

What does 'knowing' mean? Otto Pächt hears Moritz Schlick

Barbara Czwik

Introduction, sources, and objective

In Otto Pächt's curriculum vitae, it says: 'At this time in close collaboration with Hans Sedlmayr, who was inspired by the ideas and results of Gestalt psychology he took the initiative for a reorientation of the Vienna School of Art History.'¹ However, this paper addresses another aspect of Otto Pächt's *formation* as a scholar, which complements the conventional perspective of his curriculum vitae.

This article introduces aspects of a manuscript by the art historian Otto Pächt (1902 Vienna – 1988 Vienna) stored in the Art History Department's archive at the University of Vienna.² The manuscript is titled 'Logik und Erkenntnistheorie' (Logic and Epistemology). In this script, Pächt adopts a series of homonymous lectures by the physicist and philosopher Moritz Schlick (1882 Berlin - 1936 Vienna). It also comprises reflections on general aspects of science philosophy that remain somewhat indirectly relevant to a productive approach in art history. However, in the scope of this article solely those of Schlick's concepts are appealing, which inspired Pächt's art-historical work directly.

The first time Schlick delivered the abovementioned lecture in question was in Rostock 1911, and he revised repeatedly as scientific developments occurred in the area.³ Four out of seven times, he lectured on *Logic and Epistemology* in Vienna, where he taught as a lecturer from 1922 onwards: in 1923, 1925/26, and 1930, and shortly before he was assassinated, in 1934/35.⁴

Otto Pächt studied Art History at the University of Vienna from 1920 to 1925. However, in between, he went to Berlin, stayed there for one year in 1921, and returned to Vienna, where he continued pursuing his studies and received a

¹ Jan Versteegen, *The New Vienna School Of Art History. Fulfilling Of The Promise Of Analytic Holism*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2023, 27.

² Archiv für Kunstgeschichte der Universität Wien, Karton 7, a, *PHILOSOPHIE, Method, Theory, Aesthetics, Schlick, Platon, Jaspers, Geschichtliche Verantwortung*, see the transcription below.

³ Björn Henning, 'Schlicks Wege Zur Zweisprachentheorie – Psychologie Zwischen Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft' in Friedrich Stadler and Elisabeth Nemeth, *Die Europäische Wissenschaftsphilosophie und Das Wiener Erbe*, Wien and New York: Springer 2013, 153-185.

⁴ Martin Lemke and Anne Sophie Naujoks, 'Editorischer Bericht' in Martin Lemke and Anne Sophie Naujoks *Moritz Schlick, Vorlesungen Und Aufzeichnungen Zur Logik Und Philosophie der Mathematik*, Wiesbaden: Springer 2019, (337-349) 337-347.

doctorate degree in 1925.⁵ According to his academic records, he never consulted the abovementioned Schlick course. He must have taken the courses off the curriculum and out of interest. To a considerably lesser extent, Pächt also refers in his manuscript to some of Schlick's thoughts, which cannot be found in the source lecture edition here - a postscript of the lecture published in 2019 from 1934/35. In addition to the lecture, Pächt's notes also relate to some of Schlick's considerations in his work *Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre*⁶ (General Theory of Knowledge), first published in 1918 and then by Springer in Berlin in 1925.⁷

The lecture is divided into six parts: 'Was heißt Erkennen,' (What means Knowing) 'Von der Wahrheit und dem Sinn der Aussagen,' (Of the Truth and the Meaning of Statements) 'Erfahrung und Denken,' (Experience and Thought) 'Satzlogik (Aussagekalkül),' (Logic of the Sentence) 'Von der Wahrscheinlichkeit,' (About Probability) 'Funktionskalkül oder Begriffslogik.' (Functional Calculus or Conceptual Logic)

Pächt edited a summa of the lecture series consisting of ten handwritten pages. However, his questions about art history were likely influenced primarily by his engagement of the first part of the lecture, 'Was heißt erkennen' (What means Knowing), as can be demonstrated in this article. Pächt drew not only conclusions from the lecture for the development of art history as an exact science but also, quite concretely, to the development of a 'theory of images as the theory of *representation*', which was compatible with considerations of the *Gestalt* theorist Kurt Koffka (1886 Berlin – 1941 Northampton), whom he referenced. The academic dispute between Pächt and none other than Sir Ernst Gombrich (109 Vienna – 2001 London), regarding the very fundamentals of art history, is likely based, not least, on Pächt's commitment to Moritz Schlick and the 'Berlin School of Gestalt Psychology' he referenced, as will be shown. The stimulus derived from Schlick's theory of knowledge, i.e., epistemology, must have influenced Pächt well into the 1970s. In this sense, the title of his Vienna lecture, 'Methodisches zur kunsthistorischen Praxis' (Methodological Approaches to Art Historical Practice), almost appears programmatic. In the introduction to 'Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre' (General Theory of Knowledge) Schlick outlines the relationship between methodology and practical research in terms of his firm rejection of scientific scepticism.

There was once a time when philosophers marvelled that man could move his limbs, even though he was not familiar with the nerve and muscle processes on which such movement depended. They even went so far as to conclude that man was quite incapable of moving his body by himself.

⁵ Jonathan Alexander, 'Otto Pächt, 1902-1988, Ein Nachruf', in Michael Pächt and Artur Rosenauer, *Otto Pächt 'Am Anfang War Das Auge'*, Wien und München: Michael Pächt 2006, (115-133) 115-116.

⁶ Mario Bunge, *Moritz Schlick. General Theory of Knowledge* (translated by Albert Blumberg), New York and Wien: Springer 1974.

⁷ Hans Jürgen Wendel and Fynn Ole Engler, 'Editorischer Bericht' in Hans Jürgen Wendel and Fynn Ole Engler, *Moritz Schlick, Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre*, Vienna and New York: Springer 2009, (53-119)115-116.

Whenever he wished to perform some movement, they believed, a higher power had to come to his aid and to do it for him. [...]

For this reason, sceptics have argued time and time again that since we do not understand how knowing is possible, we do not really possess any knowledge, that it is a delusion to suppose that we can ever lay hold of the truth, that in reality we do not know anything.⁸

Schlick opposed this with the argument that:

A mastery of physiology does not create the capacity for performing bodily movements; it merely enables us to explain them and to understand how they are possible. Likewise, epistemology can never issue decrees that lay down what or what is not to count as scientific knowledge; on the contrary its task is only to clarify and to interpret that knowledge.⁹

'Methodisches zur kunsthistorischen Praxis' (Methodical Approaches to Art Historical Practice) could be well interpreted as a commitment to Schlick's characterization of tasks of methodology as a discipline that solely elucidates facts (rather than creating them). This might have corresponded to Pächt's aim of solidifying art history as an exact science. Further, Schlick's fundamental distinction between *intueri*/experience as a substitute for reality and discursive knowledge, particularly the notion of art as a means of knowledge as an end in itself, will be discussed in relation to Pächt.

Schlick made productive use of current or contemporary philosophical and science-theoretical tendencies for his own considerations. Regarding Pächt's methodological approaches, Schlick's engagement with Ludwig Wittgenstein's (1889 Vienna – 1951 Cambridge) *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* published in the same year (1921)¹⁰ and especially his engagement with the 'Berliner Schule' of Gestalt psychology seems relevant.

What means Knowing?

In his notes on Moritz Schlick's lectures, Pächt mentioned a mathematician probably less famous among art historians today. However, whose theories influenced Schlick's epistemology: David Hilbert (1882 Königsberg – 1943 Göttingen) defined *mathematical truths* as deductive concepts for which intuitive meaning has no relevance in the first place. Therefore, words like point, line, plane, between, outside, etc., initially have no content or meaning. They acquire those only through relationships established by the axiomatic system.¹¹

⁸ Mario Bunge, *Moritz Schlick. General Theory of Knowledge* (translated by Albert Blumberg), New York and Wien: Springer 1974, 1.

⁹ Mario Bunge, *Moritz Schlick. General Theory of Knowledge*, 1974, 2.

¹⁰ Martin Lemke and Anne Sophie Naujoks, 'Editorischer Bericht' in Martin Lemke and Anne Sophie Naujoks, *Moritz Schlick, Vorlesungen Und Aufzeichnungen Zur Logik Und Philosophie der Mathematik*, Wiesbaden: Springer 2019, (337-349), 341.

¹¹ Martin Lemke and Anne Sophie Naujoks, 'Einleitung' in Martin Lemke and Anne Sophie Naujoks, *Moritz Schlick, Vorlesungen Und Aufzeichnungen Zur Logik Und Philosophie der Mathematik*, Wiesbaden: Springer 2019, (11-80) 43-51.

That is relevant because Schlick and Hilbert both principally rejected equivalences between empirical conditions and logical propositions. Schlick drew a sharp boundary between the *empirical* and the *logical*.¹² According to this, logic would be simply the form of thinking and knowing. In Schlick's view, reality would be neither logical nor illogical but somehow beyond that distinction. It would not correspond to any logic. Therefore, logic is the compilation of all rules we apply to speak about reality.¹³ Epistemology, on the other hand, concerns the content of cognition.

In this respect, Pächt noted at the beginning of his manuscript:

Logical thinking is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for cognition. The true substance is missing. The true substance is missing. The epistemic value of sensory perception is the first question in this regard. Logic examines the rules, which are prerequisites for correct thinking. Logic - forms of thinking and knowing. Epistemology examines the presuppositions by which cognition is achieved. Logic - forms of thinking and knowing. Epistemology - the content of cognition.¹⁴

Pächt applies this input of Schlick's in his article 'Das Ende der Abbildtheorie' (The End of the Theory of Representation), published in *Kritische Berichte* in the years 1930/31. In it, Pächt criticizes art historians who claim to mirror and imitate artworks conceptually. Pächt:

Because it [the image theory B.C.] necessarily presupposes a validated concept of scientific truth - the truth as an authentic reflection, imitation of reality - which has become untenable since the advent of modern epistemology. [...] Concepts, however, are not depictions of objects of scientific observation but signs and symbols. Specifically selected, they make something of the nature of the referred object accessible to the observer.¹⁵

In the first footnote of the discussed article, Pächt refers to a passage in Moritz Schlick's 'General Theory of Knowledge'.¹⁶

In this passage, like in his lectures, Schlick emphasizes a dividing line between the conceptual-logical and the visual image.¹⁷

¹² Moritz Schlick, 'Logik und Erkenntnistheorie' in Martin Lemke and Anne Sophie Naujoks, *Moritz Schlick, Vorlesungen Und Aufzeichnungen Zur Logik Und Philosophie der Mathematik*, Wiesbaden: Springer 2019, (351- 662) 458.

¹³ Moritz Schlick, 'Logik und Erkenntnistheorie' in Martin Lemke and Anne Sophie Naujoks, *Moritz Schlick, Vorlesungen Und Aufzeichnungen Zur Logik Und Philosophie der Mathematik*, Wiesbaden: Springer 2019, (351-662) 499 - 502.

¹⁴ See the transcription below.

¹⁵ Otto Pächt, 'Das Ende Der Abbildtheorie', in Jörg Oberhaidacher, Artur Rosenauer and Gertraut Schikola, *Methodisches Zur Kunsthistorischen Praxis*, München: Prestel 1995, (121-129) 121.

¹⁶ Otto Pächt 1995, 'Das Ende Der Abbildtheorie', 121.

¹⁷ Pächt quotes here the 1925 edition of the 'General theory of Knowledge' which is: Moritz Schlick, *Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre*, 2. Auflage, Berlin: Springer 1925, 55-56.

However, how do we gain knowledge if no necessary equivalences exist between the conceptual-logical and the empirical? What does knowledge mean? Schlick addresses this question in the first section of his lecture series.

According to Schlick, humans need prior knowledge on a basic level to navigate through life's contingencies.¹⁸ Schlick states, 'When one utters such sentence that contains knowledge, so one has operated with words, and those words have the function of pointing to something.'¹⁹

According to Schlick, words, signs, or images must be considered representatives of objects we talk about. In this sense, they must be different from the objects themselves. He claims that the most crucial aspect of knowledge is that humans can make predictions on the most basic level through it. While knowledge is an end in art and science, it is purpose-bound on a non-scientific level.

An example of a purpose-bound prediction would be the statement, 'This bread will nourish me.'²⁰ Schlick explains, 'Such predictions are only possible because of a particular order in the world. Knowledge serves to depict the world's order through the order of the signs in which they stand.'²¹ Accordingly, it is about conceptual functions rather than concepts themselves.²² Describing something new would then involve a new arrangement and composition of signs.²³ To achieve this, one must possess certain signs. In other words, every 'language' must be learned. Without knowledge of the conventions relating to the allocation of signs, one cannot designate any object.²⁴ Undoubtedly, this also applies to visual arts. Crucial for understanding art history that aims to grasp and compare more than dependencies between artworks - while still keeping traditions in sight - is certainly the function-composition of the conventions that makes it possible to comprehend the specific quality of each work. Pächt, who reflected on 'quality determinations' in terms of defining artistic achievements 'within' a historical context, as in his article 'Die historische Aufgabe Michael Pachers' (The Historical Task of Michael Pacher), published in 1931 in *Kunstwissenschaftliche Forschungen*, might have been interested in this aspect of Schlick's lecture. He stated, 'Achievement is not a fixed component of a finished construct but the transformation of the overall state of the historical situation inducted by artistic creation,'²⁵ which reminds us of Schlick's emphasis on the functional relationship of signs.

Pächt summarized Schlick's approaches to defining the concept of knowledge as follows: 'Analysis of the concept of knowledge. Cognitive ability means assimilating something *new, unknown*, into something already *known*. The

¹⁸ Moritz Schlick, 'Logik und Erkenntnistheorie' 2019, 375-376.

¹⁹ Moritz Schlick, 'Logik und Erkenntnistheorie' 2019, 376.

²⁰ Moritz Schlick, 'Logik und Erkenntnistheorie' 2019, 377.

²¹ Moritz Schlick, 'Logik und Erkenntnistheorie' 2019, 378.

²² Moritz Schlick, 'Logik und Erkenntnistheorie' 2019, 398.

²³ Moritz Schlick, 'Logik und Erkenntnistheorie' 2019, 389.

²⁴ Moritz Schlick, 'Logik und Erkenntnistheorie' 2019, 391.

²⁵ Otto Pächt, 'Die Historische Aufgabe Michael Pachers' in Jörg Oberhaidacher, Artur Rosenauer and Gertraut Schikola, *Otto Pächt. Methodisches Zur Kunsthistorischen Praxis*, München: Prestel 1995, (59-106) 62.

cognitive process involves establishing relationships between that object and an already-known object. The cognitive task, initially, consists of denominating individual objects with the most general name possible. Knowledge is repeatedly achieved through the discovery of similarities. The nature of this act is to be explained psychologically.'²⁶

Here, Pächt addresses the aspect of allocation, rediscovery of the *same*, and connection, which Schlick discusses as an introduction in the '*Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre*.' (General Theory of Knowledge)²⁷

The question is: How can concepts, according to Schlick, which are purely mental entities, provide knowledge through their allocation to sensory perceptions?

One object is rediscovered in another. In Schlick's opinion, this rediscovery is based on factual correlation. In this regard, Schlick refers to Gestalt psychology, specifically the Berlin School of Gestalt psychology. This school posits that forms or shapes (*Gestalten*) are realities formed according to objective regularities, while the Graz School posits that a subject produces *Gestalten*. According to the Berlin School of *Gestaltists*, objects of knowledge are not predetermined, clearly delineated units.²⁸ Schlick states,

There are many signs as distinguishable objects, and their number can be reduced only if another condition is fulfilled, namely, that it be understood that cognitive objects are not predetermined, strictly bounded units. Modern psychology uses the term "Gestalt-quality" – coined by Christian Ehrenfels – to denote the fact that the contents of our consciousness combine into certain complexes that we experience as "units". The *Gestalten* play an absolutely fundamental role in the description of the immediately given. There is present at the same time what we call "interconnection" or "coherence": the same element may belong to different objects. Finally, if we choose a suitable standpoint, it is possible to discover the *same* very few elements repeated in all objects of a particular domain. Thus coordination, finding-the-same-again, and interconnection are all indissolubly linked: the theory of truth offered here would appear to give a complete account of their interrelationship.²⁹

In the context of the explanations above, knowledge is attained through the inherently content-empty concepts, in other words, the mental entities (imagined objects), only when they are related to one another through judgments that go beyond mere conceptual relations, as in mathematics, and instead establish connections between objects that are designated explicitly by concepts. Each

²⁶ See the transcription below.

²⁷ Mario Bunge, *Moritz Schlick. General Theory of Knowledge*, 1974, 7-8.

²⁸ Steffen Kluck, *Gestaltpsychologie Und Wiener Kreis. Stationen Einer Bedeutsamen Beziehung*, Freiburg und München: Alber 2008, 53-144; Steffen Kluck, 'Ganzheiten Als Fundament Der Erkenntnis?' in Ellen Aschermann and Margret Kaiser-el-Safit, *Gestalt Und Gestaltung In Interdisziplinärer Perspektive*, Frankfurt am Main: Lang 2014, (70-85) 71-85.

²⁹ Mario Bunge, *Moritz Schlick. General Theory of Knowledge*, 1974, 68-69.

judgment represents a fact, the existence of a relationship between objects. For Schlick, this structural connection forms the essential characteristic of knowledge.³⁰ Thus, the assumption of the unity of consciousness is central to Schlick's thesis, serving as the foundation for investigating the truth of knowledge.

Pächt adds, 'The investigation into the truth of knowledge must begin in the unity of consciousness. Through consciousness, the individual data become coherent.'³¹

Objections and controversies

(a) Wolfgang Köhler's objection

A dispute between the Gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Köhler (1887-1967) and Moritz Schlick led them to a distancing from each other, although initially, they were in close exchange.

The debate centred around Schlick's thesis that knowledge is attained through attributing concepts as inherently content-empty mental entities using judgments to perceptions. In this regard, Wolfgang Köhler wrote in a letter dated May 22, 1921: 'Now, there are several passages in your book where *knowledge* is defined as pure attribution. [...] It seems to me that these passages are virtually incompatible with others that state cognition as recognizing one object in another. Such recognition is also based on objective relationships and is by no means a pure attribution.'³² In contrast to Schlick, who drew on David Hilbert, Köhler extended Gestalt-theoretical considerations to forming concepts, whereas Schlick considered it purely conventional.

(b) Johannes Sauter's ideological polemic

Philosopher Moritz Schlick faced ideological attacks from Johann Sauter (1891 Kleeberg -1945 Winhöring), who taught state philosophy at the University of Vienna. Sauter, a supporter of Austrofascism, famously sided with Hans Nelböck (1903 Oberösterreich -1954 Vienna) in the weekly magazine *Schönere Zukunft* under the pseudonym 'Prof. Dr. Austriacus' after Nelböck assassinated his teacher Moritz Schlick at the University of Vienna in 1936. In this context, Sauter posthumously accused Schlick of 'ruining the youth.' As a sociologist, he had previously criticized Schlick's interest in mathematical structures, considering it incompatible with the Berlin School of Gestalt psychology's focus on reality. However, as noted by Christian Limbeck, this polemic is not solely based on defending the results of the

³⁰ Hans Jürgen Wendel and Fynn Ole Engler, 'Einleitung' in Hans Jürgen Wendel and Fynn Ole Engler, *Moritz Schlick, Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre*, Wien and New York: Springer 2009, (9-49) 17.

³¹ See the transcription below.

³² Quotation after Hans Jürgen Wendel and Fynn Ole Engler, *Moritz Schlick, Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre* in Hans Jürgen Wendel and Fynn Ole Engler, *Moritz Schlick, Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre*, Wien and New York: Springer 2009, (123-809) 270, footnote 271.

Berlin Gestaltists. Instead, it stems from Sauter's interest in political holism, which Schlick rejected.³³

(c) Karl Popper's critique of Moritz Schlick and the controversy between Ernst Gombrich and Otto Pächt³⁴

Karl Popper (1902 Vienna-1994 Kenley) expressed radical criticism of Moritz Schlick's theories in a dissertation titled 'Zur Methodenfrage der Denkpsychologie' (On the Methodological Question of Cognitive Psychology),³⁵ which Karl Bühler (1879 Meccesheim-1963 Los Angeles) and Moritz Schlick himself approved at the University of Vienna in 1928. Based on Karl Bühler's theories, Popper's critique targeted Schlick's psychophysical parallelism, inspired by the Berlin School of Gestalt psychology. Popper questioned Schlick's argument that knowledge is gained by reducing qualities (psychological facts) to ultimately physical terms. He criticized the following: 'Definite knowledge of qualities [...] is only possible through quantitative methods. Consciousness is only recognizable to the extent of the possibility to convert introspective psychology into physiology [...] and ultimately into physics of cognitive processes.'³⁶ Inspired by Karl Bühler's³⁷ works such as *Krise der Psychologie* (Crisis of Psychology)³⁸ or *Die geistige Entwicklung des Kindes* (The Mental Development of the Child),³⁹ Popper doubted the possibility of reducing biological regularities to physical and chemical terms, which Wolfgang Köhler also took into consideration. Popper stated, 'Especially because I believe that organic phenomena cannot be explained solely in concepts of physics and chemistry, purely teleological explanations of the results seem to me as purely speculative.'⁴⁰ Popper proposed an alternative approach that deviated radically from Moritz Schlick's works. He postulated, 'Perhaps psychological regularities can be reduced to biological ones [...].'⁴¹ Following Karl Bühler's ideas, Karl Popper's methodology is not least oriented towards biology. This led him to the hypothesis of the psychological ability to adapt to changing situations based on biologically purpose-

³³ Christian Limbeck-Lilienau, 'Review, Steffen Kluck, Gestaltpsychologie Und Wiener Kreis, Stationen Einer Bedeutsamen Beziehung' in Christian Damböck, *Influences On The Aufbau*, Heidelberg and New York: Springer 1016, (292-295) 295.

³⁴ To other reasons for the conflict between Ernst Gombrich and Otto Pächt see Jan Versteegen, 'Otto Pächt Hegelian Exile In Cold War England', *Konsthistorisk tidskrift*, 88, 2019, 113-133.

³⁵ Karl Popper, *Zur Methodenfrage Der Denkpsychologie*, Dissertation. Eingereicht Zur Erlangung Des Doktorgrades Der Philosophischen Fakultät der Universität Wien, Sommersemester 1928, Vienna 1928, II-80.

³⁶ Quotation after Karl Popper, *Zur Methodenfrage*, 1928, 6.

³⁷ More recently, Richard Woodfield has emphasised the direct connection between Ernst Gombrich and Karl Bühler; see, Richard Woodfield, 'Ernst Gombrich: Iconology and the "linguistics of the image"', *Journal of Art Historiography*, Number 5, December 2011, 1-25 and 'Preface', in Ian Versteegen, *The New Vienna School Of Art History*, 2022, xxiii.

³⁸ Karl Bühler, *Die Krise Der Psychologie*, Jena: Fischer 1927.

³⁹ Karl Bühler, *Die Geistige Entwicklung des Kindes*, Jena: Fischer 1918.

⁴⁰ Karl Popper, *Methodenfragen*, 1928, 15.

⁴¹ Karl Popper, *Methodenfragen*, 1928, 34.

based behaviour, which formed the foundation of his theory of 'trial and error' as a principle of science:

Science also tests its theories and models (as Bühler says). The actual paths of scientific research are known not to comply with the logical principles of representation in any way [...].

Nevertheless, academia is clearly 'task-driven' in the long term, and deterministic tendencies stand out.⁴²

This thesis blatantly contradicts Schlick's criticism of Avenarius-Mach's concept of the 'economy of thought' as a determining principle for knowledge and art.⁴³ Schlick, instead, compared cognition to a 'game.'⁴⁴ "Thus knowledge, so far as it is science, does not serve any other of life's functions [criticism of biological reduction, B.C.]. It is not addressed to the practical mastery of nature, although it may often be useful later for that purpose. It is an independent function, whose exercise affords us *immediate* satisfaction, a unique road of pleasure comparable to no other. And its value lies precisely in the pleasure with which the drive for knowledge fills the life of the scholar.'⁴⁵ In 'Logic and Epistemology,' Schlick can draw parallels between knowledge and art in this sense. Precisely this aspect of art and knowledge as an end in itself might have attracted Pächt, as conclusively demonstrated here. At that point, his scientific path separates from that of Ernst Gombrich (1909-2001): Gombrich was – as it is well known - interested in Poppers biologically oriented methodology. However he was also directly influenced by Karl Bühler, especially by his Theory of Language', as Richard Woodfield showed.⁴⁶

In the first chapter of 'Art and Illusion' Gombrich is interested in the 'limits of likeness'. He states: 'A style, like a culture or a climate of opinion, sets up a horizon of expectation, a mental set, which registers deviations and modifications with exaggerated sensitivity. In noticing relationships, the mind registers tendencies [...].'⁴⁷ Gombrich might have adapted ideas of Karl Bühler i.a. here, especially chapter twelve in his 'Language Theory', symbolic fields in non-linguistic representation'.⁴⁸ Bühler: 'Much will be gained, it seems to me, if it is generally recognized that every symbol needs a field and every field needs a symbol if serviceable representation are to be possible. The two factors named would thus be recognized in principle as correlative factors, and will also have to be given a correlative definition.' Gombrich's thesis of the 'mental set' might be inspired by

⁴² Karl Popper, *Methodenfragen*, 1928, 59.

⁴³ Mario Bunge, *Moritz Schlick, General Theory of Knowledge*, 1974, 94-101.

⁴⁴ Mario Bunge, *Moritz Schlick. General Theory of Knowledge*, 1974, 97.

⁴⁵ Mario Bunge, *Moritz Schlick. General Theory of Knowledge*, 1974, 100-101.

⁴⁶ Richard Woodfield, 'Iconology and the 'linguistics' of the image, *Journal of Art Historiography*, 5, December 2011, 1-25.

⁴⁷ Ernst Gombrich, *Art And Illusion. A Study In The Psychology Of Pictorial Representation*, The Andrew William Mellon Lectures In The Fine Arts 1956, Princeton and New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1969, 60.

⁴⁸ Karl Bühler, *Theory of Language. The Representational Function of Language* (translated by Donald Fraser Goodwin), Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company 1990, 203-219; this goes back to a feedback by Richard Woodfield.

Bühlert's theory of symbolic fields. Insofar it emphasizes the social aspect of art, it might have contradicted Pächt's Schlick-inspired conviction, that depiction in art as well as pure knowledge are entirely different from everyday life, which will be discussed here below.

Pächt demonstrates controversial views on this matter, even in his Vienna lecture of 1970/1971. He criticizes: 'According to Gombrich, there are no differences between symbolizing and actual representation. Depending on the prevailing standard of the reality-illusion [ultimately a critique of biological ability of adaptation in terms of purposeful behavior, in this sense, 'task-oriented' on Pächt's part, B.C.], a chiffre could be taken as a substitute for the real object [...].⁴⁹ Pächt's criticism here probably not least targets assumptions in *Art and Illusion*.⁵⁰

Descriptive and explanatory knowledge.

(a) experience - recognition

So far, there has been talk of knowledge in general. However, Schlick differentiated between 'descriptive knowledge' and 'explanatory knowledge.' Both are based on the fact that the *new* is described using old signs, and the *new* is traced back to the *old*.

Accordingly, a description is still defined by using commonly known and language-determined words (the usual word combinations) to designate the various components of the facts. On the other hand, if one worked with common signs that were not used for this particular case before and it turned out that they were sufficient to describe this fact, then an explanation would be given.⁵¹ In other words, 'a description is provided when the designation does not reduce the number of signs. If one can get by with fewer words or signs than usual for such a description, one has explained that it is attributed to some other object, an already known one.'⁵² Both description and explanation are forms of knowledge. In every explanatory knowledge, there is an attribution of the new to the old, a reduction [...]. The explanation consists of attributing the particular to the general. Pächt formulates this aspect of Schlick's lecture as follows:

The cognitive process involves a reduction of the multiplicity of objects of knowledge. Striving for unity in cognitive knowledge. Knowledge as the comparison of a perception with a conception formed on earlier perceptions. In order to free this cognitive process from the danger of deception, to elevate it from the ordinary to the scientific, a concept must replace the blurred vision.⁵³

⁴⁹ Otto Pächt, „Methodisches zur Kunsthistorischen Praxis,“, in Jörg Oberhaidacher, Artur Rosenauer and Gertraut Schikola, *Otto Pächt. Methodisches Zur Kunsthistorischen Praxis*, München: Prestel 1995, (59-106), (187-300) 245.

⁵⁰ Ernst Gombrich, *Art And Illusion. A Study In The Psychology Of Pictorial Representation*, The Andrew William Mellon Lectures In The Fine Arts 1956, Princeton and New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1969, vii-443.

⁵¹ Moritz Schlick, ‚Logik und Erkenntnistheorie‘ 2019, 393.

⁵² Moritz Schlick, ‚Logik und Erkenntnistheorie‘ 2019, 393-394.

⁵³ See the transcription below.

As Pächt spoke of 'perception,' based on Schlick's notion, he, like Schlick, opposed the idea that knowledge could be gained solely through *intueri*, i.e., an immediate look at something. According to Schlick, in the first act, there only are objects. Knowledge begins afterward. A statement like 'I see a tree' presupposes the dependence of *what is there* on one's sense organs, and this premise of knowledge begins development historically relatively late.⁵⁴ Mere looking at the object, in the sense of 'there is a tree,' is an 'experience.' In experience, one is as if amid the action. Schlick refers, for example, to Arthur Schopenhauer, who, metaphorically speaking, does not want to go around the house but wants to go into the house to become one with the object. However, in Schlick's sense, intuition – observation or, in other words, the respective experience – cannot provide knowledge and, therefore, cannot depict reality. In contrast to the process cognition, in experiencing, one 'returns from the image to reality,'⁵⁵ as in all applications. Thus, experiencing, which in other words replaces reality, is a matter of practical purpose. Schlick gives photography and technical drawings as examples, which can be torn apart once their purpose of replacing reality has been fulfilled, such as when a bridge has been built.⁵⁶ Schlick, however, sets science and art apart: 'But in art, the image has a different function; the image should not replace reality, that would not be the true purpose of art; it is precisely a matter of representing something. That is the profound meaning of art; it wants to move away from reality, and illustration is its adequacy. Depiction in art is entirely different from that of everyday life. Still, it corresponds to the manner of depiction in pure knowledge because pure knowledge is not about reality itself, it only is about representing it with a minimum of symbols. The image principally manages with a minimum of symbols; that is the researcher's goal, his unique character. Pure knowledge and illustration in art are both representations for their own sake. Researchers and artists are satisfied when they successfully represent reality in a particular way.'⁵⁷

Schlick's theory features interesting parallels to the ideas of Berlin Gestalt psychologist Kurt Koffka, which Pächt discussed in his 1933 essay 'Gestaltungsprinzipien der westlichen Malerei' (Gestalt Principles of Western Painting). Pächt cited Koffka in footnote seven,⁵⁸ specifically referencing Koffka's essay 'Zur Theorie der Erlebniswahrnehmung' (On the Theory of Experience Perception).⁵⁹ In this 1922 publication, Koffka observed that psychology is based on the perception of one's own experiences. He stated that the perceived, observed, and described experience is in a completely different context than the initial *actus*. Therefore, it, as itself, would constitute a different experience. According to Koffka, experiences are not atoms that, even unchanged, only appear

⁵⁴ Moritz Schlick, 'Logik und Erkenntnistheorie' 2019, 401-403.

⁵⁵ Moritz Schlick, 'Logik und Erkenntnistheorie' 2019, 407.

⁵⁶ Moritz Schlick, 'Logik und Erkenntnistheorie' 2019, 408.

⁵⁷ Moritz Schlick, 'Logik und Erkenntnistheorie' 2019, 408.

⁵⁸ Otto Pächt, 'Gestaltungsprinzipien Der Westlichen Malerei', in Jörg Oberhaidacher, Artur Rosenauer and Gertraut Schikola, *Otto Pächt. Methodisches Zur Kunsthistorischen Praxis*, München: Prestel 1995, (17-59) 20.

⁵⁹ Kurt Koffka, 'Zur Theorie Der Erlebniswahrnehmung', *Annalen Der Philosophie*, 3, 1922, 375-399.

in different combinations, which aligns with Schlick's perspective. According to Koffka, perceiving and describing an experience is not simply a matter of grasping it but rather involves processing the experience into a better-structured entity. Like Schlick, Koffka also differentiated between experiencing and structured, organized perception. The theories of Schlick and Koffka have implications for the approach of art historians, such as '*Gestaltetes Sehen*'⁶⁰ and a 'theory of representation' can be developed that, in turn, can be applied to visual arts. Pächt intended to develop such a theory, likely, influenced by Kurt Koffka and Schlick's ideas, although he did not directly cite Schlick in this context. However, Pächt's discussed contribution, 'Gestalt Principles', was inspired by Schlick and will now be demonstrated. In the essay cited by Pächt, '*Zur Theorie der Erlebniswahrnehmung*' (On the Theory of Experience-Perception), Koffka does not even mention art as a 'self-purpose.' On the other hand, for Schlick, who, as noted above, differently from Popper's biological orientation, opposed the notion of an 'economy of thought,' the idea of 'art as self-purpose' appears to be central. Pächt apparently incorporated this idea in 'Gestalt Principles of Western Painting' and considered it compatible with Koffka's 'Theory of Experience Perception.'

Otto Pächt's theory of 'representation as an end in itself in the visual arts of the modern age' under the influence of Kurt Koffka and Moriz Schlick

Schlick's 'Art as an End in Itself' theory may face its most significant challenge in projecting the third dimension, namely 'perspective representation'. However, Pächt examined such a historical period, namely the Dutch painting of the 15th century, in his essay 'Principles of Form in Western Painting'. The art historian specifically focused on painting as an artistic discipline, which he distinguished from techniques defined by practical purposes. He criticized,

There is an (illustrative-) technical and an aesthetic problem of reducing space to surface. And there is an odd paradox in it: although they claimed to be exclusively interested in developing painting as an artistic discipline, they only focused on the progress in dealing with technical problems.⁶¹

Pächt's representation-theory is likely based on the following consideration: If the first *actus* only presents objects in terms of an experience, then with the desire to project three-dimensionality in art, the determination of the dependence of *what is there* on the sensory organs begins to apply. (So, in Schlick's sense, not 'There is a tree,' but 'I see a tree'). And thus, not only the possibility of knowledge as a 'pleasurable, non-comparable-with-other-vital-functions game' emerges, as previously established by Schlick, but it also fundamentally differs from purposeful experience. In analogy, a better organized and structured entity would be given with Kurt Koffka. Pächt detected in Dutch painting in the 15th century visual images as an end in themselves, in the sense of such 'structured entities':

⁶⁰ Hans Sedlmayr, '*Gestaltetes Sehen*', in *Belvedere VIII*, 1925, 65-73.

⁶¹ Otto Pächt, '*Gestaltungsprinzipien Der Westlichen Malerei*', in Jörg Oberhaidacher, Artur Rosenauer and Gertraut Schikola, *Otto Pächt. Methodisches Zur Kunsthistorischen Praxis*, München: Prestel 1995, (17-59) 17.

To the extent that the appearance of the three-dimensional object world is transformed into a two-dimensional structure, a part or fragment becomes a whole. It was the decisive achievement of the Dutch to extract from the projection method itself the resources for reevaluation that secures the unity of the image.⁶²

Summary

This article presented Otto Pächt's reception of Moritz Schlick's scientific concepts. The substrate for this work is Pächt's summary of a lecture series by Moritz Schlick, titled 'Logic and Epistemology,' which Pächt must have attended in Vienna during the 1920s (transcription and manuscript attached). This article only covers Pächt's reference to the first section of Schlick's lecture, 'What Means Knowing,' as Pächt obviously drew direct conclusions for his art historical questions from it. However, Pächt's summary also includes aspects of another essential work by Schlick: 'General Theory of Knowledge.' It could be argued that Schlick's considerations not only inspired Pächt's methodological approach (such as his attitude towards grasping and describing artwork, but his efforts to set some form of criteria for a historically motivated 'determination of quality' in artworks, his aversion to 'creative' theorizing, or his development of theory concerning art historical practice, and his efforts to solidify art history as an exact science). Also, his controversy with Ernst Gombrich is likely rooted in Pächt's commitment to Schlick and his psycho-physical parallelism. Furthermore, Schlick stimulated Pächt to develop a theory of images as a 'theory of representation,' which justified understanding art as an 'end in itself' and thus comprehending art history as an autonomous discipline within the concept of 'Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung'.

Barbara Czwik is an independent art historian. She graduated with a PhD on the topic of sixteenth-century Venetian painting from the University of Vienna. Her recent publications and lectures concern Italian art from 16th century, Titian; portraiture of Giovanni Battista Moroni and the question of the meaning of their rhetoric or habitus; history of science and intermedia. Her current paper results from a long interest in 'The Vienna School of Art history' and in the conviction, that those thinkers can still provide fresh impulses for art history of our days.

barbara.czwik@gmx.net

Appendix follows...

⁶² Otto Pächt, 'Gestaltungsprinzipien Der Westlichen Malerei', in Jörg Oberhaidacher, Artur Rosenauer and Gertraut Schikola, *Otto Pächt. Methodisches Zur Kunsthistorischen Praxis*, München: Prestel 1995, (17-59)21.

Appendix – Manuscript – Otto Pächt; Archives of Art History of the University of Vienna, Box 7, a, Philosophy, Method, Theory, Aesthetics, Schlick, Plato, Jaspers, Historical Responsibility⁶³

Translated by Elif Ipek

Transkription des Manuskripts

Schlick Logik und Erkenntnistheorie

Das logische Denken nur eine notwendige, keine hinreichende Bedingung des Erkennens Es fehlt der wahre Stoff.

Zuerst kommt die Frage nach dem Erkenntniswert der Sinneswahrnehmung.

Logik prüft die Regeln, nach denen das richtige Denken sich vollzieht.

Die Erkenntnistheorie prüft die Voraussetzungen, nach denen das Erkennen zustande kommt.

Logik – Formen des Denkens und Erkennens. Erkenntnistheorie – Inhalt des Erkennens.

Erkenntnistheorie nach Locke eine Prüfung der Fähigkeiten des menschlichen Verstandes. Die neueste Logik seit Leibniz sucht sich von den Bedingungen der aristotelischen Logik (Syllogismus) zu befreien, die sich durch die sprachlichen Grenzen ergeben haben.

Die aristotelische Logik die sich im Wesentlichen auf den Gegensatz von Subjekt und Prädikat bezieht, hängt mit einer philosophischen Grundannahme ihres Schöpfers zusammen, die als Auffassung der Welt als Substanz und Eigenschaft angesehen werden muß.

Analyse des Erkenntnisbegriffs. Erkennen bedeutet die Einverleibung eines Neuen, Fremden in ein bereits Bekanntes. Erkenntnisakt besteht in der Herstellung von Beziehungen zwischen dem Gegenstand zu einem bereits bekannten Gegenstand. Die Aufgabe der Erkenntnis besteht zunächst in der Bezeichnung individueller Gegenstände mit möglichst allgemeinem Namen. Erkenntnis immer wieder Erkenntnis vermöge des Auffindens von Gleichheiten. Die Natur dieses Aktes ist psychologisch zu erklären.

Auch Existenzerkenntnisse gehören in diese Zweigliedrigen Verhältnisse (ist = existiert = ist etwas Wirkliches)

⁶³ Quellenanhang – Manuskript – Otto Pächt; Archiv für Kunstgeschichte der Universität Wien, Karton 7, a, Philosophy, Method, Theory, Aesthetics, Schlick, Platon, Jaspers, Geschichtliche Verantwortung

Durch die Erkenntnisarbeit wird eine Reduktion der Vielheit der Erkenntnisgegenstände durchgeführt. Einheitsstreben des Erkenntnisprozesses.

Erkenntnis als Vergleichung einer Wahrnehmung mit einer Vorstellung, die Aufgrund früherer Wahrnehmungen getroffen wurde.

Um dieses Erkennen von der Gefahr jeglicher Täuschung zu befreien, um es vom alltäglichen zum wissenschaftlichen zu erheben, muß anstelle der verschwommenen Vorstellung ein Begriff treten.

Frage nach der Vollziehbarkeit von Allgemeinvorstellungen (Berkely).

Unvollziehbarkeit von Allgemeinvorstellungen und Verschwommenheit der Individualvorstellungen führen zur Einführung der Begriffe.

Anstelle willkürlicher, oberflächlicher Gleichheiten der Wahrnehmung tritt die Auswahl entscheidender Merkmale des Begriffs. Erlebbar sind nur Vorstellungen als Repräsentanten der Begriffe.

Begriffe sind Zeichen für Gegenstände. Begriff und Wirklichkeit stehen zueinander im Verhältnis der Zuordnung.

Begriffe sind etwas Gedachtes, nicht Vorstellungen. Wirklich sind nur die Funktionen der Begriffe.

Inbegriff aller charakteristischen Merkmale ist der Inhalt des Begriffs, sein Umfang ist die Gesamtheit aller darunter bezeichneter Gegenstände. Unterschied zwischen konstitutiven und konsekutiven Merkmalen. Auffindung der Merkmale durch Abstraktion. Der logische Umfang des Begriffs muß sich mit dem empirischen nicht decken. Es gibt jedoch überhaupt keine Begriffe, deren einzelne Merkmale zueinander im Verhältnis der Unverträglichkeit stehen.

Die letzten Merkmale lassen sich nicht mehr definieren, sondern nur mehr konkret aufweisen. Eine konkrete Definition ist keine Definition mehr, sondern eine Modifikation derselben.

Danach bestünden für das Erkennen unüberwindliche Schwierigkeiten. Wenn aber auch die Erlebnisse etwas fließendes sind, so ist doch die Gesetzmäßigkeit der Erlebnisse (die reine Anschauung Kants), und etwas unmittelbar Bewußtes und Bekanntes. Diese Annahme Kants beruht auf dem Irrtum, seine Gesetze auch seien etwas primär Gegebenes. Die Festlegung strenger Begriffe, ohne auf die konkreten Definitionen angewiesen zu sein, ist in Gebieten der Mathematik gefunden worden.

Die Aufgabe war, den Inhalt der Grundbegriffe völlig von der Anschauung loszulösen. Die Grundbegriffe wurden inhaltslos gemacht. (In der Mathematik von Hilbert). Die Grundbegriffe haben keinen absoluten Sinn, keinen anschaulichen Inhalt mehr, sondern nur einen relativen, durch die Kombination anderer Begriffe (Implizite Definition). Die Begriffe sind rein formal bestimmt. Das System von Sätzen, das ein System von Begriffen definieren soll, muß widerspruchsfrei sein.

Unterscheidung der psychologischen Urteilsakte und der logischen Urteilsinhalte. Ein Urteil ist ein Zeichen für das Bestehen von Beziehungen von Begriffen. (Während die Beziehung zweier Begriffe noch ein Begriff bezeichnen kann). Darum ist jedes Urteil noch nicht ein Existenzialurteil. Darum ist jedes Urteil noch nicht ein

Existenzialurteil. Im Gegenteil ist jedes Urteil eine bestehende Beziehung mehrerer Glieder und nicht eingliedrig. Wechselseitige Bestimmtheit von Urteilen und Begriffen.

Bei den Realwissenschaften können Definitionen und Lehrsätze nicht vertauscht werden. Die Worte, die als Merkmalkombinationen für Definitionen dienen sollen, bedeuten noch keine Erkenntnis. Durch eine neue Erkenntnis kann der Begriff bei gleichbleibendem Wort als Zeichen erneuert werden. (Das Wort steht schon für wirkliche Gegenstände mit ihrer unendlichen Umfangsmöglichkeit). Das Wort hat die Eigenschaft die nur bei ausgebildetem System der Erkenntnisse in den Realwissenschaften die Begriffe haben könnten, die Gesamtheit vorhandener Merkmale zu umfassen.

Im Urteil werden zwei verschiedene Begriffe demselben Gegenstand zugeordnet.

Die Einfügung eines neuen Namens für ein Verhältnis ist keine neue Erkenntnis (Vermögen, Fähigkeit). Scheinerkenntnisse der *qualitates occultae*. Das sind also gar keine verschiedenen Begriffe zur Bezeichnung desselben Gegenstandes. Es müssen nachträgliche Verbindungen auf ganz verschiedenem Gebiete gewonnene Begriffe sein.

Eine Identifizierung der Begriffe findet im Urteil nicht statt, sonst wären Urteile Tautologien. In der älteren Logik spielte der Substanzbegriff (also metaphysische Bindung) als Bindeglied eine Rolle.

Das räumliche und zeitliche Zusammenkommen gewisser Merkmale, die den Innbegriff eines Gegenstandes ausmachen, entscheidet, für die Vereinigung zweier zugeordneter Begriffe. In den [...? B. C.] wird die Identifikation der Gesetzmäßigkeiten vollzogen.

Ein und derselbe Gegenstand wird zu verschiedenen Erscheinungen in verschiedenen Beziehungen angetroffen, ein und derselbe Gegenstand ein Glied zweier verschiedener Relationen.

Urteil entweder Definition oder Erkenntnis je nachdem eine Zuordnung zu einem neuen Begriff erfolgt oder nicht. Wahrheit kann nichts anderes sein als eine eindeutige Zuordnung der Tatsache im Urteile. Ein falsches Urteil müsste eine Mehrdeutigkeit der Zuordnung beinhalten.

Der Satz des Widerspruchs ist eine Definition der Negation. Darin ist schon der Satz vom ausgeschlossenen Dritten. Eine falsche Definition kann es nicht geben. Statt der Negation kann auch der Begriff der Verschiedenheit stehen. Ein Begriff kann nicht falsch sein, nur Urteile können es sein.

Erkenntnis ist mehr als Wahrheit die man erreichen könnte, indem man jeden neuen Tatsachen einen neuen Namen geben könnte.

Es kommt jeder neuen Wahrheit aber ein ganz bestimmter Platz innerhalb des Systems bereits bekannter Wahrheiten zu. Wahrheit besteht also nur in der Bestimmung innerhalb eines Zuordnungssystems.

Durch konkrete Definition wird die erste Zuordnung der Wirklichkeit erfolgen. Daraus wird vermittels eines Erkenntnisurteils die Verbindung mit dem übrigen

Begriffssystem hergestellt. Nach der konkreten Definition ein Deskriptionshistorisches Urteil.

Eine dritte Klasse bildet das hypothetische Urteil, indem über die Zukunft ausgesagt wird. Hypothetisch sind aber auch die historischen Deskriptionen. Sobald über die Vergangenheit ausgesagt wird, liegt bereits eine Annahme vor. Urteile über Gegenstände, die noch nicht erfahren sind, sind aus der Einsicht in die Übereinstimmungen der Gesetzmäßigkeit der Wirklichkeit mit der Regelmäßigkeit des Urteilsnetzes möglich.

Es ist die Voraussetzung der Begreifbarkeit der Welt, daß sie auch durch Begriffe bezeichnet werden kann, die auch implizit definiert werden können.

Eine Art impliziter Definition, deren Brauchbarkeit für die Wirklichkeit verbürgt ist, wird Konvention genannt. Mit dieser können die sog. Grundgesetze der Naturbeschreibung verwechselt werden.

Bei Wirklichkeitswissenschaften haben bei neuen Erkenntnissen deskriptive Definitionen statt. Das deduktive System fällt dann bei den Geisteswissenschaften fort.

Analytische Urteile a priori

synthetische Urteile a posteriori. A priori und a posteriori sind nicht in Bezug auf den psychologischen Ursprung festgelegt. Schließlich glaubte Kant noch an synthetische a priori. Jedes Ereignis in der Natur hat eine Ursache Positive Urteile – Negative Urteile – Limitative Urteile – Universale Urteile – Partikuläre Urteile – Singuläre Urteile

[im Manuskript ist an dieser Stelle das Rechteck der Opposition der aristotelischen Logik zu finden. B.C.]

Einteilung nach der Relation

Problematische

Assertorische Urteile

Apodiktische

(Das sind psychologische, nicht logische Urteile)

Zwischen Tatbeständen kann nur das Verhältnis von Ursache und Wirkung sein. Zwischen Urteilen das von Grund und Folge sein. (Realgrund und Erkenntnisgrund).

Subalternation-Conversion-Opposition-Äquivalenz- Contraposition als mögliche Arten der Veränderung von Schlüssen – Umformung der Relationen – Umformung der Modalität

Syllogismus. Schluß aus zwei Prämissen, wodurch anscheinend eine Erkenntnis zustande kommt. Zwei Schlüsse bilden den Gesamtbestand, sie müssen etwas Gemeinsames haben, gemeinsame Begriffe (Mittelbegriff). Der Prozeß des Syllogismus ist eine Elimination des Mittelbegriffs. (19 Modi auf vier Figuren).

Verfahren der Wissenschaft, Sätze auf hypothetisch allgemeine Art hinzustellen, und sie dann als apodiktisch allgemein zu erweisen. Da der Syllogismus nichts Neues bringt, bringt die reine Logik keine eigentliche Erkenntnis.

Leibniz hat zuerst die Notwendigkeit einer von den Zufälligkeiten der Sprache unabhängigen Zeichengebung. Die neuen Versuche gingen vom Versuch der philosophischen Begründung der Mathematik [aus? B.C.]. (Bode, Frege [...?], E. Schoedinger, Whitehead, Russel ‚Principia Mathematica‘, Moritz von Beham. Symbolisierung der Urteile (ρ, q, π). Da Falschheit und Widerspruch durch den Satz des Widerspruchs miteinander zusammenhängen, wird die Falschheit durch ρ ausgedrückt. ρ impliziert $q, \rho \supset q$, Entweder ρ oder $q, \rho \vee q$.

[Pächt fügt an dieser Stelle symbolische Schreibformeln ein, die sich auf Schlicks Vorlesungsabschnitt „Satz-Logik (Aussagekalkül)“ beziehen. Es handelt sich um Festsetzungen darüber, wie man mit dem Symbolismus etwas bezeichnen will (Schreibregeln). Sie ersetzen die Lautzeichen der Alltagssprache, um deren Zufälligkeiten zu vermeiden. Die Ableitungen Schlicks gehen auf Ludwig Wittgensteins Tractatus -logico -philosophicus zurück (Vgl. Tabelle zur Symbolik der Wahrscheinlichkeitsmöglichkeiten, 4.31); Siehe Manuskript im Anhang, B.C.]

Die traditionelle Logik hat den Unterschied von potentiellen und tatsächlichen, echten Urteilen vernachlässigt. Die Begriffe von vornherein so eingeführt, wie sie in Urteilen auftreten.

PX (mit Leerstelle) ist eine Aussagefunktion (potentielles Urteil). Satzfunktion durch Einführung zweier Leerstellen gibt einen Relationsbegriff (X ist V-von Y). Logik ist eigentlich die Leere von den Satzfunktionen, die für jeden Gegenstand richtig bleiben, die für jeden beliebigen Wert des Arguments (X) richtig sein können. Nur dürfen die eingesetzten Gegenstände nicht sphärenfremd sein, sonst kommen sinnlose Wortkombinationen heraus (Aufklärung der Trugschlüsse).

Die Untersuchung nach der Wahrheit der Erkenntnisse muß seinen Ausgangspunkt an der Einheit des Bewußtseins nehmen. Durch dieses werden die einzelnen Daten Zusammenhängend. Beim synthetischen Urteil reichen die psychischen Prozesse, die zur Erfassung ihres Sinns ausreichen, noch nicht zur Einsicht in ihre Wahrheit aus. Mit der Behandlung der Frage nach synthetischen Urteilen geht man zur Frage der Erkenntnis der Wirklichkeit über (Inhalt des Denkens). Woher wissen wir von den Tatsachen der Wirklichkeit? Wenn über die Wirklichkeit etwas ausgesagt werden soll, so wird es ein Urteil sein, daher eine Subsumierung unter einen anderen Begriff gebracht werden. Die Frage nach dem Wirklichen wird angesichts der Begriffe auftauchen, denen zum Teil Gegenstände entsprechen, denen das Prädikat wirklich zukommt. Es bleibt nur die konkrete Definition über. Was uns unmittelbar gegeben ist, das ist das unmittelbare Bewußtsein unserer selbst, das ist die fundamentalste konkrete Definition. Immanente Bewußtseinsinhalte. Bewußtseinsinhalte existieren ist aber keine Erkenntnis, sondern nur eine Definition der Existenz. Konkrete Definition des Wirklichkeitsbegriffs (aber mit Descartes eine unvollständige beispielhafte). Da Wirkliches nicht durch Nicht-Wirkliches definiert werden kann, so ist nur eine konkrete Definition möglich.

Das Wirkliche ist der Gegenstand der sinnlichen Wahrnehmung. Der Begriff des Wirklichen tritt erst auf, wenn man auf den Unterschied des Wahrnehmungsaktes und des Gegenstands der Wahrnehmung (Bei Sinnestäuschungen. Ding an sich).

Das Reich des Wirklichen besteht für den naiven Menschen im sinnlich Wahrgenommenen und in den Ursachen des sinnlich Wahrgenommenen. (Das Weltbild des naiven Realismus). Es wird das Verhältnis von Wahrnehmung und Wahrgenommenen in Analogie mit der Rückführung des nicht unmittelbar Wahrgenommenen auf Wahrgenommenes als Verhältnis von Ursache und Wirkung angeschaut. Es werden die Dinge als Bedingung möglicher Wahrnehmungen bestimmt (J. Stuart Mill). Die Dinge permanente Möglichkeiten der Empfindungen.

Zwei Wege. Alles Bezweifelbare ausschalten und alles Unhaltbare ausschalten, um die Wirklichkeit herauszubekommen. Nur der Zweite ist der Gangbare, der andere müsste beim Solipsismus enden.

Otto Pächt



This work is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/)