the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (headed by the Sultan of Sokoto).
A variety of radical movements and groups that seek to purify or revive Islam and morally reform society have emerged since the 1970s, for example, Izala, Maitatsine, the Muslim Students Society and the Muslim Brothers (Shiites) (Bienen, 1986; see also Igwara, 1995; Paden, 2005). Some have argued that these groups emerged in part to fill the political gap created by the banning of party politics (Kane, 2003). Rival groups, including the Sufi orders, receive support from different parts of the Muslim world. Conflicts between them, between them and establishment Islam, and between them and the state are common in the predominantly Muslim parts of Nigeria and have periodically become violent (Mu’azzam and Ibrahim, 2000; Paden, 2005; Salih, 2002).

The Izala movement\textsuperscript{13}, founded in 1978, drew on the teachings of Abubakar Gumi (the main religious adviser to the Sardauna of Sokoto) and was formed in reaction to the perceived non-Islamic practices of the Sufi brotherhoods. Influenced by Salafi (Wahhabi) Islam, the movement advocated a strict interpretation of the Qur’an and Hadith (Larkin and Meyer, 2006).\textsuperscript{14} Gumi teamed up with Ahmadu Bello to form the JNI, with the initial agenda of propagating Islam in the Middle Belt, and sought to persuade Muslims to vote as Muslims. Izala’s attacks on the Sufi form of Islam practised by the Hausa/Fulani resulted in sustained and often violent conflict (Larkin and Meyer, 2006). Its criticism of the wealth and greed of the Sufi Sheikhs resulted in its activities being regarded with suspicion by both the Sufi establishment and the state, which restricted its activities, especially in Kano and other Sufi strongholds. Eventually, in 1985, Babangida granted it official recognition as part of a strategy to control religious movements and the heat went out of its relationships with both the Sufi establishment and the government (Kane, 2003).

In 1980, a series of religious riots broke out in Kano and spread to three states over the next three years, resulting in thousands of deaths (Falola, 1998). The group responsible was known as the Maitatsine. It was founded by a Cameroonian preacher, Marwa, who had arrived in Kano around 1945 and alternated between preaching, prison and periods of deportation until 1966. The movement sought to purify Islam and was opposed to all Western influence and materialism, as well as most modern technology and education; it condemned the brotherhoods and corrupt ulama. From 1972 onwards, Marwa and his followers (over 2,000 by 1975, triple that in Kano alone by 1980, and perhaps 8-12,000 altogether, mostly recruited from the poor) had constant confrontations with the public (including other Muslims) and the police from their base in one of the city’s neighbourhoods.
"The sect’s realization that the public and the government had become antagonistic to it...set it on the path toward violence: the Maitatsine decided that those who did not embrace their doctrine or Islamic practices had to be eliminated in order to preserve the faith" (Falola, 1998).

Other Muslims disowned Marwa as heretical, because of his idiosyncratic interpretations of the Qur’an, his claim that he was a prophet and the way in which he mixed Islamic practices with sorcery, urging the government to deal with his sect. In December 1980, a confrontation with police at an open-air rally sparked massive rioting, causing chaos in Kano for several weeks (ICG, 2010, p 18). Estimates of the number of deaths vary, with the ICG putting it at several hundred, whereas a government inquest headed by Justice Aniogolu established that 4,122 people died. Totally ill-equipped, the police were unable to exert control and the army had to be brought in. Despite the death of its leader, the sect was associated with further violence in Maiduguri and Kaduna in 1982, Yola in 1984 and Gombe in 1985, until it was finally brought under control. In this case, therefore, intra-religious conflict sparked off violence between the sect and the government.

The radical Muslim movements that emerged in several northern university campuses in the 1970s and 1980s, notably the Izala and Shiite groups, were occasionally associated with violent incidents. For example at the University of Sokoto in May 1986, Muslim members of Izala attacked other students. The trigger was a beauty pageant and disco organized by the Student Union to honour the achievements of Asma’u, daughter of the 19th century leader dan Fodio, which Muslim students thought inappropriate. They destroyed several properties and burnt part of the Vice-Chancellor’s office (Best, 1996). In April, 1991, violent conflict erupted in Katsina, capital of Katsina State and a historically significant centre of Islamic learning, when members of the Shiite movement staged a protest following the publication of a story and cartoon considered to be blasphemous (NIPSS, 1993, p 30). The protest degenerated into violence, with fighting and destruction of property. Many of those involved were imprisoned. Underlying this incident was a general expression of discontent with the Nigerian state and its passive role in religion, the attraction of Islamic reform ideology as a means of challenging established authority, both religious and political, and a desire for Shari’a-based government.
Since the mid-1990s, intra-Muslim violence has taken the form of clashes between Sunnis and Shi'ites, especially in Sokoto State and Zaria, as well as revolts “against the secular state and even orthodox religious authorities by radical anti-establishment groups” (ICG, 2010, p 20). In the early 2000s, a similar group to Maitatsine emerged in north eastern Nigeria.

Generally referred to as the ‘Nigerian Taliban’, it also rejected all secular authority. Over time, its position hardened, until it entered into a seemingly inevitable clash with the police in Borno state, in 2004, resulting in dozens of deaths. The group then re-emerged, this time commonly known as Boko Haram (‘Western Education is Forbidden’). Centred around the radical young preacher Mohammed Yusuf, it gradually built support amongst unemployed youth in Maiduguri...its relations with the police deteriorated, and it took an increasingly violent and radical stance against all secular authorities. The seemingly inevitable (and for the group prepared) clash took place in July 2009, leaving hundreds dead in Maiduguri. Despite Yusuf’s death at the hands of the security forces, the group has since re-formed. [It has links with Al Qaeda and] in September 2010, it conducted a spectacular prison break in Bauchi, freeing over 700 prisoners, including 150 of its members. [In 2010 it was]...behind a series of targeted killings in Maiduguri” (ICG, 2010, p 18).

This group has claimed responsibility for several more recent violent attacks. Groups such as Maitatsine and Boko Haram claim to be motivated both by Islam and disillusion with the corrupt secular state.

2.2.3 Inter-religious competition and conflict

Many analysts conflate ethnic and religious identities, and there is indeed a considerable overlap between the two in Nigeria, but the two sources of identity do not necessarily coincide and conflating them into a description of conflict as ethno-religious can conceal varying links between ethnicity, religion and conflict (Appleby, 2000). However, as with ethnic identity, religion can provide a potent basis for conflict because it determines people’s worldviews and sense of moral order, may be the basis for discrimination and perceptions of injustice, and can be an effective basis for mobilization, because perceived religious insults have immense symbolic value for adherents (Langer and Brown, 2007, p 8).

Early inter-religious competition in Nigeria was mainly between Islam and Christianity and traditional religious beliefs and practices in the north and south of the country respectively. The frontiers of
religious expansion along which the two world religions met at the end of the 19th century were in the Middle Belt and along the Abeokuta-Oshogbo axis in the south west, with the missions expressing deep concern about Muslim expansion and the colonial government, as noted above, seeking to exclude them from active evangelization in the north as part of its agreements with the emirs (Kastfelt, 1994).

As already discussed, Islam spread through trade but also through conquest, so some of its expansion in Nigeria was historically associated with violence, attempts by the Hausa/Fulani to exert political control, and extraction of resources, including slaves. The folk memories and accounts of this earlier history still inform the reactions of people who today are mostly Christian, especially in the Middle Belt. Post-independence efforts by the Muslim Hausa/Fulani to exert political control over both the northern states and the federal government have fed Christian suspicion of Muslim motives with respect to the secular character of the Nigerian constitution, as have more recent trends and events (see, for example, Falola, 1998; ICG, 2010). The latter include attempts to spread Islam, prevent Christian programmes being aired in the north and Christian religious education being taught in schools, and deny Christians access to land for the construction of churches, as well as provocative publications, ongoing pressure for the re-introduction of Shari’a criminal law in successive constitutional debates, and incidents such as the secretive way in which Babangida converted Nigeria’s observer status in the Organization for Islamic Conference (OIC) into membership in 1985. Mutual suspicion has occasionally erupted into violent conflict.

The OIC controversy partly found a vent in clashes in Kafanchan in 1987, when a four-day revival programme was planned by Christian students at the College of Education (Ibrahim, 1989; Kane, 2003). The display of banners advertising the event and remarks by a speaker who was a converted Muslim antagonized Muslim students who, led by a female student, confronted the preacher, leading to a general breakdown of order on the campus (NIPSS, 1993). The Muslim Students Society thereafter organized a protest in the town, which degenerated into inter-religious fighting (Kaduna State Government, 1987; Mu’azzam and Ibrahim, 2000). Twelve people were killed and places of worship, vehicles and buildings destroyed. The fighting spread to the cities of Kaduna, Katsina, Zaria, Funtua, Kankia and Daura, where Muslims sought revenge for the losses suffered in Kafanchan (Tamuno, 1991). In Zaria 74 churches, Christian homes, some hotels selling alcohol and other facilities were
destroyed. In Kaduna, the state capital, 14 churches were burned (Boer, 2003). Ibrahim was of the view that “what happened was not a spontaneous religious uprising”, citing as evidence that the arsonists had compiled a census of churches and hotels and were well supplied and organized (1989, p 68). Underlying the clashes in Kafanchan were old antagonisms and felt wrongs on the part of non-Muslim communities, who resented the continued imposition of Muslim traditional rulers in Southern Kaduna by the Emirate of Zaria and felt that their demands for political space and inclusion in decision making had yielded few results. The Babangida military regime, however, chose to understand the violence as an attempt to subvert the government and the tribunal set up to try offenders was accused by Muslims of bias against them. As a result, the episode left behind many unsettled questions and entrenched anger (Best, 1996; Kane, 2003; Mu’azzam and Ibrahim, 2000).

Similarly, clashes between long-settled Hausa/Fulani Muslims and the Atyap ethnic community in Zangon Kataf Local Government Area (LGA) in Kaduna State (who are mostly Christians or non-Muslim minorities) reflected longstanding resentment about the imposition of Fulani rule from Zaria. The creation of Zangon Kataf LGA in the 1980s, with a local Atyap man as Chairman, gave this hitherto marginalized community some political power. In 1992, the Chairman attempted to relocate a long-established market from a location favoured by the Hausa to a supposedly ‘neutral’ location. The Muslims in whose territory the old market was situated resisted the relocation and the two groups clashed in February and again in May (Mu’azzam and Ibrahim, 2000; Turaki, 1993). The violence spread to the cities of Kaduna, Zaria and Funtua, with greater intensity than previous episodes.

Allegations of bias on the part of the security forces and the conduct of the tribunal set up to try the perpetrators further fuelled the conflict, which only subsided when the Kaduna State Government replaced the traditional leader appointed by the Zaria emirate with an independent traditional leadership institution. Similar issues underlay clashes in Tafawa Balewa in Bauchi State in 1991 and Jalingo in Taraba State in 1992 (Kane, 2003). All of these occurred in the Middle Belt, where Hausa/Fulani Muslims were relatively prosperous and controlled traditional leadership appointments, despite being in a minority.

In 1996, Shiites in Kafanchan kidnapped a Christian preacher they accused of blasphemy, setting off retaliatory attacks on Muslims by Christians (Mu’azzam and Ibrahim, 2000).
As briefly discussed above, the extension of the Shari’a legal code to criminal law by the Governor of Zamfara State in 1999 was followed by other northern states, including religiously plural Kaduna State in 2000 (Ostien et al, 2005). The reaction of many non-Muslims resident in Zamfara was to move from that state to others perceived to be more tolerant. However, in Kaduna, indigenes did not wish to leave their homeland (Ostien et al, 2005). The Shari’a issue exacerbated tensions remaining from the earlier incidents and replacement by the military regime of civil servants from Christian minority ethnic groups by Muslims. Muslims, sensing opposition to the extension of Shari’a law from Christians, embarked on peaceful protests to press for the introduction of Shari’a, with counter-protests by Christians. At the end of the fracas that ensued, at least 2,000 people were dead, including many Igbo. This led to reprisal attacks in south eastern cities such as Aba and Onitsha, where Igbo turned against local Muslims, mostly Hausa/Fulani from the north, killing at least 22 people (Boer, 2003, p 78; Paden, 2005).

2.3 Increasing violence? Trends and possible explanations

Individual instances in which conflict erupts into protest and violence seem to have occurred more frequently since the 1980s, and especially following the restoration of democracy in 1999. In addition, the clashes, which all involve attacks on people, religious buildings, houses, businesses and other buildings, seem to have become more serious, with larger numbers of people affected and more destruction. The Human Rights Watch report of 2007 refers to an ‘epidemic of violence’, estimating

...that more than 11,000 Nigerians lost their lives in clashes along political, ethnic, religious, and other lines between the handover of power to the Obasanjo government and the end of 2006...[and] that more than three million Nigerians were internally displaced by this strife” (HRW, 2007, p 18).

This report enumerates nearly 500 incidents of varying scale. Some of the possible reasons for these trends will be explored in this section, before examining the history and explanations of violence in the case study cities.
2.3.1 Changing political regimes

Writing in 2000, Ibrahim summarized the evolution of Nigeria’s political economy as follows:

Over the past four decades, the Nigerian State has evolved from a federal polity characterised by three politically strong regions, each controlled by the elite of a majority ethnic group – Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo, to a highly centralised system in which the so-called federating states have no real autonomous powers and are at the beck and call of a strong centre in which enormous powers are vested in the hands of one person and one institution, the president and the presidency. This political transformation was carried out mainly under military rule in a context in which excessive corruption and primordial issues of ethnic, religious and regional political domination have become central elements in the country’s political culture... Ethno-regional identities have become problematic in the country because they have been associated with perceptions of discrimination and the inability of some groups to exercise certain rights. The main issues have been the control of political power and in particular control of the armed forces, the judiciary and the bureaucracy (Ibrahim, 2000, p 57).

While the reduced legitimacy of the rentier state, both military and democratic, provides the backdrop for contestations over power at every level of government, regimes have drawn upon communal identities to bolster their hold on power, pursue particular economic or political agendas, and enable them to challenge existing power holders. As discussed above, the most salient (often overlapping) communal identities in the Nigerian context are ethnicity, indigeneity and religion. Often, the instrumental use of identity as a mobilizing tool has had unanticipated results, sometimes merely because the state is inept or insensitive.

Consistently, those with political power in the north of the country have sought to exert control at the national level. As noted above, this quest has had both ethnic and religious dimensions: not only do many Muslims desire an Islamic state, based on Shari’a law, Muslims (like Christians) have a religious imperative to spread their faith. The inherited state structures and traditional leadership, which were both political and religious, gave them a strong base from which to pursue these agendas. Islam has suited northern politicians, who have sought to use religion to unite the main northern ethnic groups, as well as others. For both historical and contemporary reasons, however, Christians have been resistant to Muslim expansionism, as well as the perceived erosion of the secular basis of the Nigerian constitution and attempts to Islamize the state.
Today, the Catholic and Anglican churches (the latter now the Church of Nigeria), along with the Methodists and various Baptist groups, amongst the largest Christian churches. In addition, the numbers and membership of Pentecostal, charismatic and African independent churches have grown dramatically since the middle of the 20th century. As noted above, in the immediate post-independence period, the priority of the Christian churches was to establish their autonomy and foster indigenous leadership. Christians had been taught that religion and the public square were separate and they did not want to use church organizations to achieve political goals. However, struggles for power and influence in national politics, tensions between Christians and Muslims at different levels, and perceived discrimination in government policies have led the churches to become more politically engaged.

After the civil war, the churches (especially the mainstream churches) shared various concerns, for example their loss of control over education and health facilities; government suspicion of missionaries' potentially destabilizing role, leading to the denial of visas; and the imposition of tax and import duties on gifts to churches from abroad (Tanko, 1991, p 125). Initially, denominational rivalry hindered the churches' attempts to work together and present a unified voice on religious, political and socio-economic issues (Mbahirin, 2006, p 153). This led to the establishment of a variety of bodies aimed at encouraging cooperation and strengthening Christians' ability to negotiate with government. For example, the Christian Health Association of Nigeria was founded in 1973 under the auspices of the Christian Council of Nigeria, the umbrella body of the Protestant churches (Mbahirin, 2006). However, not until the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) was formed in 1976 was there an apex body able to speak on behalf of Catholics, Protestants and Pentecostal churches. By the 1980s, CAN was becoming more and more engaged in politics, monitoring the religious balance in government appointments and urging Christians to participate in politics to prevent Islamization: "It portrays itself as the defender of a besieged Christian community against an increasingly dominant Islam, often within a framework of a call for moral 'revival'. This reflects a wider belief among Christians in the north that they are under threat from militant Islam" (ICG, 2010, p 12; see also Kukah, 1993; Larkin and Meyer, 2006).

The military regimes sought to silence all civil society organizations capable of challenging their rule, but they also extended their patronage to selected bodies, including religious organizations. For example, the Babangida regime (1985-93) favoured organizations such as the Jama'atu Nasril Islam.
and CAN (Chafe, 1992, quoted in Mu’azzam and Ibrahim, 2000). Babangida removed the question of Shar’ia law from the agenda of the 1988 Constituent Assembly. However, in 1985, as discussed above, he also announced, without previously discussing it with key (Christian) ministers, that Nigeria had become a full member of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), at which it had previously had observer status, giving rise to intense controversy and strong condemnation from Christians (and in 1991 Nigeria did withdraw) (Best, 1996; Kane, 2003; Mu’azzam and Ibrahim, 2000). Furthermore, at the end of 1990, he reshuffled the federal cabinet in an exercise that Christians interpreted as a move to remove them from key positions in the government. Protests were organized in some northern locations under the auspices of CAN, which claimed that the regime, with the support of the OIC, was planning to wipe out Christianity in Nigeria (Best, 1996, p 200-1). While the government asserted that the new appointments had been made on merit, the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs added fuel to the fire by condemning the Christian criticisms. A few months later, during a coup attempt, the plotters condemned the removal of (Christian) General Bali in the reshuffle and announced that following the installation of a new government, the six far northern (largely Muslim) states would be excised from Nigeria (unlike other coup attempts which emphasized national unity). CAN was accused by Muslims of masterminding the coup. Its failure to condemn the attempt and the similarity between issues it had brought up earlier and those raised during the coup resulted in the arrest of some CAN officials, exacerbating religious divisions.

As noted above, the restoration of a federal Shari’a court of appeal and Shari’a criminal law had been on the agenda for many Muslims since independence. The debates resurfaced during the 1977-8 and 1987-8 constitutional debates. Muslims believe that Nigeria is a multi-religious rather than a secular nation, so assert that each religion should be allowed to adopt a form of governance that it deems appropriate. They regard the constitution and common law as essentially Christian. However, Christians consider that restoration of a full Shari’a legal system would give preference to Muslims despite the secular constitution and would violate their rights as non-Muslims (Best, 1996; Kukah, 1993; Mu’azzam and Ibrahim, 2000; Ostien et al, 2005; Tamuno, 1991; Usman, 1986).

The debates rumbled on until the restoration of democracy in 1999, which changed the political dynamics dramatically. In particular, as noted above, it enabled twelve of the northern states to introduce Shari’a criminal law, to the horror of Christians, who were not persuaded by State governments’ promises that it would not apply to them. Although Shari’a punishments such as
amputation for stealing and stoning to death for adultery were imposed in some early rulings, the strict standards of proof required and national and international opposition ensured that few such punishments were carried out. Nevertheless, many Christians living in the Shari’a states consider that the law restricts their rights, for example to play music in public or consume alcohol. In some states, particularly Kano and Zamfara, hisbah organizations (uniformed groups comprised mainly of young men) have been formed, with varying degrees of support from the State governments, to enforce Shari’a by reporting infringements to the police. In the early years there were occasional reports of violence against offenders by hisbah groups and tensions with the police, but “the enthusiasm and the human rights abuses of the early years have declined” (ICG, 2010, p 17). No group, including the Federal government, has sought the interpretation of the Supreme Court as to whether or not the adoption of a Shari’a legal code is constitutional. Today the enthusiasm for full enforcement of Shari’a law appears to been tempered, and there are critical voices from within the Islamic community, because the “initial expectations that Sharia would curb corruption in government, enhance socio-economic welfare, reduce grassroots crime and ensure more efficient dispensation of justice have not been realised” (ICG, 2010, p 17). However, as will be seen in Section 3, the after-effects of its introduction are still being felt.

The struggle to end military rule and subsequent political liberalization has also led to a proliferation of secular NGOs and religious movements and organizations. The latter were, and continue to be, concerned with attempting to renew and spread their respective faiths and holding successive governments to account, in addition to providing humanitarian relief and playing roles alongside government in service delivery and development.

In some respects, democracy has “calmed tensions, by allowing freer expression” (ICG, 2010, p 9). In some states, it has enabled greater inclusion of different ethnic and other identity groups in government. However, “communal competition for resources has, if anything, intensified” (ICG, 2010, p 9; see also World Bank, 2003) and in other states, democratization has been associated with increased polarization and exclusion. Democratic government has also produced new and larger political elites all over the country. All those elected feel obliged to deliver the fruits of their access to public resources to those who voted for them, exacerbating competition for federal resources. Nevertheless, many groups feel politically excluded and marginalized and for some of these, ethnicity and religion provide alternative platforms. Democratic government appears to have failed to yield an
economic dividend (Ojo, 2006) and has also increased the perception, especially among younger people, that politics (rather than production) provides the principal avenue for upward social mobility (ICG, 2010).

In this context of cut-throat political competition, violence fomented by politicians has become systemic; it is fuelled and rewarded by corruption; and those responsible operate with impunity:

In place of democratic competition, struggles for political office have often been waged violently in the streets by gangs of thugs recruited by politicians to help them seize control of power. In recent years, hundreds of Nigerians have lost their lives in the crossfire or as paid proxy fighters for the country’s political leaders (HRW, 2007, p 2).

Gangs set up to intimidate voters have become criminal gangs, spreading violence and not being brought to account; they are also said to include campus-based secret ‘cults’. Some officials and courts try to remain aloof, but many collude or are forced to collude. Thus in the view of Human Rights Watch,

Political violence has become a central part of political competition across much of Nigeria and it takes many forms – from assassinations to armed clashes between gangs employed by rival politicians. This violence is most often carried out by gangs whose members are openly recruited and paid by politicians and party leaders to attack their sponsors’ rivals, intimidate members of the public, rig elections, and protect their patrons from similar attacks (HRW, 2007, p 17).

Members of the gangs may be hired to provide politicians with protection. They may be paid for with misappropriated public revenues or by political godfathers, who provide support in return for a substantial degree of control over the governments they bring into power, not to shape policy, but to exact lucrative government contracts, the proceeds of corruption or positions for other protégés (HRW, 2007). The dividing line between ensuring politicians’ security and aggression or criminality is very thin. Democratization has also provided space for religious leaders to make pronouncements on political issues and even to enter into party politics.

Views differ on whether the elite and the state are simply poor managers of ethnic and religious diversity or actively manipulate it for political purposes. In the view of Best and other analysts, successive military and democratic regimes have failed to address the unresolved problem of the
relationship between the state and religion, undermined the supposed neutrality of the state and thus its ability to manage inter-faith relations, contributed to the politicization of religion, and deepened suspicion and acrimony between Christians and Muslims (Best, 2009b). Analysts such as Kukah (1993), Wada (2006) and many individuals, in contrast, assert that the political elite use ethnicity and religious bigotry as weapons, with unpredictable and potentially dangerous outcomes (Usman, 1980). The politicization of religion has made it increasingly difficult for the state to effectively moderate relationships between religion and the state, because it has seemed that the gains of one group amount to losses for the other.

Interrogating the role of the state points to problems with the management of security and an inability to promptly curb violence when it occurs - these will be discussed in the following section. Trends within the religious traditions that have contributed to the rising tensions will be returned to in Section 2.3.4.

### 2.3.2 Security: state failure and citizen self-help

It has been suggested above that historical and political factors account for the protracted conflict between communal groups in Nigeria. However, rather than leading directly to violence, these factors have helped to a) sharpen the boundaries between ethnic and faith-based identity groups, b) create or reinforce consciousness based on faith categories, and c) generate and deepen inter-religious suspicion and animosity. Whether or not violence has occurred depends on the role played by key stakeholders and opportunistic factors. In particular, the upsurge of urban violence can be attributed to the weak and deteriorating role of the state in managing diversity and ensuring security. The absence of channels for articulating demands, in addition to the progressive loss of state legitimacy and authority, led to the military state becoming increasingly repressive, rather than using its monopoly of the legitimate use of violence correctly (Ibrahim, 2000). Today, outright repression of the exercise of voice and the right to protest are, in theory, unacceptable. However, the military and political legacy has made it difficult to forge security forces that are competent and neutral.

In particular, the incompetence, corruption and non-neutrality of the police and other security agencies have led to increased crime and insecurity. In response, various youth identity and vigilante groups and militias have emerged. Some of these provide security at neighbourhood level (including protecting...
areas during violence), but some have armed themselves with modern weapons, some have become involved in criminal activities and violence themselves, and some are offensive in nature. In addition, as discussed above, “… organized vigilante groups have become the means through which larger political, ethnic and religious interest groups inflict violence on their perceived enemies” (Smith, 2006, p 64). Clearly, citizen self-help in the face of weak state capacity to ensure security can be a two-edged sword.

The failure of the police to maintain order during protests, their inability to restore order when violence occurs, and often their perceived non-neutrality, have contributed to a widespread loss of confidence in their ability to exercise their functions. Their lack of capacity enables those intending to foment violence and engage in violent behaviour to do so with impunity. During crises, the local police may be supplemented with mobile police (MOPOL).

However, control over the mobile police force and the army rests with the federal government. As a result, when it becomes clear that the local police are unable to restore order, there is often a delay in the arrival of the mobile police force or troops, allowing violence to escalate. The army has much greater capacity than the police and does restore calm, but often with considerable brutality. Not unexpectedly, personnel sent to quell riots and end clashes have been accused of favouring one ethnic or religious group over another and of non-judicial killings, either during operations or after people are arrested, exacerbating citizens’ lack of trust in the security forces.

State failure extends to investigations into the causes of violence and bringing those responsible to justice. While enquiries are usually set up, the reports

…have been left to gather dust on the shelves, because implicated actors are usually influential citizens or groups that government may not want to confront for political reasons, and the perpetrators of violence are let off the hook……issues that were fundamental to the crises are brushed aside (Ukiwo, 2003, p 128; see also ICPR, 2002).

2.3.3 Economic crisis, inequality and lack of opportunity

Poverty and inequality are often cited as both causes and outcomes of conflict. Theories of economic inequality and the resulting grievances have long been popular in explaining political instability and, in more extreme cases, violent conflict. However, although economic inequalities have served as an
important explanation of violent conflict, more recent consensus suggests that the economic cannot be separated from the social, political, cultural and historical. Horizontal inequalities theories suggest that inequalities between culturally formed groups (horizontal inequalities), rather than inequalities between different classes (vertical inequalities), are key to explaining the outbreak of civil wars, and communal and religious conflicts (Ostby, 2004; Stewart, 2004). Horizontal inequalities occur where there is an intersection between cultural (including religious) identities and political, social or economic inequality. Recent work by Sen (2008) also argues that violence can be better understood by linking up social inequality/poverty theories with cultural approaches (including the role of religious beliefs and social customs). Some analysts suggest that belief in the divine gains greater political significance in times of economic, social and political unrest because, as mentioned previously, “…desperate people subject to poverty, marginalisation, or physical threats turn to their religious traditions in search of an alternative political order that satisfies their need for welfare, recognition and security” (Hasenclever and Rittberger, 2000, p 645). Power-seeking elites can then, it is suggested, exploit this renewed interest in religion, coupled with socio-economic grievances, to further their own electoral or political agenda (Brass, 2003; enwer, 2003; Hansen, 2001).

Despite the availability of oil revenue, geographical and social disparities in wealth and poverty in Nigeria have increased, structural adjustment policies have decreased state spending and formal job opportunities, and the outcomes of political power struggles, together with corruption, have restricted access to state resources to certain groups. For example, in the north, the Sahelian droughts of the 1980s and 1990s and desertification have diminished grazing lands, adversely affected pastoralists’ livelihoods and increased food insecurity. Sanusi, for example, notes that “…poverty and deprivation in the north are the lot of both Muslims and Christians, and the widespread frustration has been a major reason for conflicts” (2007, p 183; see also Gofwen, 2004, p 146). In addition, increased poverty has fuelled migration to more promising land in the Middle Belt or in search of urban opportunities (Harnischfeger, 2004). In the context of increased competition over resources, …traditional cosmologies, secret societies and modern religions (Islam, Christianity) provide ideological inspiration upon which people draw for resistance. People in general, but especially aggrieved or unemployed youths, are becoming increasingly fervent (and fundamentalist) in their religious views. They may seek relief in a greater fit between faith and political collectivity (through Shari’a law), or they may find personal salvation and relief from poverty and unemployment in ‘miracles of fire’ that bring money and salaried positions (through Pentecostal, i.e. Gospel of Wealth churches). It is these
socioeconomic conditions that account for the growth in the past two decades of militant youth organisations at points of greatest strain between...ethnic and religious identities...A general trajectory, whereby political and economic issues are re-presented in terms of religion, may sustain subtle but significant processes fetishizing violence (Ifeka, 2006, p 722).

Like Ifeka, many analysts believe that religion has become an instrument to protest deprivation, exclusion, alienation, poverty and marginalization, although it has also been used for a variety of purposes by the power elite to advance interests that are not necessarily religious. The harsh socioeconomic conditions, it is suggested, have pushed many into increased (and new forms of) religiosity, into the arms of churches and mosques for welfare and economic survival, and into seeing religion as a channel for protest and opposition. This analysis reasons that most religious conflicts are not about religion, but about the lack of social, economic and political opportunities, which is felt particularly acutely by young people (typically defined as age 14-40) (Jega, 2000; Muhammed and Adeoye, 2006; Mu’azzam and Ibrahim, 2000), which helps to explain the emergence of radical religious groups on the campuses of higher education institutions. In addition, it is suggested, religious revivalism, both Islamic and Christian, appeals to young people searching for a sense of identity (Larkin and Meyer, 2006). While many of those who feel powerless, alienated, disillusioned with the state and shamed by their inability to support their families also find absolutist religious doctrines attractive (Ifeka, 2006, p 723). The Pentecostal prosperity gospel, for example, promises material rewards to believers. For Muslims, disillusion with the implementation of Shari’a law to date has radicalized some and led them to believe that the promises of Shari’a will never be realized until a full Islamic state is instituted (Larkin and Meyer, 2006; ICG, 2010). In some circumstances, religion can provide a legitimating ideology for conflict and violence (Ifeka, 2006).20

The unemployed young men involved in mob violence include many who are attracted by the opportunities for economic gain and criminality. The lack of economic opportunities, Ukiwo suggests, explains why “some of the easiest things to do in contemporary Nigeria are to mobilise an assassin, vigilante, ethnic-cum-religious militia, rioter, crowd or rented pro-government demonstrator” (Ukiwo, 2003, p 134). Thus the gangs recruited by politicians to provide them with protection and assist in political intimidation and election rigging are made up of young men lured by immediate payments and promises of employment or other patronage. Even though the rewards they receive are limited, they may represent substantial earning opportunities for the unemployed (HRW, 2007, p 35).
2.3.4 **Global and local influences and religious change**

Since the 1970s, as noted above, there have been ‘revivalist’ movements within both Christianity and Islam in Nigeria. Christian revivalism “involves a struggle against what it considers to be the corrupt Nigerian Church whose spirituality has been destroyed by pagan practices, materialism and hierarchical structures” (Mu’azzam and Ibrahim, 2000, p 63; see also Kane, 2003). Within Islam, revivalism has been associated with challenges to the pre-existing social and political order in the north of the country:

Islamic fundamentalism is seen to be involved with a frontal attack against remnants of traditional African religious practices still present among Muslim communities, and the struggle against mystical practices and beliefs of the Sufi brotherhoods, mainly Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya (Mu’azzam and Ibrahim, 2000, p 63-4).

Both were triggered by perceptions that secularization and modernization are generating moral decadence (Obadare, 2007). Rejecting traditional culture, they are concerned to find “new ways of being modern in a religious idiom” (Larkin and Meyer, 2006, p 308). Their fervour grows as they react to each other and emulate each other’s tactics (Marshall, 1995).

Both have gained support from educated people and students and have a global orientation. Loimeier (2007, p 50), for example, suggests that Izala became a successful movement because of its appeal to “… a Western-educated and urban Muslim population no longer willing to accept seemingly obsolete, costly, and time-intensive social and religious customs.” The aims and membership of the Muslim Students Society (MSS), originally established in 1954 to protect the interests of those attending Christian mission schools, have expanded over the years, with branches on many university campuses (Loimeier, 2007). Disagreements (and sometimes clashes) have often started in institutions of higher education. For example, the MSS “has been involved in several violent incidents and is widely regarded as a breeding ground for young radical preachers” (ICG, 2010, p 15) and the Kaduna State crisis of 1987 (see Section 2.2.3) started with protests from Muslim students in the Kafanchan College of Education about an evangelical week organized by the born again Christian students’ movement, but spread to the town, where it fed on the ‘indigenous’ Christian majority population’s resentment of the Muslim ‘settler minority’. Muslim victims of the attacks fled, leading to clashes in all the major towns in Kaduna State (Mu’azzam and Ibrahim, 2000),
The expansionist ambitions of both Pentecostal Christian and Islamist movements are expressed through increased proselytization. Preachers on both sides refute the teachings of the other and denigrate their practices, labelled “tit for tat polemics” by the ICG (ICG, 2010, p13). Each holds large rallies and preaching sessions, with the use of converts in Christian events (often called ‘crusades’) being particularly inflammatory. The result has been increased competition and tension between the religious traditions (ICG, 2010; Sanusi, 2007; Tamuno, 1991).

As has been described above, the close links between religion and politics have historical and (for Muslims) doctrinal roots, but they have been deepened and made more complex by post-independence political changes. Lack of tolerance for organized civil society by successive military governments provided space for religious groups to organize and increase their influence both within and in opposition to government. Writing in the late 1980s, Ibrahim noted that emerging Islamist and born again Christian groups were

…producing mutually exclusive political-cum-religious idioms in their activities, Muslim actors have created a linkage between the Nigerian secular state and Christianity and thus reject the state as it is while demanding the establishment of an Islamic state. Christian actors for their part have created a linkage between the erosion of secularism and Muslim domination and therefore demand the preservation of the secular state (1989, p 81).

Although religiously motivated, the agendas of such groups have strong political overtones, making them potential tools and influences in wider struggles for political power, while engagement in politics may in turn lead to growth in their membership. For example, Ukiwo, in his research on Kano State, suggests that political interests around the introduction and implementation of Shari’a led to the revival of dormant faith-based organizations as well as a proliferation of new ones, and that FBOs were reportedly formed to serve as platforms for influencing or mobilizing support for or opposition to political figures or groups (Davis et al, 2011). In turn, the formation of Islamic groups with explicitly political agendas has, as noted above, increased the political involvement of Christian groups (especially CAN) in response (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005).
Violent Conflict and its Aftermath in Jos and Kano, Nigeria: What is the Role of Religion?

International influences have been important influences on and sources of funds for revivalist movements, as well as contributing to intra-religious conflict. External support for church or mosque planting and the charitable and development activities of Christian and Muslim organizations have fuelled expansion and competition. US Christian missions have invested in evangelical work and, although in recent years they have not been allowed to conduct missions in the northern states, “they have offered training to local missionaries and sponsored the establishment of new churches” (ICG, 2010, p 23). Izala and similar groups are not only influenced by Salafi (Wahhabi) interpretations of Sunni Islam (and groups such as the Muslim Students Society by Shia Islam), funds originating in Saudi Arabia and similar countries and Iran respectively have contributed substantial resources for propagating Islam and for “charitable work or to cement the ties of Islamic brotherhood” (ICG, 2010, p 23), although flows of funds for Muslim organizations have reportedly declined since 9/11. The use of such funds is poorly monitored and some, according to the ICG, have found their way to people who preach division and intolerance.
3 Communal conflict and violence in Kano and Jos

Many violent episodes occur in urban areas. This is not to imply that conflict is more prevalent in urban centres than rural areas, but in cities, people with different identities live in close proximity to each other, competition over resources and opportunities can be intense, new ideas can reach large audiences quickly, and it is relatively easy to organize and mobilize large numbers of people.

Bollens (1999) suggests that some cities are more likely to be the sites of protracted conflict and periodic violence than others - although cities potentially provide accommodative arenas for competing groups, he asserts, they also serve as locations or stages for the expression of wider intergroup antagonisms. The likelihood of such hostilities erupting in violence is greater in cities characterized by ethnic differences but lacking legitimate political means of managing those differences. Thus in ethnically polarized cities where governance structures are controlled by a dominant ethnic group that uses them to discriminate against “competing and threatening” groups, political structures become seen by the dominated group as “artificial, imposed or illegitimate” and thus incapable of resolving ethnic differences (Bollens, 1999, p. 4-5). Second, violence is more likely in an urban environment with weak or illegitimate governance and deep intergroup antagonisms (where opposing sides see the ‘other’ as a threat to their physical, cultural and/ or social survival), because in this context allocational policies implemented by the state or ruling elites are more likely to become conflictual. As a result, the urban arena and public actions within it are attributed with significant and symbolic ideological, ethnic and other meanings. Additionally, violence can come to be seen as ‘rational’ (i.e. the only way that aggrieved groups can change discriminatory structures or policies) (Bollens, 1999). Third, societies in urban areas experiencing identity-based conflicts, particularly those marked by violence, often undergo a process of segregation. This can happen both as a direct result of violent episodes (where individuals and groups are forced to migrate, or choose to do so after losing their homes or in an attempt to escape fear and persecution), as well as through official or unofficial strategies of conflict management that centre around keeping the two conflicting sides apart. These geographical shifts can impact on livelihoods and other patterns of living, exacerbating both communication breakdowns and conflicts over resources and opportunities (Bollens, 1999).

Proximity may be associated with both conflict and interdependence. Thus, urban residents may find themselves living as “intimate enemies”, stuck in a contradiction between neighbourly relations and ethnic or cultural divides (Benevisti, 1995). Although the proximity of urban living fosters social
interaction and the development of economic links, it can also exacerbate feelings of discrimination and deprivation because of the visibility of difference (Bollens, 1999, p. 15).

The characteristics and trajectories of conflict and violence in the two cities on which this research focused can only be understood by locating them within the wider historical, geographical and political context analysed in Section 2. In both cities, many of the violent episodes that have occurred in recent years have been characterized as religious clashes. Drawing on secondary sources, the main episodes will be identified in this section, and their characteristics briefly described, in order to compare the trajectories of conflict and violence in the two cities. Kano will be considered first because of its longer history of violent episodes. In subsequent sections, the most recent episodes of violence and their aftermath will be examined in greater detail, based mainly on the primary data collected during this study. As explained in Section 1, this was less detailed in Kano than in Jos because the episodes were less fresh in informants’ memories. Throughout the discussion, an attempt will be made to understand the trajectories and characteristics of conflict and violence in the two cities in the light of the analytical frameworks outlined above and the wider history and context of Nigeria.

### 3.1 Conflict and violence in Kano

The settlement of Kano was founded in the 7th century to mine ore from the ironstone outcrop of Dalla hill (Willet, 1971, p 368 cited in Albert, 1999, p 274). Dalla, after whom the hill was named, gained a reputation for religious knowledge, which, together with the mining and trading opportunities available, attracted a variety of migrants to join the Abagagyawa (who claim to be the indigenous people). The settlement was conquered in the 11th century by Maguzawa in-migrants and the first city walls completed in the 12th century (Albert, 1999). Islam was introduced during the 14th century by Wangawara traders from Mali and became the official religion of the chieftaincy (sarkinage) in the 15th century, although some traditional beliefs persisted and became mixed with Islam (Ryan, 2006). Already, by this time, Kano had become the largest commercial city in Hausaland, with a prominent role in both trans-Saharan trade and trade (in slaves and military equipment) with Yorubaland to the southwest (Olaniyi, 2004). Institutions had been established that eventually led to its emergence as an Islamic city of international repute, including a system of urban spatial organization and governance, security forces, and a central mosque, palace and market (Barkindo, 1993). By the mid-16th century, Kano was comparable in size and significance to Cairo and Fez (Watts, 1996).
The 19th century dan Fodio jihad led to the installation of a Fulani emir authorized to purify Islamic observance and “Kano became one of the leading cities of scholarship in the Sokoto Caliphate, attracting scholars and students (almajirai) from far and near” (Barkindo, 1993, p 93; see also Albert, 1996, p 28), mostly within the Sufi Qadiriyya tradition. Already by the 17th century, some Yoruba traders had settled in Kano, and their numbers increased in the 19th century following the growth of trade with Europe. Through land grants, segregated residential areas were established for in-migrant traders. Kano’s diverse migrant populations, including the Yoruba, over time became integrated into Kano Hausa culture and the Muslim religion (Olaniyi, 2004; Paden, 1971). Yoruba in-migrants nevertheless maintained elements of their Yoruba identity and links (Olaniyi, 2004).

Occupation by the British in 1903, initially resisted by the Emir of Kano, attracted further business and gave rise to new administrative functions. Trade links with the coast strengthened at the cost of the trans-Sarahan trade, especially following the arrival of the railway in 1912 and the groundnut boom of the 1920s. Although Yoruba in-migrants continued to arrive, colonial activities required other skills and by 1948 they were outnumbered by Igbos (Nwaka, 2008). The Kanawa (Kano people) disliked both British rule and the influx of southerners. Although Islamiyya schools, which combined Western and Islamic studies, increased in number, the Kanawa attempted to resist ‘Westernization’ and to maintain the Islamic character of the city (birni) (Albert, 1999). The emirate and the colonial authorities agreed on a policy of separate settlement, to preserve the Muslim religion and way of life from pollution and guard against nationalistic southerners gaining too much political influence. In-migrant Muslims were encouraged to live within the walled city, which was placed under the Native Authority; marriage between Muslims and non-Muslims was forbidden; and even non-Muslim northerners were in 1914 moved from the Sabon Gari (strangers’ quarter) to Tudun Wada within the walled city. In contrast, areas designated for the mostly Christian southern in-migrants were placed under the administration of the Colonial Authority (Nwaka, 2008; Paden, 1971). The existing pattern of separate quarters for indigenous and in-migrant populations was therefore reinforced by colonial policies, with the result that differences between the Kanawa and southerners were emphasized and the embers of ethnic and religious consciousness fanned (Nwaka, 2008). Despite the system of indirect rule, the traditional political and business classes lost power, and new political, economic and religious institutions associated with colonialism emerged in the new suburbs outside the city walls (waje) (Barkindo, 1993). For example, by 1940, the Sabon Gari market, established in 1918 and dominated by Igbo
women (Albert, 1996), had “reduced the Kano main market to insignificance and squeezed the indigenes out of business” (Nwaka, 2008; see also Paden, 1971). Ever since the 1940s, Nwaka suggests, resentment of migrant (especially Igbo) economic success, exacerbated by Igbo disdain for Islam and Hausa/Fulani culture, has underlain ill-feeling between Christians and Muslims in Kano.

The first host/settler violence occurred in 1953, following disagreement between the north and the south over whether Nigeria was ready for independence. The Yoruba-dominated Action Group carried the campaign to Kano, sparking off a riot in which the Sabon Gari (which was roughly 60 per cent Igbo, see Paden, 1971, p 120) was attacked (and mainly Igbo killed and wounded).21 In March 1966, fearing Igbo domination following a coup led by an Igbo major and promulgation of a decree designed to unify Nigeria’s three regions, rioters again attacked the Sabon Gari, while the counter coup in July produced similar attacks on Igbos in other northern cities after Radio Cotonou broadcast unfounded reports that Igbos had attacked Muslims in the east of the country (Nwaka, 2008; see also Albert, 1999). Nwaka notes that of the migrant welfare associations in Kano, the Igbo Community Association was the strongest (see also Osaghae, 1994). Initially founded during the colonial period as social and welfare organizations to support recent in-migrants, these associations continue to play cultural roles and provide welfare, but also play a role in security provision and operate as intermediaries between settler groups and the government, to safeguard investments and enterprises and coordinate responses to attacks and claims for compensation.22 Existing resentment of migrant economic success was exacerbated by competition for new formal sector jobs after independence, although tensions are also linked to national political agendas and religious expansionism.

By the beginning of the 1970s, “the majority of the Kanawa, of whatever shade of opinion, seemed to agree that some sort of Islamic revivalism or reform was required to respond to contemporary problems” (Barkindo, 1993, p 94). The temporary flight of Igbos in 1966 had brought home the city’s dependence on southerners for the supply of crucial goods and services and provided an opportunity for many Kanawa to move to the Sabon Gari to assume the management of hotels, shops and other services (to the alarm of others). The creation of Kano State in 1967 provided government jobs for many of Kano’s educated elite, many of whom moved to the old European neighbourhood of Nassarawa. By the early 1970s also, oil revenue had increased dramatically: “Awash in petro-dollars, urban Kano was transformed during the 1970s from a traditional Muslim mercantile center of some
400,000... to a sprawling anarchic metropolis of over 1.7 million" (Watts, 1996, p 66) (2.8 million in 2006). Industrial and housing areas mushroomed in the waje, ostentatious spending and corruption increased, and massive state-sponsored investment in infrastructure, buildings and industry attracted increasing numbers of migrants from the rural areas, not all of whom could get jobs.

The widening gap between the rich and the poor, lack of investment in the walled city, the failure of housing and services to keep pace with demand, and rising in-migration and unemployment led to worsening living conditions and increased crime. The latter can partly be attributed to changes in the characteristics of youth gangs (yandaba), which instead of being a normal part of the process of socialization into adulthood have turned into violent gangs of disillusioned and marginalized youth that, since the shrinking of economic opportunities resulting from economic crisis and liberalization, have drawn from a larger pool of potential recruits. In addition to local youths and impoverished in-migrants, this pool is said to include increasing numbers of Muslim students (almajirai) – followers of Islamic scholars who command less respect than in the past and are less able to maintain themselves by the established system of begging and alms giving (Albert, 1999; Barkindo, 1993; Watts, 1999). Increasingly, members of the youth gangs began to rob and rape, fight each other and also, encouraged by rival politicians, foment unrest and persecute political opponents (Smith, 2006; Ya’u, 2000). The police were impotent against them, partly because the police are not trusted by residents (see also Watts, 1996) and partly because many of the gang members were from Kanawa families and operated as vigilante groups within their own wards (Barkindo, 1993; Ya’u, 2000).

It was “from within this world awash with money, commodities and corruption that the very idea of local Muslim identity, and of correct Muslim practice, came to be challenged and contested” (Watts, 1996, p 68), through the formation of the Maitatsine (see Section 2.2.2). There had long been a history of intra-religious conflict in Kano, with scholars from different fundamentalist persuasions periodically clashing – Marwa’s challenge to mainstream Muslim thought from within was not unprecedented (Nwaka, 2008). He challenged prevalent interpretations of Islam and the moral bankruptcy of the state and built up his following among impoverished young religious students (almajirai) and others who had not benefited from the oil-based boom, especially young male migrants from the land-scarce and drought-affected northern provinces (Watts, 1996).
While the Hausa-Fulani elite in Kano and other Muslim settings in the Nigerian north had benefited from this petroleum-based windfall, the almajirai and other members of the underclass had not. If anything, esteem for their religious status and the humble services they rendered had declined with the greater secularization of the nation, of Kano, and especially of its Muslim community (Ryan, 2006, p 207).

The Maitatsine movement wanted to purify Islam and revolutionize government, but as noted in Section 2.2.2, it seemed determined to operate outside the law, for example, establishing an informal self-contained quarter (‘Yan Awaki, which by 1979 accommodated Marwa and at least 3,000 of his followers), planning attacks against government buildings and the central mosque and in 1980 fighting with the police and army (Watts, 1996, 1999).26

The violence with which the civil authorities put down the ‘Yan Tatsine disturbances in 1980 (and related disturbances in 1982, 1984 and 1985 in other areas of northern Nigeria) left the impression with many poor Muslims in Nigeria that the Muslim elite, whether civilian or military, did not have the same priorities as their fellow Muslims of humble background (Ryan, 2006, p 207).

More mainstream ways of using Islamic approaches to address social and moral decay since the 1970s have included the construction of mosques in the suburbs; increased religious activities in the mosques and beyond; appointment of imams with a western as well as a religious education; growth in the number of Islamiyya schools established by Islamic organizations, businessmen and the government; promotion of education for girls and women; and increased allocation of space and time in the government media for religious subjects. In the 1970s and 1980s, trends included increased observance of religious rituals and symbols (especially dress codes) and decreased tolerance for other religions (Barkindo, 1993).

The intolerance associated with Muslim revivalism flared up in 1982, when Muslim students destroyed a dilapidated church being reconstructed in the Fagge ward, near the Sabon Gari, complaining that it was too near a more recently built local mosque. They went on to destroy several other churches (Barkindo, 1993; Kane, 2003; Kukah, 1993). Again in 1991, a protest by Muslims against a proposed crusade by a German evangelist, Reinhard Bonnke, who had been invited by the local section of CAN, led to attacks on churches, businesses (especially bars and hotels) and homes in the Sabon Gari.27 Igbo Christians were the main victims. Further attacks the following day were met by resistance,
resulting in mosques as well as churches being destroyed and Muslim as well as Christian victims (as well as widespread looting) (Kane, 2003). In 1994, Muslim members of the Shiite sect broke into the Bompai prison and beheaded a man accused of using a page of the Qur’an to wipe himself after defecating, worsening tension between Christians (especially Igbo) and Muslims. Again in 1995, a quarrel near the Sabon Gari market resulted in a fight and then a free-for-all that spread to other parts of the city, with both churches and mosques being burnt and property looted and destroyed. Those targeted by the attacks fought back, both in the Sabon Gari and in Fagge (Mu’azzam and Ibrahim, 2000; Wakili, 2005, p 184). Typically, members of the Yandaba gangs and almajirai are blamed for the attacks, arson and looting, although observers also blame the government for failing to deal with either the immediate triggers or the underlying problems (youth unemployment and police ineptitude).

In 1996 and 1997, further intra-religious conflict occurred when the Shiites, a youth movement led by Sheikh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky, attacked other Muslims following disagreements about matters of religious doctrine and practice, resulting in four members of the Shiites being killed by the police. The frequency of violent incidents appears to have increased at the end of the 1990s at the time that northern States began to adopt Shari’a criminal law. In some instances, the original protests were formally organized by Muslim leaders and were intended to be peaceful – views differ about whether the subsequent violence was spontaneous, premeditated, or a combination of the two. On 22nd July 1999, violence broke out between the Hausa and Yoruba communities in apparent revenge for an earlier attack on Hausas in the south western city of Shagamu in Ogun State. The latter violence had been triggered by disrespect supposedly shown by Hausas for Yoruba traditions. Victims of the attacks, mainly Hausa women and children, were repatriated to Kano. A mob, allegedly consisting mainly of almajirai and yandaba, targeted Yoruba homes and businesses, forcing many to seek refuge in the premises of the security forces. As in other violent incidents, easy targets included homes, businesses and people pursuing livelihoods on the street, such as water vendors. The violence lasted almost four days, during which hundreds of Yoruba and others whose identity was in doubt lost their lives and property worth millions of Naira was destroyed. Originally a clash over ethnicity and culture, the conflict took on a religious dimension, with the initial violence against all Yoruba (Muslim and Christian) extending to members of non-Yoruba Christian groups.
In 2001, according to Smith,

...a spate of ethno-religious violence had erupted in the city....[It] allegedly began when young Muslim vigilantes confronted some young female Igbo secondary school students...for not covering their heads...and the ensuing skirmish allegedly resulted in the death of at least one of the students. Word of this incident spread and led to widespread violence in Kano between Christian Igbo migrants and mostly Hausa-speaking Islamic youths, followed by revenge attacks by Igbos on Hausa minorities in the eastern cities of Aba and Owerri. An unknown number of people were killed (some reports said dozens), but relatively few compared to some other incidents, variously attributed to Igbos' preparedness and ability to defend themselves, their businesses and Sabon Gari and to negotiations between Hausa and Igbo leaders which had prevented fully fledged rioting (Smith, 2006, p 61-2).

Later in 2001, on 12th October, a peaceful demonstration after Friday prayers in support of Osama bin Laden and in reaction against the American war in Afghanistan again degenerated into violence, during which the main targets were Christians, churches, houses and businesses in the Sabon Gari (Ethnic and Religious Rights Quarterly, April, 2002, p 19 cited in Wakili, 2005, p 186).28

In May 2004, Muslim leaders sought permission to organize a peaceful demonstration and present a letter to the State Governor in protest against attacks on Muslims in Yelwa in Plateau State in retaliation for the earlier killing of Christians in a church. The police gave permission for a meeting within the mosque compound, where the Governor was presented with the letter. Later, however, outbreaks of violence occurred elsewhere in the city. This initially appeared to have been mob action, but vigilante groups, including Yandaba, Yantauri29 and almajirai, reportedly took over and then led the attacks. Although it is not clear whether the demonstration and the violence were linked, attacks on Christians resulted in the deaths of about 200 people before peace was restored. It is suggested that Muslim feelings were inflamed by hearing the testimony of refugees from the Yelwa violence, some of whom were invited to speak in mosques in the city (ostensibly to raise funds to assist victims). Witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch described how Christians of a variety of ethnic groups (and a few Muslims thought to be Christian) were hunted down by attackers, who were mostly unemployed youths. It is estimated that between 200 and 250 people died, mostly men but also women and children, and tension remained high for months afterwards, with Christian residents feeling threatened and fearful (HRW, 2005). Despite many extrajudicial killings, the police and army struggled to restore order.
3.2 Conflict and violence in Jos

Jos emerged as a centre of tin mining in the early colonial period. Located in the Middle Belt, in a previously rural area populated by indigenous groups of Afizere, Anaguta and Berom, it became part of Northern Nigeria in 1900 (Adamu, 1978; Bello, 1962; Dariye, 2002; Hiskett, 1973). Initially established in Naraguta, a village six kilometres from Jos, the headquarters of the tin mining industry was relocated in 1914 when tin deposits were found to be more abundant at the Dilimi River and beyond. Designated as a second class township after the site was mapped and the initial layout plan developed in 1915, the town was divided into three parts: the Government Residential Area (GRA) for Europeans and colonial administrators, the Native Town (mostly inhabited and run by Hausa in-migrants) and the Township (mostly occupied by in-migrants from the south). The economic opportunities offered by tin mining, colonial administration and the railway connections to Zaria and Bauchi in 1915 and Port Harcourt in 1927 attracted large numbers of migrants. Because local farmers were reluctant to work in tin mining, the colonial administration encouraged migration from the north (Danfulani and Fwatshak, 2002), while growing opportunities, especially in administration, attracted migrants from the south. By the late 1920s, Jos was perhaps the most important tin mining centre in the world, while its trading and commercial activities were boosted by colonial investment in social and commercial infrastructure and transport (Dariye, 2002).

Competition between the indigenous Afizere, Anaguta and larger Berom groups over land and political control is longstanding, as is competition between them and the descendants of the in-migrant Hausa/Fulani group. Although the local groups continue to own land in the urban area, they also sold land to other groups, especially the Hausa/Fulani, who now insist that they settled on virgin land and are the original settlers (Danfulani and Fwatshak, 2002). Many of the indigenous groups continue to farm in the areas surrounding the city, where they compete for land with seasonal Hausa/Fulani in-migrants engaged in dry season farming, while other sectors of the urban economy are dominated by non-indigenous groups, including the Hausa/Fulani (Adetula, 2005). By the 1940s and 1950s, with its highly unionized tin mining and civil service workforces and active ethnic associations (see Adetula, 2005), the city was already characterized by intense political activity.
Large scale tin mining has declined in importance since the 1960s but there is some manufacturing. Today, Jos is a large commercial city, with good public transport links, a pleasant climate and a tourist industry. In 1967 it was designated the capital of the new Benue-Plateau State and in 1975 of Plateau State. In 1991, it was divided into three Local Government Areas (Jos North, South and East), setting off a new phase in the rivalry between groups claiming indigeneity, with the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom alleging that the creation of Jos North was designed to enable the Hausa/Fulani population to take political control of that LGA (Harnischfeger, 2004; see also Ityavyar and Gundu, 2004; Ostien, 2009). Reduced employment following structural adjustment in the 1980s and the influx of refugees from the northern Shari’a states around 2000 have increased competition for economic opportunities, land and housing, heightening political and social tension (HRW, 2001; Ityavyar and Gundu, 2004).

Because of its geographical location and economic history, Jos became one of the most religiously plural cities in Nigeria, and a particularly significant meeting point for Christianity and Islam, although until the 1990s its diverse communities lived together in peace (HRW, 2001). Until the 1950s, the Muslim Hausa/Fulani were the single largest ethnic group, retaining their distinctive and relatively homogeneous religious, cultural and linguistic characteristics long after settling in Jos, and still preferring to live in enclaves where they can elect leaders and run their own Shari’a civil courts (Harnischfeger, 2004). Their long residence was associated with the founding of significant Muslim organizations, such as health and educational institutions, as well as Jama’atu Izalatil Bidi’ah Wa’ikamatis Sunnah (JIBWIS) in the 1980s, bolstering their claim to indigeneity. As noted above, however, Hausa/Fulani conquests and slave trading in the 19th century had made the indigenous groups resistant to conversion from traditional religion to Islam (Danfulani and Fwatshak, 2002).

Prohibited by the colonial authorities from evangelizing in areas to the north, the Middle Belt was fertile ground for the missions, leading to the location in Jos of many mission headquarters and the conversion of most indigenous ethnic groups to Christianity. Yoruba in-migrants to the city included both Muslims and Christians, while other migrants from the south were mostly Christian. Today, the majority of the approximately one million urban residents in the Jos/Bukuru metropolitan area are Christian, with a large Muslim minority (although figures are not available).

It is the claims of local indigenous groups and Hausa/Fulani settlers to the land that fuel contestation in Jos – Yoruba, Igbo and other in-migrant groups do not make similar claims. To safeguard their claims to land, it is important for the rival groups to have allies in the government, judiciary and, if clashes
occur, in the security forces. In addition, it is desirable to secure political posts above the
neighbourhood level because of the access they provide to revenue flows from the State government
(Harnischfeger, 2004). In 1994, attempts by the military government in Plateau State to appoint an
administrator for Jos North LGA from the Hausa/Fulani population was resisted by the indigenes, who
claim that they ‘own’ the land (Adetula, 2005; HRW, 2001; Best, 2008). Rival protests culminated in a
fracas on 12th April, 1994, which resulted in the death of four people and the destruction of property. In
June, 1998, a quarrel between a Hausa man and a Berom man in Bukuru, near Jos, in which the
Hausa man was alleged to have attacked and killed the Berom man, led to another violent
confrontation, triggering fighting in which a number of Hausa/Fulani residents of Bukuru were killed.
In 2001, some Christian youths objected to the appointment of a Hausa/Fulani Muslim as local director
of the Federal government’s Poverty Alleviation Programme because a few years previously, following
his appointment by the military as Chair of Jos North local government, he had been convicted of
perjury and falsehood and dismissed; his appointment was seen as an affront to the Christian
majority; and they feared that he might favour Muslims in the allocation of welfare allowances.
Muslims, in contrast, supported his appointment (HRW, 2001). On September 7th, 2001, accounts of
how the events started varied, with some suggesting that the trigger was an allegation that a Christian
woman had pushed her way through a congregation of Muslims during Friday prayers (e.g. HRW,
2001; Ityvyar and Gundu, 2004) and others (e.g. Danfulani and Fwatshak, 2002) suggesting that the
events had been planned in the central and other mosques. By the 12th September, exacerbated by
reports of the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York, the “predominantly ethnic
struggle between Hausa and the local Berom turned into a religious confrontation, thus drawing further
parties into the conflict” (Harnischfeger, 2004, p 446). The violence spread to all parts of the city and
beyond, claiming large numbers of lives before it was brought to an end by a security crackdown
(Danfulani and Fwatshak, 2002; HRW, 2001).34

Local government elections were held elsewhere in Nigeria in 2002 but could not be held in Plateau
State. In February, 2002, the new city market was blown up and destroyed by fire. No group claimed
responsibility, leaving the field clear for mutual accusations, with the indigenous groups blaming the
Hausa for making good an earlier threat to destroy ‘economic milestones’ in Plateau State and the
Hausa accusing the indigenous groups of envying their commercial success, which had enabled them
to dominate the market. Later the same year (in May), a ward congress of the People’s Democratic
Party, which was in political control of the city, was held to elect ward officials. Located in a mainly
Anaguta residential area, large numbers of Hausa attended the meeting, the scale of which
exacerbated existing tensions over the political control of Jos North, leading to an explosion of violence
that left many dead. Until 2008 the State Governor appointed a succession of office holders from the
indigenous groups to run the Jos North local government.

On November 29th, 2008, following the local government elections, large scale fighting broke out once
more (Ostien, 2009). During the elections, control over Jos North had been hotly contested between a
Hausa-Fulani Muslim affiliated to the All Nigeria Peoples’ Party and a Berom Christian affiliated to the
ruling People’s Democratic Party. Although the polls were conducted peacefully, a group of Hausas,
suspecting that the results were being rigged against the losing candidate, started a protest in the
middle of the night and called for support from other Muslims. Christian victims claimed that
broadcasts through mosque loudspeakers claimed that they were fighting a *jihad* to seize the land of
Jos from infidels (FGD, COCIN, Angwan Rogo, January 2009). The initial protests spiralled out of
control, with Muslim youths, some allegedly high on drugs (Interviews with Rev Jacob Dashop,
January, and Daniel Oyo, March 2009), engaging in arson, looting and killing targeted at churches,
Christians and the homes and businesses of Christians (Interview with Gyang Paul, January 2009), as
well the university.

By the second day, reprisals against Muslims occurred, apparently by gangs of youths (Interview with
Rev Jacob Dashop, January 2009), with observers noting that all Muslims were attacked, regardless
of the ethnic group to which they belonged. A victim who lived in Congo/Russia claimed that even while
Christians and Muslims living in the area were negotiating with each other, a horde of Muslim youths
arrived from Angwan Rogo and started attacking Christians and setting alight their homes and
businesses as they fled. Other informants living in Dutse Uku and Yan Trailer claimed that *imams* had
called for reinforcements and that their attackers came from the Dilimi and Rikkos areas (FGD,
COCIN, Angwan Rogo, January 2009). It was also alleged that, after attacking adults, Muslims started
to target children in a bid to drive Christians out of Dutse Uku (Discussion, Rahab Yerse, February
2009). Christian victims claimed that they knew some of their attackers (their Muslim neighbours) but
could not identify others, who they suspected to have been hired from outside the city (FGD with
displaced persons from Angwan Rogo, January 2009). The violence continued until a security
crackdown brought it to an end, with some loss of life and about 4,000 people displaced.
Hausa/Fulani Muslims who lost large grain, palm oil, poultry feed and second hand clothing businesses in the Katako market area to arson expressed a belief that the attacks were perpetrated by Igbo Christians out of envy for their economic prosperity, although Igbo retailers of electronics, domestic appliances and spare parts were also the targets of arson attacks, which were blamed on Hausa/Fulani Muslims. In both Muslim attacks on Christian homes in 2001 and Christian attacks on Muslim homes in 2008, victims in religiously mixed areas claimed that their attackers had already marked out their houses for destruction. They alleged that the attacks were selective, designed to achieve 'ethnic cleansing', and through this political control over the local government, with its important resources for patronage, including control over land allocation.

Thus by 2008, the scale of violence in Jos had escalated and its religious dimensions had become more prominent, although the underlying motive seems to be a contest between groups for political control of the local government on the basis of rival claims to indigeneity.

3.3 Contexts and dynamics: comparing trajectories and episodes of conflict and violence in Kano and Jos

The historical development and context of the two cities and the occurrences of violence in each have been analysed chronologically. It is clear that both cities play significant roles in the larger religious and political geography of Nigeria, and that conflict and violence within the cities cannot be understood without locating them in their national and historical context. Kano’s pre-colonial position as a well-established Islamic religious and political centre associated with Hausa/Fulani dominance and expansion has had a lasting legacy for the city’s characteristics and the role of the northern States in Nigeria’s political economy since independence. As an important trading, commercial and administrative centre, it already had a large and ethnically mixed population and well developed governance arrangements when indirect rule was established in northern Nigeria and its local inter-ethnic and inter-religious dynamics continued to reflect its role in ethno-regional competition in national politics under both military and democratic regimes. Jos, in contrast, did not exist before tin mining started at the beginning of the colonial period, but then, in addition to its economic importance, developed an important role in Nigerian Christianity because of its location as the bridgehead of Christian mission in the contested Middle Belt.
Neither Islam nor Christianity is homogeneous. In both faith traditions, there has always been disagreement over doctrine and practice, competition for adherents and moves to reform the traditions from within. Mostly, disagreements have been managed without resorting to violence, but occasionally conflicts within Islam have become violent. In recent years in Kano, radical groups have sought to challenge mainstream interpretations of Islam, moral decadence in society and the corrupt state (the Maitatsine and Shiite movements). In the case of the Maitatsine, which attacked government institutions, it suited the religious establishment to allow the state to destroy the movement. In the latter case, the religious establishment was also content to allow the state to restore order.

Economic opportunities and the need for personnel with appropriate skills for colonial administration resulted in large scale in-migration to both cities, while colonial policies intended to manage potential competition between local and in-migrant groups with different ethnic origins and religious practices were based on administrative and residential segregation. Differences between in-migrant groups and the existing societies (feudal Hausa/Fulani society concerned to maintain the Muslim way of life and suspicious of the missions and Western education in both cities, and the indigenous peasant agricultural society in the area of Jos) were associated with different patterns of economic activities. The growing dominance of trade and commercial activities by in-migrant groups and their descendants led to tensions that were reflected in political competition and occasionally in conflict and violence – thus well-established businesses have been attacked during some of the clashes in both cities. Migrants were not integrated, especially in Kano, "partly because the Muslim overlords continued to consolidate state power, and partly because the British tried to avoid inter-group tensions by encouraging the quarantining of non-Muslim in-migrants in sabon gari (strangers’ quarters)" (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005, p 15). Generally, therefore, communal organization concentrated on the establishment of ethnic associations that protected the cultural identity and welfare of the in-migrant community and maintained its links with its community of origin, rather than competing directly for political power at the local level, although this has become more of an issue in recent years. In contrast, in Jos, the early Hausa/Fulani settlers and their descendants challenged the indigenous groups over land and local political control. Unlike the local groups, who have ancestral rights to the agricultural land that was used for mining and urban development, the settlers' claim to indigeneity, which according to the Nigerian constitution entitles indigenes to privileged access to land and various government resources, is based on an assertion that they founded the city.
Economic and political trends since the 1980s include economic crisis and liberalization, declining wage employment opportunities because of de-industrialization and government retrenchment, as well as drought, land pressure and rural poverty in the north. These have increased competition for economic opportunities, fuelled rural-urban migration, and led to high unemployment in the cities, in particular amongst the young. Commentators point to the large numbers of young men hanging around the streets, especially in Kano, as a factor in the increased tendency for protests or disagreements to escalate into violence (for example Albert, 1999). Ya’u notes that groups of young men aged between 15 and 30, which offered vigilante and other community services in their own neighbourhoods have, with rising unemployment, poverty and inequality, increasingly become involved in criminal activities, absorbing not only homeless almajirai who can no longer sustain themselves by begging, but also increasing numbers of young women, young people from rich families, and older men. Their members are increasingly armed and drug taking has become more extensive. Even though many of their activities harm ordinary residents, they continue to provide security and undertake communal work for their own wards, making it difficult for the government to curb them. In addition, politicians and the rich have uses for them as security guards and bodyguards and for hire during political campaigns (ICG, 2010; Ya’u, 2000). Smith (2006) detects a tendency for the violence perpetrated by these vigilante groups to progress from the provision of security and killing of criminals …to the rooting out of ethnic and religious ‘others’ (most often, in Nigerian urban contexts, migrants), [with the result that] the potential scale of this violence becomes much greater, the ability to rationalize it much stronger, and the line between violent crime, vigilantism, and urban communal violence becomes almost imperceptible (Smith, 2006, p 95).

The groups are positioned ambiguously between vigilante group, ethnic militia and criminal gangs. As stories about their activities circulate, “the strength and divisiveness of identities rooted in place of origin, but increasingly overlaid with a religious dimension, become all the more powerful. In the process, the distinction between violent crime (arguably rooted in poverty) and communal violence (seen as rooted in identity) becomes obscured” (Smith, 2006, p 66). Thus in Smith’s view, the actions of these groups and the discourses that surround them have strengthened the connection in the public consciousness between ethnicity and religion.
Religious movements have emerged most strongly in urban centres, where they attract both educated members of the middle class and young people, and are associated with more assertive and expansionist religiosity (Mu’azzam and Ibrahim, 2000, p 81). Since the 1990s, in addition, the threat and then the reality of the introduction of Shari’a criminal law in the northern states have also contributed to the increased salience of religion in the dynamics of competition and conflict in the cities under study. Fear of the implications of Shari’a law and the effects of subsequent inter-religious disturbances have led to increased temporary and permanent in-migration to Jos by people affected, especially Christians, contributing to tensions in that city, while the Kano origins of many Hausa/Fulani families living in Jos means that conflict and violence in one city has reverberations in the other. In addition, some youth groups have taken on the agenda of promoting Shari’a – though not all adopt violent tactics, feelings about religious issues tend to run high and the boundaries between revivalist and vigilante groups are blurred, so that it is difficult to determine who is responsible for tipping peaceful meetings and demonstrations into violent attacks on places of worship and members of the opposite religion.

In recent years, violence in both cities has mostly had a religious hue, although it rarely arises solely from disagreements about beliefs and practices, let alone values – instead religion is intertwined in complex ways with ethnic identity, inter-group competition, and struggles for political power and the access it gives to state resources. Not only is it necessary to understand the historical origins of urban populations, the links between local and national politics, and the economic and political dynamics of individual cities, contemporary dynamics in which many violent incidents are reprisals for attacks on fellow community members elsewhere in the city or country are also important. For example, in Kano, Sabon Gari is usually cordoned off by armed youths to ward off invaders, but success in securing this neighbourhood gave the vigilantes courage to attack Fagge in retaliation for attacks on Christians outside the Sabon Gari during the 1999 crisis. Media accounts and the stories of return migrants and displaced people inevitably convey partial and sometimes exaggerated accounts of violence, provoking reprisals elsewhere. For example, Smith, in his 2001 research in the area from which many Igbo residents of Kano come, noted that “the accounts [of the 2001 violence] were almost unrecognizable, exaggerated in ways that both inflated the extent of violence in Kano and embellished its ethnic and religious significance” (2006, p 62). In addition, easier travel and access to telecommunications (including, more recently, the social media) seem to facilitate more rapid retaliation than in the past.
Aspects of conflict and violence in Jos and Kano that have been given relatively little attention in either official reports on the episodes or existing studies will be examined in the next three sections, drawing on the primary data collected in 2009. This study was interested not only in understanding the roles of religion in conflict and violence but also in what happens in the aftermath, because as Azar suggests, this helps to explain whether a conflict between communal groups becomes protracted and influences the likelihood of further episodes of violence. As outlined above, he identifies four possible outcomes of violence that may sustain protracted social conflict: deterioration of physical security, weakened institutions (both state and civil society), reinforcement of feelings of fear and hostility towards the other community, and a sense by a community that it has lost control over the lives of its members. All of these, he asserts, contribute to the breakdown of cooperation between communal groups and make it less likely that the basic needs of each community will be met. Failure to improve communication and mutual understanding and to address the underlying causes of conflict results in it becoming persistent, with the potential to turn violent on future occasions. The analysis considers the coping strategies of those affected by the violence, the part played by the state, and the roles of non-state actors and organizations. A distinction will be drawn between the episode itself, the immediate aftermath of the violence and the longer period during which normalcy may or may not be restored and actions taken to prevent further violence.
4 The coping strategies of those affected by urban violence

Typically, analyses of violence focus on the victims, with less attention given to the perpetrators. However, as noted above, not only is it difficult to categorize many of those involved as either victims or perpetrators, but also a distinction may be needed between the instigators (those who openly or covertly foment and organize violence) and the perpetrators (those who engage in violent acts). In all the cases studied in Jos and Kano, each group thought of itself as a victim and invoked the need for ‘self defence’, sometimes to avoid taking responsibility for starting the violence. However, many were also, at least on occasion, perpetrators. More often than not, the wounded had been injured in active combat, but when encountered in camps for displaced persons, they presented themselves as victims rather than perpetrators. Analysis of how those affected by urban violence responded must bear in mind the ambiguous position of some victims. Moreover, while there is a tendency to label whole communal groups as victims or perpetrators, those participating in or harmed by the violence are usually a minority of group members. In addition, while victims tend to be associated with the group which was targeted during the violence, those affected are not confined to a single group, because others who may or may not have been involved in the protests or attacks may be caught up in the crossfire, suffer from police brutality or lose their property to fire or looting.

4.1 Strategies during the violence and its immediate aftermath

During and immediately after violence occurs, the priorities for those affected are to seek a temporary place of safety, secure medical treatment for the injured and burial for those killed, find members of their family from whom they have become separated during the attacks, and obtain sufficient food and other necessities to survive.

In Jos and Kano, people rely primarily on the security forces to restore order and provide them with physical protection. Those forced to flee prefer to find temporary sanctuary with relatives and others in safe areas within the city (those in which their ethnic or religious group is in the majority or higher income areas, many of which are unaffected by the violence). Those who are not taken in by others are forced to seek refuge in camps for internally displaced people – churches, mosques, schools, police stations and barracks provide spaces in which people hope that they will be safe. With the increasing prevalence of religious violence, places of worship may be less frequently perceived as places of safety than in the past, as they are often the target of attacks. In addition to the bases of the armed forces, the premises of any government agency whose staff are armed (including the National
Drug Enforcement Agency and the Nigerian Customs Service) may be considered safe. In Kano the main places in which people took refuge included the Air Force Base, Bukavu Barracks and Central Police Station, and in Jos the Air Force Base, Rukuba Barracks, Police Staff College and Police Headquarters. Some flee the city. Commonly, victims report that they suffer from psychological and health problems related to their traumatic experiences.

In the confusion, some become separated from their family members and their priority is to find their missing relatives, who may have been displaced, injured, killed or arrested. Often forced to flee without food, money, clothing, toiletries and medicines, displaced people rely on their hosts or seek assistance from government or non-government organizations, which usually distribute relief in the IDP camps or at religious buildings (see Section 6). The climate of distrust and fear following inter-religious violence makes it unlikely that victims will seek assistance from organizations associated with the other religion, and even some government agencies may be suspected of discriminatory practices. In some neighbourhoods, vigilante groups patrol the streets, build barricades and man road blocks to restrict pedestrian and vehicle access and maintain security.

Because of the central role played by mosques and churches in funeral rites, ascertaining the religious identity of the victims is crucial and the body count may further inflame fear, resentment and anger. For example, in Jos, the corpses of Muslims from all the areas affected by the violence were assembled at the Central Mosque and their burial organized by Islamic groups, which reinforced the religious dimension of the conflict, even though some of the victims had been caught in the crossfire rather than targeted as Muslims.

Those affected rely primarily on the security forces to restore order, but once calm has returned they are faced with a decision about whether or not they can return to the area in which they were living prior to the crisis and if so, how they will cope with the tasks they face – to take up their old employment; re-start a business whose stock, equipment or premises may have been damaged, burnt or looted in their absence; repair or rebuild their houses; and obtain access to necessary services, especially schooling and health care. It may take months before they have the confidence to face neighbours who may have been amongst those who attacked them and their property, in order to assess whether returning to their previous location and a return to normalcy is feasible. Widows and
other families in which breadwinners have been killed or injured not only have to cope with the emotional trauma, but also their housing and livelihood situations may be particularly difficult.

### 4.2 Return and adaptation

For some, the restoration of order in the short term (and the additional sense of safety experienced as a result of the long term presence of troops in Jos) has been sufficient to enable them to take up their old lives – to return to their previous employment and area of residence. This is not always easy - returning residents and their children may face hostility and fear that they may be attacked again in future. Employers may be unwilling to re-employ workers, and businesspeople may have lost customers and lack the resources to replace lost stock. At the time of the research, many houses were still in ruins in the areas affected by the 2008 violence in Jos. Not only do residents who return face greater insecurity than before, they may also have been impoverished by their temporary displacement and the effects of the attacks.

Places of worship are often targeted and in the short term may be forced to stop operating. However, they have symbolic significance and are important in providing spiritual and social support to members of their congregations. Many religious groups therefore give high priority to repairing or rebuilding churches or mosques (for example the Deeper Life church in Angwan Rimi and the COCIN and several other churches in the Kwararafa area in Jos). In the process, they may redesign the buildings to decrease their vulnerability to attack. For example, the Assemblies of God church in Sarkin Mangu in Jos was redesigned after 2001 with a higher roof supported by heavy concrete pillars to make it less vulnerable to arson. The COCIN church in the same area increased the height of its security wall, built an observation tower into the gate and plans to rebuild the whole structure so that it is immune to arsonists (Interview with Church Rebuilding Committee). In addition, places of worship associated with a minority group may start to operate more unobtrusively by, for example, worshipping more quietly.

However, sometimes it is not possible to rebuild because of opposition from residents, for example the mosque in Bukuru low cost housing area in Jos after 2001. In addition, some rebuilt places of worship are vulnerable to attack during future episodes of violence (for example, the churches mentioned above or the mosque in Rock Haven). After repeated destruction, some may relocate to other areas, for example, some of the churches in Brigade in Kano.
4.3 Relocation and resettlement

Many of those whose houses and business premises had been destroyed in the violence in both Jos and Kano felt too unsafe to return to their original neighbourhoods. In addition, property owners in contested neighbourhoods may seek to prevent refugees from returning and to drive out remaining members of minority groups. The post-conflict periods in both cities have therefore been marked by significant relocation to other neighbourhoods in the same city or out-migration.

Landowners in both cities, especially those belonging to the indigenous groups, are cautious and selective in leasing land or accommodation after violence has occurred (Informal discussion with traditional sources in Jos). In Jos, both Christians and Muslims relocated following the 2001 and 2008 crises. It was reported that even some Muslims living in Muslim minority areas such as Tudun Wada, Alheri, Fuduwa, Eto Baba, Apata and Jenta Adamu whose property had not been destroyed have subsequently sold or exchanged their houses and relocated to areas such as Angwan Rimi, Gangare, Rikkos, Dutse Uku, Nasarawa and Tudun Wada, which are majority Muslim. Some have moved from middle income neighbourhoods to these areas (for example, one interviewee had relocated to Rikkos from Rock Haven). In Christian majority Jos, Christians can select neighbourhoods appropriate to their income levels. Muslims have fewer areas from which to choose. It has become increasingly difficult for the latter to buy land outside the city walls, with the result that conditions in their traditional residential areas, which are mainly unplanned, have become more and more difficult and overcrowded, with inadequate housing, infrastructure and services, including schools. New building is restricted to areas unsuitable for residential development, such as hilltops and river banks. These unplanned areas lack infrastructure and services. In Kano, movement by non-Muslims to Sabon Gari, which is perceived as relatively safe, has also led to increased densities, upward pressure on rents, inadequate and poorly maintained infrastructure and overstretched social facilities.

Following temporary closures in response to attacks on privately owned Muslim schools in Dutse Uku during the 2008 violence, such as Al-Bayan, Al-Iman and Jabal-u-Nur, their pupils were scattered, with adverse effects on their education. Relocation of Muslims to new areas raised further issues related to the availability of education. For example, Usman Shehu, a member of JIBWIS, fled from Fudawa to Tudun Wada during the 2001 crisis, where he reported that it had taken close to a year to find an appropriate school for his four children, two of whom had had to repeat a year. Displaced again during
the 2008 violence, he had relocated to Dutse Uku where he had not yet found an affordable school for his children at the time of the interview, two months later (Interview with Usman Shehu, January 2009). In response to the increased demand in areas to which those affected by the violence have relocated, religious organizations have started new schools. These include religious teaching in the curriculum and, while in theory open to all, are rarely attended by children of the other faith. They are, therefore, exacerbating the weakened links and lack of mutual understanding between people of different religions.

In the longer term, some residents in vulnerable areas, especially neighbourhoods in which they are a minority, arm themselves and fortify their premises. In addition, vigilantes may be encouraged to continue their attempts to maintain security. This appears to be most strongly embedded in Sabon Gari in Kano, where the youth across religious and ethnic divides collectively provide security, although residents of Rantya Low Cost area in Jos collaborated in a similar way during the 2001 violence to ward off outside attackers. Although superficially militarization may appear to improve residents’ security, it is a double-edged sword, since local militias may take the law into their own hands, innocent passersby may be attacked or killed, and the increasing prevalence of weapons may be associated with increased criminality and violence. The apprehension of vehicles carrying weapons and rumours that both sides are stockpiling weapons in anticipation of future violence contribute to the atmosphere of mistrust. In addition, increasing vigilante protection for some areas may result in other areas becoming more vulnerable, for example Naibawa, Brigade and Badawa in Kano have become targets since the institution of permanent policing by vigilantes in Sabon Gari.

Residents’ attempts to oust members of minority identity groups from some neighbourhoods and the choices of those affected by violence to relocate to safer areas have resulted in increasing residential segregation in both cities, largely along religious lines. Although as discussed above, residential differentiation is by no means new, the recent episodes of inter-religious violence have reinforced the process. The re-naming of ‘ethnically cleansed’ neighbourhoods (for example by Christians as Jesus Zone, New Jerusalem and Promised Land, and by Muslims as Jihad Zone, Saudi Arabia and Seat of [bin] Laden) has symbolically reinforced the segregation (Harnischfeger, 2004, p 446).
Reports were also received of people living in both cities who had relocated to their areas of origin or other towns, either temporarily or permanently. According to Human Rights Watch, “one of the effects of the May 2004 riots appears to have been the more permanent departure of Christian residents who lost relatives in the attack and whose homes and livelihoods were destroyed” (HRW, 2005, p 80). Some residents from Jos had relocated to Abuja and its surrounding settlements, while others had relocated to Bauchi, although some travel to Jos daily because their livelihoods are still there.

As noted above, businesses were targeted during the Jos violence, with adverse effects on the availability of employment for Muslims in the city. Of the larger businesses, second hand car dealerships run by Muslims but located along the Zaria road in a Christian majority area and merchants operating in the Katako market were the worst hit. According to Alhaji Haruna Musa (Chairman/CEO of PAMA motors), vehicles with the value of nearly Naira 800 million (£3.1 million) were destroyed during each of the episodes of violence (FGD, PAMA motors, February 2009). By the end of 2009, some of the dealers had started to operate again, despite the lack of any compensation payments, but some had relocated to Muslim strongholds. One estimate of the stock lost by traders in the Katako market was Naira 200 million (£800,000) (Interview with Ahmed Garba, Secretary Youth Wing JNI). Some but not all the grain, poultry feed and timber merchants operating in this market have been able to rebuild their businesses.

Traders displaced from some markets have established makeshift markets in other locations, with the result that markets have gradually become segregated along ethnic and religious lines. For example in Jos after both the 2001 and 2008 violence, Igbo women who felt insecure trading in the Kwararafa (New) Market started to operate in the Ojukwu Street vegetable market and at Chorbe junction near a military post (Interviews with three market women,19 January 2009). In addition, the Gada Biyu Yam Market was established as a Christian alternative to the Gangare Yam Market, which is dominated by Muslims, and the Rikkos Tomato Market replaced the Gangare Kasuwan Dare market, which is located in a Muslim stronghold. After the 2008 violence affected Christian yam traders for the second time, they approached the Chairman of the Kabong satellite market. They were allocated space adjacent to the market, to which four fifths of the traders previously operating in Gangare were estimated to have relocated (Interviews with Onwuka Monday, Chairman, and Innocent Ibwa, Vice-Chairman). Although the traders in the new yam market are Christian, the transport sector is
dominated by Muslims, on whom the traders depend. They report that they face high transport costs, damage to their stock by livestock belonging to residents in the new area and loss of customers. After one of their number was threatened with death by Hausa youth in Gangare during the 2008 violence, Christian women vegetable traders started a new vegetable market on the Jos-Bauchi Ring Road (later relocated to a site away from the main road to the east of Rikkos) (Interviews with three traders). A year after the 2008 violence, it was reported that traders, tradesmen such as mechanics, electricians and plumbers, and street vendors (e.g. water vendors) were starting to enjoy cross-faith patronage once again.

Another category of livelihoods that has been adversely affected by the violence is the dry season vegetable farming traditionally undertaken by seasonal Hausa/Fulani migrants on land belonging to local Berom landowners. There is a general belief among Muslims that the conflict has resulted in Berom landowners withdrawing usufruct rights from migrants. Some of these unskilled Muslim migrants have taken up water vending or hawking seasonal fruit and vegetables in order to survive, without assistance from any external group.

The strategies open to those affected by the violence depend on the resources available to them, including their individual skills, family resources, and the support they receive from government agencies and non-governmental organizations. The roles played by government and NGOs, especially religious organizations, in the immediate and longer term aftermath of the violence will be discussed in Sections 5 and 6 respectively.
5 The roles of the state during violent episodes and their aftermath

Federal, state and local governments play roles during violent episodes themselves, but also, in a context of protracted social conflict, during the periods before and after particular incidents, when tensions emerge, problems are dealt with appropriately or inappropriately (or ignored), and needed governance and security sector reforms are instituted (or not).

5.1 Restoring order

All the security forces in Nigeria come under the control of the Federal government. However, initial responsibility for restoring order rests with the local police force. Invariably, the local police lack the capacity and public backing to restore order. According to many informants, this opens the door to vigilante group involvement, leading to an escalation of the violence.

When it becomes clear that violence is continuing, the government can call on an additional mobile police force (MOPOL) and the army. However, the order to mobilize either of these has to come from the Federal capital. Although their capacity and ability to restore calm greatly exceeds that of the police, the order to deploy them is often delayed, with the result that the violence can escalate in the meantime (HRW, 2001, 2005). For example, in Jos in 2001 it was not until the university was attacked and the Vice Chancellor managed to persuade the troops stationed in the city to intervene that any action was taken against Muslims who were attacking churches and Christians, and even after MOPOL and then additional army units arrived, the attacks continued (HRW, 2001; Danfulani and Fwatshak, 2002). The response in Jos in 2008 was more immediate and substantial, with the Federal government deploying about 5,000 troops to Jos under the command of the Chief of Army Staff, but they only arrived a day after widespread violence had resulted in many victims. Typically, as in Jos in 2001 and 2008, a dusk-to-dawn curfew is imposed. Other actions may include bans on public preaching and prohibition of the blocking of streets outside churches and mosques for prayers. As noted above, the premises of the security agencies also provide locations for camps in which internally displaced people can seek refuge – for example, there were still an estimated 4,000 people living in the main barracks in Kano two months after the May 2004 violence (HRW, 2005, p 80).

All the security forces are said to use excessive violence, resulting in deaths and injuries to unarmed civilians and bystanders as well as the perpetrators of violence. For example, the anti-riot police were accused of attacking people in Jos. The JNI reported that more than twenty people had confirmed that
they had been shot at by the MOPOL, members of which had also been heard to make negative remarks about Muslims. This was reiterated by Abdul Kakim, an interviewee living in Dutse Uku, who observed that the mobile police had shot at his friend when they were outside and unarmed. Another informant, Kabiru, described how he had observed the police throwing canisters of tear gas into a neighbour’s house in the Yan Shanu (livestock) area and shooting at people fleeing the gas. Buhari Na-Adamu, the Chairperson of the Muslim group Rahatul-Islam Wal Hajj identified those who had attacked Muslims as “ethnic Berom, MOPOL and hoodlums.” Informants also described the violent tactics used by MOPOL against Muslims (Discussion, Rahab Yerse, February 2009).

In the 2004 Kano crisis, soldiers and MOPOL were reported to have responded to the carnage with maximum force and brutality. Security officers had reportedly been given orders to shoot on sight in order to bring the situation under control, leading to large numbers of deaths, including those of many people not involved in the violence. The conduct of the security forces in this instance was typical – not only do they arrive late, when many victims have already been attacked, but they use force even when there is no provocation, with the result that extrajudicial killings are common (HRW, 2005, p 65).

In addition, the security forces are frequently accused of not being neutral and impartial (for example in the Kano violence of 2004, HRW, 2005). Christians in Jos claimed that in both 2001 and 2008, they had watched helplessly as Muslim members of the security forces escorted their attackers and watched the looting, while preventing Christians from defending themselves or protecting their property (FGD, COCIN, Angwan Rogo, January 18, 2009). In 2008, Muslims also complained about the police, while suggesting that army personnel had discharged their duties professionally and neutrally.

In spite of their occasional use of excessive violence and violation of human rights, in Jos there was widespread acceptance of the role of the military in managing post-conflict security. A State task force that brought together the army, police and air force was established after the 2001 violence and enabled a more rapid response in 2008. Even though non-indigenous groups supported the Federal government and the army and indigenes, who have greater trust in the Plateau State government, were suspicious of them, most informants agreed that the security response had been more effective in 2008 than during previous episodes.
5.2 Preventing or exacerbating violence?

It is often reported that the likelihood that an outbreak of violence will occur can be predicted, if not its precise timing. Despite this, the state is accused of doing nothing to address longstanding grievances during the period prior to an incident and of acting in ways that may exacerbate the violence (HRW, 2005).

For example, government agencies are often accused of opening the way for violence by giving permission for protests, demonstrations or elections despite high levels of tension. Examples include giving permission for the Reinhard Bonnke crusade and a protest meeting in Kano in 1991 and 2004 respectively. In addition, Muslim organizations, including the Council of Ulama, contended that the Plateau State government was complacent in insisting on holding the Jos North local government elections in 2008, despite the many warning signs and informants alleged that the State government had disregarded security reports which suggested that the elections should not be held in Jos North because of its political volatility. For example, the Chairman of Rahatul-Islam Wal Hajj reported that he had met with the Governor to warn him and others, such as Alhaji Danladi Garba Pasali, who claimed to have won during the ruling People’s Democratic Party primaries but to have been rigged out of nomination as a candidate, went to court to prevent the election from being held, to no avail. In its defence, the government argued that it had held several meetings with leaders of the Hausa/Muslim community who had given assurances that there would be no violence if the elections were to be held. Further, as the government explained, Alhaji Dasuki Nakande, a Minister from the Hausa community, had petitioned the federal government to withhold all revenues accruable to the Jos North local government unless and until democratic structures were put in place through elections.

During the incident, informants claimed that government actions exacerbated the violence, including statements by the State Governor and his personal aides, especially his Media Adviser and the Commissioner for Information (Interview with Murtala Sani Hashim of the JNI). The Governor was also blamed for the selective nature of the initial 24 hour curfew, which was allegedly only imposed on areas in which Muslims were in a majority, the shoot on sight order he issued to security agents and the government’s insensitivity in announcing the results of the elections while injured people were still waiting for medical assistance. Muslims also claimed that the State government failed to provide
assistance to Muslim victims of the conflict. In Kano likewise, informants alleged that the security agencies are untrustworthy and sometimes side with the perpetrators. Following the 2008 violence in Jos, the Plateau State Emergency Relief and Management Agency (PLASEMA) did an assessment of the houses damaged or destroyed and recommended to government that it should reconstruct them so that their owners would not be permanently displaced resulting in residential segregation along religious lines (Interview with David T Dakwo).

5.3 Providing relief

The federal and state governments play a role in the provision of relief after incidents of violence, generally through the establishment of various logistical and administrative committees. However, accusations of favouritism in the distribution of relief materials are sometimes made (for example by Christians in Kano) and NGOs, including at least one Muslim organization, complained that bureaucratic hurdles obstruct both government assistance reaching victims and the operations of non-governmental humanitarian organizations.

Following the 2001 crisis in Jos, the Plateau State government constituted a Relief Committee to receive relief materials and distribute them to victims (Final Report of the Relief Materials Management Committee on the Jos Crisis of 7th September, 2001, p 2). The committee received funds, food and non-food items from individuals and 28 organizations, including government agencies and domestic and international NGOs. Food and other items were distributed to victims who had taken refuge in 32 verified camps, and later to individuals through CAN and JNI. It also upgraded the Emergency Unit, at that time under the Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development, to a fully-fledged parastatal, the Plateau State Emergency Relief and Management Agency (PLASEMA).

Following the 2008 crisis, several committees were established (for relief, recovery, provision of health treatment, etc), coordinated by a senior civil servant with the rank of Permanent Secretary. The existence of PLASEMA provided an organizational framework for the purchase and distribution of food and other items to victims in 26 camps it identified (Interview with David T. Dakwo).
In Kano in 2004, a committee coordinated by the Secretary to the State government was given the task of ascertaining the amount of assistance required and providing relief, although some of the displaced complained that they had received little or no assistance from the government (HRW, 2005, p 80).

5.4 Ensuring justice

It is common in Nigeria for State governments to establish commissions of enquiry following outbreaks of violence, but this does not always happen. For example, following the 1991 riots in Kano, the State government established a Panel of Investigation, with eight Christian and four Muslim members, all of whom were men, as well as representatives of so-called ‘special interests, such as Igbo, Yoruba, the Kano State Chamber of Commerce and Industries and the affected Local Government Area. The panel’s terms of reference were (Kano State Government, 1991):

- To speedily enquire into the immediate and remote causes of the disturbances.
- To determine the involvement of people and groups of persons who might have contributed to the outbreak of the disturbances.
- To determine the extent of damages to properties and loss of lives.
- To make recommendations in the light of its findings to prevent future occurrences.
- To recommend measures that will enhance promotion of peace and harmony among sections involved.

The panel was welcomed but none of the recommendations of the bulky report it produced appear to have been implemented.

Again, after the September 1999 revenge attacks, the State government set up a Committee on Communal Disturbances in Kano State. Because the government regarded the conflict as communal rather than religious, all the committee members were Muslim, although it did include two women, one of whom was appointed Chair. Its terms of reference concentrated on identifying the characteristics and needs of refugees, assessing damage to property and distributing relief materials (Kano State Government, 1999). However, it was not required to identify individual victims, leading observers to suspect that the government was uninterested in either providing assistance to victims or bringing perpetrators to justice.
Similarly, after the 2004 attacks, a Judicial Commission was established, but victims did not receive compensation and perpetrators were not brought to justice. Thus, according to the police, “by early July 2004, 228 people had been arrested in connection with the riots. 45 of them had been charged, 61 were under investigation, and 102 had been released” (HRW, 2005, p 79). No police officers or military personnel appeared to have been charged over the extra-judicial killings.

The Judicial Commission of Inquiry set up by the Plateau State government following the 2001 crisis and led by Justice Nikki Tobi was also typical. Its terms of reference were to:

- Investigate the immediate and remote causes of the crisis
- Identify persons or groups responsible for the crisis
- Establish the extent of damage to property and loss of lives
- Obtain any relevant information or facts
- Suggest and recommend ways to forestall future reoccurrence.

The establishment of the commission was well-received, helped to calm nerves and raised expectations that justice would be done. However, the government had not released its report and did not appear to have acted on its recommendations before the 2008 crisis erupted. Previous commission reports had been treated in the same way, for example after the 1994 crisis in Jos. Some reports were belatedly released in 2010 and government white papers produced, but the recommendations are yet to be implemented.

While levels of military security were maintained after the 2008 violence, during the year that had elapsed between then and the research, little had been done to establish a sustainable peace process. Distrust of the Plateau State government by Hausa/Fulani (Muslims) and of the Federal government by indigenes (Christians) led to arguments over which level of government had the power to establish a Commission of Enquiry. Eventually, parallel commissions were set up, with the Federal Commission dealing with matters under Federal jurisdiction such as citizenship, the role of illegal aliens and the use of small arms and light weapons in the violence, although Christians remain suspicious of it. The State government inaugurated a commission led by the former International Court
of Justice judge Bola Ajibola, with similar terms of reference to its earlier commission, despite the announcement by Hausa/Fulani Muslims prior to its establishment that they would not give evidence to it. Although the latter submitted its report in October, 2009, it had not been published by the end of that year. These arguments over the legitimacy and interests of levels of government under different political control have deepened divisions between Muslims and Christians in Jos.

Informants in both cities complained not only that few perpetrators (or their collaborators and suspected sponsors) had been arrested following violent episodes, and even fewer brought to trial, but also that arrests are often one-sided. Residents reported seeing their attackers walking about freely, leading them to suspect that the police had no intention of apprehending the perpetrators. As a result, and with the history of government failure to publish and act on the reports of the commissions of enquiry it establishes (see also Enwerem, 1990), most informants were cynical about government commitment to justice, further undermining their confidence in the state in general.

5.5 Peacebuilding and conflict prevention

After the 2001 crisis, mimicking the national inter-religious council established by the Federal government, the Plateau State government set up the Plateau State Inter-Religious Council, comprised of ten Christian and ten Muslim religious leaders. The Council has organized a series of workshops and seminars to encourage Christian-Muslim dialogue, including one at the Jos Central Mosque only a few days before the 2008 incident, during which the participants resolved to work for peace. In addition, a Plateau Peace Conference was organized with the purpose of transforming existing stereotypes. While 53 delegates of varying religious and ethnic backgrounds signed the resolutions of the conference, the Hausa/Fulani participants declined to do so, arguing that the resolutions did not meet their needs. Bodies and activities such as these have tended to be elite-based and driven.

At the time of the research, religious groups in Jos were unaware of any State government peacebuilding initiatives following the 2008 violence.

Moreover, government is not always perceived as neutral and interested in peacebuilding. For example, Christian organizations in Kano complain that they are discriminated against in the allocation of land or grants of permission for the rebuilding of churches destroyed during the violence.
6 The roles of non-state actors and organizations in violent episodes and their aftermath

In addition to considering the role of the state in the aftermath of violence, this study sought to identify non-state organizations that participated. It focused mainly on the roles played by religious organizations, including individual congregations (mosques and churches), the organizational structures of the faith traditions (such as Roman Catholic dioceses) and more or less autonomous faith-based organizations. Although it sought to compare the roles played by these organizations with those played by non-religious civil society organizations, as well as the state, most attention was paid to religious organizations. As with other aspects of the research, more information is available on Jos, mainly because it proved easier to contact organizations and individuals involved in the more recent episodes in Jos and for informants to remember details of what role different organizations had played in the confused and uncertain conditions that prevailed in the days and months after the incidents.

Systematic data are lacking and so the research was based mainly on interviews with representatives of religious organizations of various types. Given the limitations of time, the difficulties of undertaking fieldwork in Nigeria, even in urban centres, and the sensitivity of the issue, it was not possible to interview more than a selection of those operating in the two cities. Although the intention was to supplement the individual interviews with focus group discussions in selected neighbourhoods and with members of particular social groups and individual congregations, it was only possible to conduct a limited number of such discussions. The examples of organizations and activities given below are therefore illustrative rather than comprehensive. While many general conversations and the local knowledge of research team members enabled them to assess the quality of the information provided, none of the organizations provided the teams with objective assessments of the effectiveness of their activities and so the conclusions are necessarily tentative.

6.1 Providing relief and support

Nearly every Christian denomination in Nigeria is present in Jos, including the Catholic Church, Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN), Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA)/Tarayar Ekklesiyoyn Kristi a Nigeria (TEKAN), Lutheran, Presbyterian, Baptist, Anglican Communion, Wesleyan, Apostolic and Assemblies of God, as well as new generation Pentecostal churches. Almost every congregation and its members was reported to have become involved in providing material, psychological and spiritual support to the victims of violence, especially their own congregations and members.
After the 2001 violence, both individual congregations and denominations and the local chapter of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) organized fasting and prayer sessions. In the words of the Anglican Bishop of Bukuru, Jwan B.N. Zhumbes, “like other CAN groups, we first prayed for the victims”. Church leaders also provided counselling to injured victims and those who had lost their relatives, houses or businesses. Individual Christian families took in victims. For example, the coordinator of the COCIN Women’s Fellowship (CWF), Mrs Naomi Ado Noma, reported that:

We helped displaced people by absorbing them into members’ homes. I hosted 17 people for two months. We counselled them as they stayed with our families and we also prayed for them.

When a family was too large for a single host family to accommodate, she explained, they were split up between different hosts, but even this was preferred to living in a displaced persons camp.

Not only did some churches provide temporary refuge for victims, much effort was devoted to providing material relief. This was organized by CAN blocks (members), individual denominations and congregations, FBOs, NGOs and women’s groups. For example, CAN received funds and goods from CAN branches in other states, the local governments, the Plateau State government and individuals. It then distributed food and clothes to IDPs in churches being used as camps, including Muryar Bishara (Voice of the Gospel), COCIN Nasarawa, COCIN Jos Jarawa, COCIN Kabong, St Michael’s Nasarawa, Sacred Heart Gada Biyu and St Augustine Major Seminary Katak. Individual denominations also raised funds and collected goods, providing churches that had been attacked with funds for repairs and replacement furniture, and distributing food, clothing and funds to the members of affected congregations through their pastors (Interview with Rev Sam T Alaha). The Anglican Communion, for example, mobilized and distributed relief supplies to victims, including food, clothes, household goods and drugs, as well as providing first aid (Interview with Bishop Zhumbes).

A variety of other faith-based organizations were engaged in relief, including the Justice Development and Peace Commission (JDPC), the Christian Foundation for Social Justice and Equity, the Justice, Peace and Reconciliation Movement (JPRM), Rural Development Counsellors for Christian Churches in Africa (RURCON), CWF and Catholic Women Organization (CWO).
Managers of the JDPC who were interviewed indicated that in 2001 the crisis had taken them by surprise and that their relief activities, which were coordinated by only two people, were not well organized, although they were able to mobilize funds from the dioceses, as well as international funds via Catholic Relief Services based in Abuja and the Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria based in Lagos. The funds were used to purchase food and clothing, which was distributed to victims in the affected parishes (Interview with Fr. Anthony Fom, JDPC Coordinator). In addition, the CWO distributed food and clothing collected from its members to other members who had been affected, through the Bishop (Interview with Mrs Rose Agur).

RURCON runs biannual training courses in Holistic Development Management, but following the 2001 violence, it distributed food and other items to victims at its office, using funds from its UK-based partners (Interview with Mrs Florence Uwanhen).

The Christian Foundation for Social Justice and Equity (CFSJE), founded in 2000, used resources obtained from local churches, individuals and international partners such as the Institute of Democracy South Africa and the Norwegian Human Rights Fund to carry out needs analysis in the affected areas, as well as registering victims in IDP camps and providing them with material assistance, with a focus on medical supplies and girls’ needs. This organization stressed that it assisted victims regardless of their faith, as did CWF, through the Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET), although the latter also provided help to members of its own church, through the COCIN Relief Committee, on which it is represented. CWF raises funds from its members at annual Regional Church Councils, when Women’s World Day is held to pray for a particular country. Of the funds collected, half are sent to the country prayed for and half retained by the CWF for use in emergencies. In Jos, it assisted households with cooking utensils and women and children with clothes (Interview with Mrs Naomi Ado Noma).

Following the 2008 violence, the churches again responded by making their premises available to displaced people, while individual members took victims into their own homes. Christian hospitals such as ECWA Evangel Hospital (Jankwano) and Our Lady of Apostles (OLA) Hospital again provided health care for injured victims regardless of faith.
CAN played a major role in the relief efforts, although it first held an international press conference to correct earlier reports that Christians had taken the offensive against Muslims. It also, as in 2001, organized a week-long fasting and prayer session throughout Plateau State, from 19th-25th January, 2009. It established a three person Documentation and Relief Committee tasked to establish the number of Christians killed and injured and the churches destroyed, and to distribute relief materials as needed. It found that 23 churches were being used as IDP camps and that 13,000 Christians had been displaced (Interview with Rev. Ezekiel Lesmore). With funds from CAN national headquarters and its branches in other states, as well as donations from individual CAN officials, members, political office holders and businesspeople, food, clothes, household items and medical supplies were distributed to affected Christians in the camps through the leadership of the five CAN blocks (members) in the city. Victims were also asked to provide CAN with a list of items they had lost during the crisis.

Individual denominations pursued similar activities – all noted that their approach was more organized after the 2008 violence than in 2001. For example, the PFN organized a three day seminar for its member churches and individual members who were victims, to relieve them of their fears and grief and restore hope. Next, it set up a 7-person committee to collect data on the impact of the conflict on its members, and thirdly, it collected funds and relief materials from PFN members elsewhere in the country for distribution in Jos. The assistance was distributed by the committee at the Four Square Gospel Church premises. In addition, the PFN national headquarters provided funds to hospitals including the Plateau Specialist Hospital, ECWA Evangel Hospital, Jos University Teaching Hospital, OLA Hospital and the Nigerian Red Cross, Plateau State branch, for the treatment of victims, regardless of their ethnic and religious affiliation (Interview with PFN President, Jos).

The Anglican Communion organized relief along similar lines. For example, the national headquarters of the Communion brought a bus load of relief supplies that were shared among Christian victims (Interview, Bishop Zhumbes). Mrs Naomi Ado Noma reported that the CWF’s first step was to meet with women leaders of its Regional Church Councils in the affected neighbourhoods to check on their welfare and that of their members, ask them to ascertain the whereabouts of members who had been forced to flee, and counsel those whose houses had been burnt or family members killed. As well as the immediate distribution of food and items such as soap to members in need, it used its Regional
Church Council structure nationally to mobilize and locally to distribute funds and relief materials, and to organize three day meetings to pray for the affected churches and individual members. Of the donations received, a third was given to TEKAN, a third distributed to members who were victims and a third passed on to the COCIN relief committee. The CWF also raised funds and materials and distributed them to victims through the parishes (Interview with Rose Agur).

The JDPC reported that it had first reached out to its members to calm them and de-escalate tensions in the affected areas. Following the 2001 violence, it had established a multi-faith Emergency Preparedness and Response Team (EPRT) mandated to run workshops on early warning, emergencies and peacebuilding, carry out community risk assessments and raise funds and distribute relief (Interviews with Benedicta Daboer, Sani Suleiman, Boniface Anthony). In 2008 it was able to work with other EPRT members, including the Red Cross, the Christian Foundation for Social Justice and Equity and local officials of the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA). JDPC mobilized funds from the Catholic Secretariat, Catholic Relief Services, the Catholic Agency for Development (CAFOD), the Mennonite Committee and the Kaduna Archdiocese, and with its partners registered victims of all faiths in need of assistance, evacuated injured people to health facilities, identified households in IDP camps and outside, and distributed food, blankets, household utensils, soap and drugs to those in need.

There are fewer Muslim than Christian organizations in Jos, but those present in the city played similar roles in the provision of relief to victims of the violence (although they appear to have been less concerned with offering spiritual and counselling services). The local branch of the national organization, Jamatul Nasril Islam (JNI), under whose umbrella most Muslim organizations are coordinated, which most Muslims follow, whose secretariat is located at the Jos central mosque and which exerts control over mosques and preaching activities, received assistance from Federal government agencies (such as NEMA), the Plateau State Emergency Management Agency, other State governments, especially Sokoto (also Kano and Bauchi), and prominent individuals. The total provided in 2008 was reported to have been over a hundred million Naira (approx £400,000) (Interview with Murtala Sani Hashim). JNI distributed some of relief materials itself, including food and clothing, as well as paying for victims’ medical treatment (Interview with Barrister Ahmed Garba, Secretary Youth Wing of JNI). It also assisted Jama‘atu Izalatil Bid‘ah Wa‘ikamatis Sunnah (JIBWIS, Izala), which was founded in Jos in 1978 and is today a large, well organized and influential radical Islamic
movement. It distributed food and non-food materials to victims through mosques. Rahatul-Islam Wal Hajj also distributed food and clothing on a smaller scale.

With medical supplies and funds from FOMWAN chapters in neighbouring states, the Federation of Muslim Women’s Association of Nigeria provided assistance to victims after both episodes of violence in their clinic in Gangare, as well as providing clothes and sanitary pads to women and assisting those in need of temporary accommodation (Interview with Hajiya Nafisat Musa Lawan). Its Gangare clinic was reported to have treated more than 60 displaced people suffering from malaria, typhoid fever, diarrhoea, acute respiratory infections, TB and meningitis. As significant as these health problems, it was suggested, was the trauma suffered by victims, with some women and children developing post-traumatic stress disorder or other psychopathic disorders requiring therapy.

In Kano, religious organizations also played important roles in the provision of relief, although as expected in this Muslim-majority city, many more Muslim organizations were present and active than in Jos. As in Jos, JIBWIS is the most organized Muslim organisation and the most experienced in the management of humanitarian assistance, with trained staff. Its Kano, Katsina and Zaria branches collected funds, food, clothing, toiletries and medical supplies, which were distributed to Muslims in need and it also sent relief materials to displaced Muslims in Jos. In addition, JIBWIS used sermons to encourage and support victims, advocated fairness in the distribution of relief by the government and served as a pressure group to canvass the government and President for justice for victims (Interview with JIBWIS Secretary, January 2009).

Other Muslim organizations also provided temporary sanctuary for displaced persons in mosques, mobilized funds and relief supplies, and distributed food and other assistance to Muslim victims of the violence in both 1999 and 2004. These included Ansurul Islam (the members of which are mainly Yoruba Muslims who are sometimes mistaken for Christians and attacked). Its members living in Sabon Gari accommodated people who had been forced to flee during the violence. It also organized search and rescue operations with the help of the security agencies; provided assistance to IDPs living at the Bukavu Barracks, in mosque premises, schools and elsewhere; and undertook an impact assessment three weeks after the violence (Interview with Ansur Islam, Secretary). Similarly, the Anwarul Movement of Nigeria, which is based in Sabon Gari, provided accommodation for about 60
victims at its mosque during the 2004 carnage, as well as assistance to men living in the IDP camp at the Bukavu Barracks, and later provided a list of affected people who it had identified to the State government (particularly those who had lost physical property) (Field interviews, February 2009).

During both the 1999 and 2004 crises, the Islamic Foundation of Nigeria constituted 2 or 3-person committees to visit different areas to assess the impact of the violence. It raised funds in mosques, solicited donations from wealthy individuals, and received funds from government agencies in Kano (such as Hisbah Zakkat). These were used to provide cash, food and clothing to Muslims in need. In addition, the medical arm of the organization, the Al-Noury Clinic, treated many injured people during the 1991 Reinhard Bonnke crisis (Field interviews, January/February 2009). In 2004, the Ansaruddeen Society of Nigeria also raised funds from those attending Friday prayers and wealthy individuals and distributed cash, food and clothes to victims. Following an alleged arson attack on its mosque in Sanusi Street by Igbo Christians, it prioritized security for its premises, where IDPs were housed. Its Welfare Committee made on-the-spot assessments and reported back to the Society, which emphasized assistance to women and children, as did the Muslim Sisters Organization, which received materials from its members nationally as well as the Hudaibiyah Foundation of Nigeria. Like other Muslim organizations, the MSO provided food, clothing and psychological support to Muslim victims of the violence.

Christian organizations in Kano are mainly the individual denominations and their coordinating organizations, the capacity of which varies. Initially, impact assessments were undertaken by CAN (Kano), PFN (Kano), the Christ Foundation Apostolic Church, the Redeemed Christian Church of God and Our Lady of Fatima Cathedral in Sabon Gari to establish the relief required. Relief materials were collected from individuals, NGOs, government agencies, congregations, and branches of the churches elsewhere in Nigeria. Food, blankets, medical supplies and occasionally cash were distributed to victims, mostly those living in IDP camps. In rare cases, congregations (such as the Our Lady of Fatima Cathedral) paid school fees for the children of very poor victims. Churches, pastors’ residences, and faith schools in areas considered safe (such as Galadima Road, Sabon Gari) were used as IDP camps, in which some displaced people lived for up to a year, although many started to move on after three months. Some churches provided counselling to help victims deal with their experiences of violence and trauma, for example, it was reported that the Redeemed Christian Church of God stressed the comforting work of the Holy Spirit. CAN also monitored the distribution of relief by
government, to ensure that Christians were treated equally. For example, following the 2004 violence, it protested to the Federal Government that relief supplies sent to Kano had not reached Christians and succeeded in getting the government to deliver another batch of supplies.

A number of non-religious organizations, both Nigerian and international, also provided emergency relief, for example the Murtala Muhammed Foundation, Lagos; the Nigerian Red Cross Society (NRCS) and the International Committee of the Red Cross; Save the Children; and Action Aid. For example, the Murtala Muhammed Foundation donated food and water tanks following the 2008 violence in Jos; the Bauchi and Nawarawa branches of the NRCS provided support to the Plateau branch in providing first aid to the wounded, evacuating the injured for treatment, distribution of relief to residents in IDP camps and tracing the relatives of IDPs (Interviews with Umar Useini, Zakari and Manasseh A. Panpe); the ICRC donated food, equipment, tarpaulins and water tanks following both the 2001 and 2008 episodes in Jos; and Save the Children donated food and provided children’s games facilities for recreation and stress management. Many of the international NGOs channelled funds through local government and non-government organizations for a variety of activities, including the purchase of relief materials.

Relief activities are similarly organized in both cities: they include documenting the effects of the violence (deaths, injuries, destruction of property), locating and registering those in need, and soliciting and distributing relief supplies. Although NGOs, government agencies and some religious organizations claim to provide assistance regardless of ethnic or religious affiliation, accusations of government bias occasionally surface. In practice, most of the religious organizations provide support only to victims from their own denomination or faith. The ability of organizations to provide relief varies, although repeated violence has led to the establishment of improved coordinating arrangements by government, religious and civil society organizations.

6.2 Reconstruction and rehabilitation: returning to normalcy?

As discussed in Section 4, once order has been restored, decisions must be made about whether to return to houses, businesses and places of worship damaged or destroyed during the violence. Those who decide to return have to resume their day-to-day lives and re-negotiate their social relationships; they may also have to try and replace lost stock or equipment, revive the economic relationships on
which their employment or businesses depend and repair or reconstruct buildings. During this period, what assistance is available to those affected?

As noted above, religious buildings are often attacked during violence and repairing or rebuilding them is both of symbolic significance and important to those who continue to live in a neighbourhood or are making a decision about whether or not to return. In addition, if many people decide that they cannot return, the viability of a congregation may be threatened. Thus the church or mosque authorities not only mobilize funds from amongst their members locally and elsewhere for rebuilding but may also encourage victims to return to their previous neighbourhoods. For example, after the violence in Jos, the PFN made funds available to churches for rebuilding and various churches encouraged their members to return to their previous areas of residence (Interviews with Rev Ezekiel Lesmore, Rev Ambassador Chuwant Davou and Bishop Kaigama).

A few of the organizations that provided relief during and in the immediate aftermath of the violence also made available building materials to those seeking to repair or rebuild their houses or business premises (often one and the same thing). For example, the Anglican Communion provided roofing materials to those whose houses had been burnt down during the 2001 violence in Jos, and the distribution of building materials, including cement, to church members engaged in rebuilding through their congregations was reported to have continued long after other forms of relief had ended (Interview with Bishop Zhumbes).

JNI and Rahatul-Islam Wal Hajj were also reported to have made building materials available to Muslims whose houses had been destroyed in Jos, and JNI assisted more than 175 people to move back to their homes in neighbourhoods such as Tudun Wada and Dutse Uku (Interview with Ahmed Garba, Secretary Youth Wing JNI). With funding and assistance from the Danish aid agency DANIDA, the Lutheran Community Development Association (LUCODA) assisted fifty families (both Christian and Muslim) with building materials following the 2001 violence, to reconstruct their original houses or build a new house elsewhere (Interview with Rev Samuel Goro). The Stephanus Foundation, a Christian organisation, assisted both Christians and Muslims in all the flashpoints in Plateau State with rebuilding by providing two additional rooms for each room victims returning to their old houses were able to build (Interview with Stephanus representative, March, 2009). JDPC/EPRT also sometimes assists with house reconstruction alongside its attempts to encourage reconciliation (see below).
In Kano, informants noted that assistance had been provided for mosque rebuilding (for example by the Anwarul Islam Movement for mosques at Gold Coast and New Road, and the Islamic Foundation of Nigeria at Galadima Road in Sabon Gari). In addition, a few organizations were reported to have helped individuals (mainly their own members) to rebuild their houses, for example Ansurul Islam, Anwarul Islam (which also helped some victims with renting alternative accommodation), the Muslim Sisters Organization (which helped some women with loans or jobs and rent) and FOMWAN (which provided some of its members with small loans to restart their businesses).

Christians in Kano, as noted above, are generally the primary targets of attacks and so inter-religious violence has been characterized by widespread damage to churches, schools, houses and businesses. Reconstruction was reported to have been important in the post-conflict period, although most effort had been focused on rebuilding churches, for which assistance was sought not only locally but elsewhere in Nigeria and overseas. However, informants reported obstruction by the government and others, for example vandalism resulting in the destruction of building materials intended for the rebuilding of churches in Shagari Quarters in Tudun Wada LGA. There is little evidence that churches helped their members or displaced people with rebuilding their homes, although some assisted with rent payments on a short-term basis. It was also reported that landlords who had rebuilt residential premises not only increased the rents, but were also reluctant to let to tenants from the minority group lest their property be targeted in future.

For some, therefore, the restoration of order enabled them to return to their previous employment and area of residence. Although religious organizations often encourage their members to move back into areas in which they are a minority and provide them with spiritual and psychological support, little practical assistance was provided to returning residents. Often faced with hostility and suspicion, repairs or reconstruction of houses or business premises and the need to re-establish social and economic relationships, their lives cannot return to normal. Although it may be possible for a ‘new normal’ to gradually be established, this may be characterized by greater insecurity, a poorer quality of life, more limited social ties and more difficult working relationships than before.
6.3 The long-term aftermath: relocation, conflict prevention and peacebuilding

During the longer term aftermath of violence in Jos and Kano, the attention of religious and other NGOs focused on the resettlement of those who felt unable to return to their previous neighbourhoods and its wider implications, as well as efforts to prevent further violence and build peace. The latter include some attempts to address the underlying issues of unemployment and inequality, but much less attention appears to have been devoted to these aspects by the organizations concerned.

In response to the increased demand from Muslims relocating to Muslim majority neighbourhoods in Jos, Islamic organizations have established some new schools, for example JIBWIS established new primary schools in Gangare and Angwan Rimi after the 2001 violence.

Some of the organizations that provided building materials as part of their relief efforts were happy for recipients to use them to build a house in another area, while as noted above, others urged recipients to return to their original neighbourhood if possible. In addition, some organizations (such as JNI) assisted those moving to another neighbourhood with rental payments in the short term. However, the assistance available to residents for rebuilding and relocation has been limited and these processes have been largely self-organized and self-funded.

The increasing religiously-based residential segregation that has occurred, as many of those affected by violence seek safer areas in which to live and do business, has been accompanied by the construction of new faith schools, places of worship and other facilities to meet the needs of incomers. However, many fear that more religiously segregated patterns of residence will fuel misunderstanding and hinder communication between Muslims and Christians, and that this will be exacerbated by children being educated in faith schools.

Some of the activities during the periods between violent incidents have focused on preparation for future violence. For example, it was reported that the Catholic Church in Kano had encouraged its congregations to keep donation boxes at the entrance to all churches in order to maintain the flow of funds for emergency assistance and help for victims, while after the 2001 crisis in Jos both JNI and JIBWIS acquired ambulances. Measures to increase the level of physical security in buildings and neighbourhoods, referred to above, may also come under this heading.
In addition to the immediate prayers organized by churches and mosques for peace and for victims of the violence, many of them preach tolerance and co-existence and admonish their adherents to live in peace, in accordance with the teachings of their religion. In the aftermath of violence, some religious organizations reported that they had emphasized the need for leaders to preach the values of tolerance and peace and to avoid inflammatory language. In addition to offering spiritual healing to assist victims to come to terms with their trauma, they also reported that they preach reconciliation and forgiveness.

Many of the religious organizations and NGOs studied during the research reported activities at the local and higher levels intended to improve relations between the faith traditions and prevent future violence.45 They organized and participated in both single and multi-faith seminars and other activities. For example, following the 2001 violence in Jos, CAN organized conciliatory meetings between Christians and Muslims at the TEKAN conference hall in Jos, although because the venue and convenor were not perceived as neutral and mutual suspicion was still rife, relatively few Muslims attended and those that did were not opinion leaders (Interview with Rev Ezekiel Lesmore). It continued to actively support peace building efforts by participating in seminars and other meetings organized by religious and other groups and building dialogue with Muslim organizations such as JNI (Interview with Catholic Archbishop Ignatius Kaigama). JNI is reputed to have been in the forefront of Christian-Muslim dialogue and a member of all the peace committees established by the government in the state (Ityavyar and Gundu, 2004). The PFN also reported that it had organized and participated in seminars on the causes of and remedies for conflict (Interview with Rev Sam T. Alaha, February 2009). Seminars on peace building for Christian nominees were organized by bodies such as LUCODA, JDPC, JPRM and the Christian Foundation for Social Justice and Equity in Jos and the National Evangelical Mission in Kano, while CWF in Jos focused on working to support victims.

JDPC/EPRT also reported that it had visited mosques and churches to advocate working together, held community meetings, and organized training workshops for Muslims as well as Christians, to facilitate Muslim-Christian dialogue and improve intelligence about rising tension between the two communities. Following two religiously mixed Training the Trainers Workshops, which focused on the early warning signals of conflict, workshops for religiously mixed groups of ten men, ten women and ten youths in each LGA were held. These were reported to have built trust between participants,
whose coordinators were notifying JDPC of early warning signs, which are passed on to the security agencies (Interviews with Benedicta Daboer, Sani Suleiman, Boniface Anthony).

Inter-Gender, a Jos-based NGO, carried out a 2-year conflict management project for Plateau and Kaduna States, with funding from the European Union (see Ityavyar and Gundu, 2004). Members of a team of ten Christians and ten Muslims visited churches and mosques and organized novelty matches with mixed faith teams. The Christian Foundation for Peace and Equity organized a round table for Christian and Muslim leaders immediately after the 2001 crisis, organized a workshop on non-violence for leaders of the Student Union at the University of Jos and ran a peacebuilding programme to increase the capacity of FBOs to deal with emergencies and safeguard child rights during crises. LUCODA organized inter-religious meetings at Tudun Pera (Interview with Rev Samuel Goro). The Christian Foundation for Social Justice and Equity plans educational programmes on the indigene-settler question, which it believes is one of the major sources of conflict in Jos, to encourage tolerance and the development of strategies to prevent the re-occurrence of violence (Interview with Joseph Adeyemi Sangosanya).

LUCODA had also worked with the Lutheran World Federation, ECWA and the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs to hold four Muslim-Christian dialogue meetings in Jos and Zamfara. The Plateau State Inter-Religious Council, in addition to meeting regularly, set up a small team comprised of the Catholic Bishop of Jos and the Emir of Wase (the leader of JNI), which worked with the Nigeria Union of Journalists to use radio jingles to try and reduce conflict (Communication Hope).

As noted in Section 4, both large and small scale businesses were adversely affected by the violence. No form of assistance for either was reported to have been available in Kano. Entrepreneurs with substantial businesses in Jos reported that they had not received any assistance from either government or religious organizations to rebuild their businesses. In addition, there was little evidence of support for those engaged in micro-enterprises and informal employment, although a few small-scale initiatives were reported. For example, in Jos:

- the Christian Foundation for Social Justice and Equity had trained 28 youth from across Plateau State in fish farming and provided them with start-up capital
- LUCODA had established a computing skills programme open to both Muslims and Christians (Interview with Rev Samuel Goro).
- CWF has established a Domestic Science Centre and workshop at Rikkos in Jos to provide skills training to women (in tailoring, weaving and other crafts) and adult literacy classes (Interview with Rose Agur).

- The International Centre for Reconciliation (ICR), a ministry of Coventry Cathedral in the UK, which had established a field office at the Centre for Conflict Management and Peace Studies at the University of Jos as a base for a variety of peacebuilding and reconciliation activities (see below), had started a microfinance programme for women whose livelihoods had been destroyed in 2001 (Interview with Mrs Katherine Hoomlong, ICR Programme Officer).

It is possible that the limited involvement in livelihoods support activities by religious organizations is due to their lack of previous experience and relevant skills, and that secular organizations have more extensive programmes, but little information on this was obtained during the fieldwork.

Issues of access to justice concerned both people detained and victims. Although informants were frequently critical of the government and judiciary for failing to bring perpetrators to justice, few organizations appeared to be addressing this question. However the Christian Foundation for Social Justice and Equity reported that it had taken up some cases of people detained without trial and had succeeded in securing their release on bail or had paid fines on behalf of some who were unable to do so.
7 Conclusion and implications

International research has sought to understand how violence can be halted and to assess alternative approaches to the provision of relief and the process of reconstruction. However, as noted in the introduction to this paper, there has been relatively little research on the aftermath of violence, especially violence with a religious dimension, compared to analysis of the violence itself.

This study set out to analyse the role of religion in the aftermath of recent single or recurrent episodes of violent conflict between religious groups in the urban areas of Jos and Kano in northern Nigeria. It also sought to identify the circumstances and ways in which religious organizations have played different roles in the welfare of victims, rebuilding of social relations and peacebuilding.

The likelihood that identities will be politicized, that groups will mobilize on the basis of identity and that such mobilization will result in conflict and violence is influenced by both the existence of identities that are important to people and contextual factors (Luckham, Moncrieffe and Harris, 2006). Mobilization begins with the politicization of an identity, which is particularly likely to occur where it is founded on members of a group’s shared experience of injustice. An identity is most likely to become politicized when it is perceived as being under threat, for example, through the denial of rights or the perceived loss of power. Moreover, the horizontal inequalities literature indicates that identities are more likely to become politicized when discrimination linked to social, economic and political characteristics is perceived to intersect. Identity markers and political and economic grievances can thus be seen as different sets of ‘raw materials’ for generating mass mobilization (Hasenclever and Rittberger, 2000). Specific identities, Ukiwo argues, provide a basis for mobilization when an over-arching identity (citizenship) is weak, the national state is relatively new or fails to provide economic and socio-political goods to citizens irrespective of their ethnic or religious affiliation, and the state is unable to accommodate expressed demands (perhaps because of limited resources, perhaps because the political culture and democratic procedures needed to manage demands and allocate resources are weakly developed). Arguably, therefore, it is not democracy per se, but weak democracy that is associated with the prevalence of unresolved conflicts (Ukiwo, 2003; see also Bollens, 2009; Offe, 1985).

Nigerian politics is characterized by struggles between the Muslim-majority northern states and the predominantly Christian, although religiously mixed, southern states over access to federal political power and resources, continued inequalities in access to opportunities, and different views about legal
regimes, although religious differences are intertwined with ethnic rivalries. There is a danger that analyses focusing on communal conflict imply that identity groups can be clearly identified, change little over time and are mutually exclusive; that individuals associate themselves with one or another; and that the groups are homogeneous and act purposively. None of these are accurate: as noted in the analysis, sources of communal identity such as ethnicity or indigeneity are socially constructed and malleable; individuals belong to several overlapping “circles of identity.” [and] operate simultaneously on different, and sometimes contradictory, registers” (Chabal and Daloz, 2006); their feelings of belonging may change over time; the salience of different identities and organizations varies between settings; and identity groups are rarely homogeneous. Apex bodies such as the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs and the Christian Association of Nigeria interact with the state on behalf of their members, contributing to the mobilization of identity and potentially exacerbating religio-political rivalry. However, although the ways in which identity is expressed organizationally make a difference, organizations do not necessarily speak or act on behalf of a whole identity group.

To some extent, use of the ‘federal character principle’ since the 1980s to ensure a balance between ethnic and religious groups in federal political and senior administrative offices has assuaged the fears of both (Nolte et al, 2009; Suberu, 2009). Concerns about religious polarization and the effects of violence have led the members of the religious apex bodies mentioned above and Muslims and Christians more widely to engage in inter-faith dialogue and cooperation. For example, the Nigerian Inter-Religious Council was established by the Federal government in 1999 and inter-faith FBOs that promote religious tolerance, mediate in violent conflicts and develop common responses to social problems have emerged (for instance, the Interfaith Coalition for HIV/AIDS, which aims to harmonize the responses of Islamic and Christian organizations to the HIV/AIDS challenge).

However other influences, such as religious revivalism and competition, formal democratization, shrinking state resources, growing poverty and inequality, and international influences, have contributed to the increasing salience of religion in politics and the periodic degeneration of political and religious competition into violence. The rise of Pentecostalism and Islamism has been a product of disillusion with the secular state, international influences, their ability to “provide members with a secure moral and religious position from which to…affirm… a distinctly religious conception of the moral order of society …[that] should be seen not as a mere return to the purity of a religious past.”
rather as] rearticulating political movements based on class, to religious ones based on religious belonging” (Larkin and Meyer, 2006, p 309). The result has been that, since democratization, religion has been more prominently inserted in the public sphere than in previous decades. However, the extent to which increased religious competition can be attributed to doctrinal differences and religious expansionism or to the instrumental use of religion to serve political ends (see, for example, Okafor, 2007) is contested. In addition, it is difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle the role of religious, ethnic and indigene/settler differences in explaining conflict. What is clearer is that the failure of the state to manage diversity and conflict and to prevent violence (and its complicity in some instances) has contributed to the changing geography of violent clashes and the apparent increase in their frequency in recent years.

In this paper, we suggest that conflict and violence in Kano and Jos can best be understood by placing the cities within the wider Nigerian geographical, political and social context, and a historical timeframe. Azar’s framework for analysing protracted social conflict was adopted for this purpose: all four of the preconditions that he suggested (communal content, human needs, governance and international influences were found to be relevant in explaining the types and evolution of conflict and violence in the Nigerian context), as was Bollens’ emphasis on (weak) governance by a dominant group in a situation of inter-group antagonism. An understanding of the context was combined with analysis of the process dynamics of conflict, including communal actions, state responses and properties of the conflict, as suggested by Azar. A review of analyses of conflicts that have resulted in violence in Nigeria divided them into three types: ethno-regional, intra-religious and inter-religious, although the categories are far from distinct.

The apparent increase in the frequency and scale of violence since the 1990s seems to have been associated with the restoration of democracy, which has sharpened political competition, especially in the face of economic difficulties, increasing both the instrumental use of religion by political actors and the politicization of religion by religious actors. Neither of these is new – both were dimensions of earlier ethnic competition and conflict (especially between the largest ethnic groups), but religion enables competitors for political power in the democratic system to appeal to a larger constituency than ethnicity. In addition, its doctrinal and symbolic dimensions make it a potent weapon for mobilization, especially with the emergence of religious revivalist movements that actively seek to
expand their membership. Nigerian politics has concentrated resources in the hands of political office holders, but since democratization, accountability mechanisms have not been institutionalized and competition for spoils by the political class has made ordinary people vulnerable to political manipulation, with the political class manipulating aspects of diversity, especially religion (Ityavyar and Gundu, 2004).

Least attention was given in Section 2 to the outcomes of violence with respect to physical security, institutional capacity, attitudes and the extent to which community members feel that they have control over their lives, because of the limited secondary material available on these aspects. However, comments were made about the ineptitude, partiality and violence of the security forces, which has further undermined people's confidence in them; the government's limited and unsatisfactory responses to addressing underlying problems, reconstruction or the desire for justice; the increasing salience of religious alignments and dimensions of conflict; and deteriorating relations between communal groups in urban areas, underlain by increased poverty and inequality, youth marginalization, aggressive religious revivalism, and increasing crime.

Communal violence is “typically portrayed as the outcome of ethnic and religious tension, produced by the proximities of urban life” (Smith, 2006, p 54). Analysis of historic and recent episodes of violence with an apparent religious dimension in Jos and Kano in Section 3 shows that, rather than differences in religious values and doctrines being the cause of violence (except in some cases of intra-Muslim clashes), religion appears to have been instrumentalized by the religious and power elites in both cities. It has served to mobilize people, and to provide a means for demarcating competing interests and an ideological justification for conflict. Similarities in the characteristics and dynamics of conflict and violence between the two cities are more noticeable than differences, despite their different histories, ethnic and religious composition (and associated range of ethnic and religious organizations), party politics and economic trajectory. Often characterized as a Muslim majority city (Kano) and a Christian majority city (Jos), the analysis shows that a simple division of the urban population into Muslim and Christian, especially if it is assumed that ethnic groups are one or the other, is inappropriate, since many ethnic groups (e.g. Yoruba) are religiously mixed, there are doctrinal splits within religious traditions and there is competition between and within ethnic and indigene/settler (host/migrant) groups over access to political influence and economic opportunities.
Underlying apparently religious conflicts in both cities are majority/minority struggles and contests over access to political power, and economic competition.

For example, the violence in Jos appears to be primarily about control over local government, especially in Jos North, which is contested between indigenous and settler groups, although the conflicts have become polarized along religious lines. “These repeated cycles of ‘religious violence’ occur … because on a local level the constitutional question as to whether Jos’s Muslim migrant settlers should have equal rights as the indigenous Christians remains unanswered. These cycles are amplified further by uncertainty at the national level over the balance of power between Christians and Muslims” (Schwartz, 2010, p 4). Thus, as Smith notes, “...the escalation and potentially explosive nature of these conflicts must be situated in the context of internal migration. Minor local disputes with little or no macro-political significance are magnified and inflamed into national ethnic and religious issues through the amplifying circuitry of Nigeria’s migration networks” (Smith, 2006, p 54). Relations between hosts and migrants, and between migrants and their home communities, provide circuits in which ideas about ethnicity and religion, us and them, circulate and are reinforced.

In addition to competition between Muslims and Christians, hosts or indigenes and migrants/settlers, social dynamics in both cities are complicated by other rivalries, for example between the numerically dominant Berom and other indigenous groups in Jos, between Igbo and Yoruba over trading monopolies in different markets or transport sectors (Adetula, 2005) and between radical Islamist groups opposed to the Muslim religious establishment and/or the state. Conflicts of the last type are currently less common than inter-religious conflicts – they occur mostly in the northern part of the country (although may spill over elsewhere) and have different intra-religious and state-religious dynamics from inter-religious or inter-ethnic conflicts.

Thus the issues underlying conflict between identity groups in the two cities include a legacy of acrimony from historical events, resentment of economic and political marginalization, contestations over political office, fear of the other faith’s desire to expand, the state’s perceived non-neutrality, and indigene/settler conflicts in which these groups are co-terminous with different religions. The triggers of individual violent episodes vary – they include personal quarrels that escalate, perceptions that the state is unfair and partial so that protests are needed to obtain justice and neutrality, revenge/reprisals
(often for attacks on identity groups elsewhere), collective outrage against specific actions, international events, elections, and objections to events associated with aggressive religious expansionism. Official, media and residents’ accounts tend to focus on the perpetrators of violence, often blaming it on foreigners, almajirai or Yandaba. However, these appear to be scapegoats – there is a reluctance to identify the instigators: those who foment religious and other competition, conflict and violence; manipulate identity and competition in their own political or religious interests; and recruit Yandaba and similar groups to perpetrate violence in those interests.

In protracted social conflict, Azar suggests, latent conflicts are not addressed. The potential for further violence depends on the extent to which physical security can be ensured or is uncertain, the institutional capacity of the state and social organizations to manage conflict before it escalates into violence is weak or strong, a vicious cycle of fear and hostility has been countered or reinforced, and community members feel in control of their own lives or vulnerable. The research demonstrated that in Kano, and particularly in Jos, these conditions (and, as Bollens suggests, increased residential segregation) are more likely to presage further violence than lasting peace.

The research examined the roles played by the state and non-state organizations, especially religious organizations, in the immediate and longer term aftermath of recent episodes of violence in the two cities.

The recurrence of violence shows both how the ethnic and religious dimensions of conflict at the national and State levels provide a backdrop to events at the local level and also demonstrate

…the grave consequences of the Nigerian government’s persistent neglect of communal tensions and of its failure to take action to prevent longstanding grievances from turning into violence. [For example] both the federal and state governments failed to respond to three years of intermittent fighting in Plateau State, until the situation had spun out of control [in Yelwa in 2004]. Had the government acted much earlier on, notably by bringing to justice those responsible for the violence, hundreds of lives might have been saved. Specifically, the massacres in Yelwa in 2004 and the revenge killings in Kano might have been prevented (HRW, 2005, p 82).
Furthermore, if the Federal government had resolved the constitutional contradictions between secularism and State autonomy and between citizenship and indigeneity, it might have defused local conflicts, for example, over the position of Christians following the extension of Shari’a law in Kano State or indigene/settler conflicts such as those in Jos.

The Federal and State governments both played roles in restoring order following episodes of violence and providing funds for relief. However, they have failed to pay compensation; to ensure that the instigators or perpetrators of violence (politicians or religious leaders and individuals, vigilantes or members of the security forces respectively) are brought to justice; to address underlying problems of poverty and inequality, contradictory conceptions of citizenship, corruption and lack of accountability; or to create sound and accountable local government structures with meaningful functions and sufficient capacity and resources. Thus the roles played by the state have been controversial (for example its perceived non-neutrality and its role in the politicization of religion), so that it is part of the problem. In addition, it has failed to fulfil its roles inadequately, for example to check the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, to administer post-conflict justice, or to build competent and neutral security forces able to prevent and rapidly deal with violence.

As noted above, some religious actors are instigators or perpetrators of conflict, but religious organizations also play tangible roles in the immediate aftermath of violence, providing sanctuary, immediate relief and some assistance with the longer term restoration of everyday lives. They provide places of refuge and immediate relief out of necessity, and because other agencies (especially government) are seen to be failing. Understandably, given the levels of mutual distrust, they mostly put the interests of their own members first, and only a few reach out to beneficiaries beyond their own religion. In addition they prioritize the repair and reconstruction of religious buildings. Both of these may exacerbate religious antagonisms. They make only a limited contribution to longer term reconstruction of the lives and livelihoods of those affected, mostly appearing to lack the capacity and expertise to provide support for the repair or rebuilding of private property or businesses and livelihoods. However, they do build places of worship and religious schools in newly segregated residential areas, potentially reinforcing religious boundaries. Some religious organizations have initiated or participated in inter-faith dialogues, to build peace and prevent future violence, but such engagement does not appear to be widespread at the local level and the role played by apex/elite bodies such as the Federal or State
Inter-Religious Councils in peace building also seems to be limited. As a result, there is a danger that religious organizations may more often exacerbate than contribute to solving the inter-religious conflicts that can be manipulated by interests within and beyond the religious.

Secular NGOs also play roles in relief, reconstruction and peace building. They universally reach out to people in need regardless of religion or ethnicity in both their immediate humanitarian and longer term programmes, so are less likely to contribute to sharpening the religious divide. However, they mostly seem to operate on a relatively small scale and to be dependent on external funds and resources.

Attempts to return to a ‘new normal’ have therefore been initiated by victims, perpetrators, religious communities, civil society organizations and government, and shaped by the context and location within which affected individuals and groups find themselves. Residents generally expect the state to set the pace, by ensuring security and establishing appropriate policy frameworks to both deal with relief and rehabilitation and address underlying problems. However, in practice, the Federal and State governments tend to have limited their roles to maintaining security and providing relief funds, failing to address underlying issues or to ensure justice.

There is some evidence that in the six years since the most recent violence in Kano, relationships between communities in Kano have started to mend. The inclusion of leaders of different ethnic groups in the Emir’s Council has reportedly lessened suspicion, although the reduction in overt conflict may also be due to other factors. For example, Igbo attribute the cessation of violence to their acquisition of arms and determination to stand up to attack (Smith, 2006, p 62), while in an increasingly global economy, the new Kanawa elite is said to view settler investment as advantageous rather than resenting the economic success of in-migrants. Some neighbourhoods in the city are becoming more ethnically and religiously mixed. However, conflicts continue and the likelihood that they will erupt into violence again in the future depends, in Nwaka’s view, largely on whether government acts to reform the security forces and promote good governance (Nwaka, 2008).

Inter-religious violence has erupted again in Jos since this research was completed, and there is a growing fear that the city may become trapped in cycles of violence and vengeance that will preclude the formation of inter-community trust. The violent conflict has weakened the city’s social fabric,
divided the population, undermined interpersonal and communal trust, and eroded the norms and values that underlie cooperation and collective action for the common good. There are now widely divergent views about the truth of past events, as each group bases its interpretations of history on its collective narratives and interests. Hausa/Fulani Muslims thus feel that they are portrayed as enemies of the indigenes who must be destroyed and vice versa. As in conflicts elsewhere, exclusionary mythologies are fostering a subjective communal narrative that can provide a justification for continued mutual aggression unless active steps are taken to address the issues underlying the conflict.

Some *implications* of this research for policy makers, development actors and religious bodies can be identified. It is clear from the analysis that conflict in both cities is underlain by longstanding historical trends and deeply rooted contradictions, which can only be addressed through major initiatives, for example, constitutional changes. However, it is also possible to identify more immediate and practical implications that can be tackled in the shorter term.46

- FBOs and NGOs can play important roles in conflict transformation but informants in this study agreed that they can only supplement the efforts of the state, which must drive the process by supporting victims, punishing perpetrators, ensuring good governance and instituting measures to prevent future violence.
  - Existing coordinating arrangements involving different levels of the state and non-state actors for providing relief during emergencies and compensation to victims need to be strengthened and new mechanisms established where necessary.
  - Assessments are needed of the characteristics, value and outcomes of initiatives that have been taken by all the relevant actors to assist victims rebuild their lives and livelihoods and prevent further outbreaks of violence.
  - Support should be extended for local institutions engaged in improving access to education and livelihood opportunities, conflict prevention and resolution, including identification of and provision of support for local actors who could play an enhanced role in building bridges between increasingly segregated communities, training and networking.

- Residents in the two cities, especially Jos, believe that conflict is ongoing and that there is a danger that violence will continue to recur.
  - Efforts to curtail the spread of small arms and light weapons need to be stepped up.
  - Security sector decision-making procedures need to be reformed to reduce the delays in response times that have allowed violence to escalate.
Police reform is urgently needed, so that police are accountable at the local level, well-trained, able to exercise oversight over self-help security initiatives, and capable of preventing violence rather than merely reacting to it.

Decentralization of the police to conform to federal systems will also help to ease decision making at the state and local government levels. States should be supported to establish and train their own police for the effective maintenance of law and order.

Improved training for the military is needed to ensure that they act neutrally and do not employ excessive violence.

In the longer term and at higher levels of governance

The reports of official commissions of enquiry into conflict and violence need to be published and their recommendations acted upon, including reforms to the judicial system to ensure that instigators and perpetrators are brought to justice.

Democratic and electoral processes need to be reviewed to ensure that they provide a level playing field for different political actors, a non-violent channel for citizens to express their frustration with corruption and the abuse of power, and a means of ensuring accountability.

Local government reform should provide local governments with meaningful functions, resources (other than control over the distribution of land) and the capacity to improve access to land and adequate services for all residents, as well as improving transparency and accountability.

The constitutional contradictions between citizenship and indigeneity, and between state secularism and the integration of religion in the state, need to be resolved.
## Appendix: List of interviews

### Kano – Muslim organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name of Organization</th>
<th>Physical Address</th>
<th>Contact Person</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ansaruddeen Society of Nigeria</td>
<td>No. 16 Sanusi Street, S/Gari</td>
<td>A.K. Jimoh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ansarul Islam</td>
<td>No. 25 Freetown Rd. S/Gari</td>
<td>Dr. B.B. Badmus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Anwarul Islam Movement of Nigeria</td>
<td>No. 11 Niger Road, S/Gari</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Nuruddeen Society of Nigeria</td>
<td>No. 47 New Road, S/Gari</td>
<td>Tajuddeen S. Imam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Z.S. Ladan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>FOMWAN</td>
<td>Hotoro</td>
<td>Sadiya Adamu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Fityanul Islam</td>
<td>Kofar Dawanau,Kano</td>
<td>M. Kaugama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Islamic Foundation of Nigeria</td>
<td>Iyaka Road, Nasarawa, GRA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>JIBWIS</td>
<td>Tudun Murtala Street, Tudun Wada</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Sabilur Rashad Islamic Center</td>
<td>Ibrahim Umar Street, Zoo Road</td>
<td>Musa Ibrahim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Muslim Sisters Organization</td>
<td>Sallari Quarters, Kano</td>
<td>Dr. Fatima Mukhtar</td>
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### Kano – Christian organizations

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<th>Contact Person</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Assemblies of God Church</td>
<td>Gold Coast Rd, S/Gari</td>
<td>Rev. Z. Isah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Calvary Life Assembly</td>
<td>Plot 1-6 Calvary Close S/Gari</td>
<td>Rev. Ransom Bello</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Christ Foundation Apostolic Church</td>
<td>No. 92 Egbe, Sabon Gari</td>
<td>Pastor J. Obafemi</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Redeemed Christian Church of God</td>
<td>No.29 Airport Rd, S/Gari</td>
<td>Pastor Remi Akintunde</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>National Evangelical Mission</td>
<td>No. 52 Abeokuta Rd.</td>
<td>Rev. E.S. Onurah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Victory Chapel Int.</td>
<td>Yankatako Naibawa Motor Park, Kano.</td>
<td>Rev. O. Bestman</td>
</tr>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Celestial Church of Christ</td>
<td>Egbe Road, S/Gari</td>
<td>Evang. Oladoku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Cherubim and Seraphim Movement Church</td>
<td>31/31A Sanusi Road S/Gari</td>
<td>Pastor Bada V.</td>
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Kano – Christian organizations

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<td>9</td>
<td>Anglican Communion</td>
<td>Ibo Road/Yoruba Road</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Our Lady of Fatimah Cathedral</td>
<td>Ilaro Road/Ibo Road S/Gari</td>
<td>Rev. Fr. J. Salihu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Christ Apostolic Church</td>
<td>Aitken/Ibo Road</td>
<td>Pastor Moses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>ECWA Church</td>
<td>Airport Road</td>
<td>NA</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Selected list of persons interviewed in Jos:

- Mannasseh A. Panpe (Branch Secretary) and Umar Useini Zakari (former Branch Secretary) (14/01/02)
- Dr. Tor Iorapu, Executive Director, YARAC, a youth empowerment NGO (16/01/09)
- Rev. Ambassador Chuwang Davou, CAN General Secretary, Plateau State (20/01/09).
- Archbishop Ignatius Kaigama, Catholic Bishop of Jos and CAN Chairman, Plateau State
- Joseph Adeyemi Sangosanya, Executive Director, Christian Foundation for Social Justice and Equity (22/01/09)
- Mrs. Dinatu Ayinzat, Advocacy Officer, RURCON (23/01/09)
- Mrs. Florence Uwamhen, Publications and Development Officer, RURCON (26/01/09)
- Rev. Ezekiel Lesmore, Secretary General, Christian Council of Nigeria, Plateau State branch, Director of Ecumenism and Interfaith and Secretary General, YMCA (22/01/09)
- Rev. Samuel Goro, Coordinator of LUCODA (23/01/09)
- Rev. Sam T. Alaha, PFN Chairman, Plateau State and overseer, Faithway Jos (25/01/09)
- Bishop Jwan B. N. Zhumbes, Anglican Bishop of Bukuru (25/01/09)
- Mrs. Naomi Ado Noma, Coordinator, COCIN Women Fellowship (CWF) (26/01/09)
- Benedicta Daboer, Director of Programmes, JDPC (26/01/09)
- Sani Suleiman, Programme Officer (Emergency Relief and Peace Building) JDPC (26/01/09)
- Boniface Anthony, Secretary, JDPC (26/01/09)
- Rev. Mipo Dadang, ECWA General Secretary
- Rev. Seth Nden, COCIN General Secretary
- Mrs. Rose Agur, former President CWO (to 2007)
- Rev. Istifanus M. Habila, President, JPRM (16/01/09)
- Mr. Emmanuel Dashe, immediate past Chairman, Plateau Youth Council (19/01/08)
- Onwuka Monday, Chairman, Yam market, Kabong Satellite market; and Innocent Abwa, Vice-chairman, Yam market, Kabong Satellite market (19/01/09)
- Madam Keziah and two others, at Ring Road vegetable market (19/01/09)
- David T Dakwo, Executive Secretary, State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), state Secretariat, Jos (24/02/09)
- Alh. Alhassan-Barde, Director of Relief Operations, SEMA, State Secretariat, Jos (24/02/09)
- FGD held at COCIN Angwan Rogo (18/01/09):
  - Samuel T. Dawap
  - Jolly Mulakshen
  - Dung Pwajok
  - Aishatu Bitrus
  - M. P. Gyang
  - Sidi Bako
  - Emmanuel Dado
  - Stephen Chuwang Chollom
  - Pam Nyam Dung
  - Chuwang Rwang Nyap
  - Toma Gyang
Notes

1. Afrobarometer: www.jdsurvey.net/jds/afrobarometer.jsp
2. A detailed history of Islam in Kanem and Borno is provided by Clarke (1982, pp 66-71).
3. The Hausa became an identifiable (and self-identifying) ethnic group in about the 12th century, ruling over seven major city states and seven associated states, which were consolidated into an empire in the 17th century. Fulani migrated from present-day Senegal to Hausaland in the 13th century and Borno in the 15th century. Although mostly nomadic herdsmen, the scholars amongst them found appointments in the Hausa royal houses. “Neither the Hausa nor the Fulani is a rigid lineage group – one can become Hausa by adoption or conversion to Islam, although in doing so one enters at the bottom rung of a highly stratified society. As large Islamised ethnic groups closely associated with the nineteenth-century Sokoto Caliphate, the Hausa and Fulani are often …grouped together as a single Hausa-Fulani group [which suits their political strategy]….However [they] are distinguishable in terms of names and languages and consider themselves distinct” (ICG, 2010, p 2).
4. Straddling the central zone of Nigeria, the Middle Belt is a relatively large, complex, multi-ethnic and multi-religious geographical area, which (unlike the areas occupied by Hausa-Fulani and Kanuris in the far north) is populated largely by minority ethnic groups.
5. “The Qadiriyya, present in the region from the fifteenth century, became the dominant (and official) order of the caliphate. However, in the nineteenth century, the Tijaniyya, whose social base was among the newly rich traders and bureaucratic classes, became more popular and over time associated with resistance to the ruling aristocracies of the region, and of Sokoto in particular” (ICG, 2010, p 4).
6. The Catholic Church’s support for Biafra during the Civil War contributed to the government’s takeover of schools.
7. Another factor explaining the proliferation of NGOs in the 1980s was the graduation of radicalized students from Nigerian universities, attracted to the NGO/FBO sector (as volunteers or as paid staff) during periods of high unemployment and declining opportunities in the private sector. This explains why a considerable proportion of NGOs and FBOs were established by professionals, such as lecturers, doctors, lawyers and civil servants.
8. In contrast, in India, ethnicity is commonly understood in linguistic and racial terms (Varshney, 2002).
9. For example, HRW (2007, p 10) suggests that there are more than 250, but Otite (2000, p 20) puts the number at about 370. The ICG suggests that there are three main and about 160 smaller groups in the 12 Shari’a states alone (ICG, 2010, p 2).
10. A fourth region, Mid-West, was created in 1963, but because its population was made up of minorities, it did not alter the basic struggle for political power between the three main regions.
11. This issue is not specific to Nigeria – it is important in many African countries: “Access to land symbolises local or regional citizenship in many African societies. The ultimate proof of belonging is the ability to possess – or at least make use of – part of the territory within which one resides….The claim to land across Africa is typically expressed in terms of the rights of first comers….or rights established by virtue of conquest…This means that history is typically taken very seriously indeed….[with] claims to indigeneity and ancestry….often predicated on historical understandings….The twin concepts of people and place have been used as interlinked means through which to define citizenship” (Dorman et al, 2007, p 16; see also Young, 2007).
12. As well as spreading Islam, the JNI provides a range of services, especially education, and works closely with Muslim holders of political office to ensure the progress of Islam and to speak for all Muslims.
The Society for the Removal of Innovation and Re-establishment of the Sunna (tradition), Izala, was founded by Sheikh Ismaila Idris as an anti-Sufi anti-tariqa movement dedicated to the eradication of innovations (bid’ah) said to have been introduced into Islam by the Sufi brotherhoods, especially the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya. It believes that the renewal of society requires a return to Islam and the replacement of civil codes modelled on Western principles with Islamic law. It has a strong following amongst young educated Muslims and is one of the largest societies in Nigeria as well as neighbouring countries such as Chad, Niger and Cameroon. In the process of promoting its message Izala has split many mosque communities, establishing its own mosques and often denouncing other communities and their Sufi leadership as infidels (Ryan, 2006; see also Paden, 2005). It has constructed and developed schools, orphanages and clinics for the purpose of establishing strong Islamic institutions throughout Nigeria, and also organizes preaching activities, seminars and Qur’anic recitation competitions. In the early 1990s, it split into two and was weakened by the death of its charismatic leader, Abubakar Gumi. However, it is well organized, with an extensive branch network, and very influential (see, for example, Ityavyar and Gundu, 2004).

Salafism and Wahhabism are often used interchangeably to denote fundamentalist Sunni Islam. However, while Wahhabism considers the Qur’an and Hadith as the only authoritative texts, Salafism also draws on the interpretations of the first three generations of Muslims – the companions of the Prophet and the following two generations. Wahhabism is therefore more accurately to be seen as a relatively recent orientation within Salafism associated with the 18th century Saudi cleric Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. It is dominant in Saudi Arabia and has been influential around the world, partly due to Saudi funding of mosques, madrasas etc. Some Salafis support violent jihad, but the extent to which Wahhabism is associated with violent jihad is unclear.

Kane (2003, p 223) notes that in the Nigerian context, “the term shiite has no doctrinal connotation. It characterizes the young Muslim activists …who were fascinated by the Iranian revolution…[and is used to discredit] people who are considered anarchist and irresponsible, with heterodox religious beliefs, involved in antigovernment activities.” However, Larkin and Meyer (2006) do draw a distinction between groups oriented towards Sunni Saudi Arabia and those oriented towards Shia Iran, with Izala more closely tied to the political and military organs of the state and concerned mainly with a theological attack on Sufism, while the Shiite Muslim Brothers are opposed to both the state and traditional royal elites.

For example, the Igbo are mostly Catholic.

Afrobarometer’s 2005 survey suggested that 36.5 per cent of Christians are Catholics, 26.8 per cent Evangelical/Pentecostal Protestants, 18.3 per cent mainline Protestants, 4.2 per cent African Independent Churches and 14.2 per cent others. [www.jdsurvey.net/jds/afrobarometer.jsp](http://www.jdsurvey.net/jds/afrobarometer.jsp)

CAN’s members include the Catholic Secretariat, the Christian Council of Nigeria (the mainstream Protestant churches), the Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria (PCN, made up of charismatic churches such as the Assemblies of God Mission, Redeemed Peoples Mission, Redeemed Christian Church of God, Living Faith Church and Faith Way), Tarayyan Ekleisiyoyin Krista a Nigeria (Confederation/Fellowship of Evangelical Churches in Nigeria, TEKAN) and the Organisation of African Instituted Churches (OAIC, white garment churches such as Christ Holy Church, Aladura, and Cherubim and Seraphim). The Seventh Day Adventist church is not a member. Stewart gives examples from Brazil, Fiji, Malaysia, Mexico, Northern Ireland, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Uganda and the USA to support the theory of horizontal inequalities.

As shown by Ifeka’s discussion of the motives of militant youth organizations in southern Nigerian situations of serious rural resource conflict (Ifeka, 2006, p 728).
21 Official estimates were 21 southerners and 15 northerners killed, and 71 and 163 respectively injured (NRG, 1953, p 21, cited in Albert, 1999, p 281; Wakili, 2001).

22 Smith (2006) also stresses the role of this association in providing a sense of community and continuity, extending the obligations of kinship ties across geographical space, maintaining links between migrants and their areas of origin, and reproducing a distinctive ethno-religious identity.

23 The Kano Urban area covers 137 sq.km and comprises six LGAs (Kano Municipal, Fagge, Dala, Gwale, Tarianni and Nassarawa), with a population of 2.2 million in 2006. The Metropolitan Area covers 499 sq.km and comprises eight LGAs - the six mentioned above plus Ungogo and Kumbotso, with a population of 2.8 million. [http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/nbsapps/Connections/Pop2006](http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/nbsapps/Connections/Pop2006) (accessed 12th June, 2011).

24 According to Lubeck (1987) quoted in Watts, 1999, almost 20 per cent of the rural migrants who came to Kano during the 1970s were Muslim students (almajirai) or the sons of Muslim scholars. This informal Islamic education system was rooted in the human ecology of the Sahel. Young men studied with lay clerics (mallams) during the dry season and migrated to centres of Muslim learning to study the Qu’ranic science of exegesis with notable scholars. The networks were sustained by an urban moral economy – begging and almsgiving – as part of a normative set of relations between the rich and the poor. In addition, the students often worked in the textile industry. However, this system had increasingly come into disrepute, as government primary education expanded, friction within Islam over different forms of Islamic education increased, it became more difficult to rely on begging for sustenance as the number of in-migrants grew and the almajirais were increasingly perceived to be associated with violence.

25 Originally these were neighbourhood groups of adolescent boys and young men who also carried out community work such as providing security, cleaning up, engaged in sporting and cultural activities, and helped each other. They were tolerated and accepted, enrolment was more or less automatic, and there was no definite membership and no formal leadership. Older youths withdrew when they graduated to adulthood, generally on marriage (Ya’u, 2000). Ya’u provides a detailed discussion of the ways in which these groups have changed in response to the lack of economic opportunities available to young Nigerians, noting their changing age and gender composition, predisposition towards violence and recruitment as political thugs in inter-party conflict within the city.

26 According to the official tribunal figures, over 4,000 people died (excluding the security forces), but other estimates are much higher. Maitatsine’s followers within the city were reinforced by many from outside. After being routed by the security forces, they scattered to various other northern states. It is estimated that 4-5,000 people died in the clashes in other towns (Watts, 1999).

27 They were aggrieved because, while a license to preach had been issued to the German evangelist, an application on behalf of a South African Muslim preacher they wished to invite had been refused. Also the methods and language used to publicize the rally was considered provocative. The initial protest to lodge their complaints was peaceful. According to official sources, a total of 200 lives were lost, 16 churches and 3 mosques destroyed, and many shops, vehicles and houses attacked and burnt (Report on Kano Disturbances, 1991, p 56-67, cited in Wakili, 2005, p 183).

28 Police reports indicate that 32 people lost their lives and 52 were injured, while 52 houses, 32 shops, 5 churches, 7 mosques and 16 vehicles were destroyed.

29 Ya’u notes that a distinction needs to be made between the Yandaba, which “are gangs of unemployed youth who reject the poor conditions to which their social background has relegated them and … tak[e] refuge in group criminal and violence activities” (2000, p 162); Yan Daukar Amarya, which are groups that share the same characteristics but specialise in the abduction and
rape of women; Yantauri, people believed to be immune to harm or injury from metallic weapons; and Yanbanga, or professional political party thugs. However, there is some overlap between members of the different categories.

A Hausa-Igbo clash in 1945 can be attributed to the economic and commercial competition between the two groups (Plotnicov, 1971, quoted in Adetula, 2005).

At its height in the 1940s, tin mining employed about 75,000 local and migrant labourers. The industry has left a considerable environmental legacy which has not been tackled, although some ponds are being used for tourism and fish farming. Small scale informal mining continues.

Adetula (2005) also suggests that the strong welfare associations and traditional leadership structures amongst the Igbo, Yoruba and other groups, which function to support group members in Jos, maintain cultural distinctiveness and foster links with the groups’ communities of origin, do not exist amongst the settler Hausa/Fulani, leading them to use Islam as a source of identity and concentrate on seeking political power. The main Hausa/Fulani ethnic association is the Jassawa Development Association, a loose association of youths beset by leadership contests and, in Adetula’s view, of limited relevance. The Afizare, Anaguta and Berom ethnic associations (which include development, youth and women’s associations) are not only concerned with cultural and welfare activities but are also politically active (Ityavyar and Gundu, 2004).


Varying from 150 according to the government to 3,000 according to Danfulani and Fwatshak (2002) and Harnischfeger (2004, p 446). HRW (2001) estimated, based on extensive interviews soon after the event, that over a thousand people were killed in six days and 50,000 displaced people were living in eight IDP camps immediately after the violence ended.

Further violence occurred on 17th January and again in April, 2010. Versions of what triggered the violence differ, with both Christians and Muslims blamed for starting it. Although a curfew was imposed immediately and the army brought in, attacks against people, religious buildings, houses and vehicles lasted four days, with Human Rights Watch putting the death toll at nearly 500, including nearly 400 Muslims. In April, the army was called to restore order after armed gangs rampaged through the city. The police estimated that there were more than 300 deaths.

For example, Muslims whose homes were attacked in Tudun Wada claimed that the motive of their Christian neighbours was to drive them out (Interviews with Ahmed Garba, Secretary, Youth Wing, JNI and Ahmed Yahya Adam, member of JIBWIS and Mallam, Adamu Fari Mosque Committee).

As with the reluctance of indigenous landowners within the urban area to sell or lease land to non-indigenes, this tendency is not unique to Nigeria. Dorman et al (2007, p 18), for example, note that competition between indigenes and non-indigenes over who really owns particular parcels of land threatens to increase tenure insecurity, is most advanced in cities, and is associated with urban autochthonies politics.

The Plateau State Governor Jonah Jang highlighted this point in a number of media interviews to push the blame back onto the Haisa/Muslim community for failing to control the behaviour of its members.

For a more extensive list of the NGOs and community organizations in Jos, see Ityavyar and Gundu, 2004.

The Catholic Archdiocese of Jos has 49 parishes, as well as many educational, training and health facilities.
ECWA’s Nigerian headquarters are in Jos, where it has many programmes, offices and facilities, and affiliated organizations. It has 234 District Church Councils in Jos and Bukuru Metropolis. TEKAN is an umbrella body for the Sudan United Mission Churches in Northern Nigeria. Its members are regional autonomous churches, including Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN), some of which have ethnic affinities. For example, the members of COCIN, which is prominent in Jos, are mostly Plateau State indigenes (Ityavyar and Gundu, 2004).

The Baptist, Methodist and Anglican churches were first established in southern Nigeria and in Jos mainly cater for in-migrant groups. For example, the Methodist diocese contains seven churches and the Anglicans nearly 40 churches. All three run schools, seminaries and health facilities (Ityavyar and Gundu, 2004).

The JDPC was established in 1993 by the Catholic Archdiocese of Jos to, amongst other things, “promote justice especially for the marginalized”, “initiate integrated rural and urban development programme” and “develop a Diocesan water provision programme” (JDPC leaflet).

FOMWAN was established in 1985 in Minna with a mission to propagate Islam through da’awah, establish educational institutions and engage in other outreach activities to empower women and to improve the socio-economic status of the population (especially women, youth and children) through advocacy and the provision of training, good quality education, health services and micro-credit. It seeks to provide a forum for the expression of Muslim women’s views at national and state levels, foster cooperation among Muslim women’s associations, educate Muslim women about Islam and encourage them to establish groups for educational purposes. It has chapters in 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory, with over 1,000 affiliated organizations, 554 local government chapters, over 100 model nursery, primary and secondary schools, five hospitals and three orphanages, over 200 Islamiyya schools, adult literacy centres and income generation projects. It generates funds from membership dues, sale of publications, donations, grants from development partners and zakat (alms from the Muslim community) and works with other Islamic and non-religious organizations to provide education, reproductive health care, assistance for refugee children and rehabilitation of almajirai.

However, none of the initiatives in Kano or Jos seem to have as high a(n international) profile as the Inter-Faith Mediation Centre/Muslim-Christian Dialogue Forum established in Kaduna following the inter-religious violence in 1995 (Wuye and Ashafa, 1999, 2005).

See also suggestions made by John Paden, at an event at the United States Institute for Peace in Washington DC on 20 March 2010.
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