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DEVIANCY, POLITICS AND THE MEDIA

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This paper is largely speculative. (1) It refers to a piece of work on the way certain forms of political deviance and political activism are handled by the mass media and labelled in the political domain. The research is still in its early stages. It is not, therefore, possible to present any substantive findings or to resume the empirical evidence. But we are now at the stage of sketching out our working hypotheses, and as these suggest certain links between the study of deviance, political behaviour and mass media research, it seemed opportune to present, in a compressed and provisional form, the process of ad-hoc theorizing for comment and discussion.

I

Political deviance does not figure prominently in the study of deviant behaviour. Becker (1963) suggests that this is because, in many forms of social deviance, "The conflicting segments or ranks are not organized for conflict; no one attempts to alter the shape of the hierarchy". Yet it is clear that the process by which certain deviant acts come to be defined as 'social problems', the labelling process itself, and the enforcement of social controls all contain an intrinsically political component. Horowitz and Liebowitz (1963) argue that 'Deviance has been studied by employing a consensus welfare model rather than a conflict model'. This model has tended to suppress the political element in deviant transactions with 'straight' society. Lemert (1967) appears to be one of the earliest deviancy theorists in the interactionist school to have openly acknowledged the close interpenetration of labelling theory with power and ideology:

'Social action and control usually emanate from elite power groups who have their own systems of values, which differ from those of the general population, from those of other groups, and even from those of individual members of the elites. The organizational
values of such elites and their rules of procedure also have a strong bearing on controlling events. The position of groups and individuals at the point of their interaction in a social structure is of great significance in predicting the resultant action taken by a society to control or decontrol.

Horowitz and Liebowitz (1963) argue that, conventionally, deviance theory has accepted a 'highly formalistic vision of politics' which confines politics to the formal juridical aspects of social life, such as the electoral process and to the maintenance of a party apparatus through procedural norms.

'In this view, only behaviour within the electoral process is defined as political in character.'

From such a vantage point, certainly, the study of deviance and of politics have little or nothing to say to one another. Yet events in the real world are increasingly revealing the operational and ideological content of this formal proposition about politics. From the normative point of view, all political action which is not expressed via the electoral process, which does not contribute to the maintenance of party apparatuses and is not governed by procedural norms, is, by definition, deviant with respect to politics. But, as in all labelling theory, the question is, who defines which action belongs where? Operationally, the maintenance of boundaries between 'politics' and 'non-politics' and the casting of certain 'political' acts into the 'non-political' domain, are themselves political acts, and reflect the structure of power and interest. These acts of labelling in the political domain, far from being self-evident, or a law of the natural world, constitute a form of continuing political work on the part of the elites of power: they are, indeed, often the opening salvo in the whole process of political control.

The crisp distinction between socially and politically deviant behaviour is increasingly difficult to sustain. There are at least five reasons for this. First, many socially deviant groups are being politicized. Secondly,
political activist groups are frequently also 'deviant' in life-style and in values. Thirdly, the 'politics' of deviant political groups has, in contrast with the more 'objective' content of traditional class politics, a distinctive cultural or existential content: their dissociation from the status quo is expressed as much in cultural attitudes, ideology and life-style as in programme or economic disadvantage. Fourthly, the collective organization and activities of such political minorities have had the effect of transferring some questions from the 'social problem' to the 'political issue' category. In this way, the hidden political element inside deviant behaviour is rendered transparent, and the map of social deviance is altered.

Fifthly, under pressure from events, the consensual nature of sociological theory - to which the earlier forms of deviant theory of, say, the Kertorian variety, belonged - has been polarised and fragmented. (2) Models of social action predicated on the assumption of an integrative and self-regulative functional social order are progressively challenged by models in which, precisely, the internal cohesiveness of the 'social system' and its ability to 'tension-manage' dissidents and deviants are rendered problematic. The elaboration of such counter-theories clearly apply in equal measure to the analysis of socially deviant and politically conflictful behaviour. Thus, at different levels, both of action and theory, new, more radical perspectives on the phenomenon of deviance have opened up, in which hard-and-fast distinctions between deviance and politics are weakened. Horovitz and Liebowitz (1968) therefore seem correct when they declare the distinction between 'political marginality' and 'social deviance' to be, increasingly, 'an obsolete distinction'. This presents us with new problems of definition which, in turn, open the lines of confluence once again between deviance and politics.

Lemert (1967) gives a classic formulation of the distinction between 'deviant groups' and 'political minorities'.

'Groups are individuals whose values are being sacrificed by intoxication
and drunkenness may have no structure to formulate their vaguely felt dissatisfaction. On the other hand, minorities, because their programmes are defined and their power is organised and well-timed, more readily have their values cast into an emergent pattern of social action.

This distinction, too, is no longer so clear-cut. Certainly, we need some way of distinguishing between behaviour labelled deviant, where the participants formulate no programme of action, and require only to be left alone by the authorities of control, or more organised form of political activism. Many so-called 'crimes without victims' or 'crimes' where the only victims are the participants themselves, fall within the first category. Such forms of action differ from the actions of political minorities whose 'values' are more readily cast 'into an emergent pattern of social action'. Yet, deviant groups who regularly, because of their deviation, fall foul of the law, and are harassed by law-enforcing agencies and the courts, may, in response, develop programmes, organisations and actions directed at ending their stigmatisation or redefining the legal injunctions against them. This represents, at the very least, the inception of a process of politicisation of deviant subcultures, along at least two dimensions: by opposing constituted authority in the form of the courts, political legislation and social control agencies, such groups take up an organised existence against the locus of authority as such. They undertake projects, 'to alter the shape of the hierarchy'. This, in turn, may lead to the forging of formal or informal coalitions with other groups who are also ranged against the hierarchy on other grounds. Secondly, in the course of organising themselves, deviant group come, retrospectively, to redefine the social stigmas against them in political terms. Hence, in recent years, many deviant groups - drug addicts, homosexuals, welfare claimants, etc. - have begun, on their own as well as in company with other, more overtly political groupings, to 'pioneer the development of organisational responses to harassment'. In return, (especially within the spectrum of 'new left
political subcultures) such deviant subcultures provide 'a broad base for political organising'. The extent to which a 'soft drug' culture is common both to deviant and political minority groupings in the United States is one indication of the coalescence of deviant and political elements within what might be broadly labelled a 'generational underground'. (Hall, 1969). This process of mutual interpenetration has been facilitated by the fact that, in any case, the political groupings with which deviant subcultures are most likely to ally themselves rarely throw up clear and permanent organisational forms, and are only loosely, if at all, attached to a stated programme of political reforms. In many cases, the 'members' of deviant groups and or politically activist minorities are one and the same. This process of coalescence is attested to in the widespread convergence of criminal and ideological labels, applied, without much distinction by labelling agencies to dissenting minorities of both a 'deviant' and 'political' type.

Horowitz and Liebowitz (1963) suggest that the 'right to dissent' is traditionally accorded to many organised political minorities but traditionally denied to most deviant groups. But, as political minorities increasingly cross the line from privatised deviancy to public protest, the 'traditional right to dissent', for both groups, becomes problematic and is contested.

Horowitz and Liebowitz (1963) also argue that the conventional wisdom about deviance in its liberal form is based on the 'majoritarian formulation of politics'.

'This is a framework limited to the political strategies available to majorities or to powerful minorities (our italics) having access to elite groups. The strategies available to disenfranchised minorities are largely ignored and thus the politics of deviance also go unexamined'.

This suggests an important distinction which we cannot neglect. In classic democratic theory, of course, a very simple model was preserved in which political decisions were arrived at through the conflict and interaction of organised
majorities representing the broad sections of the population, within the framework of a written or unwritten constitution, the electoral process, parliamentary representation and the State. It is now clearly recognised, even by its defenders, that such a simple majoritarian model of democratic politics has little or no relevance as a portrait of the modern industrial state. 'With the emergence of mass politics... all hope of this immediacy and comprehensibility was irrevocably lost'. (Volpe 1965). Between the organised majorities of an electorate and the process of political decision-taking there has grown up the great corporate industrial state-within-the-state, intermediary bureaucratic organisations associated with national and local administration and government, the web of voluntary organisations and the intricate network of private associations, pressure and interest groups, all of which, systematically, mediate and transform a simple, majoritarian model of the political process. While democratic theory in its simple sense is vestigially retained, as a sort of a ideological and legitimating myth, political theory has itself had to come to terms with the much more complex and ramified nature of the modern state, and especially with the complex of intermediary associations which stand in between organised electoral majorities and the political process.

As Partridge (1972) observes:

'Only the most naive now entertain the model of a political system in which policy initiatives proceed from the body of the citizens and the function of government is to give effect to the popular will. For a great number of empirical reasons, we recognise that the politics of complex societies cannot work like that; that political parties and other organisations, leaders and elites, bureaucracies and governments necessarily assume such functions as selecting and defining issues or problems, assembling and distributing information, proposing policies and advocating them, engaging in public persuasion, demonstrating the satisfactoriness of general lines of policy by initiating practical measures that are seen to work.... These are among the ways in which governments (and other influential political organisations and groups) may forge, consolidate and expand the approval or support which enables them to continue to enjoy and deploy authority - or, as we commonly say, manufacture consent'.

This modification in the simple variant of 'majoritarian politics' is usually defined as a shift towards a theory of democratic elitism, or demo-
cratic pluralism. But within the theory of democratic pluralism, there is all
the distinction in the world between those large corporate institutions and
the web of powerful minority interest or pressure groups which operate within
and upon the organs of the State, on the one hand, and the small, emergent,
marginal, disenfranchised minority groupings not institutionalised within the
processes of political bargaining and compromise. While in theory democratic
pluralism allows for the entry of new groups and associations into the political
arena, concretely and in practice it operates in such away as systematically
to ignore and disenfranchise certain emergent groups and interests which are
outside the consensus, while maintaining intact the existing structure of
political interests. Writing about the application of democratic pluralism
in the context of American political life, Wolfe (1965) has observed:

There is a very sharp distinction in the public domain between legitimate
interests and those which are absolutely beyond the pale. If a group
or interest is within the framework of acceptability, then it can be sure
of winning some measure of what it seeks, for the process of national
politics is distributive and compromising. On the other hand, if an
interest falls outside the circle of the acceptable, it receives no
attention whatsoever and its proponents are treated as crackpots, ex-
tremists or foeing agents. With bewildering speed, an interest can
move from 'outside' to 'inside' and its partisans, who have been scorned
by the solid and established in the community, become presidential
advisers and newspaper columnists...Thus the 'vector-sum' version of
pluralist theory functions ideologically by tending to deny new groups
or interests access to the political plateau. It does this by ignoring
their existence in practice, not by denying their claim in theory.

For our purpose, then, the important distinction is not that between
a 'majoritarian' and a 'minority' formulation of politics, but that between
the powerful, legitimate minorities and the weak, emergent, marginal minorities.
Powerful political minority groups, whether hereditary, voluntary, pressure-
group or interest based, share with elites and with organised majorities the
right to exercise influence, to organise to further their views, and to dissent:
they are understood to act in a 'political' manner. Weak, marginal, non-
institutionalised and illegitimate political minorities share with social
deviants the definition of their actions in terms of a 'social problem' para-
they are 'explained' within a welfare-state, therapeutic or psychological framework: their actions are, by definition, 'non-political'.

If one looks at the political spectrum as a whole, within this perspective, it is clear that while some emergent minority interests gain ready access to the political process, are accorded a legitimate place within the process of bargaining about decisions or scarce resources, and, as successful formed interests, other - which share many social characteristics with deviant groups - are themselves defined as 'deviant' with respect to the political process itself: different models of explanation are applied to the latter, and they are subject to quite different processes of social stigmatisation and control.

We may now formulate one of the central problems of the emergence of deviant political minorities in the following way:

A. When new political movements come into existence, it is a matter of critical importance whether they are legitimated publicly within the 'political' category, or de-legitimised by being assigned to the 'deviant' category. Deviant groups and individuals may be sick, disadvantaged, corrupted by others, lead astray or subject to social disorganisation: but they are not exploited. Consequently, they can be made well again (therapeutic), isolated from contagion (segregated) or supported (welfare state) - but they cannot organise or dissent.

B. Under certain circumstances, legitimate political minorities are subjected to severe 'status degradation' ceremonies, and are lumped with the more marginal groups. They are then subject to quite different forms of public opprobrium, stigmatisation and exclusion. They have been symbolically de-legitimated.

In general terms, then, the line between social deviance and minority political militancy is disappearing. The alliance between some types of social deviance and political marginality has been strengthened: politics has become more 'deviant' with respect to social norms, and deviancy is progressively
politicalised. The latent political content of the deviant process and the deviant element in radical politics now emerge together as a single phenomenon. As this happens, political dissent by deviant means will become subject to the types of repression that have been a traditional response to social deviance' (Morowitz 1968).

II

For the purpose of this paper, political deviance is very loosely defined. The projects of such groups must contain some manifest political aim or goal, as well as perhaps a latent content of socially deviant attitudes and lifestyle. Their activities tend to fall outside the consensual norms which regulate political conflict, and they are willing to employ means commonly defined as 'illegitimate' to further or secure their ends. In lifestyle attitude and relationships, they are socially unorthodox, permissive, even subversive. They are marginal to the more powerful groups - organised majorities, legitimate minorities, interest-groups, elites - institutionalised in the political domain. They challenge the representative/electoral/parliamentary framework which stabilises the British political structure, with its complicated mechanisms for negotiating conflict. They tend to by-pass the 'reformism' of the organised mass parties of the 'left' and the 'economism' of the trade unions. The forms of political deviance I have in mind here all have a radical political perspective and are recent arrivals on the stage of political life in advanced industrial societies. Centrally, we are concerned with movements involving students and young people, ethnic and religious minorities. These groupings and formations are complexly structured by class, but are not explicitly class-based. They are largely extra-parliamentary in form. The types of deviant political activities involved include student militancy and protest (confrontations with university authorities, sit-ins, occupations, etc.); militant extra-parliamentary demonstrations, which might involve conflict with the police;
urban rioting and rebellion (e.g. Watts) and urban insurgency (e.g. Ulster); sporadic incidents or bombing incendiarism, attacks on property for political reasons, (Weathermen or 'Angry Brigade' activities); squatters movements, rent strikes, militant tenants action; ethnically-oriented 'Black Power' or Panther-style activities. It will at once be clear that all these groups' activities fall roughly within the category of the 'new politics' or extra-parliamentary oppositional groups which have so decisively emerged on the political stage of the advanced capitalist societies of the West in the past decade. I want also to consider, as a special transitional category, the case of 'unofficial strikes' - industrial strikes originating through shop-floor organisation, rather than via the initiative of union bureaucracies, which, even when subsequently sanctioned by official sponsorship, are systematically defined as 'deviant' to the political system as such, and contrary to the 'national interest'. One might also include the resistance - sometimes with official union sponsorship - to the recent attempts by both political parties to legislate for control over the unions by some form of Industrial Relations Bill.

Our concern is specifically with the way these emergent forms of political militancy are defined and labelled. But it is necessary, first, to understand their emergence and position in relation to the socio-political structure as a whole. This constitutes at least a paper on its own, and a full account cannot be attempted here. But, briefly, we may say that, in the years immediately following the Second World War, the armed rivalry between East and West served to stabilise the internal political systems of the West. The expansion of welfare capitalist structures, the dominance of mass parties of the centre-left and centre-right and the evolution of social-democratic parties towards a general accommodation with capitalism were integral aspects of this process. This enforced stabilisation of advanced capitalist societies
has, in recent years, been broken: first, by the liberation movements and armed struggles of the 'Third World', second by the emergence of militant minority movements within the Western capitalist world itself. In the majority of cases, these latter emergent political groupings occupy positions marginal to the institutional power groups and the institutionalised forms of class conflict upon which the welfare-capitalist consensus was based. In many cases, these activist minorities also remain marginal to the traditional class agencies of change. Even when they openly and consciously espouse a revolutionary class perspective, they remain largely segregated from the organised industrial working class. Such groupings may work for, and temporarily succeed in forging, alliances and coalitions with class formations: events in France in 1968 represent the clearest example of such a convergence. In other circumstances, such groupings are clearly in one sense or another 'vanguard elements' in relation to class conflict, articulating and promoting protest from the outside amongst such wider sectors as well as on their behalf. Thus, 'Black Power' militants clearly speak and organise on behalf of the disenchanted black majorities of the Deep South and the disadvantaged black poor of the urban ghettos; the early civil rights movement in Northern Ireland articulated the structural discontents of the poor, disenfranchised Catholic minorities in Ulster.

There is, clearly, a spectrum here in terms of the relation between emergent political minorities of this new type and their real or potential 'constituents'. But, by and large, the pace, content, style, direction and tempo of development among such minority activist groups move at a different rate from the growth of organised protest amongst the disadvantaged classes and majorities. The relation here between the extra-parliamentary opposition and the articulation of class conflict in the more traditional sense exhibits all the characteristics of a 'combined and uneven development'. Their relative marginality, not only to the political heartland of their own
societies, but also to the groups and classes on whose behalf they are active, remains one of their defining characteristics.

As Raymond Williams has remarked:

'It seems to be true that in late capitalist societies some of the most powerful campaigns begin from specific unabsorbed (and therefore necessarily marginal) experiences and situations. Black Power in the United States, civil rights in Ulster, the language movement in Wales, are experiences comparable in this respect to the student movement and to women's liberation. In their early stages, these campaigns tend to stress as absolutes those local experiences which are of course authentic and yet most important as indices of the crisis of the wider society.'

Despite the many differences within and between such groups, they share, by and large, certain features in common. In social composition, they tend to recruit most successfully outside the sphere of productive relations proper: either - as in Black movements, ghetto rebellions, tenants and claimants organisations, etc. - from the 'hidden' under-classes, or from other groups - lower professionals, students, social deviants, and drop-outs, intellectuals and bohemians - marginal to the structure of productive class relations. Typically, they define their alienation from the prevailing structure in social, cultural and experiential, as well as economic, terms: as Juliet Mitchell (1971) remarks, 'their position enables them to embrace a "totalist" attack on capitalism' - and thus to transcend the economism which has so effectively neutralised working class organisations cast in the trade union or social-democratic moulds. In many cases, students have provided the core-recruits to such groupings - recruits precisely from the sphere of expanded higher and technical education, itself a consequence of the growing sophistication and differentiation of the modes of reproduction and the advanced division of labour in technically-sophisticated, mature capitalist societies. Typically, such groups do not seek to advance their cause via the traditional access to elite influence; they do not seek to enhance their position within the system of political bargaining. Instead, they embrace militant, activist, 'extremist' political tactics, and explicitly challenge the system itself and its 'rules of the game'. Their technique of protest
and dissent contravenes the norms of political legitimacy which institutionalise political conflict. They take up deviant issues, adopt deviant lifestyles and attitudes, in part because of the elective affinity between their political aims and socially-subversive values, in part as a way of dramatising and symbolising their alienation from the dominant orientations of the hegemonic system. Far from seeking to win their way, by the traditional means of influence and negotiation, from the margins to the mainstream of power, they accent their dis-affiliation from majority consensual values. They are especially sensitive to the hidden mechanisms by which the dominant system wins and manipulates consent to its own hegemony - socialisation through the family and secondary institutions, the manipulative content and constraints of the education process, the creation of an environment of consensus in the mass media. That is, their position makes them acutely sensitive to the spheres of ideological domination and coercion. (6) This sensitivity occurs at precisely the stage, historically, when ideological domination plays a special role in the pacification of class conflict.

'In a consumer society, the role of ideology is so important that it is within the sphere of ideology that the oppressions of the whole system sometimes manifest themselves most apparently. It is here that middle class radicalism has its place' (Mitchell 1971)

It is essentially groupings, activities, strategies of this type which attract to themselves the stigma of political deviance.

Briefly then, these emergent forms of political militancy appear at a highly contingent moment, historically, in the evolution of advanced, late-industrial capitalist societies. They are the product of, as well as the response to, the corporatist structure and consensual style of managed capitalist societies. (They are also the product of more specific, contingent structural features of such societies: their appearance in the same historical moment is, therefore, doubly determined, 'over-determined').

'Consensus politics' has become, in one variant or another, the stable form of institutional politics in managed capitalism. (7) In Britain in the
post-war period, both major political parties have been in active pursuit of a basis of legitimacy rooted, not in class, or in group or sectional interests, but in a loosely-defined political consensus. Consensus politics does not represent a real decentralisation of power and authority. Rather, it is the form in which elite class power manages the consent of 'masses' in socially stratified, differentiated, so-called 'pluralist' societies. In the ideology and rhetoric of 'consensus politics', the 'national interest' is represented as transcending all other collective social interests. We draw a distinction between the 'welfare state' and 'consensual' variants of capitalist politics; in the 'welfare state' variant, conflicts of interest are recognised, but are mitigated by reforms and regulated; in the 'consensual' model, 'all good men and true', whatever their class and social position or outlook, are supposed to have an over-riding interest in maintaining and advancing the consensual goals. Conflict, especially of an open or radical kind, is symbolically displaced to the political margins. Those who engage in conflict-politics, or interpret society in conflict terms, are powerfully stigmatised. The essential task for consensus politics is:

'to construct around each issue by means of bargaining and compromise a coalition of interests; to associate with this legislatve programme the big battalions of power in the state; and from this base to manage public consent and isolate or exclude dissent'. (Hall 1967)

In Britain, the move towards 'consensus politics' has been underwritten by persistent economic stagnation and crisis. The rhetoric of 'consensus politics' in Britain thus pivots on a basically economistic definition of 'over-riding national interest'. The post-war effort, by Conservative and Labour administration alike, has been to win over the traditional agencies of working class organisation and defence to active integration within and collusion with the system of politico-economic management. Elsewhere (Williams 1968) we have argued that social democratic parties, like the Labour Party, have played a peculiarly adaptive role in pioneering the path of integration and
incorporation, though nowhere has this process been successfully accomplished or completed.

The politics of the extra-parliamentary opposition is specifically the politics of this stage in the evolution of 'integrated' capitalist societies. That is not to say it is the only form of politics — it exists as a new strand of political dissent alongside and in a complex relation to more traditional agencies of change: capitalism, in seeking stability at this higher level of integration, has not eliminated, but further compounded its untranscended contradictions. But the politics of deviance is a specific and contingent response to the specific stage of evolution of modern capitalism. This form of political protest emerges just at this stage (a) because the position of such groups is now more pivotal than at earlier stages of the system to the system's mode of reproduction; (b) because of the partial containment of the traditional agencies of change; and (c) because such groups are peculiarly responsive to modes of ideological domination which depend, in part, upon the repressive and coercive functions of 'the state', in part upon the invisible lines of coordination and integration operating in the ideological and socialising spheres, or what have been called 'ideological state apparatuses' (Althusser 1971). The protests from students — the privileged but alienated cadres of the new society — and from blacks — the permanently lumpen strata of an 'affluent' society — are the loci of political conflict in moments when the classic class agencies of change are temporarily contained inside the structures of bargaining of the state, the mitigating institutions of welfare, labourism as a political practice, and economism. Hegemonic demands arise, in their displaced, proto-political form, among supernumerary social strata which remain, nevertheless, neither sufficiently developed or evolved to be, on their own account, pivotal to revolutionary political transformation.
Societies moving ambiguously towards 'consensus politics' therefore provoke a specific counter-politics - the politics of deviance. Since the form and content of consensus is highly problematic, it has to be powerfully advanced in ideological terms. The drive to install consensual forms of domination at the heart of the political process itself is countered - specifically in the ideological zone - by the promulgation and articulation of counter-norms and values: that is, by counter-cultured or 'deviant' forms of political action. Shared norms, values and institutions - the 'sacred' character of the consensus itself - are stressed: conflicts of outlook and interest are repressed. Alternative minority politics is therefore impelled, not simply to advance counter-interests within the pattern of regulated class conflict and 'due process', but to exaggerate their degree of deviation from institutionalised processes as such. New systematic contradictions which arise are displaced, in the search for consensus, from the heart of political life. Groups which express these grievances and contradictions, having been given marginal political status, are labelled 'marginal': they develop coalitions with groups and issues already so stigmatised, they crystallise their self-images in 'deviant' terms: their deviance is then made the basis for public denunciation and symbolic status-degradation, which legitimates the enforcement of 'consensual norms' - and repressive social control. A classic political version of a deviance amplification-spiral is joined. (8) Thus, the drift and drive to consensus politics not only engenders its own types of conflict, but tends to produce, as a response, a specific type of oppositional movement: political deviance. Political deviance is the form in which conflict reasserts itself at certain nodal points in a system drifting and driving towards 'consensus' management of the state. The deviant character and form of minority politics is an unintended consequence - but also a determinate negation - of the movement towards consensualism in the institutionalised life and management of advanced capitalist societies.
III

We argue that militant political deviance is engendered - in its location incidence and form - as a counter-praxis to institutionalised consensual politics. But consensus, in either its political or its ideological form, does not spontaneously evolve: it must be actively constructed. That is the praxis to which deviant politics is a counter. The rise of conflict politics in its deviant form is, therefore, problematic for the society; and requires its own 'interpretative work'. Problematic situations are those in which the available public meanings and definitions fail to account for, and cannot easily be extended to cover, new developments. New political developments which are both dramatic and 'mean ingless' within the consensually validated norms, pose a challenge to the normative world. They render problematic not only how the political world is defined, but how it ought to be. They 'breach our expectancies'. They interrupted the seen but unnoticed, expected background features of everyday political life (Garfinkel 1967). When such practical reasons and accounts are breached, and we are 'deprived' of consensual support for alternative definitions of social reality, the active work of constructing new meanings is not to be confused with the elaboration of theories and explanatory models (though it often comprises the 'ad-hoc' element in them): the latter are systematic accounts, governed by a more formal logic of propositions, which attempt to be internally coherent and consistent.

Political structures engender their own characteristic ideologies and theorising, or, better, political structures, ideological and theoretical forms are inter-penetrating elements or 'practices' in any specific social formation which is 'structured in dominance' (Althusser 1971); but the work of public and pragmatic management of political reality cannot be accomplished at this level. We are dealing, rather, with the construction of ad-hoc 'explanations', accounts 'for all practical purposes', working definitions of political reality, with their own situational logic (or 'logic-in-use') which serve to
to 'make sense of' problematic situations, and which then become the 'socially-sanctioned grounds of inference and action that people use in their everyday affairs and which we assume others use in the same way'. (Garfinkel 1967).

As Berger and Luckmann (1967) have suggested:

'If the integration of an institutional order can be understood only in terms of the "knowledge" that its members have of it, it follows that the analysis of that "knowledge" will be essential for an analysis of the institutional order in question. It is important to stress that this does not exclusively or even primarily involve a preoccupation with complex theoretical systems serving as legitimations for the institutional order. Theories also have to be taken into account, of course. But theoretical knowledge is only a small part and by no means the most important part of what passes for knowledge in a society. ...the primary knowledge about the institutional order is knowledge on the pre-theoretical level... It is the sum total of "what everybody knows" about a social world, an assemblage of maxims, proverbial nuggets of wisdom, values and beliefs, myths and so forth, the theoretical integration of which requires considerable intellectual fortitude in itself.'

The social construction and the 'interpretative work' involved in explanations at this level, which resolve problematic, troubling or deviant events, is, nevertheless, a complex process. The work of establishing new kinds of 'knowledge' about problematic features of social or political life is accomplished through the mediation of language: the transactions of public language is the specific praxis - the praxis of public signification - through which such new 'knowledge' and its social base 'is a dialectical one':

'that is, knowledge is a social product and knowledge is a factor in social change. This principle of the dialectic between social production and the objectivated world that is its product has already been explicated'. (Berger and Luckmann 1967).

The social production of new definitions in problematic areas produces both 'explanations' and 'justifications'. 'Legitimation is this process of "explaining" and justifying'.

'Legitimation "explains" the institutional order by ascribing cognitive validity to its objectivated meanings. Legitimation justifies the institutional order by giving a normative dignity to its practical imperatives. It is important to understand that legitimation has a cognitive as well as a normative element...Legitimation not only tells the individual why he should perform one action and not another; it also tells him why things are what they are'. (Berger and Luckmann 1967).
In complexly-structured, socially differentiated societies, like Britain or the United States, based on an advanced division of labour, groups lead highly segregated lives, and maintain apparently discrete, often contradictory 'maps of problematic social reality'. In such societies, Durkheim observed, 'representations collectives become increasingly indeterminate'. This is especially true of the political domain, which progressively becomes a segregated area, requiring a special expertise, familiarity or commitment: a finite province of the social world.

'Modern mass societies, indeed, are made up of a bewildering variety of social worlds. Each is an organised outlook built up by people in their interaction with one another; hence, each communication channel gives rise to a separate world... Each of these worlds is a unity of order, an universe of regularised mutual response. Each is an area in which there is some structure which permits reasonable anticipation of the behaviour of others, hence, an area in which one may act with a sense of security and confidence. Each social world, then, is a culture area, the boundaries of which are set neither by territory, nor by formal group membership, but by the limits of effective communication' (Shibutani, 1955).

This does not mean that there are no prevailing and dominant symbolic universes which 'integrate different provinces of meaning and encompass the institutional order in a symbolic totality' (Berger and Luckmann 1967). But it does mean that such symbolic universes operate at a high degree of typification, and are experienced by the majority, as, at best, sedimented and stereotypical constructs. (13) It also means that those who are not directly concerned with enforcing norms and definitions in a problematic or contested area of political life are heavily dependent for their 'working definitions' on those agents, institutions and channels which have access to power and have appropriated the means of signification. This accords with our knowledge about the situations in which typically the mass media exert innovatory power.

The mass media cannot imprint their meanings and messages on us as if we were mentally tabula rasa. But they do have an integrative, clarifying
and legitimating power to shape and define political reality, especially in those situations which are unfamiliar, problematic or threatening: where no 'traditional wisdom', no firm networks of personal influence, no cohesive culture, no precedents for relevant action or response, and no first-hand way of testing or validating the propositions are at our disposal with which to confront or modify their innovatory power. The sort of 'effectiveness' we have in mind here is not reflected at the primitive behavioural level normally pursued in traditional mass media studies. It is best expressed, as it has been by Walloran (1970), in the following terms: -

'The sort of situation I have in mind is where television puts across an attitude or mode of behaviour by presenting it as an essential component of required behaviour in a valued group. It is stated or implied that certain forms of behaviour, attitudes, possessions, etc. are necessary if the individual is to remain a member in a group... Those who do not have what it takes or refuse to make the effort may be presented as deviants or non-conformists. The appropriate social sanctions for deviance and the modes of approval for acceptance are sometimes explained and illustrated. Adoption of the behaviour or attitudes may also be presented as conducive to the integration and general welfare of the group... What is involved in this type of influence, is the provision of social realities where they did not exist before, or the giving of new directions to tendencies already present, in such a way that the adoption of the new attitude or form of behaviour is made socially acceptable mode of conduct, whilst failure to adopt is represented as socially disapproved deviance.'

In the area of political deviance, the prevailing, emergent 'common sense' definitions have largely been the product of three main agencies: professional politicians (or trade union leaderships) - the legitimate 'gate-keepers' of the political domain; agents or representatives of the agencies of face-to-face control; and the mass media. Each of these agencies for the definition of political reality has a different perspective on the phenomenon of political deviance: but, like all the elements in a social formation 'structured in dominance', these perspectives show a strong disposition, in the face of overt challenge, to 'hang together'. By political gate-keepers we mean, of course, both the organised mass parties, since each has a vested interest in
the 'sacred' nature of the consensus. By mass media we mean, essentially, television, the press (regional, national and local) and radio. By 'agencies of face-to-face control' we mean vice-chancellors and university administrators with respect to student militancy; public spokesmen and the army with respect to Ulster; official trade union functionaries with respect to 'unofficial strikes'; the police and the social welfare agencies with respect to squatting, rent strikes, militant demonstrations, 'Black Power' militants, etc.

IV

Goertz (1964) has argued that the study of ideology as a specific social praxis lacks 'anything more that the most rudimentary conception of the processes of symbolic formulation'.

'The links between the causes of ideology and its effects seem adventitious because the connecting element - the autonomous process of symbolic formulation - is passed over in virtual silence. Both interest theory and strain theory go directly from source analysis to consequence analysis without ever seriously examining ideologies as systems of interacting symbols, as patterns of interworking meanings. Themes are outlined, of course; among the content analysis, they are even counted. But they are referred for elucidation, not to other themes nor to any sort of semantic theory, but either backward to the effect they presumably mirror or forward to the social reality they presumably distort. The problem of how ideologies transform sentiment into significance, and so make it socially available is shortcircuited...'

The new definitions of political deviance do not emerge once-and-for-all, as 'full-blown, inevitable totalities'. The work of 'classifying out' the political universe, of building up meaningful 'semantic zones' to which deviant political acts can be assigned and within which they 'make sense', the processes of telescoping, of ascription, of amplifying descriptions and the attribution of 'secondary status traits', the use of charged associative metaphors which summon up old meanings in the service of explaining the unfamiliar, the way discrete events are selectively composed into composite 'action-images' and 'scenarios' of political action, the use of analogies and metaphors which
'transform sentiment into significance', win plausibility and command the
assent of uniformed and remote publics: these, and other processes compose
the specificity of the praxis of political signification as a discrete level
within the 'ensemble of social relations'. (15) Such interpretative work is,
at one and the same moment, social and symbolic: its study constitutes a
reflexive theoretical practice of its own - that study once described by
Levi-Strauss (1957) as 'the study of the life of signs at the heart of social
life'.

'Not only is the semantic structure of an / ideological / figure a good deal
more complex than it appears on the surface, by an analysis of that
structure forces one into tracing a multiplicity of referential connect-
ions between it and social reality, so that the final picture is one
of a configuration of dissimilar meanings out of whose interworking
both the expressive power and the rhetorical force of the final symbol
derive. This interworking is itself a social process, an occurrence
not "in the head" but in that public world where "people" talk to-
gether, name things, make assertions, and to a degree, understand each
other". (Gaertz 1964).

Such theoretical work, as a necessary and integral part of the study of deviance,
(and of political deviance in particular), as well as of politics and the
media, is only just beginning. (16) All too often we still employ the much
'cruder concepts of 'intentional bias' and 'deliberate distortion' (rather than,
say, the more structural notions of 'unwitting bias' and 'systematically
distorted communications'). (17) These notions are based on either simple
functionalist or simple reflexive models of the relation of consciousness to
social being wholly inadequate to the situations they are called upon to
explain. They repress the reciprocallly structured interaction of social
experience and the cultural form in which experience is handled.

The process by which certain kinds of political deviance come to be
signified in a distinctive way, and the relation of the agents of signification
to this process is complex, and can only be enforced by detailed analy-
sis. The events dealt with here, and the quotations are intended for illustrative purposes only. No is there space to develop the argument about how
this kind of analysis can be carried through. But we must insist that analysis of political signification through linguistic transactions in the public domain must give special weight to the linguistic mediation, and the process of symbolisation itself, as Gaetz (1964) has argued. In our analysis, we have adopted the method of 'immanent structural analysis', in preference to quantitative analysis of the manifest content of political communications. This method is concerned with the 'interior relations' which linguistic forms establish within a 'system' of discourse, as well as with the 'codes' and the 'logics-in-use' which integrate linguistic items within an inferential structure of argument. The logic is a 'situated logic' proceeding (via the basic tropes of condensation and displacement) as much by inference as by direct statement. Special attention is paid to stylistic and rhetorical features of expression.

'Structural analysis proposes...such a framework in which the style is the level of integration of content in the code from which it arises. Thus, analysis of style, and particularly, analysis of figures of rhetoric of content in the interior of the code is the best way to reach the code. The figures of rhetoric are...the moment where the code (normally unconscious) betrays and confesses its presence. (Burgelín 1968).

Analysis of political communications concerning political deviance conducted by this method of semiological analysis reveals one dominant pervasive deep structure in the material. (17) This is the structure we call minorities/majorities. All the agents of signification when dealing with this type of political behaviour employ the minority/majority distinction. The world of political deviance is systematically 'classified out' in terms of this basic opposition. Politicians of local and national status, in public speeches and reported statements, the media in all its forms, and the agents of face-to-face control all consistently employ the minority/majority explanatory model.

One brief comparison suggests how powerful this minority/majority structure is. The two cases concern the incidents around the destruction of the gates
within the building at LSE in January/February 1969, and the occupation of
the main administration block by students at Birmingham University in
December 1968. The first was one incident in a series of militant confronta-
tions between students and university authorities at LSE over a period of
three years; the second was an isolated incident at a university noted for
its conservative outlook and political quiescence. The first involved the
destruction of property, several incidents of milling and scuffling; the
second involved no destruction of property and no incidents which could be
labelled as 'political violence'. The first involved the closing of the
School for several days; in the second, only the administration block was
occupied and normal teaching continued throughout. Yet, a study of the
way both incidents were signified reveals a convergent use of the minority/
majority paradigm. In both cases, the active political groups were defined
as 'small minorities', exploiting the majority of their compatriots, and
holding their institutions and the public at large 'up to ransom'. This
image of a conspiratorial group survives, in the LSE case, the virtually
unanimous vote, on February 3rd, in favour of two motions supporting militant
action; and, in the Birmingham case, the fact that the occupation was
supported by an overwhelming majority of those voting in the relevant extra-
ordinary meeting of the Guild of Undergraduates.

The events at LSE were widely reported in the national press. The
Birmingham occupation was sparingly reported, the main coverage being on
the regional television and radio news, and in the local press. A clear
example of the minority/majority paradigm as applied in the LSE situation
is the following report in the Sketch: (19)

'A cabal of about 300 students at the London School of Economics has,
for patently selfish and confused reasons, caused 2,700 other students
to be denied their studies.
They deliberately engineered a closure of the College. The majority
suffer. The hooligan clique withdraw to repair their wounds and excite
themselves in yet another storm of public outrage... I believe that even
the people who have been prepared to tolerate student idiosyncracy have now had their fill of this calculated anarchy. The group of 300, including foreigners...."

Another example may be quoted from the Evening News: (20)

'It is an astonishing piece of anarchy...3,000 students, the bulk of who want to work and appreciate their privileged position, are being deprived of their rights by a comparative handful of revolutionary socialists (probably not more than fifty) whose avowed aim is to create physical havoc to overthrow the LSE regime - and the nation's regime, too... What these revolutionaries want is violence for its own sake'.

This structure of argument was common to press reports of the LSE events as a whole, though there was the usual distinction, in terms of tone and sensationalism, between the popular and the 'posh' papers. Thus, the Telegraph (21) predicted, more sedately:

'Students from the LSE are likely to dissociate themselves from the militant minority at a Union meeting at Buxton today.'

The prediction was wrong. Reports in the press and television, as a whole, were full of the 'wreckers of the School'; this was also the occasion of the now-famous remarks by the then Secretary for Education, Mr Short, about 'academic thugs' and 'Brand X revolutionaries'.

Exactly the same paradigm dominates the coverage of the Birmingham events in the local press (Birmingham Post and Evening Mail). The simplest way of characterising this coverage is to quote from the lead editorial of the Post for Saturday 30th November - the second of five editorials on the subject in the relevant eight days:

'The real afflication for Vice-Chancellors is that universities are also collecting grounds for small minorities, who, under a multiplicity of labels, advocate revolution and are out to stir up trouble. Although their aims are principally political these can make effective use of genuine student discontents or aspirations. Vice-Chancellors have the duty to meet the just aspirations of the majority while at the same time giving no ground to deliberate trouble-makers.'

On the following Tuesday, the Post printed, on the front page, running across the top of the page, and pre-empting the main news headlines of the day, a letter from 61 students, condemning 'militant extremist minority'.

It introduced the letter to its readers thus:

'The Post believes that the activities at Birmingham University are stimulated by a minority group. Unhappily, there is growing evidence that the public is tending to associate all students with the extremists. This letter underlines what we feel is the attitude of the majority.'

The same inferential structure of argument is to be found throughout the reports of comments made by local councillors and aldermen about the occupation, as well as by representatives of the University administration. One councillor spoke of 'a small minority of agitating adolescents' holding up 'the life of the whole University'. Another said, 'I believe that the majority of students are quite sound and want to get on with their studies...'

In the vast majority of the press and television reports covering militant student protest in the period of high activity between 1967 and 1969, the majority/minority paradigm is employed. The same is true of public statements by representative politicians and by face-to-face agencies of control. It has become ubiquitous as a 'common-sense explanation' of the perplexing phenomenon of why student protest has made its appearance on the political stage, and of why it should assume such militant forms. It thus serves the latent function of resolving into intelligible terms a highly problematic phenomenon. It is a powerful labelling device. It has cognitive power, effectively classifying 'students' into two groups. It has evaluative power, since it attaches to the favoured group the preferred title of 'majority', transferring to this category the sacred symbolism attaching to all 'majorities' in a parliamentary democracy. It has crystallising value, in that it separates out the complex groupings and proto-formations within student radicalism into simple, stereotypical units, resolving ambiguities. It has generative power.

On the basis of this simple polarisation, all sorts of 'secondary status attributions' can be made. The classified groups can now be particularised and concretised by attributing to them status traits, drawn from other deviant areas, where the stereotypical classifications already exist. Thus, 'minorities'
become 'extremists', and, in the course of time, accrete a variety of other qualitative attributes: they are 'hooligans'... 'a hooligan clique'... 'wreckers'... 'agitating adolescents'... 'a cabal'... 'thugs'... 'adolescent hooligans'... 'mentally disturbed'... a 'smash-now-and-think-later caucus'... 'outside agitators'... 'rowdies'... 'plotters'. It also has expressive power, providing a framework for the minting of new epithets which are powerfully picturesque: 'Brand X revolutionaries'... 'A bunch of hairy coconuts'. Above all, it has explanatory and predictive power. For it is only if the student world can be polarised into a minority-extremist-clique and a majority of dupes, 'judgmental dopes', whose desire for legitimate reform and whose attention to their studies is being subverted and exploited by the minority, 'who have something else in mind', that the phenomenon of student militancy can be rendered accountable within the consensual norms of what politics should be. Finally, it has consolatory power: if only the small handful of agitators can be isolated - 'probably not more than fifty' at LSE - normalcy can be restored, the status-quo affirmed.

The minority/majority paradigm is also a persuasive definition. It is employed, not simply to explain and account for the phenomenon of student militancy, but contains its own implicit strategies for containment and its own inferred call for retributive punishment. In almost all cases, the minority/majority paradigm attempts to build a coalition between the moderates and the agencies of control. It attempts to win over 'majority dupes' to a position of active cooperation with the authorities. The clearest example of this is in the _Fest_ editorial already quoted:

At the very least five-sixths of the 6,000 or so students at Birmingham University have held aloof from the movement that inaugurated the "direct action", and it is fair to assume that even more disapprove of the actual form this has now taken. The Vice-Chancellor is entitled to look for support not only to the public but to the general student body; because he is upholding their right not to have their studies and university life interfered with by a clannish and apparently intolerant minority group. Unfortunately, when in like circumstances, firm action has been contemplated
elsewhere against an activist minority the majority has sometimes felt it should side with those being disciplined. The student majority should remember that if Birmingham University had to be closed because of student indiscipline, the general public would probably bear it with considerable fortitude. It is the student majority that would suffer.

The 'explanation' thus frequently assumes a characteristic rhetorical form. It splits the student body into two simple and opposed groups - the 'pure' (but stupid) and the 'polluted': it seeks to 'win over' the majority to the side of the reasonable, the rational, the normal, the natural (all these normative elements are centrally built-in to the paradigm itself and are actively present in its actual use): but it also counterposes to students as a whole - as if audiences to a spectacle - the 'general public', whose relation to what is going on, it is inferred, cannot be anything but distant, passive disinterested and remote. If the paradigm serves to stereotype the minority extremists, intent on violence for its own sake, and the majority as reasonable but simple men, whose good-will is being used and exploited, it also stereotypes 'the public' as a distant, heterogenous and uninvolved mass - spectators to a dangerous but diverting symbolic drama, linked only by their as yet unexpressed wish to see the reasonable, the normal - 'due process' - resume its steady course once again: a silent majority. This process of splitting/isolation and projection is the precise rhetorical form assumed by elite power in the society of 'masses'. It is the new symbolic version of the ancient principle of 'divide and rule'.

The significant fact, for our purposes, is that this minority/majority paradigm in its amplified form has become one of the most persistent 'inferential structures' in the signification of political deviance of all types in the political domain and in the media. It has long since become a standard 'deep structure' in the definition and labelling of militant political demonstrations, such as the protests against the South African cricket and Springboks tour and the famous Hyde Park/Grosvenor Square demonstration against the
Vietnam War of October 27th, 1968. The Times, for example, reported to
Mr Callaghan, then Home Secretary, as saying in the House of Commons on the
Friday before the Vietnam demonstration:

'The organisation of the demonstration, Mr Callaghan said, carried a
heavy responsibility when they called large numbers of people together.
The overwhelming number of people in the march were likely to be concern-
ed passionately with the issue of peace in Vietnam. They must be care-
ful, he said, not to allow themselves to be exploited by a tiny minority
who were basically not concerned with this issue, but with undermining
and destroying the institutions that enabled protests to be made.'

Taking his cue from this paradigm, Mr Marcus Lipton then undertook his
own private piece of amplification, referring to the organisers as a 'motley
crew of crackpots...'.

It has for long also been the dominant definition applied to 'unofficial
strikes' - the notion of conspiratorial cliques, challenging the due authorities
of their own leadings and holding the innocent public up to ransom. For
a long period, the use of this paradigm in respect of 'unofficial strikes'
had a strong element of 'coalition-building' - it was designed to 'win over'
union leadings and the TUC to support for the Government in the effort
to restrain certain types of trade union conflict, and to 'distance' the mass
of the public (the consumers /audience) from any commitment to the event.

Its use has certainly also been a common feature of the process of public
signification associated with developments in Northern Ireland. With respect,
especially to events in Ulster since the later months of 1970, this paradigm
has indeed attained the status of a 'self-fulfilling prophecy', with the
emergence of the IRA stigmatised, split off from and counterposed to the vast
majority of 'good and reasonable folk' of both religious persuasions in
Ulster, whose grievances are being exploited for the pursuance by a tiny
minority of a 'holy war' against Stormont, Whitehall, the army and forces
of moderation and reform. Indeed, the emergence of the IRA - a known, labelled,
stigmatised, extremist group, committed to the policies of armed insurrection
and physical force - has powerfully crystallised and simplified the complex
problems of signifying the Ulster crisis to the British public. It permitted the agencies of signification - the political managers both at Stormont and at Whitehall, the agents of face-to-face control in the shape of the army and its public relations machinery, and the media of press, radio and television - to extract, isolate and stereotype a small, organised band of 'foreign' insurgents, committed to violence against the state, from the complex structure of exploitation, disenfranchisement and oppression of the Ulster minorities, and, behind that, from the interlocking complex of immediate class-rule at Stormont and distant colonial oppression in the continuing links between Britain and the Protestant ascendancy. Accounts of engagements between the para-military forces of the IRA and the army could now be depicted in simple form as a straight confrontation between a minority extremist element and a peace-keeping force. In the language of the weekly and nightly accounts of bombings, explosions, street encounters, etc., the IRA is consistently attributed an active, destructive role, the army a passive, neutral one. Thus, the girl inadvertently shot by a sniper bullet is described in the press headline as 'Girl shot by IRA sniper', but the girl inadvertently wounded by army fire is described as 'Girl shot in IRA-Army crossfire'. The difficult task of extracting a political solution to the Ulster crisis has been, accordingly, suppressed, replaced by the call for military measures to 'end the violence'. On this basis, the public has been brought to collude with such developments as the imposition of internment without trial, and the use of repressive and coercive methods of inter-rogation on the basis of the inferred logic that 'the gunmen and the bombers must be brought to heel'. The power of the paradigm to crystallise a complex political situation in stereotypical and simplified terms may be evidenced in a BBC television news broadcaster of February 27th, 1971. The Ulster correspondent observed that 'the Northern Ireland situation is resolving itself into a straight battle between small groups of
armed agitators and the British army'. But this comment was accompanied by film clips from incidents in Belfast on that same day, showing a block of flats ('predominantly Catholic') where 'youths' (but also, visibly, women and children) were involved in persistent stone throwing and pan-rattling at soldiers and in which the army had to attack the flats in order to 'root out the rioters'. The form in which these events were signified simply left no room in which the most critical question could be posed: that which would have exposed the fact that the army were unlikely to isolate and destroy the IRA gunmen precisely because they were tactfully and actively sheltered, supported, forewarned and assisted by the vast majority of the working class Catholics in the predominantly Catholic areas. The power of signification to legitimate repressive control and methods of intimidation was nowhere so powerfully attested to as in the whole episode surrounding the revelation of the methods used to interrogate detainees. The plain fact is that the vast majority of the allegations of physical brutality investigated by the Compton Report, and widely reported on in the press and television, were confirmed: but the meaning of the physical forms of interrogation was symbolically legitimated by a purely semantic device: that of re-defining the methods not as 'brutality' (unacceptable) but as 'physical ill-treatment' (acceptable). As Compton (1971) asserts:

"Where we have concluded that physical ill-treatment took place, we are not making a finding of brutality on the part of those who handled these complainants. We consider that brutality is an inhuman or savage form of cruelty, and that cruelty implies a disposition to inflict suffering, coupled with indifference to, or pleasure in, the victim's pain. We do not think this happened here."

It is a nice distinction. The generative and associative power of the paradigm is evidenced in an interview with a Stormont politician, transmitted in the 7.00 p.m. Newsdesk on BBC radio, in which, in reply to a question as to whether the 'young hoodlums' on the street were organised, he replied: 'Yes, by men described as shadowy figures...Just the sort of person of inelgant mentality such as lay behind the bombing incident with Mr. Carr...anarchists, proto-
revolutionaries, call them what you will. These are only a few, brief examples taken at random from the coverage of the Ulster crisis. In any substantive analysis of the process of political signification, events in Ulster provide an almost paradigmatic instance.

The paradigm was also, significantly, employed with reference to the activities, not simply of unofficial minorities in strike situations, but to the official trade union leaderships in so far as their wage demands threatened to attempt to control the level of wages by both Labour and Conservative governments; and more recently, as unions undertook strike action in defence of their claims, and one-day strikes in opposition to the proposed Industrial Relations Bill. The escalation of the use of the minority-extremists/majority-moderates common-sense explanation in response to the actions of groups which can in no sense be labelled 'political deviants' - that is, the transfer of the more militant actions of powerful majorities and legitimate minorities to the 'deviant' category - can be pinpointed in the renowned speech by Mr Wilson in June 1966 concerning the strike by the National Union of Seamen: 'A natural democratic revolt is now giving way, in the name of militancy, to pressures which are anything but democratic...a few individuals have brought pressure to bear on a select few on the Executive Council of the NUS, who, in turn, have been able to dominate the majority of that otherwise sturdy union...this tightly knit group of politically motivated men...'. A more recent example was Mr Carr's televised speech, on the eve of the second one-day strike against the IRE (17th March 1971), in which he described the action as one of 'mindless militancy', a 'denial of democratic leadership', the 'acts of a small minority recognising no responsibility to anyone or anything' and contrary to the wishes of the 'vast majority, including those who oppose the Bill'.

The minority/majority, extremist/moderate way of labelling acts of political deviance is now being applied to situations which are intrinsically quite different in manifest character, e.g. in relation to industrial conflict.
This process of 'cross-attribution' and amplification is characteristic of persuasive inferential explanations which try to resolve ambiguities at the same time as they actively contain threatening and problematic political developments. A close analysis of the way this process of stigmatisation and signification is carried through yields other deep paradigms which, in a similar way, tap sacred and symbolic values which are widely shared (e.g. the sanctity of majorities, the 'due process' of negotiation as a way of resolving conflict, the taboo against violence and confrontation, the role of reasonableness, rationality, moderation and compromise in the regulation of conflict, - the sacred values of British institutional political life -, and either 'map' them on to new, problematic situations, or 'map' emergent political phenomena in terms of already known and legitimate values. (24)

V

Some problems of considerable complexity are posed by the model and account offered above. These can only be briefly resumed here. The first cluster of problems concerns the relationship, at both theoretical and empirical levels, between the dominant and subordinate forms of ideological consciousness present in a society at a specific historical moment on the one hand, and on the other, the level of ideological 'work' and praxis with which we have been primarily concerned. Such a discussion must take as its departure Gramsci's (1971) concept of hegemonic and corporate class formations and, linked with that, the essence of the marxian notion of dominant and subordinate value systems - the classic formulation of which is the German Ideology. In a useful amplification of this model, Perkin (1971) suggests that we must concern ourselves with at least three levels of ideological consciousness: a dominant value-system - 'those groups in society which occupy positions of the greatest
power and privilege will also tend to have the greatest access to the means of legitimation': a subordinate value system, the generating milieu of which is 'the local working class community', and whose content is both different from, but also subordinate to and accommodated within the dominant value-system - it is a 'negotiated version of the dominant value system'; and what he calls a radical value-system, which is in effect a counter system of values to the hegemonic ideology. Though all ideological systems contain the interests of hegemonic class forces imprinted in them, dominant value-systems represent themselves as the natural mental environment and horizon of the whole society, and the explanations of accounting for new problematic events tend to be accomplished within the mental universe, the symbolic forms and the embedded interests of such forms of consciousness. As Marx (1965) observed, 'each new class...is compelled...to represent its interests as the common interest of all the members of a society...expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the form of universality and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones'. Installed ideological perspectives of this type are thus not only the symbolic bearers of the social interests of ruling groups, but tend to be amplified into what Lefebvre (1968) calls 'a vision or conception of the world, a Weltanschauung based on extrapolations and interpretations'. Their function is not simply to assert, in a naked open or direct manner, the establishment of class power, but to provide for society as a whole what Harris (1968) calls 'a more or less coherent organisation for our experience'. Ideologies are one of the principal mechanisms which expand and amplify the dominance of certain class interests into hegemonic formation. Their role, as Lefebvre remarks, 'is to secure the assent of the oppressed and exploited. Ideologies represent the latter to themselves in such a way as to wring from them, in addition to material wealth, their 'spiritual' acceptance of this situation, even their support'. The crucial
point, made by Poulantzas (1971) is that 'the dominant ideology does not simply reflect the life conditions of the dominant class-subject "pure and simple", but the political relationship in a social formation between the dominant and dominated classes'. In the gloss by Steadman-Jones (1972), 'ideologies are not simply the subjective product of the "will to power" of different classes: they are objective systems determined by the whole field of struggle between contending classes'. Thus, though we can see, over time, the continuity in themes, interests and content of a dominant ideological formation, we nevertheless have to deal with the process by which ideologies are reproduced, seek and win consent in a contending situation, the social praxis through which they renew themselves at the heart of social life, and gain legitimation as dominant perspectives. This process is compounded by at least two further factors. First, the social division of labour, the distribution of power and the segmentation and differentiation of different classes and groups will work in such a way as 'to stress different elements in the given orthodoxy'. As Harris (1968) comments:

'Orthodoxies have an elastic quality to cover very different social groups, to unite them within a common terminology, but inevitably the version of the orthodoxy held by different social groups will be different, incorporating each group's specific perspective.'

The second point is that ideologies only survive if they are able to change, transform and amplify themselves so as to take account of, and integrate, within the existing mental environment, new events and developments in social conflict. As Gaetz insists, ideologies are 'maps of problematic social reality' (our italics). Ideologies which are thoroughly fixed in their forms and content are not flexible enough to sustain themselves in the face of problematic and threatening events. Thus, though ideologies may remain at one level, stable and persistent over time, in terms of the class interests they represent and the constituent elements legitimated within them, at another level, they require to be continually reproduced, amplified and elaborated
so as to 'cover' the unexplained. As Lefebvre remarks, 'No historical situation can ever be stabilized once and for all, though that is what ideologies aim at'. The objectivation of social knowledge within the environment of a specific ideological formation is, therefore, an on-going social process with its own specific contradictions (Althusser 1971). This process constitutes ideological work as a specific social praxis - and it is this aspect of elaboration which we have tried to 'net' in our concept of 'signification within the public discourse'. It follows from this that ideological discourse is characterised by the rigidity of its structuring at the level of 'deep' interests, and by the relative 'openness' - the flexibility, the labile quality of its forms - at the 'surface' level. The borrowing of a Chomskyan metaphor of 'deep' and 'surface' structures for the study of ideological discourse is not fortuitous, since the study of ideologies as a specific level of a social formation requires precisely such a model by which quite restricted elements give rise, via 'rules' of transformation, and by way of specific forms of praxis (signification) and institutions (e.g. the mass media), to a heterodox variety of 'surface' forms. Recent studies of the nature of ideological discourse stress its polysemic character. Althusser (1970) has observed that, though specific ideologies have a history, there can be no 'history of ideology' as such:

'Unlike a science, an ideology is both theoretically closed and politically supple and adaptable. It bends to the interests of the times, but without any apparent movement, being content to reflect the historical changes which is its mission to assimilate and master by some imperceptible modification of its peculiar internal relations...Ideology changes therefore, but imperceptibly conserving its ideological form: it moves, but with an immobile motion which maintains it where it is, in its place and its ideological role.'

The polysemic or polyvocal character of ideological discourse presents us with another set of problems whose range can only be sketchily be touched upon here. The mediatory role played by rhetoric and symbolisation in the elaboration of ideological formations has been emphasised by Geertz. Ideologies, like other 'cultural' systems, consist of symbolic items, rich and diverse
in their connotational power, which have been ordered and disposed, through
human use and through social structures, into diverse and interpenetrating
meaning-systems. Barthes (1971) and other semiotists have, correctly, drawn
our attention to the fact that since individual items in such meaning-systems
are 'arbitrary', what matters is the relational system (correspondences and
oppositions) into which the elements in a constituted symbolic field - or,
as Levi-Strauss would put it, the relations of difference within a system of
meanings - which specify and signify. Harris observes 'The central role of
culture...is to present us with a diversity of partial or coherent systems
with which to organise our experience, so that by identifying objects and attribut-
ating systematic meaning to them, we shall be able to overcome the problems
we face in seeking to survive'. Of course, the same object may be identified
in a host of different ways within different systems'.

It is the structure of social relations which establish, maintain and
preserve certain meaning - systems in being, generating around them the quality
of a stable, 'taken-for-granted' world, which permits certain ideological clusters
to retain their power to specify new and troubling events in old and legitimated
terms, and which tend to 'rule out of court' other, alternative meanings.
In this way, through their continued production or objectivation within a specific
social formation, certain meanings come to represent what Berger and Luckmann
call 'the social stock of knowledge at hand' which supplies us with 'typificatory
schemes required for the major routines of social life, not only the typific-
ations of others... but typifications of all sorts of events and experiences
both social and natural'.

'When government becomes as changeable as the men who constitute it,
when the apparent objectivity of institutions dissolves into no more
than the contradictory subjectivities of an uncoordinated mass of indi-
vidual men, it is no wonder that some onlookers feel a "sense of meaning-
lessness"'. (Harris 1968)

Not only will ideological systems be polyvocal in their symbolic content: they
will frequently be extended and amplified to deal with new situations by 'putting
together', often in an illogical or incoherent way, what were, previously, the
fragments of more ordered or stable meaning-systems. As they evolve, ideologies employ what Gramsci has called traces embedded in previously accumulated cultural traditions. The process of ideological elaboration is thus closer, as Harris has noted, to Levi-Strauss' process of bricolage, than it is to the consistent elaboration of theoretical or philosophical 'world views'. The usual mode of ideological analysis, common, say, in the work of Lukács or Goldmann, which analyses ideological formations at their most representative and coherent point, linking them with major philosophical totalisations, misses the critical ad-hoc level at which ideologies are brought to bear on specific situations, and organise the experience of particular groups and classes of men. The distinction Harris suggests between 'higher' and 'lower order' meaning-systems is an important one, because it distinguishes the great conceptual schemes and totalisations, historically embedded or sedimented over time, or articulated with a rare logical consistency, from 'lower order' systems which are more directly related to immediate experience, and which are concerned with 'particular ways we use this logic, the associations we make and unmake'.

'It is the lower order systems about which men argue, which change, which vary between historical periods. Of higher order systems, philosophers examine perhaps the tip of the iceberg, giving an account of some of the rules presupposed by our ordinary use...'

In line with this, it seems to follow, as Berger and Luckmann argue, that the critical study of ideology must deal with the continued production of everyday knowledge itself, in so far as this knowledge provides us with the terms, categories and the classifications within which social reality itself is apprehended and maintained. As they remark:

'Only a very limited group of people in any society engages in theorising in the business of "ideas" and the construction of "Weltanschauungen. But everyone in society participates in its "knowledge" on one way or another'.

Such a critical study must therefore take as its object of reflection the forms, content and production of 'everything that passes for "knowledge" in society' - or, to put it in another way, with the everyday forms of ideological consciousness, including the process by which new kinds of knowledge are legi-
timated and win assent for their plausibility in the real world.

This brings us to the third cluster of problems: the relationship between what we have called the different 'agents of signification', or the role which the institutions charged with the production and amplification of 'knowledge' play within a social formation which is complexly structured in dominance. The starting point for such a discussion must be Gramsci's (1971) notion of the production and maintenance of social hegemony.

What we can do... is to fix two major superstructural "levels": the one that can be called "civil society", that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called "private", and that of "political society" or the State. These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of 'hegemony' which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of "direct domination" or command exercised through the State and "juridical" government. The functions in question are precisely organizational and connective. The intellectuals are the dominant group's "deputies" exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government.

The functions for this double structure which Gramsci anticipated included the organisation of 'spontaneous' consent, 'given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group', and the exercise of coercive power, which "legally" enforces discipline on those groups who do not "consent" either actively or passively. Gramsci's (1971b) formulations are based on the notion of the distinctive role and position within the State of the 'coercive apparatus', which brings 'the mass of the people into conformity with the specific type of production and the specific economy at a given moment'; and the apparatus for the maintenance of social hegemony, 'exercised through the so-called private organisations, like the Church, the Trade Unions, the schools, etc.'. He adds that 'it is precisely in civil society that intellectuals operate especially.' This distinction has recently been expanded by such theorists as Althusser and Poulantzas who, while differing precisely in the way they conceive the relations between what Althusser (1971) has called the 'State Apparatus' and the 'Ideological State Apparatuses'; nevertheless share, with Gramsci, a
fundamental determination to think' the specificity of the ideological or superstructural level within a complex social formation. In essence, both insist that a dominant social class maintains its rule and legitimacy, not only through the coercive agencies of the State, but also via 'the whole institutional superstructure of bourgeois class power: parties, reformist trade unions, newspapers, schools, churches, families...' (Steadman-Jones 1972); both insist, therefore, on the specificity, the 'relative autonomy' - until the 'last instance' - of the various levels of the superstructure. Poulantzas (1970) argues that though State power imposes limits on the ideological institutions, 'power relations in the State Ideological Apparatuses do not depend directly on the class nature of the State power and are not exhaustively determined by it'. Thus, 'in a social formation several contradictory and antagonistic ideologies exist'. Althusser (1971) argues that 'ideologies are realised in institutions, their rituals, and practices' - 'it is by the installation of the Ideological State Apparatuses in which this ideology is realised itself that it becomes the ruling ideology'.

'But this installation is not achieved all by itself; on the contrary, it is the stake in a bitter and continuous class struggle: first against the former ruling classes and their positions in the old and new ISA's then against the exploited class... In fact, the struggle in the ISAs is indeed an aspect of the class struggle, sometimes an important and symptomatic one... But the class struggles in the ISAs is only one aspect of a class struggle which goes beyond the ISAs'.

Despite the important differences of emphasis between these theorists, the important questions which they address concern the relations of unity and difference within the ideological or signifying agencies, between the ideological institutions of 'indirect hegemony' and the State institutions of 'direct domination'. Only by concrete analysis can we determine the degree to which the signifying agencies may undertake their work of amplifying and elaborating a specific form of ideological consciousness within limits set by the prevailing structures of power and interest, and yet not be 'exhaustively deter-
mined by it' - becoming, that is, the locus of contending and conflictual definitions of the situation, the focus of struggle at the level of authority and consent, (as Althusser puts it) 'the seat and the stake' of ideological class struggle.'

'Ideologies are not "born" in the ISAs but from the social classes at grips in the class struggle: from their conditions of existence their practices, their experience of the struggle, etc.' (Althusser 1971)

In any specific historical conjuncture, therefore, we are required to examine the specificity of the role and the work which such agencies of signification undertake; to acknowledge that contradictory definitions contend for hegemony within their orbit: at the same time recognising that their form, content and direction cannot be deduced from some abstract 'dominant ideology' which is taken, in a process of conflict-free realisation, to saturate all the complex levels of a social formation from one end to another in an unproblematic manner. As Gramsci observed:

'The dominant group is coordinated concretely with the general interests of the subordinate groups, and the life of the State is conceived of as a continuous process of formation and superceding of unstable equilibria... between the interests of the fundamental group and those of the subordinate groups - equilibria in which the interests of the dominant group will prevail but only up to a certain point, i.e. stopping, short of narrowly corporate economic interests'.

In our case, we are required to offer an analysis which would clarify where the dominant paradigms of an ideological consensus originate: what the role of the media, the political apparatus and the judicial and other agencies of face-to-face control play in elaborating those definitions: the existence of disjunctures between the different levels of civil and state institutions in the amplifying of such 'maps of problematic social reality': the differences between the different institutions, and yet their complex unity-in-dominance: the locale of struggle and conflict in the elaboration of consensual perspectives: and the forms of class struggle expressed by these similarities and differences.

We cannot undertake such an analysis here. But this resumé of problems
posed by our initial analysis allows us to formulate, more precisely, the
nexus of issues which this paper explores. It is an attempt to explore the
mediations between a rhetoric and ideological discourse, its social location
and function. The position adopted is that these levels must be studied, at
once, with attention to their full specificity, and, simultaneously, in terms of
their place in a complexly structured social formation. This attempt necessi-
tates what might at first appear to be a theoretical detour, by way of certain
key concepts and perspectives of phenomenology, symbolic interaction and ethno-
methodological ideas. In this detour, what, in former paradigms which have given
this problem sustained attention, is presented either as an unmediated deter-
minanism (v'lar Marxist) or a formal determinism (structuralism) is transmuted
back into the concepts of praxis — signification maintaining and interpreting
a social reality, definitional work, etc. . Ideological discourse about
problematic political events are not conceived as flowing, full-blown, from
the heads of practical bourgeois men and institutions, as unproblematic for
them as they are for those who are enclosed within their horizons of thought.
'Explanations' of political events are conceived as normative structures
which have to be objectivated by their own specific social practices, evolved
and realised by specific groups and institutions, maintained and sustained amidst
contending definitions in situations, and only with some difficulty winning
assent among subordinate groups. Such 'explanations' are related to more
stable, more comprehensive historical ideological formations, in that, at a
lower level of specificity, they rehearse, thematically, linguistically,
rhetorically, the 'vocabularies of motive', the historical interests and
experience of dominant groups and classes which lie embedded within the environ-
ment of a public language, and which are drawn on — made active — in a per-
suasive sort of 'labour', in specific settings of dominance. There are points
at which such definitions are minted anew, when the work of ideological briccolage
is accomplished for the first time: there are other times when these rhetorical
elements, in their truncated form, lie sleeping in the public language, awaiting an appropriate sequence of events to awaken them. In crisis moments, when the ad-hoc formulas which serve, 'for all practical purposes', to classify the political world meaningfully and within the limits of legitimacy are rendered problematic, and new problems and new groupings emerge to threaten and challenge the ruling positions of power and their social hegemony, we are in a specially privileged position to observe the work of persuasive definition in the course of its formation. This is a privileged moment for the student of ideologies. In this process the mass media play an extremely important role; but they remain only one of the several institutions in which this process of signification is realised. The relation at any specific moment between the ad-hoc definitions arrived at within their domain and the structure of a prevailing or dominant ideology: the relation between the work of managing the definition of social reality and reproducing the relations of production and power; the relation between the ideological and the coercive apparatuses of the State; the outcome of the groups which contend on its terrain over the means and modes of signification: the relation, above all, of the operative definitions of power and control, which are employed by the state apparatus, to the structure of definitions 'determined by the whole field of struggle between contending classes' - the area of consensus, to which the media seem too powerfully attached: these and other related issues can only be clarified by the study of a specific conjuncture between the different levels of practice and institution in a historical moment.

We said such a study was only possible on the basis of a theoretical detour. But the route by which such insight is gained into the specificity of ideological discourse cannot be the final resting place of theory. Phenomenology teaches us to attend, once again, to the level of meaning: symbolic interaction presses on us the decisive level of 'definitions of the situation' as critical intervening variables: ethnomethodology refers us to the interactive
work by which normative features of interpreted social situations are sustained, and to the indexical character of expressions. Yet, in the end, these different aspects of the process by which abnormal political events are signified must be returned to the level of the social formation, via the critical concepts of power, ideology and conflict.

'The question', Dreitzel (1970) has recently observed, 'is to understand how the assignment of significance to social actions and events works'. We have to analyse the construction of such norms and typifications through the pattern of interpretive communication'. But,

'in order to overcome the limitation imposed by phenomenological bracketing, studies of communicative behaviour should be open to the fact that the rules of interpretation are not invariable essences of social life-world, but are themselves subject to other social processes... In fact, communicative behaviour rests on work and power relations as well as on language; and if we comprehend the typification schemes of language as the cost fundamental rules of everyday life, we also have to notice that even language is subject to distortions caused by the condition of our lifestyle... The interpretive paradigm may well serve to bring a deeper understanding of the potentialities as well as the limitations of the patterns of communicative behaviour that produce and reproduce the social reality... However, the social world is structured, not only by language, but also by the modes and forces of material production and by the systems of domination...'

VI

Militant political activity of the kind described in this paper is a real, new, emergent feature of political conflict in our society. Its significance as a form of 'political deviance', while not wholly attributable to the cultural process by which such acts are labelled and defined as deviant, appears in large measure as an aspect best understood in terms of that labelling process. Events are real enough, but they are appropriated in social consciousness only as they are culturally defined. Our analysis must therefore attempt to discover the ideas, values and attitudes which inform those definitions. It must also reveal the categories, conscious or unconscious, into which events are grouped and classified, ranked and ordered, so as to make them meaningful. These frameworks of value and meaning are 'inferential normative structures' of social life. They are widely shared, though not by everyone, and are not
understood in the same way by groups who have different life-situation and projects, and who may be the objects rather than the subjects or authors of such 'accounts'. These maps of meaning give plausibility order and coherence to discrete events, by placing them within a common world of meanings. Culture is knitted together by these overlapping, partially closed, incomplete mappings of problematic social reality. Such 'structures' tend to define and limit the range of possible new meanings which can be constructed to explain new and unfamiliar events. In part, such normative structures are historical constructs, already objectivated and available as the informal social knowledge - 'what everybody knows' about a social situation. They have been routinised and sedimented over time, and are available for the construction of new definitions and labels only in truncated form. They also exhibit varying degrees of 'closure' and of 'openness', of coherence or contradictoriness. They are 'moving structures' in that they must be continuously revised and amended to 'cover' new events. They are never stable. The process of amending and revising known definitions, or of constructing new ones, is a societal process, and like all processes in society, is 'structured in dominance'. Nor are they fixed. They contain or make use of their own 'logic-in-use', which serves as a set of loose generative rules which govern the way the 'explanation' can be used. Such normative definitions contain strong predispositions to 'see' events in certain ways: they tend to 'rule in' and 'rule out' certain kinds of additional inferences.

In problematic situations, old normative structures are often 'mapped' on to new situations, or new situations are 'mapped' in terms of older meanings. While not limited to 'social interest' in a narrow sense, such structures arise in and are maintained by the reciprocity of social life: they therefore have embedded in them the life-situations, outlooks, interests and informal models of the social world of those who actively project them. They are structured by power and domination: inevitably, the normative ad-hoc explanations of
dominant groups tend to exert more power, to 'cover' a wider range of topics, to provide more inclusive and comprehensive formulations, than those of subordinate groups. The conflicts between social groups are thus always and inevitably mediated by conflicts between contrasting normative definitions: indeed, the conflicts are understood only in so far as such outlooks exist. These structures thus 'betray themselves' at different levels of social life, with respect to wider or narrower areas, with greater or lesser degrees of structuration. At the level of everyday comprehension, the common-sense world is 'classified out' in stereotypical ways which simplify and crystallise complex social processes in distinctive ways. At this level, then, they surface in the form of informal 'models', ad-hoc explanations, proverbs, maxims, routines, recipes, truncated social myths, images and scenarios. At the level of social life as a whole, they 'surface' as full-blown ideologies, symbolic universes, secular versions of the sacred canopy.
NOTES

1. Empirical work relating to this project is currently being undertaken in the News/media project, Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, Birmingham

2. Deviance always represented a 'deviant' area within the overall American structural-functionalist paradigm. Cf.: D. Matza, Becoming Deviant (1969, Prentice-Hall)


5. No adequate theoretical account of these emergent movements is yet available. Habermas, though abstract and moderate in perspective, is suggestive: Toward a Rational Society (1971, Heinemann). Two modest but important attempts are J. Mitchell, Woman's Estate (1971, Penguin) and T. Haim 'Why it happened' in The Beginning of the End, ed. Quattrocchi and Nairn (1968 Panther). Any adequate account would have to deal with what Gramsci called 'organic' and 'conjunctural' features.

6. Though contemporary critiques retain both the notion of 'dominant ideology' and of 'consensus', there is little detailed work which analyses the mediations between them.

7. For a brief characterisation of 'consensus politics', see May Day Manifesto, ed. Raymond Williams (1968, Penguin)

8. For the original notion of a 'deviancy amplification spiral', see L. Wilkins, Social Policy, Action and Research (1967, Social Science Paperbacks). For its application to the role of the media, see J. Young, 'Role of the Police as Amplifiers of Deviancy', in Images of Deviance, ed. S. Cohen (1971, Pelican)


10. The perspective employed here is, of course 'ethnomethodological'. Cf. especially, H. Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology (1967, Prentice-Hall)


12. Work is only just beginning on the specificity of 'signification' as a form of praxis. Apart from the work of marxist structuralists, such as the Tel Quel group, see some suggestive remarks on poiesis as a praxis,


14. The media both serve as primary agents of signification, generating descriptions and explanations of their own account, and as secondary agents, relaying and amplifying accounts given by other agencies. Where it secondary function is concerned, the link must be made via the notion of the media's 'accredited witnesses' - its sensitivity to other power signifying agencies in society, set against the problems of access by alternative minority groups. It is by way of some structure composed of accredited witnesses/limited access/notions of news values that the media reproduce the structure of dominance and subordination within the public discourse.


16. I am indebted here, especially, to Jock Young and Stan Cohen for the opportunity to discuss work in the area of the media and 'deviance', much of it as yet unpublished, which considerably advanced this argument. See, *inter alia*, Jock Young, 'Mass Media, Drugs and Deviancy', unpublished paper for the BSA Conference on 'Social Control, Deviance and Dissent', and Stan Cohen, *Hods and Rockers: Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, (1972, Paladin)


18. The semiological analysis of ideological discourse now developing in France appears as yet to have made little or no impact on traditional content analysis or mass communications 'effects' studies which use content analysis as a base.

19. Sketch, 27th January 1969

20. Sketch, 28th January 1969

21. Telegraph, 3rd February 1969

22. For a very similar model, cf.: J. Young, 'Mass Media, Drugs and Deviancy', *op. cit.*

23. See, for example, E. McCann, *The British Press and Northern Ireland* (N.I. Socialist Research Centre, 1971) and H. Foot, 'Ulster Coverage or Cover Up', *Irish News*, 7th January 1972

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