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Bureaucrats or Politicians? Political Parties and Antidumping in the US

Aquilante, Tommaso (2016) Bureaucrats or Politicians? Political Parties and Antidumping in the US. Discussion Paper. University of Birmingham, Birmingham UK.

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Abstract

Antidumping (AD) is the most widely used contingent protection measure. In the United States, key decisions on AD are delegated to the International Trade Commission (ITC), an independent agency composed of six non-elected commissioners. Using a newly collected dataset, I study the determinants of all final ITC votes on AD during the 1980-2010 period. Contrary to the view that ITC commissioners are bureaucrats who simply follow technical rules, I find that their decisions crucially depend on which party has appointed them (the selection effect) and on the trade policy interests of key senators in that party (the pressure effect): whether (Democratic) Republican-appointed commissioners vote in favor of AD depends crucially on whether the petitioning industry is key (in terms of employment) in the states represented by leading (Democratic) Republican senators.

JEL: D72, F10, F13, F14, P16

Type of Work:Monograph (Discussion Paper)
School/Faculty:Colleges (2008 onwards) > College of Social Sciences
Number of Pages:36
Department:Birmingham Business School
Date:24 February 2016
Series/Collection Name:Birmingham Business School Discussion Paper Series
Keywords:Antidumping Policy, Political Parties
Subjects:H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
J Political Science > JK Political institutions (United States)
Copyright Status:This discussion paper is copyright of the University and the author. In addition, parts of the paper may feature content whose copyright is owned by a third party, but which has been used either by permission or under the Fair Dealing provisions. The intellectual property rights in respect of this work are as defined by the terms of any licence that is attached to the paper. Where no licence is associated with the work, any subsequent use is subject to the terms of The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 (or as modified by any successor legislation). Any reproduction of the whole or part of this paper must be in accordance with the licence or the Act (whichever is applicable) and must be properly acknowledged. For non-commercial research and for private study purposes, copies of the paper may be made/distributed and quotations used with due attribution. Commercial distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holders.
Copyright Holders:The Authors and the University of Birmingham
ID Code:2117

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