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The University of Birmingham, P.O. Box 363, Birmingham B15 2TT

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THE POLITICS OF POPULAR CULTURE;
CULTURES AND SUB-CULTURES

John Clarke and Tony Jefferson

Department of Cultural Studies
University of Birmingham

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This paper is an attempt to look at how youth sub-cultures have been variously conceived and to present an alternative conception. More precisely, it looks at what we take to be the shortcomings in various approaches and, basing ourselves on these shortcomings, it formulates what we feel to be the crucial elements in an alternative approach. Brief sketches of what this alternative conception might look like in practice are proffered, to exemplify, at certain points in the paper. Finally, and crucially for us, the paper ends with a "political" redefinition of youth culture.

The classic American text on "the social life of the teenager" is Coleman's The Adolescent Society.(1) Concerned with adolescent status systems and their educational implications, it takes as its starting point, along with Musgrove's English text Youth and the Social Order,(2) which is concerned with the determinants and consequences of the status of youth, the notion of adolescence created primarily by the economic change which have resulted in the need for longer, more formal and institutionalised training in schools. This age segregation of adolescents in secondary schools creates a distinct social system: the adolescent society. This is the starting point for both authors so that while Coleman takes a microscopic look at this adolescent society (its values, activities, interests, etc.) in a number of schools, so as to gain insight into the factors shaping its contours, and Musgrove at the status of youth at different times, together with a re-examination of a number of common assumptions about youth, both ignore the notion of class-based youth cultures.

This is not to say that they are not aware of different youth cultures. Coleman specifically states that it is important not "to see adolescent culture as all of a piece, a single invariant entity".(3) But, after examining the culture in a number of schools, he can only conclude that the cultures are more alike than different, despite the presence of some very interesting deviant, lower-class (girl) cliques who wore black, "rock and roll" jackets and preferred Elvis Presley to Pat Boone. In favour of the 'general' adolescent culture these deviations are concluded away. Musgrove, too, gestures towards his awareness of different youth cultures: 'delinquent', 'separatist cultural', 'political' and 'conformist', but the only one that is followed through in a sustained way is the conformist grammar school one. Finding secondary modern 'rejects' less frustrated and more at one with adult life generally than he expected, his attention focusses on the conflicts and strains produced by grammar schools, and the way neuroticism and introversion are rewarded in such schools and at university. And since, finally, he believes adolescence to be essentially a created socio/psychological category, his concluding call for an earlier admittance into the adult world, for a reduced rather than, as at present, a prolonged adolescence, prevents him taking their real, and we would add class-based, problems seriously.

This treatment of adolescence as a single monolithic culture, which is the net effect in both Coleman and Musgrove, together with the ignoring of class as a crucial element in understanding different youth cultures, cannot be levelled at the sub-cultural theorists concerned with delinquency. Emerging from all their studies in the class basis of delinquency: the fact that court convictions for delinquent acts are

predominantly the preserve of working-class adolescent boys. (Thus studies in Bethnal Green, for example, reveal that 1 in 3 such boys will appear before courts before they are 21.) This class differential becomes more pronounced if one looks only at 'indictable' (the more serious) offences and even more so if one considers only 'repeaters' (persistent offenders). Even if one makes allowances for the fact that middle-class delinquency is probably higher than official statistics indicate, this does not alter the ubiquity of working class delinquency, since the real figures are, probably higher than official statistics, if the boys' own accounts are reliable: young adolescents in Bethnal Green "commonly regard stealing as normal".(4)

Theoretical explanations of this delinquency, centre heavily, on both sides of the Atlantic, on the contrast between a prosperous and democratic society and the lot of the working-class boy within it, although obviously interpretative emphases differ. American interpretations have used notions of "status frustration" (profound disenchantment with available legitimate opportunities)(5), "alienation" (withdrawal of attributions of legitimacy for conventional norms)(6), and "anomie" (the conflict between culturally defined goals and the institutional norms available for achieving them).(7) British theorists, following the same tack but unable to find the same degree of discontent and frustration, have talked primarily in terms of "dissociation" (simply not caring about the middle class institutions of school and work).(8)

But in these studies, as in Coleman, often the most interesting, and potentially the most fruitful areas, are not fully explored: the concern with a general theoretical interpretation requires that significant minority findings are, to some extent, glossed over. Willmott's Bethnal Green survey, recorded in Adolescent Boys of East London, revealed, for example, that about 15% of the adolescents were "rebels", i.e. they were generally more antagonistic to school, work and the police, got on less well with their parents, were more likely not to want to get married, and were more rejecting of the notion of 'deferred gratification'. Although Willmott concludes that the serious delinquents were probably drawn from the "rebels", no attempt is made to follow them up in detail. And so the notion of "dissociation", despite these significant exceptions, is allowed to hold sway.

We believe that one area which could help with these theoretical gaps, created by ignoring 'significant exceptions' and which has not been explored by delinquency theories, is the area of 'cultural symbolisation', or 'style'. A look at culture simply through activities, attitudes, interests and values (observed or solicited) remains superficial so long as it ignores cultural symbols since, for us, such symbols (e.g. dress and music) are attempts, by people, to make meaningful, at the cultural level, their social reality.

The third approach to youth culture - the literary, journalistic attempts to historically map the fields of post-war Youth Culture - fails, despite imaginative insights, to adequately come to terms with either class or style. Nuttall's Bomb Culture, the first, and still the best, account, exemplifies this failure: the bridging of theoretical gaps with rhetorical flourishes. The book, an attempt to trace the gradual emergence and crystallisation of a distinctive international subculture - the

"underground" - in the years between 1945 and the mid 60's, is founded on two suspect theses: (i). the notion of the supreme importance of Hiroshima in explaining the initial rise of the "disaffiliated" sub-cultures, and (ii). the notion of the congruence of the various disaffiliated groups in the 60's to form the underground. The Hiroshima thesis is held to account for the "formalised stoicism" of the post-war spivs, the "real affectlessness" of the Teds, and the culmination, in the mid 60's, of the first "completely formalised society", founded on "defensive brutality", the Hell's Angels. The congruence thesis, the coming together of the middle-class, C.N.D. protesters and working-class disaffiliates, rests upon the idea of "bridges" being built. Alexis Korner, a trad jazz man who turned to skiffle and Chris Barber, a populariser of trad jazz via his hit-parade successes are seen to be seminal link men. The emergence of the underground is thus seen as a result of such bridges - the point of cultural development where the previously separate traditions of pop, protest and art begin to merge and, as a result of it being impossible to wallow any longer in the filth and brutality of the Post-Hiroshima world, the point of cultural development where negative rebellion from the dominant culture changes to positive affiliation with an alternative one.

Even despite the many questions left unanswered by the above sketch of Nuttall's thesis, we would want to argue that the real point of departure is not Hiroshima, post-war austerity and the spivs but the early 50's, the emergence of rock, "affluence" and the Teds, since they offer so obviously a recognisable change in 'style'. We would also want to take issue with the congruence thesis: the skinheads hostility to the hippies emphatically demonstrates how one working-class sub-culture did not see their future as part of the underground. Obviously, despite Nuttall's attempts to 'yoke' together working class and middle class disaffiliates, the class basis of youth cultures remains strong.

All of these approaches then, we find wanting: the approach that deals with youth as an entity in itself without reference to class; the approach of the sub-cultural theorists of delinquency which ignores the element of style; and the approaches of the pop historians which do less than justice to both class and style. Having said this, we need now to begin sketching the elements of our approach. From what we have already said, some of these elements will be obvious.

Briefly to sketch these in, we take the crucial elements in any examination of youth culture to be class, historically located structures and cultures, and social reaction. Leaving aside for one moment the notion of social reaction, what we need to ask about any youth sub-culture are:

- (1) Who are its principal 'bearers and supports' in class terms?(10)
- (2) What is their structural situation which sets limits to their possible courses of action, i.e. what is their historical situation in relation to the basic structures of society (i.e. income, education, housing, employment and race)?
- (3) How do these structural constraints operate to modify the range of possible cultural responses or options? (By cultural response

we mean a response which, whilst not freely chosen since it is subjected to structural constraints, nevertheless attempts to impose meaning. It is both symbolic expression of a given structural situation, and a negotiated adjustment to it: both subjective reaction to objective structural conditions and an attempt to objectivate subjective experiences of the world).

A brief look at the Teds will demonstrate this approach in action. Primarily a lumpen proletariat phenomenon, it 'erupted' in South London during a relative worsening of the structural position of the young of this particular class fraction. Many were unemployed which, in a period of full employment represents a relative 'worsening'. In housing, too, a similar worsening of their situation is clearly visible. The ecological redevelopment of London which caused the break up of long-standing communities, together with the "planning blight" endemic in the take-off phase of such comprehensive inner city redevelopment (a rise in land values, a fall in rental values, the buying up of dilapidated property by speculators and 'Rachman-type' landlords, the migration of people and local employers the movement in of immigrants) meant a severe dislocation for young and old alike, for those that left and for those left behind.(11)

In Education, the Education Act of 1944 meant that since now all were to be educated according to merit, those not selected for grammar school had now only themselves to blame. It was their lack of ability and not, as with their parents, the class inequalities endemic in the system - or so the meritocratic myth went anyway. But as for income, the general rise in teenage earnings, which had doubled compared with pre-war standards, meant that those in employment were comparatively affluent.(12) But the general lack of public provision for leisure,(13) together with the fact that the embryonic commercial provision was still largely for the over 20's,(14) meant that there was little real provision for a group who, because of their exclusion in the fields of work and education, ironically demanded more from their leisure. Nevertheless, this was the (restricted) 'space' where cultural options were taken up and invested with meaning. The only space available, the 'caff' and the streets, were adopted as 'home' and the only area where a meaningful identity could be forged in the areas of 'self' (in the form of a fussily vain appearance), the 'cultural extensions' of the self (crucially dress and music) and the 'social extensions' of the self (the group) were cultivated into a style: a style based on defending a tenuous and constantly threatened status (hence their touchiness to insults over appearance and dress which started many of the Ted 'incidents' and on a celebration of their assigned role that of 'outsiders' (via the bastardization of the original Edwardian look and their embracement of 'defiant' rock as 'their' music). The nature of their cultural response, as just outlined, becomes meaningful to them, comprehensible to us, and, in the final analysis 'political'. by re-creating symbolically, at the cultural level, their relationship to the basic structures of society (which ultimately have their sources in the distribution of power and wealth within a society), we would argue that this is, latently at least, a political response.(15)

There is though, a modification to be made to this thesis - as it stands it falls into the trap of those studies that regard youth sub-cultures in isolation from the parent cultures. These approaches,

stressing the 'generation gap' ignore the continuities between parent culture and youth sub-culture. Miller, taking issue with those American theorists that talk of delinquent sub-cultures arising through conflict with middle-class culture,(16) feels that the "focal concerns" of the male adolescent corner group are those of the general cultural milieu in which it functions, i.e. lower-class culture, although the "relative weighting" and importance of these concerns pattern somewhat differently for adolescents than for adults. Thus "trouble", "toughness", "smartness", "excitement", "fate" and "autonomy" are focal concerns for both lower-class parents and their offspring.(17) Matza and Sykes have similarly attacked the notion that the values underlying the delinquents behaviour constitute a deviant normative system. They assert that many delinquent values have their counterpart in the "subterranean values" of the "dominant" society - values whose expression is confined to ritual occasions, holidays, sport, etc... Thus, for them, "thrill-seeking" is not a deviant delinquent norm, but a subterranean value of the dominant society which is held in abeyance until it can be expressed in an accepted and acceptable way. The delinquent is, on this reckoning, simply someone who suffers from bad timing.(18) Phil Cohen offers the most complex formulation. He feels that the succession of post war youth cultures have been attempts to express and "magically" to resolve the contradictions which remain hidden or unresolved in their parent culture. For him, the parent culture which has been under the greatest stress during the period - and thus the one which has generated most youth sub-cultures - has been the "respectable" working-class. Pulled between the two contradictory ideologies of the day, the traditional ideology of production (the so-called "work ethic") and the new media promoted ideology of "spectacular consumption", these "internal conflicts" become registered most deeply in, and on, the young where they "came to be worked out in terms of generational conflict". In essence then, for Cohen, all post war youth cultures are variations on the same theme: they "all represent, in their different ways, an attempt to retrieve some of the socially cohesive elements destroyed in their parent culture, and to combine those with elements selected from other class fractions, symbolising one or other of the options confronting it." Thus mods, for example, can be seen as exploring the "upward" option of spectacular consumption, skinheads the "downward" one of the celebration of more traditional working-class loyalties.(19)

Our position borrows something from all of these approaches. But where it substantially differs is in its explanation of the observable differences between the cultural responses of parent culture and its youth sub-culture. For us, none of these approaches adequately tackles this question, though Cohen's formulation, inadequately sketched here, comes closest of all to our approach. We would want to argue that whilst many youth cultural responses have the same structural 'root', since both parents and offspring, as members of the same class fraction, have similar negotiations to make with the dominant culture (although the responses of the young are often less muted, less 'negotiated',(20) and take place often in illegitimate, non-institutionalised settings and are, hence, labelled deviant or delinquent), not all of them are of this nature. Some youth cultural responses are engendered by structural conditions that are quite specific to youth. Thus the changed employment situation for the young school-leaver and education, which has been crucial in opening up unattainable options, are areas of structural inequality where the young,

and only the young, are affected. As a consequence, much in their cultural response has to be viewed as relating to their specific socio-historical situation.

Our view of youth sub-cultures, to end this section of the paper, is, in brief, that they originate in structural inequalities and culminate in specific historical moments: moments when the negotiations of particular subordinate class fractions both for a space and a definition of self become crystallized, for a short period, into a recognizable cultural style: a specific, symbolic system.

The Social Reaction to Youth Culture:

At this point we wish to turn our attention to the social reactions to Youth Cultures, and begin by identifying two dimensions of these reactions: the media and the police. In the post-war British press, youth cultures have been pictured as anti-social outsiders who threaten the stability of the social order: all the various specific youth cultural groups - the Teds, Mods and Rockers, Hippies and Skinheads - have been cast in this role, as have less well defined, but still obviously youthful stereotypes, such as hooligans, thugs and muggers.

The stereotyping which casts these groups into the role of what Cohen has called "folk devils" is dependent on a number of factors. The public in a large scale complex society is susceptible to such stereotyping because for information about things outside their immediate personal orbit they are dependent upon the media.(22) Secondly the groups themselves are vulnerable because (with the possible exception of the Hippies) they are relatively unorganized and inarticulate and have little access to major channels of communication to oppose the public definitions attributed to them in the media. Thirdly, the stereotype's effectiveness is dependent upon its use of the imagery of the existing moral order, and its representation of youth groups as standing outside this order. They are defined in terms which specify their distance from the rest of 'us' - the 'us' in question being the 'vast majority of sensible, law-abiding citizens', while their stereotypes are at best uncivilised, at worst subhuman - yobs, thugs, hooligans, packs of wild animals and so on. Finally, the stereotyping identifies the group's outsider status in terms of equating its chosen uniform with the publicly condemned behaviour, - the cloths, it seems, maketh the man.

This stereotyping fulfils a valuable function for the continuing political drama, for it provides the opportunity for a symbolic reaffirmation of the validity of the established social and moral order against those who would front its code of conduct.(23) The moral anger of the outraged community which is directed against those outsiders is captured by the phrase which is seemingly engraved in every English magistrate's heart: "decent people must be protected from people like you." And the vision of a stable and well behaved society, embodied in the plea for 'law and order', is once again upheld.

In such ways are the general discontents and strains generated by the experience of rapid social change and the advent of "affluence" displaced on to those who are held to exemplify the dysfunctional side of

such changes. Thus 'we've never had it so good', but 'they've had it too good and too early.'(24)

The second dimension of the social reaction is the relation of the police to youth cultural groups, all of whom have suffered extreme police harassment in their activities. The "moral panics" in the media have contributed to this in two significant ways. By stereotyping the groups in terms of their outsider status, the expectation was established that anyone wearing vaguely Mod clothes and riding a motor scooter on a Bank Holiday was on his way to a major gang war, and those with long hair and strange clothes were sure to be carrying drugs. A more recent example came in this newspaper item headed "Portrait of a growing menace".

"Scotland Yard's top detective gave a verbal identikit picture of a mugger yesterday. Then he apologised in advance to any long-haired youths who may mistakenly be pounced upon by police when they might only be waiting for a girlfriend."(25)

Secondly an important element of these media-carried moral panics was the prediction that unless immediate and severe action was taken the Ted/Mod/Hippie/Skinhead situation would soon get much worse. In response to these demands (often voiced by 'leaders' of the community), and in line with the cultural stereotype, the police have paid especial attention to young people who identifiably 'belong' (or at least seem to belong) to youth groupings. For example, trainloads of youths were turned away from seaside resorts on Bank Holidays, while at football matches police impounded large numbers of bells, boots and braces belonging to skinheads. These are of course justified on the grounds of preserving the peace, but involve an unusual extension of police powers and the victimisation of selected groups within the community.

The effects of such social reaction may vary: they may, for example, strengthen the commitment of the original members of the group to the style; they may make the option more widely available to those who find what it offers attractive; or it may cause the fragmentation, break up, or further development of the style in order to retain its authenticity and integrity (these responses may also be generated by attempts by commercial institutions to co-opt the less radical 'stylistic' consumer elements of the original culture - producing, in the classic phrase, "plastic hippies").(26)

Certain shortcomings of this approach must be noted. Employed by itself, it may lead to an absence of concern for the genesis of the behaviour which is labelled 'deviant', and consequently, a lack of concern for its meaning for those actors involved with it. The naive statement that 'deviance is in the eye of the beholder' ignores the fact that such behaviours are meaningful for those who commit them, as well as for those who label them.(27)

Consequently we would insist that the insights of the social reaction perspective must be employed within the same general view of society and social action as our earlier analysis used. Thus if cultural styles are to be seen as cultural responses to structurally generated problems, then the social reaction to them, albeit from a different class

situation, is a response to those phenomena which are deemed problematic or threatening, and a response which must be articulated within certain structural and cultural dimensions.

'Reading' Youth Cultural Styles

We now wish to sketch how we feel cultural studies should approach these recognisable cultural styles. We should not expect to find within these groups an articulate self-definition at a verbal level, that is, the level at which most of us would consider articulacy to be primarily achieved: in most cases they come from those sectors of society where such articulacy is held in suspicion and to whom formal education offers only minimal training in such fine arts. Instead their self definition is articulated at the level of style. There are two dimensions which a reading of any such style must take into consideration: that of the internal meanings,(28) the style's constituent elements, and that of its external location: the events, situations and meanings which together form the historical conjecture in which it arises.

As a brief example of such a reading we have chosen to use the Skinheads.(29) They first came to prominence at the end of 1967, and their chosen uniform involved hair cropped very short, plain or overchecked "Ben Sherman" shirts with button down collars, heavy duty jeans worn very short and supported by braces, and heavy boots, usually with steel toecaps. Their main activity involved violence at football matches, usually against rival gangs of supporters, and extended to vandalism on the way to and from football matches, (often involving spraying their team's name in paint onto convenient surfaces). Other well publicised but comparatively minor activities were those of 'Paki-bashing' and 'queer bashing' (their definition of queer stretching to cover those males with long hair and brightly coloured clothing.

Their historical location was briefly this: they developed most strongly in those traditional working class areas which were undergoing substantial change: most noticeably, redevelopment necessitating enforced mobility and the breakdown of traditional extended family arrangements; an influx either of young middle class property buyers or sizeable numbers of coloured immigrants; and a disappearance of the focal points of the traditional community: the corner shop, the pub and the streets as a major area of "communal space".(30)

Their class position - typically from the respectable working class - meant they were confronted with a class based education system which ideologically represented itself as an open/achievement based system: a representation which left the responsibility of failure resting on the individual alone and not on the previously overt class inequalities. Their occupational present and future were those of routine "dead end" manual jobs (and often a regular succession of these) or at least regular periods of unemployment.

Finally we wish to look at their relationship to other youth cultural developments. In the preceding few years youth culture had been dominated by two major themes - the mods and the underground. The mod style was essentially one of 'affluent consumerism' - involving rapidly

changing dress and dance styles, supported by basically English rhythm and blues groups, hectic parties maintained through the use of pills, both stimulants and depressants. Their 'conspicuous consumption' was a youthful extension of the image of the 'affluent worker' prevalent in England through the previous decade. By 1967 the Mod style had become totally commercially institutionalised - its clothes had been incorporated in Carnaby Street and the nationwide boutique chains, their pop heroes institutionalised by the record industry as untouchable superstars.(31) The Underground's developments were based on the individual, ideas of freedom, the expansion of consciousness and self knowledge through mysticism and drugs, its music involving the musical complexities of jazz and rock, or the significant lyrics of contemporary folk song. It was an essentially middle class based culture.(32)

Against this background, the style of the skinhead may be identified as an attempt to reassert the focal concerns of traditional working class culture in an era when its demise was apparently imminent. Thus when communal space was being removed by urban redevelopment, the football ground was chosen as the place for the celebration of communal and territorial loyalties, to be defended against 'outsiders'. Two other dimensions focus on the football ground as the significant location. Football has historically been one of the major leisure activities for the male working class,(33) and other more typically youthful leisure outlets were dominated either by the stagnant commercialised remains of the mods or the individualist intellectualised culture of the Underground. A similar parallel may be seen in the turning away from the use of drugs and a return to the traditional working class 'liberator', beer and the pub, which as before became another major leisure and territorial focus. Their group basis may be seen as a reassertion of the historical collectivist tendencies of the working class against the individualising, nuclear family based effects of urban redevelopment while the violence fulfilled a number of the focal concerns of working class culture - the assertion of territoriality, of masculinity (it is noticeable that both the Mods and the Underground went some way to blurring traditional masculine-feminine stereotypes), and of providing excitement (both in the fighting itself and the discussions of it afterwards) and temporarily at least, feelings of power and being in control. Finally the uniform itself possessed a purely functional quality in its appearance - a hardness and starkness which makes it seem almost a parodied representation of working clothes.

We are suggesting then that the skinheads may be "read" as an attempt to revive a culture which was changing and entering into new negotiations of its own with the dominant culture as a response to its changed structural position.

The Politics of Youth Culture

In turning to what we have called the politics of youth culture, we hope to draw some of the earlier themes together in terms of viewing youth culture as a struggle for control, an attempt to exert some control over one's life-situation. What characterises most youth culture is the search for excitement, autonomy and identity - the freedom to create their own meanings for their existence and to symbolically express those, rather than simply accepting the existing dominant meanings.

The members of youth cultures recurrently enter into 'negotiations' with the dominant structures and culture of society in the attempt to impose their definition on their situation. These negotiations typically involve the exploitation of two types of social space: firstly that leeway traditionally afforded by society for youth to "have its fling" before taking up its responsibilities (although that leeway is usually double edged, involving both tolerance and intolerance - simultaneously celebrating the freedom of youth, and demanding that it show proper respect for adult rules and regulations); and secondly they exploit the space provided by the commercial leisure facilities aimed, usually, at the teenage market. They exploit these possibilities by attempting to turn them to their own purposes: for example, seaside towns for the Mods provided an escape from the confines of family and neighbourhood and which gave the expectation that "something" would happen.

That these negotiations in youth culture should take place primarily in the leisure area is not surprising for it is here that the controls of the dominant structural and cultural arrangements are at their weakest. By comparison, school and work restrict their autonomy, minimise excitement and involve a more compulsive imposition of meanings from external sources - most obviously the authority structures of such institutions. For the youth as well as for their parents, fulfilment is to be found outside such institutional ties.

In terms of its political content then, we would characterise youth culture as being involved in a struggle fundamental to the social order - that of the control of meaning. Here one can see the significance of the media's stereotyping (and thereby redefining) youth cultures - it is an attempt by the dominant culture to reaffirm its own view of society as the only correct one. It is significant that in this struggle for the control of meaning, one of the most frequent adjectives used to describe disapproved of behaviour by the young is 'meaningless'.

Our use of 'political' here is a broad one, but one we feel is all the more justified by the increasing narrowness of its normal usage. We wish to emphasise that this attempt to define and express one's own situation and to break with dominant cultural representations is a very real political struggle, both for those attempting to do it, and for those of us attempting to analyse and understand such phenomena from a distance.

FOOTNOTES

1. Collier-Macmillan, 1961
2. R.K.P. 1964
3. Coleman, op.cit., p.43
4. Evidence and quotation from P. Willmot, Adolescent boys of East London, Penguin.
5. See A.K. Cohen, Delinquent Boys, Free Press (paperback) 1971 (1st ed. 1955)
6. See R. Cloward and L. Ohlin, Delinquency and Opportunity, Free Press, 1960
7. See R. K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, Free Press, 1957
8. See D. Downes, The Delinquent Solution, R.K.P., 1966
9. Paladin, 1970. (See also G. Melly, Revolt into Style, Allen Lane, 1970.
10. See Phil Cohen "Subcultural conflict and working class community" in WPCS 2.
11. This section of ecology condenses much of Phil Cohen's argument, op.cit.
12. For the evidence on teenage "affluence", see N. Abrams, The Teenage Consumer, London Press Exchange, 1959.
13. See T. Fyvel, The Insecure Offenders, Penguin 1961.
14. See S. Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics, Paladin, 1973.
15. This is a condensed account of the argument in T. Jefferson, "The Teds: a Political Resurrection", Annali, (University of Naples). (Also stencilled paper No.22 C.C.C.S.) Much of the empirical evidence is drawn from Fyvel, op.cit.
16. Principally, A.K. Cohen, op.cit.
17. W.B. Miller, "Lower class culture as a generating milieu of gang delinquency", Journal of Social Issues, 1958, Vol.15
18. D.Matza and G. Sykes, "Juvenile delinquency and subterranean values". A.S.R., 1961, Vol.26.
19. P. Cohen, op.cit.

20. For a discussion of the 'negotiated' versions of subordinate culture, see F. Parkin, Class Inequality and Political Order, Paladin, 1971.
21. S. Cohen, op.cit.
22. J. Young, "Mass Media, Deviancy and Drugs" in P. Rock and N. McIntosh (eds) Deviance and Social Control, Tavistock, 1974.
23. See K. T. Erikson, Wayward Puritans, Wiley, 1966.
24. See S. Cohen, op.cit.
25. Daily Express, 8.3.73.
26. For a consideration of "deviancy amplification", see J. Young, The Drugtakers, Paladin, 1971.
27. For a critique of the social reaction/labelling perspective, see I. Taylor, P. Walton and J. Young, The New Criminology, R.K.P. 1973, Ch.6.
28. For a consideration of the internal meanings of style, see P. Willis: Pop Music and Youth Cultural Groups in Birmingham, PhD. Thesis, C.C.C.S.
29. The material here draws on J. Clarke, "The Skinheads and the Study of Youth Cultures", Annali (also CCCS Stencilled Paper No.23) and The Paint House, Penguin, 1972.
30. See P. Cohen, op.cit.
31. See inter alia, D. Hebdige "The Style of the Mods", Annali, (also CCCS Stencilled Paper No. 20), S. Cohen, op.cit., and G. Herman, The Who, Studio Vista, 1971.
32. See J. Young: "The Hippies: an essay in the politics of leisure", in I. Taylor and L. Taylor (eds) Politics and Deviance, Penguin, 1973.
33. See C. Critcher, "Football and Cultural Values", MPCS.1