



**CENTRE FOR CONTEMPORARY
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Stencilled Occasional Paper

TRANSLATION OF PIERRE BOURDIEU

'THE CULTURE FIELD AND THE ECONOMIC FIELD'

by

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I. SYMBOLIC POWER

page 2, first paragraph, last line: for "integrations" read "integration"

page 3, second paragraph, line 8:
for "the power to impose and even inculcate)"
read "the power to impose (and even inculcate)"

page 4: the sentence which appears as Note 5 should be inserted in the
main text. It forms a separate paragraph, between lines 3 and 4.
It starts the fourth section of this text.

page 5, note 9, line 13:
for "interest of the class which is opposed"
read "interest of the class, i.e. the enlightened conservatism
which is opposed"

page 7, "1971 (b)": "Genèse et structure..."
page 3, line 1: for "Contrary to" read "Against"

INTRODUCTION

In the Spring of 1977 two major works by Pierre Bourdieu became available in English - Reproduction and Outline of a Theory of Practice. These overdue publications will make it possible for substantive knowledge in Britain and America of the corpus of Bourdieu's writings to catch up with a reputation hitherto based on a small number of not always well-translated articles.

This stencilled paper makes two further - modest - contributions to the stock of texts now accessible to the English reader.

The first, Symbolic Power, was originally delivered, in French, in Harvard in 1973. It indicates some of Bourdieu's debts to various strands in the social science traditions, and, through these placings and critiques, sketches the foundations of Bourdieu's own sociology. The account given here of the conditions and effects of symbolic power, though brief and therefore abstract (perhaps even cryptic), may well prove useful as a navigational instrument in an exploration of Bourdieu's more substantial writings.

The second piece, Qualifications and Jobs, by Pierre Bourdieu and Luc Boltanski, is also perhaps best seen as a tool for use in conjunction with other texts. It brings into play the gains achieved in the previous research work of the Centre for European Sociology, of which Bourdieu is the Director. It first appeared (in 1975) in Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales, the journal published by the CES. As a note indicates, its purpose is to signal the orientation of current research. This function, together with its brevity, may lead this text, taken in isolation, to appear as a series of abstract reflections. But that would be to give a very misleading picture of Bourdieu's work, which is characterized by an insistence on the necessary unity of theoretical and empirical research work; on the self-annulling futility of a "purely" theoretical labour.

In its original form in Actes, the article was accompanied by a number of newspaper cuttings and other documents which strikingly emphasize the immediate pertinence of the text to processes now at work in France. The use of similar illustrations to accompany this translated text would no doubt have been equally impressive. But things are not so easy. Britain does not now exhibit a pattern of relations between the economy and the school (and, third element, the media) immediately comparable with those now obtaining in France. Newspaper extracts would have testified to significantly different forms of antagonism between agents (or institutions) in the economic and educational fields, and would have outrun the present text, pointing to the work of analysis which offers itself to be done on this side of the Channel. It is clear, for example, that exploration of the current British situation would be led to emphasize much earlier the relationship between the private and public sectors (both of the economy and of the school) - an aspect understandably absent from Qualifications and Jobs.

But it is, nonetheless, Bourdieu's work (as a whole) that will make the decisive contribution to such a study. The article translated here presents itself as a sketch of the possible applications of concepts (developed more fully elsewhere, especially in Reproduction) - such as the habitus, cultural capital, or the relative autonomy of the field of specialized production - which have an essential part to play in any future analysis of the educational system and its relations with the class structure.

SYMBOLIC POWER.

This somewhat "scholastic" diagram is designed to give a synoptic view of the sum of the achievements of social science which have to be integrated (and superseded) in order to produce an adequate theory of symbolic power.

1. "Symbolic systems" (art, religion, language) as structuring structures.

"Symbolic systems" are symbolic forms (Cassirer, 1958), instruments for constructing reality. This tradition emphasizes the cognitive function of symbols, ignoring the question of their social functions. It is concerned to grasp the specific logic of the different forms of organization of the world, the different modes of cognition (myth, language, art, science). The so-called Sapir-Whorf tradition, which sees language as an instrument of knowledge and construction of the world of objects, is an American version of the Kant-Humboldt-Cassirer tradition. In "Perspective as Symbolic Form", Erwin Panofsky in fact treats perspective as a historical form without going so far as systematically to reconstruct its social genesis (Panofsky, 1924).


Durkheim explicitly sets himself in the Kantian tradition (Durkheim, 1915). However, inasmuch as he seeks to give a "positive" and "empirical" answer to the problem of knowledge, escaping the dilemma of apriorism and empiricism, he lays the foundations for a sociology of symbolic forms (Durkheim & Mauss) (Cassirer explicitly states that he uses the concept of form of classification as an equivalent of "symbolic form" - Cassirer, 1946 p.16). With Durkheim, forms of classification cease to be universal (transcendental) forms and become (as they implicitly are for Panofsky) social forms, i.e. arbitrary and pertaining to a particular group. One thinks of the etymological meaning of katagoreisthai, which Heidegger has reminded us of - to accuse publicly; and, by the same token, one thinks of kinship terms, the example par excellence of social categories (terms of address).

In this idealist tradition, objectivity is defined by the agreement of subjectivities, sense by consensus.

2. "Symbolic systems" as structured structures amenable to structural analysis.

Structural analysis provides the methodological instruments which make it possible to achieve the neo-Kantian ambition of grasping the specific logic of each of the "symbolic forms": by means of a tautological (as opposed to allegorical) reading which relates myth to nothing other than itself, as recommended by Schelling, structural analysis seeks to establish the immanent logic of each symbolic production. But, unlike the neo-Kantian tradition, which emphasized the modus operandi, the productive activity of consciousness, the structuralist tradition privileges the opus operatum, the structured structures (Lévi-Strauss, 1966, 1968). This is seen clearly in the conception which Saussure, the founder of this tradition, has of language: the structured system of the language is fundamentally treated as the condition of the intelligibility of speech, as a structured medium which must be constructed in order to account for the constant relationship between sound and sense. (1)

(1) By the opposition he establishes between iconology and iconography, (which is the exact equivalent of the opposition between phonology and phonetics), Panofsky (and that whole aspect of his work which seeks to draw out the deep structures of works of art) places himself in this tradition (Panofsky, 1955).



First Synthesis

"Symbolic systems" are instruments of knowledge which exert a structuring power insofar as they are structured. Symbolic power is a power to construct reality which tends to establish a gnoseological order; the immediate meaning (sens) of the world (particularly of the social world) presupposes what Durkheim calls logical conformism, i.e. "a homogeneous conception of time, space, number, and cause which makes agreement possible between intelligences". Durkheim - or, after him, Radcliffe-Brown, for whom "social solidarity" rests on the sharing of a symbolic system - has the merit of explicitly pointing to the social function (in the structural-functional sense) of symbolism, a genuinely political function which is not reducible to the structuralists' communication function. Symbols are the instruments par excellence of social integration: as instruments of knowledge and communication (cf. Durkheim's analysis of the feast), they make possible the consensus on the sense of the social world which makes a fundamental contribution toward reproducing the social order; "logical" integration is the precondition of "moral" integrations(2).

3. "Symbolic systems" as instruments of domination.

The Marxist tradition privileges the political functions of "symbolic systems", at the expense of their logical structure and their gnoseological function (though Engels speaks of "systematic expression" apropos of law*). This functionalism (which has nothing in common with structural functionalism à la Durkheim or Radcliffe-Brown) explains symbolic productions by relating them to the interests of the ruling class. Unlike myth, a collective product collectively appropriated and consumed, ideologies serve particular interests which they tend to present as universal interests, common to the whole group. The dominant culture contributes to the real integration of the dominant class (by ensuring immediate communication among all its members and distinguishing them from the other classes); to the fictitious integration of the society as a whole, and hence to the demobilization (false consciousness) of the dominated classes; and to the legitimation of the established order by the establishment of distinctions (hierarchies) and the legitimation of these distinctions. The dominant culture produces its specific ideological effect by concealing its function of division (or distinction) under its function of communication: the culture which unites (a medium of communication) separates (an instrument of distinction), and legitimates distinctions by defining all cultures (designated as sub-cultures) in terms of their distance from the dominant culture (i.e. in terms of privation), identifying the latter with culture (i.e. excellence).

2. The neo-phenomenological tradition (Schutz, 1962; Berger, 1966), and certain forms of interactionism, accept the same presuppositions simply by omitting the question of the social conditions of the possibility of doxic experience (Husserl) of the world (particularly the social world); i.e. the experience of the social world as "taken for granted" (as Schutz puts it).

* /E.g. Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, in Marx and Engels, Selected Works, London 1968, p.617, (trans.)./

Second Synthesis

Contrary to all forms of the "symbolist" error which reduces relations of force to relations of communication, it is not sufficient to note that relations of communication are always, inseparably, relations of power which depend, in their form and content, on the material or symbolic power accumulated by the agents (or institutions) involved in those relations and which, like the gift or the potlatch, may enable them to accumulate symbolic power. It is as structured and structuring instruments of communication and knowledge that "symbolic systems" fulfil their political function as instruments of domination (or, more precisely, of legitimation of domination), which help to ensure the domination of one class over another (symbolic violence), adding the reinforcement of their own force to the relations of force which underlie them and so contributing, in Weber's phrase, to the "domestication of the dominated".

The different classes and class fractions are engaged in a specifically symbolic struggle to impose the definition of the social world that is most consistent with their interests; the field of ideological positions reproduces the field of social positions, in a transfigured form (3). They may pursue this struggle either directly, in the symbolic conflicts of daily life, or vicariously, through the struggle between the specialists of symbolic production (full-time producers), for the monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence, i.e. the power to impose and even inculcate instruments of knowledge and expression (taxonomies) of social reality, which are arbitrary but not recognized as such (Weber, 1968; Bourdieu, 1971 b and c).(4) The field of symbolic production is a microcosm of the symbolic struggle between the classes: it is by serving their own interests in the struggle within the field of production (and only to that extent) that the producers serve the interests of the groups outside the field of production.

The dominant class is the locus of a struggle for the hierarchy of the principles of hierarchization (Bourdieu, 1971a). The dominant fractions, whose power is based on economic and political capital, seek to impose the legitimacy of their domination either through their own symbolic production (discourse, writings, etc.) or through the intermediary of conservative ideologists who only ever really serve the interests of the dominant fractions incidentally, i.e. only to the extent they thereby serve their specific interests as professional producers, and who always threaten to divert to their own advantage the power of defining the social world which they hold by delegation. The dominated fraction always tends to set cultural capital - to which it owes its position - at the top of the hierarchy of the principles of hierarchization (this remains true of those whom the logic of the struggle within the field of cultural production leads to serve the interests of the dominant fractions).

To insist that instruments of communication and knowledge are, as such, instruments of power, is to insist that they are subordinated to practical functions and that the coherence which characterizes them is that of practical logic (contrary to the structuralist error which, attending only to the logical and gnoseological function, overestimates the internal logic

(3) The ideological position-takings of dominant-class agents are reproduction strategies tending to strengthen belief in the legitimacy of that class's domination, both within that class and outside it.

(4) The ideological work of specialists has the effect of making explicit and systematizing, and thus of providing the means of transforming simple practical mastery into symbolic mastery; of transmuting the unsayable into the sayable, of transgressing the boundaries of the unthinkable.

of "symbolic systems" and "ideological systems", elliptical and allusive quasi-systematizations oriented by ethical and political dispositions) (Bourdieu, 1972). (5)

"Symbolic systems" differ fundamentally depending on whether they are produced and, by the same token, appropriated by the whole group or, on the contrary, produced by a body of specialists and, more precisely, by a relatively autonomous field of production and circulation (6). The history of the transformation of myth into religion (ideology) is not separable from the history of the constitution of a corps of specialized producers of religious rites and discourses, i.e. the progress of the division of religious labour, which is itself a dimension of the progress of the division of social labour, and hence of division into classes (Weber, 1968; Bourdieu, 1971,b), and whose consequences include the dispossessing of the laymen from the instruments of symbolic production(7).

Ideologies owe their structure and their most specific functions to the social conditions of their production and circulation, i.e. to the functions they fulfil, first for the specialists competing for the monopoly of the competence in question (religious, artistic, etc.), and secondarily and incidentally for the non-specialists. When we insist that ideologies are always doubly determined, that they owe their most specific characteristics not only to the interests of the classes or class fractions which they express (the "sociodicy" function) but also to the specific interests of those who produce them and to the specific logic of the field of production (usually transfigured into the ideology of "creation" and the "creator"), we obtain the means of escaping crude reduction of ideological products to the interests of the classes they serve (a "short-circuit" effect common in "Marxist" critiques), without falling into the idealist illusion of treating ideological productions as self-sufficient and self-generating totalities amenable to pure, purely internal analysis (semiology) (8).

(5) Instruments of domination that can structure because they are structured, the ideological systems which specialists produce through and for the struggle for the monopoly of legitimate production reproduce the structure of the field of the social classes in a misrecognizable form, through the intermediary of the homology between the field of ideological production and the field of the social classes.

(6) The Marxist tradition affirms the relative autonomy of ideologies and the producers of ideology but without establishing the foundations and social effects of this autonomy.

(7) The existence of a specialised field of production is the condition for the emergence of a struggle between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, which are alike opposed to doxa, i.e. the undiscussed.

(8) We also escape the ethnologism (visible, in particular, in the analysis of archaic thought) of treating ideologies as myths, i.e. undifferentiated products of collective labour, and so neglecting all that they owe to the characteristics of the field of production (e.g. in the Greek tradition, the esoteric reinterpretations of the mythic traditions).

The specifically ideological function of the field of ideological production is performed quasi-automatically on the basis of the homology of structure between the field of ideological production, organized around the opposition between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, and the field of struggles between the classes for the maintenance or subversion of the symbolic order. This struggle is organized around the opposition between the dominant ideology, a structured, structuring medium tending to impose apprehension of the established order as natural (orthodoxy) through masked (and hence misrecognized) imposition of classificatory systems and mental structures objectively adjusted to the social structures, and heterodox (or critical) discourse, a symbolic power to mobilize and subvert which actualizes the potential power of the dominated classes by destroying the false self-evidences of orthodoxy (the fictitious restoration of doxa), and so neutralizing the power to demobilize which it contains.

The homology between the two fields causes the struggles for the specific objectives at stake in the autonomous field automatically to produce euphemized forms of the ideological struggles between the classes (Bourdieu 1975b). The fact that the correspondence is only ever effected from system to system masks, in the eyes of the producers themselves as well as in the eyes of the profane, the fact that the internal classificatory systems reproduce the directly political taxonomies in a misrecognizable form (9) and that the specific axiomatics of each field is a transmuted form (transmuted in accordance with the specific laws of the field) of the fundamental principles of the division of labour (for example, the university classificatory system makes explicit in a quasi-systematic form and so legitimates the objective divisions of the social structure and especially the division of labour - theory and practice - converting social properties into essential properties (- Bourdieu, 1975 d.). The specifically ideological effect consists precisely in the imposition of political systems of classification in the legitimate guise of philosophical, religious or juridical taxonomies. Symbolic systems owe their specific force to the fact that the power relations expressed in them only ever manifest themselves in the misrecognizable form of sense relations (displacement).

(9) Meaning, i.e. function, is revealed in the correspondence between one structure and another (ideological field and social field) or one position and another (within each of these fields) and not between one element and another. For example, internal analysis of doxosophic discourse (produced by the "political science" specialists) shows that the most frequent rhetorical device consists in projecting two extreme positions (archaic conservatism - unrealistic revolutionism) in order to generate the mid-point of rational and reasonable equilibrium; this structure, understood as such, corresponds to the structure of the dominant class, characterized by the opposition between an ideologically retrograde fraction, threatened with decline, and a progressive fraction (dominant-dominated), with the bureaucratic fraction having as its particular interest the general interest of the class which is opposed both to reactionary conservatism and to blind progressivism. Thus it is the ideological system as such and not this or that element of it (e.g. the affectation of stylistic neutrality in Le Monde or Flaubert's refusal of commonplaces) which can be brought into relation with the system of social relations that it expresses - like the phoneme, which has no link with a concrete referent except insofar as it functions within a system.

Symbolic power - the power to constitute the given by stating it, to show forth and gain credence, to confirm or transform the world view - and, through it, action on the world, and hence the world itself, the quasi-magical power which makes it possible to obtain the equivalent of what is obtained by (physical or economic) force, thanks to its specific mobilization effect - is only exerted insofar as it is recognized (i.e. insofar as its arbitrariness is misrecognized). This means that symbolic power does not lie in "symbolic systems" in the form of an "illocutionary force" but that it is defined in and by a determinate relationship between those who exercise power and those who undergo it, i.e. in the very structure of the field in which belief is produced and reproduced (10). The power of words; and commands, the power of words; to give orders and bring order, lies in belief in the legitimacy of the words and of the person who utters them, a belief which words cannot themselves produce (Bourdieu, 1975 c).

Symbolic power, a subordinate power, is a transformed - i.e. misrecognizable, transfigured, and legitimated - form of the other forms of power. A unified science of practices must supersede the choice between energy models which describe social relations as relations of force, and cybernetic models which make them relations of communication, in order to describe the transformational laws which govern the transmutation of the different forms of capital into symbolic capital and, in particular, the work of dissimulation and transfiguration (in a word, euphemization) which makes it possible to transfigure relations of force by getting the violence they objectively contain misrecognized/recognized, so transforming them into a symbolic power, capable of producing effects without visible expenditure of energy (Bourdieu, 1970) (11).

- (10) The symbols of power (vestments, the sceptre, etc.) are simply symbolic capital objectified, and their efficacy is subject to the same conditions.
- (11) The destruction of this power of symbolic imposition based on misrecognition presupposes an awakening of consciousness of arbitrariness, i.e. the unveiling of objective truth and the annihilation of belief.

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II.

QUALIFICATIONS AND JOBS: The Relationship between the Production System and the Reproduction System.

by Pierre Bourdieu and Luc Boltanski

translated from "Le titre et le poste: rapports entre le système de production et le système de reproduction"

Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales (1ère année)
2 March 1975, pp. 95-106.

II.

QUALIFICATIONS AND JOBS.

1. The transformational laws of the field of producer, production and the field of economic production, and the resulting structural discrepancies

All surveys on mobility and all historical comparisons take for granted what ought to be the central object of inquiry, i.e. the permanence of the relation between words and things, between titles (le titre) and jobs (le poste). (1) How meaningful is it to identify the primary-school teacher of 1880 with the primary teacher of 1930 and the primary teacher of 1976? Is the son of a primary teacher really the son of a primary teacher in the same sense in which he himself is a primary teacher? Doesn't the nominal identity hide a real disparity? But that is not all: in the struggle between the classes, the dominant class may pay in real satisfactions or in nominal satisfactions (no less real, sociologically). This means that if nominal identity can cover real differences, nominal differences may serve to maintain real identities: this is the logic of "standing in". But this is still too simple: fobbing off with appearances can't be done with impunity. To possess the name is to feel the right to claim the things normally associated with those words, i.e. the practices (e.g. the "studentification" of adolescents in rural areas when enrolled in CEGs (2)), and the corresponding material and symbolic profits (wage claims, etc.).

Mobility theories tend to reduce to individual mobility on the one hand that which is the product of change in the apparatus for the production of agents (the educational system, ES), and on the other hand that which stems from transformation of the structure of posts, i.e. transformation of the economic apparatus. The summary materialism which, recognizing only technological determinism, would see changes in machinery as the sole principle underlying changes in the occupations of the agents who serve the machinery, forgets that apparatuses like the ES, which produces agents for production, have a relative autonomy, which is the source of effects of hysteresis (for example, the ES may be producing arts graduates when the production apparatus demands scientists). Explanation in terms of technological determinism is no doubt proportionately less valid when one looks at sectors of production where the amount of cultural capital invested is greater (hence more valid for semi-skilled building workers than for electronics engineers). We must avoid two types of reduction: it is the play between changes in the production apparatus and changes in the educational system that is the source of the time-lags between competences (habitus) and structures. These discrepancies have to be understood in terms of the present state and history of the relationship between the educational system and the production system.

(1) This working note is a summary and programme originally intended for internal use at the Centre for European Sociology, Paris. It offers for discussion, in a rapid, provisional form, the hypotheses underpinning a number of research projects now in progress. Hence its sometimes somewhat elliptical formulations.

(2) CEGs: Collèges d'enseignement générale, providing a "secondary modern" schooling.

So we must analyse the relationship between the transformational laws of the field of economic production and the transformational laws of the field of producer production, i.e. the school and the family, with the school tending to occupy a more and more important place as the economic apparatus develops and grows in complexity. In earlier modes of production, where the quantity of cultural capital incorporated in machines and agents was less great, changes in the mode of production brought about changes in the relations of production more rapidly and more directly. In a state of the mode of production in which the cultural capital embodied in machines and in the producers is very great, the ES becomes the dominant agency (instance) for the production of producers. But, because it fulfils not only functions of reproducing skilled labour power (which we shall call, for the sake of simplicity, the function of technical reproduction), but also functions of reproducing the positions of the agents and their groups within the social structure (the function of social reproduction) -- positions which are relatively independent of strictly technical capacity --, the educational system depends less directly on the demands of the production system than on the demands of reproducing the family group. Furthermore, the specific logic of the ES, as described in our previous research, (3) leads it to organize itself in terms of the imperatives of its own reproduction, and this predisposes it to fulfil its function of social reproduction rather than its function of technical reproduction. It is clear that analysis of the internal laws of the ES as a relatively autonomous field was indeed the prerequisite for any analysis of the relationship between the ES and the economic apparatus, and in particular of the structural tension resulting from the fact that the ES and the economic apparatus obey different logics and consequently have very different structural durations: we find in the logic of the ES the principle of the structural discrepancy between the ES and the economic apparatus which gives the agents' strategic games their objective basis.

The interests of the purchasers of labour power incline them to reduce the autonomy of the ES to the minimum, and to place the ES, like the family, in direct dependence on the economy -- with autonomy manifesting itself in the form of the time-lag between the speed of evolution of the ES and the speed of evolution of the economic apparatus (hence, for example, the employers' desire to reduce the length of schooling). With the growing role of the ES in reproduction, reproduction is taken out of the hands of the family, but also out of the hands of industry. The process which takes the ES away from the family also takes it away from the economy. In the ES, a socially powerful agency contrives to operate in a relatively autonomous way with respect to the economy. The ES, an apparatus for producing competent producers, is also a juridical apparatus guaranteeing competence: the mass of the agents whose value on the labour market depends on academic guarantees tends to constitute a social force of growing strength.

It is necessary to distinguish between the economy, whose own dynamism is the mainspring of the changes in the system of posts, and the educational system which is the main producer of the producers' technical capacities and of the formal qualifications (titres) which they hold. Each system obeys its own logic: the ES has, with respect to the economic system, a relative autonomy and its own tempo of evolution; unlike other systems, the ES has a strong relative autonomy with respect to the economy, and hence a structural duration particularly out of phase with that of the economy. A capitalist economy may have a partly mediaeval ES. It

(3) See, in particular, P. Bourdieu and J.-C. Passeron, Reproduction, London, 1977, (translator's note).

follows that the play between formal qualifications and jobs is perhaps unprecedented.

The pertinent feature of the ES as regards its relationship with the economic apparatus resides not in the fact that it produces producers endowed with a certain technical competence (a process on which it has no monopoly), but in the fact that it bestows on these products -- whether or not equipped with a technically measurable technical competence -- formal qualifications bearing a universal and relatively timeless value. In so doing, it introduces the principle of an autonomy of formally qualified economic agents vis-à-vis the free play of economic necessity (and this explains the hostility of the dominant agents in the economic field towards the ES, a collective mechanism of protection, and their preference for "internal" qualifications, e.g. the "company-trained" engineer). The diploma universalizes the worker because, analogous in this respect to money, it makes him a "free worker", in Marx's sense, but one whose competence and all his correlative rights are guaranteed on all markets (as opposed to the "company-trained" product who is chained to a market because all his properties come to him by virtue of the post he occupies). It guarantees a de jure competence which may or may not correspond to a de facto competence (this is the legalism inherent in the educational qualification). The time scale of the diploma is not that of competence: the obsolescence of capacities (equivalent to the wear and tear of machines) is masked/denied by the timelessness of the diploma. Personal properties such as the diploma are acquired once and for all and accompany the individual throughout his life. The result is a possible discrepancy between the competences guaranteed by qualifications and the characteristics of jobs, in which change, stemming from the economy, is more rapid.

2. The labour market and the transactions between qualification holders and job suppliers.

In order to grasp how the relations between the educational system and the economic apparatus are established in practice, and how the relative autonomy of the ES manifests itself in a practical way, we must take as our object the specific effect of educational guarantees on the labour market (defined as the system of objective relations governing the transactions which take place in practice between agents offering qualifications guaranteed by the ES and agents -- or institutions -- offering posts). The "articulation" of instances is no more than a word easily articulated until one has grasped the specific logic of the innumerable confrontations, all different but all equally necessary in terms of the relative positions of the agents concerned in the power relations prevailing at a given moment between the holders of a definite qualification and the suppliers of jobs. In these transactions, the sellers of labour power have the more strength the greater their educational capital, defined as embodied cultural capital that has received school sanctioning and is therefore juridically guaranteed. What they have to offer on the labour market (and, more broadly, their social identity) may be entirely reducible to the capacity implied in the fact of filling a post (a company-trained engineer) or, on the contrary, to the title they possess, which may contain no information as to their capacity to fill a given post (e.g. in France, an agrégé or a member of the Conseil d'Etat) -- with a number of agents having properties which derive partly from their formal qualifications and partly from their jobs (they are doubtless to be found mainly in the middle classes). The value they receive on the labour market depends the more strictly on their educational capital the more rigorously the relationship between qualifications and posts is codified. Conversely, the more fuzzy and uncertain the definition of the qualification and the definition of the post, and hence their relationship, as in the recently developed

occupations (the jobs of the various kinds of "representatives"), the more room there is for strategies of bluff: the more, for example, the possessors of social capital (connections, "manner", bearing, etc.) can obtain a high rate of return on their educational capital.

This shows, incidentally, the inanity of the textbook opposition between the analysis of structures -- here, the still empty, formal analysis of the relations between the ES and the economic apparatus -- and partial, blind analysis of strategies -- here, analysis of the games and double games made possible by the relationship between diplomas and jobs; it is by constructing, through an analysis of the objective structures, the site where strategies are in practice generated, that one is able to escape the unreality of the theoreticist "articulation of instances" as well as the hyper-empiricist abstraction of interactionist descriptions which, under the guise of returning to the things themselves, bracket off the structural conditions, and hence the true meaning, of the strategies analysed. As soon as one poses in this way the problem of the relation between formal qualifications and posts as the manifestation, at the level of practical experience, of the relation between the tempos of transformation of technique, the economy, and the school, politics (otherwise evacuated) reappears, in the form of individual strategies which agents implement in order to defend themselves against exploitation or to exercise it -- in everyday class struggles --, to maximize the return on their qualifications or to derive maximum profit from their posts; or in the form of collective strategies, implemented by the trade unions or professional bodies and aimed at establishing, through conflict or negotiation, a guaranteed relation between qualifications and jobs, a relation which is at all times an object of struggle, with the sellers of labour power seeking to make the most of their diplomas while the buyers of labour power try to obtain as cheaply as possible the capacities which those diplomas are supposed to guarantee. (This struggle is itself one of the factors in economic inflation). It is largely because it plays a determinant role in this struggle that the ES is an object of political struggle, a struggle which, here too, may take the form of individual strategy -- with the reconversion strategies which are the motor of the processes of inflation of academic qualifications (4) -- or collective strategies (organized by teachers' unions or parents' associations and above all, perhaps, in this area, by less visible pressure groups). The masters of the economy have an interest in suppressing the formal qualification and its basis, the autonomy of the ES; they thus have an interest in completely merging qualification and post. They want to get the technical capacities that are produced by the instrument of producer production (the ES) without paying the quid pro quo, i.e. the guarantees bestowed by the existence of a relatively autonomous ES (i.e. the diploma). The ES produces no competence (e.g. the capacities of an engineer) without producing the universalizing-eternalizing guarantee effect of competence (the title of engineer). The masters of the economy do not have an interest in the formal qualification which gives agents a certain freedom relative to the economic system. The more autonomous the diploma-producing agency relative to the economy, the greater the independence which the diploma it dispenses gives relative to the economy. Hence the employers' dream of a school system merged with industry, a company school (cf. the Orleans conference on formation permanente /continuous in-service training/, 13-14 November 1970). For their part, the producers of qualifications have an interest in defending the autonomy and value of

(4) See P. Bourdieu, L. Boltanski and M. de Saint Martin, Les stratégies de reconversion, Social Science Information 12 (5), 1973, pp. 51-113.

qualifications. Qualification holders also have an interest in this, which rises with the extent to which their economic and social value depends on qualifications. The power a title gives is not individual but collective, since one cannot contest the legitimate power (the rights) a title gives its bearer without thereby contesting the power of all title holders and the authority of the ES which guarantees it. But it would be a mistake to see an antinomy in the fact that a qualification is that much more precious (costly) when it is rarer but by the same token has fewer champions. In reality, the strength of a title is not measured by the power to subvert (and hence the sheer number) of its holders, but by the social capital with which they are endowed, which they compound by virtue of the distinction which objectively constitutes them into a group and can also serve as a basis for intentional gatherings (old boys' associations, clubs, etc.). Thus the alumni of the grandes écoles are a perfect example of the small group which owes its strength to the magnitude of the social capital held by its members, precisely because of their small number and hence their scarcity, and because of the solidarity which unites them and enables them to pool symbolically and often practically the capital which they possess individually.

The members of the ruling fractions of the dominant class, who, especially through the intermediary of the grandes écoles, make use of entitlement (titularisation) in their own reproduction strategies, cannot overtly contest the legitimacy of the academic title and so deprive the sellers of labour power of the protection afforded by the title, without depriving themselves of a highly effective instrument for legitimating access to the dominant positions and for dissimulating the direct modes of heritage transmission. They can only act on the system of diploma-dispensing agencies and try to control indirectly the award of qualifications by favouring those educational institutions tied to the economy by personal bonds (the teaching staff, etc.) or institutional bonds (the board of governors, subsidies, etc.), at the expense of the relatively autonomous agencies (universities) whose "mission", we are reminded, is "the training of teachers for higher and secondary education" and not the skilling and "selection of men" destined for production. The employers' contradiction -- to maintain the advantages which entitlement gives the dominant class while limiting the access of the other classes to the advantages conferred by the title -- is resolved by the development of private educational institutions, the institutions for training, updating and retraining that are encouraged by the emergence of formation permanente and, perhaps, more generally in the setting up of a tripartite educational system, with grandes écoles to reproduce the dominant class, technical schools controlled by the economy to reproduce the skilled workforce, and the university to reproduce the university. Thus, the objective collusion between the strategies of the ruling fractions of the dominant class and the strategies of the sellers of educational services (whose number tends to rise with the volume of qualification holders) helps to explain how it is that the universalizing of the value conferred on the diploma, and the correlative monopolizing of sought-after positions by diploma holders, can coincide with a withering away of the university's monopoly of the award of diplomas. The growth in the number of diploma holders (which tends to favour the exclusion of non-diploma holders and the obsolescence of older mechanisms of promotion and, secondarily, the devaluation of each particular diploma that accompanies translation of the whole system of diplomas), the universalizing of diploma recognition, and the unification, at least in this respect, of the labour market, have generated their contrary -- the diversification of the educational market and the development of an educational apparatus more directly adapted to the economic system and capable of challenging the monopoly of the public sector school system.

The low-autonomy educational institutions created, financed, or controlled by big business are determinant elements in the struggle between those classes and class fractions who have an interest in defending the value of the diploma (the higher fractions of the working classes, skilled workers, foremen, etc., new middle-class fractions, technicians, middle-rank executives in commerce or the medico-social services, etc.) and the ruling fractions of the dominant class for whom control over the value of the diploma and over the mechanisms of access to diplomas constitutes one of the instruments helping to control the value of skilled labour power, to fix it, contain it, or, in other cases, devalue it by "disqualification" or "de-qualification".

3. Classification struggle and class struggle

The ES plays a prime role in the individual and collective conflicts, transactions, and negotiations which take place between the owners of the means of production and the sellers of labour power, over:

1. the definition of the post: the tasks which the occupiers of the post must perform and also, by the same token, the tasks they can refuse;
2. the conditions for access to the post: the properties which the occupants of the post must possess (essentially diplomas, sometimes also age, etc.);
3. the remuneration paid to the occupants of the post and the place of that remuneration within a hierarchy of remunerations;
4. the name of the post or, if you will, of the position.

In societies divided into classes, social taxonomies - the systems of class classification which produce the representation of the groups (e.g. socio-occupational categories or salary-scale categories) - are, at every moment, produced by and at stake in the power relations between the classes. Depending on the state of the power relations, a group may obtain a post without obtaining the material remuneration and symbolic remuneration of those who are formally entitled (the "stand-in"), or obtain all the material advantages but not the name (the sub-manager). They may, on the other hand, be fobbed off with the name, without getting the material advantages corresponding to their formal qualifications. The holders of qualifications may respond to these strategies by endeavouring to create situations of fait accompli - taking the titles in order to try and obtain the corresponding remunerations, or taking the material remunerations and the "responsibilities" in the hope of securing the corresponding titles. In short, there is always a gap between the nominal and the real (of varying magnitude from one period to another and from one sector to another within the same social formation), and the struggle over classifications plays on this discrepancy with strategies aimed at bringing the nominal closer to the real or the real closer to the nominal. This struggle is institutionalized in the machinery of collective negotiation which produces collective contracts legalizing the established systems of classification and fixing a guaranteed state of the balance of power between the classes as regards the system of classification. But the labour market is not the only arena of this bargaining: from all the studies which have been made to determine the relative prestige of the occupations or the means of enhancing the attractiveness of this or that deserted occupation, nothing worthy of note emerges except the innumerable forms assumed by the struggle for the definition of the image of the occupations, with the affirmation of respectability and honourability responding to the reductive stereotype and denigration. As a product of struggle and bargaining, the names of trades (or posts) may in certain conditions (to be defined) be subject to processes of inflation. The various groups will seek to change the names in order to keep aloof from certain groups and get closer to other

groups (semantic distance being a transformed expression of social distance). The psychology and sociology of work contribute to the production of bureaucratic taxonomies (of which the INSEE (5) catalogue of occupations represents the *summa*) by providing allegedly objective descriptions of the jobs to be done and of the properties required in the agents appointed to do them. Thus, bureaucratic taxonomies are the product of a recording, in accordance with procedures recognized as scientific, i.e. positivistic ones, of taxonomies which are not produced scientifically but negotiated in the bargaining between employers and employed. Positivist taxonomies such as the taxonomies of the INSEE or the "classes" of American sociology (an immense denial of class) are the product of a recording of the given as it gives itself, which implicitly contains an adherence to the established order. The illusion of recording (which the ethnomethodologists have revamped for modern tastes with the neo-Schutzian theory of the "account", which makes science the mere recording of common sense *qua* verbal apparatus constituting the world) leads one to accept a pre-constructed given (or even an official definition of the world) instead of breaking with the appearance offered by the given in order really to construct its rules of construction (6). Momentarily fixed products of the struggle or negotiation between groups, systems of classification, such as the vocabulary of occupations or ranks, with its rude words and its euphemisms, are not, as the idealist tradition would have it, forms of construction of social reality or even of experience of social reality, but simply the principles of constitution of the official, legitimate experience of the social world at a given moment in time. Whether one looks at bureaucratic taxonomies arising from collective negotiation and endlessly subjected to multiple deformations under the pressure of the different groups, or the less highly rationalized classificatory systems that are carried by ordinary language and used by the different classes in their everyday classifying operations, these taxonomies have not only logical but also practical functions. In social coding, words are followed by effects (and this is the definition of law). If a word is forgotten when the definition of an occupation is being drawn up, there are effects: for example, a man may have to perform a task he doesn't want to perform or, conversely, a man may not be allowed to perform tasks he would like to perform.

Social terminology - the issue at stake and the principal instrument in the symbolic struggle between the classes for the definition of the social world, i.e. for the constitution of social classifications - belongs, like kinship terminology in other societies, to the order of official categories, i.e. of law, the authorized discourse and discourse of authority which, in social formations equipped with a school apparatus, owes the essence of its authority to the educational system. Like the bureaucratic taxonomies which integrate all occupational situations, from barman to barrister, into a series of homogeneous, explicit categories, the educational system gradually brings all occupations, even the least rationalized and those most abandoned to the diffuse transmission of skills, into the hierarchized universe of the educational qualification, so that the effect of naturalization and eternalization of classifications which it tends to produce by virtue of its inertia is gradually extended to the whole social structure. Thus the classification struggle is one dimension, but doubtless the best-concealed one, of the class struggle. Every taxonomy, even the categories used to judge works of art, refers back, in the last resort, to the opposition between the classes; but this relation is the less apparent the more autonomous the field in which these classification systems are produced. The specifically ideological effect of misrecognition (méconnaissance) results from the transformation that each field imposes on the initial classifications and, by the same token, on the misrecognizable form which the classification struggle assumes there.

(5) Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques.

(6) See for example J.D. Douglas, Understanding Everyday Life Chicago: Aldine 1970 and P. Attewell, "Ethnomethodology since Garfinkel", Theory and Society 1 (2) 1974 pp. 179-210.