Youth, armed violence and job creation programmes

A Rapid Mapping Study

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1. Introduction

In response to growing evidence from the social science literature about the links between youth unemployment and armed conflict (especially Collier et al 2003), donors have increasingly used youth job creation programmes as a tool with which to address armed violence. Many donors now identify addressing youth unemployment as an urgent priority, both in the field of peacebuilding and in efforts to foster economic development (World Bank, ILO, UN 2009, DANIDA 2005, DFID 2007). The link between job creation and peacebuilding has been affirmed by the UN Secretary General’s approval of the ‘UN Policy For Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation And Reintegration’ in 2008 and more recently by the ILO’s 2010 Guidelines on Local Economic Recovery in Post-Conflict (UN 2009, ILO 2010). A new sub-target for the first Millennium Development Goal which focused on youth unemployment was agreed in 2007. Donor armed violence reduction (AVR) strategies have begun to deploy a range of multi-sectoral interventions, including job creation, although AVR integration into donor strategies ‘remains relatively rare’ (MFA UNDP 2010, 28).

This rapid mapping study reviews donor approaches to addressing armed violence through youth job creation programmes. It covers a range of programmes including reintegration programmes, early recovery and cash for work programmes; as well as integrated AVR programmes that involve youth job creation components. Section two assesses the theoretical and empirical case for using job creation as a means of reducing armed violence. Section three provides an overview of key donor strategies for addressing armed violence and conflict through youth employment generation. Section four assesses the impact of these interventions; section five identifies some gaps in the current literature. Section six highlights some specific examples of successful programmes and section seven draws out some lessons and best practice based on donor experience.

The study finds that both the theoretical and the empirical cases for using youth employment programmes as a stand-alone tool for reducing violent conflict are extremely weak. Donor interventions have been poorly evaluated and evidence of success is usually limited to demonstrating increases in employment levels, with little effort made to assess the impact on conflict. The evidence on using job creation as part of an integrated or comprehensive armed conflict or AVR strategy is stronger: some government-led initiatives in countries that experience high levels of armed violence (such as Brazil and South Africa) have shown clear positive results in reducing levels of armed violence.

The study finds that donor approaches to reduce armed violence through job creation schemes have become more nuanced and sophisticated. There has been a growing emphasis on ‘holistic’, ‘comprehensive’ and ‘integrated’ approaches that go beyond simply addressing a lack of economic opportunities and seek to address the more complex array of factors that cause social exclusion for young people. These initiatives combine and integrate job-creation schemes with a range of other forms of intervention, such as capacity-building and training in conflict resolution. In a similar way AVR strategies have moved beyond a narrow focus on controlling arms and reducing the demand for weapons, towards more comprehensive strategies that address a range of risk factors associated with armed violence (Gonzales 2010). Donors have also sought to make job creation schemes more effective by conducting more rigorous contextual analysis. They have also looked to improve the effectiveness and relevance of these schemes by working more closely with the private sector and tackling the demand-side of youth unemployment. Despite this progress, there is a still a significant gap between donor rhetoric and practice in this area.

The literature has been slightly hampered by the difficulty of identifying a stable definition of youth. For the purposes of this report, the UN’s definition of youth which refers to persons between the ages of 15 and 24 years old will be adopted. This study sees youth as a transitional state between childhood and adulthood, and between the family and society. The particular stage in a young person’s life that this transition takes place or is deemed to take place is dependent upon the socio-cultural context. This study focuses specifically on donor responses that link youth unemployment and armed violence in post-conflict societies. Since most donor initiatives have focused on addressing the risk of the organised forms of violence associated with armed conflict, this paper is slightly more focused on these initiatives than on integrated AVR initiatives that have explicitly utilised job creation as a tool for reducing criminal or inter-personal violence. In reality, these different forms of violence are closely (and increasingly) linked (OECD 2009) and the lessons of best practice that emerge from these two areas of practice overlap considerably.

1 This definition was endorsed by the UN General Assembly (see A/36/215 and resolution 36/28, 1981).
2. The relationship between armed violence reduction and youth job creation initiatives

The literature suggests that there are multiple motivations for youth engagement in armed violence, that these need to be understood in relation to each particular context, and that there may be considerable variation in the motivations of individual youth within any given context. In-depth case studies suggest that while youth unemployment may provide part of the explanation of why armed violence occurs, this factor is rarely a main or direct cause of violence (Cramer 2010). Even where youth employment may be a factor, its relationship to violence is complex and multi-faceted and should not simply be understood in opportunity-cost terms (ibid).

For this reason, job creation initiatives alone are unlikely to generate a reduction in armed violence, even if they are successful in creating job opportunities. Evidence suggests that although frustration at lack of livelihood opportunities can play a part in motivating youth violence, social and political grievances are usually more central. Research in West Africa (Sommers 2009), South Asia (Amarasuriya 2009) and the Middle East and North Africa region (Yousuf 2003) has suggested that youth frustration is usually underpinned by perceptions that society or the political system is unjust and corrupt or that social norms prevent young people from making a successful transition to adulthood. While many early recruits to rebel groups such as the RUF in Sierra Leone or the JVP in Sri Lanka were unemployed, for example, the motivating factor behind violence was not unemployment *per se*, but rather grievance at an unjust and corrupt patrimonial system that increasingly shut out young people.

The empirical case is obscured by poor data. There are very few conflict-affected countries with reliable unemployment data, making an analysis of national trends in most post-conflict countries and cross-country comparison between contexts extremely difficult (Cramer 2010). Another important problem is that unemployment in developing countries is in fact fairly uncommon as people cannot afford to be unemployed – they need to engage in some kind of productive activity in order to survive. As such, it might make more sense to assess under-employment or low productivity employment (ibid).

There are four prominent strands in the literature on the causes of conflict (McLean Hilker and Fraser 2009), each of which have subtly different implications for how job creation programmes are understood (these approaches are summarised in a table in Appendix 3). Most donor interventions in this field are not based on a clearly articulated theory of youth violence. As Sommers (2009) has demonstrated, interventions are often designed with caricatures of idle and unproductive youth in mind, or based on ill-founded fears of unmanageable youth bulges, where large youth populations lacking employment opportunities are depicted as a ‘social Molotov cocktail ready to be ignited’ (Buscher 2008, 69). These interventions will typically be based on a general assumption that mass youth unemployment can drive violent conflict rather than a specific analysis of the causal factors underlying conflict in a particular region.

The shift towards more comprehensive approaches to youth unemployment suggests a slight move away from the more extreme interpretations of the ‘greed’ or opportunity perspective on violence, towards a more historically-rooted and locally-specific account that examines how ‘greed’, ‘grievance’ and psychological factors have combined in processes of social exclusion. Most donor policies involve a number of these perspectives. The ILO’s guidelines, for example, depict employment creation as both a way of providing alternatives to fighting for youth (an opportunity perspective), whilst also stressing the importance of reducing inequalities and improving inter-group relations (a grievance perspective) (ILO 2010). Having said this, the assumption that unemployment and poverty are straightforwardly linked to violence persists, and many (if not most) donors still assume rather uncritically that attempts to reduce unemployment and boost growth will help to prevent or reduce violence.

‘Greed’ or opportunity perspectives typically see armed violence as the outcome of rational individual choices to maximise economic, social or political benefits. Rebellion is only feasible when the potential gain from joining an armed group outweigh the benefits of not fighting and pursuing alternative income-generation opportunities (Urdal 2007). From this perspective, the costs of organising rebellion are lower where there is a large youth population (which is relatively cheap to recruit), where there are high levels of poverty or where there is an abundance of easily lootable resources (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). This approach seems to support broadly-targeted youth job creation opportunities in countries with large youth populations as a means of reducing the risk of armed conflict by raising the opportunity cost of rebellion. Employment schemes and economic growth can provide a ‘peace dividend’, which will leave the population disinclined to return to conflict.
'Grievance' perspectives see armed violence as a response to relative deprivation or exclusion. Frances Stewart’s work (2008) on horizontal inequalities has demonstrated the link between horizontal inequalities and armed violence. These perspectives tend to be more concerned with the societal or group dynamics of violence. This perspective justifies job creation schemes on the grounds that they can reduce inter-group grievance. Group employment schemes such as public works initiatives may also help to build solidarity amongst beneficiaries. The grievance lens appears to support more targeted youth job creation interventions, based on a contextually-appropriate understanding of the various inequalities works initiatives may also help to build solidarity amongst beneficiaries. The grievance lens appears to support more targeted youth job creation interventions, based on a contextually-appropriate understanding of the various inequalities between ethnic or cultural groups that cause conflict.

Psychological perspectives emphasise particular psychological reasons why young people are more prone to engaging in violence. These perspectives note that adolescents may be more susceptible to recruitment by rebel groups or to engage in violence for a number of psychological reasons (because they are at a particular stage in their emotional development or identity construction, for example). Job creation schemes are often rationalised as providing restless youth with a means of channelling their energies and thereby resisting a natural propensity to violence in its various forms. This perspective has tended to overstate the threat posed by youth and neglect the positive peacebuilding roles played by youth (Sommers 2006).

Social and political exclusion: This perspective sees youth violence as a product of the social and political marginalisation of young people. As McLean Hilker and Fraser (2009, 18) have argued, there is a growing sense in the literature that ‘the social and economic statuses required for adulthood are increasingly unattainable for young people’. A number of ethnographic studies of young people in a number of different conflict-affected countries have identified various social, economic and political barriers that block young peoples’ transition to adulthood, and highlighted the central role these barriers can play in driving violent conflict. Sommers’ (2006a) work on ‘youthmen’ in Rwanda and on blocked youth transitions in West Africa (2007), research on ‘waithood’ in the Middle East (Salehi-Isfahani and Dhillon 2008), and studies of youth violence in Sri Lanka (Amarasuriya et al 2009) all emphasise a blocked transition to adulthood emerging as a result of a complex combination of demographic, economic, social and political factors. A related theme, which has been noted in a range of contexts, is corruption or hypocrisy of the political elite (Sommers 2009, Amarasuriya et al 2009, Yousuf 2003). As Yousuf (2003, 19) has argued, it is the fact that resources are controlled by entrenched elites rather than poverty and inequality per se that drive youth grievance. Taking up arms against the state or the political elite in these contexts can provide a means by which they can integrate into society (albeit by force), or gain the sense of purpose and recognition denied by ordinary society (Sommers 2007, 9). From this perspective, youth job creation will not address violence unless it also deals with the social and political exclusion that underpins youth grievance.

Most youth facing deprivation, poverty or frustration at a corrupt political system do not resort to violence. In order to understand why some youth do, it is important to look at the specific proximate causes of armed violence. These factors include the availability of weapons, levels of drug use, indoctrination, recruitment by force, ideology, leadership factors, organisational dynamics and trigger events. It may be necessary to examine the relationship between political groups (particularly those with a youth-orientation) and the political system as a whole.

While certain groups (such as young people who have moved from rural to urban areas or highly educated youth who have been denied employment opportunities) may be at greater risk than others (Kvitashvili 2007, 5), the literature stresses that it is problematic to perceive young people from ‘at-risk’ groups as a threat (Sommers 2009). There may be a very small minority of youth combatants who are motivated by financial advantages of fighting: in West Africa, for example, some young people have effectively operated as mercenaries (UN 2006, 6). In these cases, opportunity perspectives may have greater relevance, but it seems unlikely that they represent a significant group, and it will be difficult for donors to clearly identify such individuals.

Different perspectives may have more or less relevance depending on context. MacLeod and Davalos (2008) have argued that job creation programmes can ‘mitigate conflicts over scarce jobs’ in conflicts over ethnic grievances, while in conflicts driven by resource rents they can increase opportunity costs. Again, however, it is difficult to clearly distinguish between conflicts in this way since the causes of conflicts are complex and liable to change over time. As a result, it is hard to derive clear policy recommendations based on this framework.

Reintegration programmes for ex-combatants form an important sub-category of programmes in this area and tend to be designed primarily to reduce the threat to security and stability posed by this group. These projects tend to have more short-term aims and are more concerned with conflict management than conflict transformation or peacebuilding. As
with more general job creation schemes, there is a danger in these programmes of overstating economic opportunity as a motivating factor in youth violence. A micro-level study by Samii (2007) found that youth involved in rebel activity in Burundi tended to have similar income levels to non-participants. The main distinguishing factor was a difference in the level of grievance they felt at the aborted democratic transition. Another micro-level study of young ex-combatants in Liberia found that poverty was the most commonly cited reason for returning to fighting amongst respondents who would consider doing so, followed by lack of jobs/benefits or training. It also found, however, that the number of respondents who were actively considering a return to violence was only 3 per cent (Taylor et al 2008, 9).

Like the assumption that job creation schemes will contribute to AVR, the claim that war and armed violence are major causes of youth unemployment is fairly ubiquitous. War and armed violence can destroy rural economies, which provide the basis of most employment opportunities in many conflict-affected countries (PBC 2010). War and armed violence also disrupt job networks, depletes trust and community support (UN 2009, 41, IDS 2010) and may damage formal education, leaving many young people unskilled and unprepared for the job market (ILO 2005). It is important to stress, however, that armed violence does not necessarily create unemployment: armed conflict, for example, can act as a major driver to youth employment by providing jobs in the armed forces (Venugopal 2008). Similarly, armed violence does not always reverse economic development: during the war in the Sri Lanka, the South and West of the country experienced almost uninterrupted growth.

3. Donor approaches to using job creation as a tool for peacebuilding

Donor approaches to using job creation as a tool for violence reduction span a number of response phases. These include the immediate post-conflict or stabilisation phase (Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes and cash for work schemes), the medium-term (livelihoods creation, private sector development) and long-term (shaping policy environment, public sector reform) (Blum and Angeles 2008, UN 2010). They also span the three broad areas of youth programming: rights-based work (which focuses on protection, basic education, psycho-social work and advocacy), socio-political programmes (focused on peace education and support for youth organisations) and economic initiatives (vocational training, job-creation programmes and income-generating activities) (Kemper 2005). As donors have become more committed to comprehensive approaches to youth unemployment, the boundaries between these different areas of intervention have become more blurred. This study has focused only on those donor programmes that make an explicit link between youth job creation and either armed violence or conflict reduction and prevention.

As mentioned above, there has been a shift towards more ambitious and more comprehensive youth programming. Calls for more holistic approaches are widespread, both in the academic and policy literature and in donors’ own policy statements (Sommers 2006, 2007, Munive 2008). There is a greater recognition that young people turn to violence as a result of a complex mix of economic, political and social factors and that in order to prevent youth violence, donors will need to adopt integrated approaches to tackle them. There is also greater recognition of the heterogeneity of youth and a greater willingness to consider the positive roles played by youth in post-conflict contexts (UN 2009, 41). The armed violence reduction and prevention lens, which is becoming increasingly influential, emphasizes the need for integrated and multi-sectoral strategies to reduce armed violence. The AVR lens emphasizes the need to link local, national, regional and global strategies and to combine developmental and preventive approaches with effective law enforcement (OECD 2009, 15). Traditional reintegration approaches have been criticized for being too top down and failing to address individuals’ and communities’ security needs (IDS 2010).

An assessment of past and current programming by the main donor agencies suggests that a significant gap may exist between a rhetorical commitment to comprehensive youth programming and current practice. In post-war contexts, ‘jobs for peace’ programmes have continued to be criticised on the grounds that they are failing to address root causes of social exclusion. In contexts such as post-war Sri Lanka and Nepal, providing young people jobs may fail to alleviate (or even entrench) tensions in a context where underlying political and social inequalities remain.

Although youth programming in post-conflict contexts has been underfunded (Kemper 2005, Beasley 2006, PBC 2010) there are signs that funding may be increasing. The World Bank has increased its investments in youth since 1995 from around $750 million to $1.1 billion per year (World Bank 2009). The World Bank’s Youth Inventory, which examined all youth programmes funded by the Bank, found that the most ‘popular interventions are skills training (particularly vocational training and apprenticeships systems), and multi-service or comprehensive programmes (combining job and life
skills training, work experience, subsidies, and other support services); which account for 38 and 33 percent, respectively, of all interventions covered by the inventory. Other prevalent categories are interventions to make the labour market work better for young people (such as wage subsidies, public works, information, and job placement), and entrepreneurship schemes’ (Puerto 2007, 2). The report found that in the poorest countries, programmes were mostly focused on young entrepreneurs. While donors have been at the forefront of developing strategies to reduce the risk of armed conflict, they are unlikely to play such a prominent role in AVR. Many societies with high levels of armed violence are lower-middle income countries where governments have the capacity develop and implement their own strategies and where donors play a relatively minor role.

There have been a number of common criticisms of donor-funded youth employment programmes. First, interventions have not been based on a context-specific analysis of conflict, market-demands or an understanding of young peoples’ grievances, motivations or expectations (Chingunta 2006, Buscher 2008, Sommers 2009). Second, as mentioned in the last section, there has been a widespread failure from donors to articulate clearly how youth employment projects contribute to armed violence reduction, peacebuilding or conflict prevention. Most donor-funded youth employment projects do not specifically work ‘on’ conflict; they have developmental or poverty reduction aims, focusing instead on pursuing these goals in a conflict-sensitive way (working ‘in’ conflict). Third, there has been a tendency to focus on the supply-side of job creation (training and skill development, job counselling), while the demand-side (public works programmes, targeted wage subsidies, and self-employment or entrepreneurship schemes) has been neglected (Puerto 2007, UNIDO 2007, UN 2009, WRC 2010). Fourth, programmes often prioritise the formal employment sector at the expense of the informal sector (where most newly employed youth find work) (Sommers 2009, Buscher 2008). Fifth, existing programmes often fail to develop linkages between short- and long-term job creation programmes (Beasley 2006, Chingunta 2006). Sixth, there has been a failure to connect youth employment programmes with other strands of youth programming (Amarasuriya et al 2009).

The following section summarises the key approaches and policies of leading actors in the field of youth job creation in post-conflict environments. It is based on a desk-based review of a larger group of donor, UN agencies and NGOs. The organisations discussed below are those where it is possible to identify a clear approach to using job creation as a tool to tackle armed violence in post-conflict situations (as opposed to general statements on working with youth or post-conflict development). These include both AVR and peacebuilding policies. These findings are summarised in a table in Appendix 4.

**The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development**, first adopted in 2006 and now endorsed by over 100 states, aims to support states and civil society actors to achieve measurable reductions in the global burden of armed violence in conflict and non-conflict settings. The Declaration commits signatories to:

- Support initiatives to measure the human, social and economic costs of armed violence;
- Undertake assessments to understand and respond to risks and vulnerabilities;
- Evaluate the effectiveness of armed violence prevention and reduction programs around the world; and
- To disseminate lessons and best practices.

**Multilateral Organisations**

The **United Nations** has taken a number of steps towards creating a more consistent and coherent policy towards youth unemployment in post-conflict environments. In 2008, the UN published a combined policy for **Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration**. The report proposes a practical ‘three track approach’ – stabilising income generation and emergency employment; promoting employment opportunities at the local level; and supporting sustainable employment creation and decent work (UN 2009):

- **Track A: Stabilising income Generation and Emergency Employment.** This track includes measures such as cash for work programmes targeted at demobilised youth and ‘emergency repair and public service programmes’, which can ‘improve the image of young people’. ‘Short-term employment should be complemented with on-the-job or vocational or small business training or part-time education’.
- **Track B: Local Economic Recovery for Employment and Reintegration.** ‘Community-based employment and livelihood support initiative should address the special challenges faced by young men and women in finding employment through capacity development, vocational training, mentorship/internship/apprenticeship programmes that build youth employability’.
- **Track C: Sustainable Employment Creation and Decent Work.** In this phase, governments should ‘encourage hiring of young workers by creating special internship provision and payroll or social security tax exemptions to encourage employers to take on young workers’. Private-public partnerships should be encouraged to create more jobs and young entrepreneurs should be supported. Legal reforms and national youth policies can help youths’ transitions into the formal sector.

ILO and UNDP are responsible for leading the implementation of this policy. The first roll-out countries are Timor-Leste, Nepal, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone. This approach goes some way to addressing the lack of a coherent UN agenda on youth and violent conflict, identified in a 2006 report by the UNDP (UNDP 2006).

In 2010 the UN also published a ‘World Programme of Action for Youth’. This report highlighted fifteen priority areas, which included employment and armed conflict. It proposes four specific proposals to tackle youth unemployment: generating opportunities for self-employment, opportunities for specific groups of young people (migrants, ex-combatants, young women), voluntary community services involving youth, and creating jobs in new technology areas. The UN has also developed clear guidelines on involving youth in DDR programmes (UN 2006). These guidelines emphasise the importance of addressing youth as a distinct category with distinct needs, based on an analysis of why young people join armed groups and recognising the heterogeneity of these individuals.

The ILO implements a range of youth employment projects, which focus on creating job opportunities in both the long-term (for example, by shaping the policy environment for youth employment) and in the immediate aftermath of disaster or conflict. In 2010, ILO published Guidelines for the Socio-Economic Reintegration of Ex-Combatants. The report emphasised the importance of making reintegration programmes to all youth (not just ex-combatants), and using vocational training programmes to tackle illiteracy, build life skills and promote reconciliation. It recommended involving the community in project design and implementation. In the same year, the ILO also published guidelines on ‘Local Economic Recovery in Post-Conflict’. These guidelines focus on displaced people, ex-combatants and IDPs and promote an ‘area-based approach’, which stimulates both the demand and supply sides of the market. The approach also aims to ‘promote reconciliation, social inclusion and participation within the targeted communities’. Small-scale livelihood recovery/creation activities and efforts to build the capacity of local actors are implemented in the early phase. Local economic recovery initiatives aim to re-establish a minimum of productive and commercial functions, and should eventually evolve into local economic development strategies. By this stage, participatory planning will be more systematic, institutionalised and ‘fully bottom up, with the involvement of a broader base of local stakeholders’ (ILO 2010a, 13).

ILO jointly implements the Youth Employment Network with the World Bank and UNIDO. This programme involves a number of components including a ‘Lead Country Network’ of developing countries that have agreed to participate in a regular benchmarking exercise of youth employment policies and programmes; a ‘Youth-to-Youth’ fund innovative employment initiatives of youth organisations in Africa; a ‘Private Sector Initiative’ in West Africa, which seeks to build networks of private sector initiatives, learn lessons and build partnerships; and a Youth Employment Databank (also in West Africa) which seeks to catalogue youth employment initiatives and the organisations that conduct them.

UNDP works with youth in conflict-affected countries in a number of ways including providing support for national youth policies, promoting long and short-term youth employment (for example, in East Timor and Kosovo), reconciliation projects and activities to promote youth volunteerism (UNDP 2007). Some recent UNDP programmes (such as the Jobs for Peace Programmes in Nepal) have sought to link employment generation activities with social initiatives designed to strengthen youth groups and reconciliation activities. Together with the WHO, UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery has implemented an action-research programme between 2004 and 2007, which was designed to support and evaluate effective AVR strategies (UNDP WHO 2005). UNDP has also implemented a number of programmes that combine violence reduction, peacebuilding and development goals. One example is the Violence Prevention, Peace and Sustainable Programme in Jamaica, where youth job creation is used alongside other measures such as civil society strengthening, life skills coaching, policy development work on small arms and institutional strengthening for the ministries of Justice and National Security.

UNICEF’s interventions in conflict have been focused on the areas of protection, health and nutrition (UNICEF 2009). UNICEF has worked to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers by providing income-generating, education and training opportunities. A recent report argues that these reintegration activities should be closely linked to child protection.
activities (ibid). The report also stresses the importance of tailoring livelihood development interventions to local contexts and the potential of public-private sector partnerships to support the demand-side of employment creation.

**UNESCO** (2004) has produced guidelines designed to support national governments in drawing up national youth action plans or policies on youth. It recommends the active involvement of civil society and young people themselves in drawing up these strategies.

The **Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)** has to date funded eight youth programmes in seven countries at a cost of $14.64 million. The PBC convened a working group on ‘Youth Employment in Peacebuilding’ in July 2010, which produced a ‘Lessons Learned’ Report (PBC 2010). The report makes the following recommendations:

- Involve the community in training programmes for young workers and ex-combatants.
- Provide incentives to the private sector to make it more attractive for them to hire youth.
- Integrate entrepreneurship in technical and vocational programmes.
- Involve youth in the design of employment policies and vocational training.
- Deal with youth unemployment ‘in a holistic manner involving a partnership between youth, the community, the business sector, the government, international and local organisations’.

The **World Bank** sees youth-targeted programming as central to its work. It has a dedicated Children and Youth Unit and has developed a framework for working with youth. Its **World Development Report 2007** focused on young people and proposed a more comprehensive approach to youth employment. It argues that vocational training packages should be a ‘comprehensive package that gives recipients the incentives and information to find jobs—such as employment services, counselling, and life-skills training’ (World Bank 2007, 21). This stance was reaffirmed by a 2008 report on youth unemployment in Africa. It argues that policy responses require ‘an integrated, multi-sector approach and close monitoring’. The report emphasises job creation through employment rich growth, and stresses the importance of partnership between donors, governments and civil society to ensure the sustainability of job creation interventions.

A recent report noted that the World Bank was adopting ‘a holistic approach’ to youth and violence (McLean Hilker and Fraser, 2009). It noted that ‘[t]he Bank considers that the focus has been too heavily on small arms and DDR with insufficient focus on underlying issues of youth exclusion’ and that ‘the links between youth exclusion and violence were now widely accepted in the Bank and the focus is now on how to operationalise [this approach] in its own work as well as engaging in dialogue on these issues with partner governments’ (McLean Hilker and Fraser, 2009, 37).

**OECD-DAC** has played a central role in establishing guidelines and best practice in the field of armed violence prevention. In 2009, it published an influential report entitled **Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling Development**. The report makes the case for making existing development programming AVR-sensitive. It notes that AVR programming can be direct (programming that specifically targets the prevention and reduction of armed violence and its effects) or indirect (development programming that is not specifically focused on reducing or preventing armed violence but that mainstream AVR elements so that programming is AVR-sensitive and includes AVR sub-goals). It makes some recommendations for practice in this area:

- Early analysis should be conducted to help to avoid unintended negative impacts on levels of violence.
- Analysis for AVR should involve inputs from local actors and beneficiaries. Assessments should be ongoing.
- Programmes should be multi-sectoral: they should address gun-control, but also tackle factors such as youth unemployment, gender relations, police reform and community mobilisation have shown promising outcomes.

### Bilateral Organisations

**USAID** has historically focused its post-conflict activities on addressing the economic dimensions of conflict, and has taken the challenge of youth unemployment seriously (Beasley 2006). It published a ‘Toolkit for Intervention’ on youth and conflict in 2005. This document stressed the need for contextual analysis of the root causes of violence. It made six specific recommendations: (i) Identify, but do not isolate youth at risk; (ii) Build community-based programmes; (iii) Ensure youth ownership and leadership; (iv) Engage female youth; (v) Programme holistically; and (vi) Plan transitions to adult roles for youth. USAID also published a report on ‘Job Creation in Post-Conflict Societies’ in 2006. This report stressed that employment would not simply follow from policies that encouraged growth in post-conflict societies. The
report criticises existing post-conflict job creation programmes for failing to link to long-term job creation and that funds should be made available for this purpose. USAID has increasingly integrated employment and training schemes with political participation programmes (Kvitashvili 2007). It has funded projects that address youth unemployment in post-conflict environments alongside interventions that seek to improve citizenship/civic engagement as well as increased inter-ethnic engagement (such as the recent $45 million Yes Youth Can project in Kenya).

**GTZ** was one of the first donors to focus on youth and has worked on issues of youth education, employment and peace education since 1997. GTZ has long recognised the need to address the multiple factors that underpin youth exclusion and negative socialisation in specific contexts (McLean Hilker and Fraser 2009, 38). GTZ also has a systematic and cross-sectoral approach to youth, involving both young people and their communities. There is currently a drive towards sectoral concentration within countries, which has led to a reduction in cross-sectoral youth projects (ibid, 38). In its recent *toolkit on youth employment*, GTZ stresses an approach that links supply- and demand-side responses to youth unemployment (GTZ 2010). This document also emphasises the importance of the informal sector, continually updating counselling services, and encouraging youth participation in National Action Plans on Youth Employment. GTZ also developed a ‘Youth and Violence’ toolkit in 2010 which calls for an integrated multi-level approach to youth violence prevention including strategies at a political level, capacity building youth social organisations and reconciliation activities.

**DFID** produced a mapping study, outlining the organisation’s approach to working with young people in 2007 (Maguire 2007). This study highlighted the need for a coordinated strategy to address youth issues and stressed that DFID’s work on conflict should be more youth-focused, and address the positive role played by youth in peacebuilding. Tackling youth unemployment was given prominence in DFID’s 2009 White Paper. It has provided support to youth employment projects in several countries, most notably in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

**Norway** produced a strategy for children and young people in 2005 (MFA 2005). This strategy gives high priority to vocational training. It stresses the need to provide opportunities for young people to gain formal employment, the importance of linking counselling services, micro-credit and marketing training, and of strengthening co-operation with the private sector. The report also states that priority will be given to educational and recreational programmes, psychosocial rehabilitation and to training in non-violent conflict resolution. Norway has worked closely with UNDP to build international support for armed violence reduction.

The **Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation** established a Youth Policy in 2007 (SDC 2007). The policy commits to working with youth organisations and encouraging young people’s political participation. SDC is committed to overcoming youth unemployment, paying particular attention to youth in conflict situations. SDC emphasises the importance of life skills for enhancing positive behaviour in relation to unemployment.

**NGOs**

**Save the Children** have been at the forefront of developing tools to assist donors and governments to increase youth and children’s participation in policymaking and implementing development projects. Its 2005 report on girls and armed violence (‘Forgotten Casualties’) includes a number of recommendations for reintegrating female youth combatants after war. It advocates a community-led approach to DDR programmes and recommends that donors establish a fund to meet the specific needs of girls during reintegration.

**International Alert** has been very active in addressing the economic dimensions of conflict and has undertaken a number of projects which seek to tackle youth unemployment. It has worked to facilitate policy dialogue on youth unemployment in Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Nepal. A 2009 report examined some of the conceptual links made between youth, unemployment and conflict; and identifies gaps in practice (Amarasuriya et al 2009). It recommends that youth employment strategies should be more closely related to in-depth analysis of the causes of youth frustration. IA’s work has sought to overcome what it perceives as a major deficiency in existing donor practice: a tendency for programmes that focus on the economic dimensions of youth violence to be disconnected from projects that address the social and political dimensions. IA’s work with youth entrepreneurs has attempted to generate direct links between their employment generation programmes and peacebuilding objectives. They have used district-level and nation-wide networks of entrepreneurs and micro-enterprise groups in Sri Lanka and Nepal as a tool for increasing solidarity among people from different ethnic groups.
Search for Common Ground has a reputation for supporting innovative practice in the peacebuilding field. In 2009 it produced a toolkit for engaging Children and Youth in Conflict Transformation. This toolkit identifies key principles for working with youth: working with influential youth leaders, encouraging youth engaged in negative activities to channel their energies into more positive occupations, working directly with youth organisations, replacing the power of the gun and fostering adult-youth partnerships.

4. The impact of job creation initiatives

Although many donor policy and strategy documents make bold claims about the potential for youth employment initiatives to reduce violence, keep the peace or assist long-term peacebuilding and reconciliation, the empirical record for these interventions is weak (Chingunta 2006, Sommers 2006, UNIDO 2007, World Bank 2007). This record suggests that a direct causal link between job creation programmes and violence reduction does not exist (Sommers comments). It also points to a number of deficiencies in donors’ commitment and capacity to evaluate these programmes.

First, although many donors have sought to use job creation as a tool for peacebuilding, very few have attempted to assess the impact of these initiatives on local and national-level conflict (or indeed their long-term impact on poverty reduction or employment levels). Instead, most evaluations of youth employment in post-conflict environments have focused on implementation, and success has been measured by meeting stated objectives. A recent study found that only a quarter of documented employment promotion programmes included impact evaluations (Peeters et al 2009).

In the case of the ILO, these objectives usually relate to implementing the various aspects of the project, such as the number of jobs created or the number of placements on a work scheme. An evaluation of UNDP’s YEP programme in Sierra Leone noted that the ‘ability to attribute impact is also compromised by the absence of either measurable or qualitative indicators that would have allowed the evaluation to make some tentative judgements in this regard’ (Sewell and Giles 2008, 31). The World Development Report 2007 also noted that ‘few solid evaluations of youth programmes in countries unambiguously identify the causality from policy to programme effect’ and argued that this gave youth policy ‘the aura of being soft’ and ‘lacking in rigor’ (World Bank 2007, 215). Most evaluations surveyed for this report assessed programmes’ potential to create jobs in the short term and were usually assessed at or near the end of the project.

Second, evaluations have failed to examine the lives of participants beyond the end of the project cycle, and have very rarely compared participants with non-participants (Sommers 2006). Programmes have rarely disaggregated participants on the grounds of gender or ethnicity, which serves as a further barrier to assessing their impact on social exclusion or conflict (Sommers 2006). Third, these problems are often compounded by a paucity of official unemployment statistics or detailed labour market information in post-conflict countries (Pietz 2004, UN 2006, Buscher 2008). Fourth, these deficiencies are at least partly due to the considerable methodological problems associated with analysing the impacts of peacebuilding interventions, which relate to the difficulty of dealing in counterfactuals and problems with attribution and time-frames. Job creation schemes may have a number of overlapping objectives - which include fostering economic growth, reducing inequality, tackling poverty, fostering political stability, reducing violence and encouraging reconciliation – which make their impacts difficult to assess. These issues may be compounded by the fact that many of these initiatives have been conducted relatively recently, precluding long-term evaluation. As the previous section described, the aims of job creation programmes have evolved over time, making analysis of their impact something of a ‘moving target’ (Buxton 2008).

The small number of evaluations that have examined the wider impact of job creation initiatives have found that their effects beyond direct beneficiaries are minimal (see, for example, GTZ 2008, NORAD 2010). These studies show the long-term structural economic impacts of these schemes to be limited. The Youth Employment Inventory found that only 15% of youth employment programmes from developing countries provided evidence of net impact. An evaluation of NORAD support to Kosovo found that while youth employment projects implemented by the UNDP had a positive impact on participants’ employment levels, the long-term sustainability of the project was questionable and efforts to reduce youth unemployment were limited (NORAD 2010a). A preliminary analysis of income generation schemes in Nepal by International Alert (2010) demonstrated that although a conflict-sensitive approach to micro-enterprise was successful in building some degree of solidarity between participants and reduced family and community conflicts, there was little

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evidence that the project had been successful in building a larger-scale political movement for peace. The limited impact of job creation initiatives may be partly the result of poor implementation. Buscher’s (2008) assessment of skills training programmes in Liberia found that the majority of these programmes were poorly targeted and implemented and that they did not prepare youth for the informal market, despite opportunities existing in this area.

The literature on reintegration programmes tells a similar story: most studies suggest that the impact on economic and social reintegration is limited (Chingunta 2006, Humphreys and Weinstein 2007, Pugel 2009). Chingunta (2006) argues that this failure is principally a result of these programmes’ limited coverage and their failure to take into account the specific needs of different types of ex-combatants. Gilligan et al’s (2010, 1) review of a World Bank’s ex-combatant reintegration programme in Burundi finds that while this programme caused ‘significant economic reintegration for its beneficiaries’, ‘this economic reintegration did not translate into greater political and social reintegration’. This study is unusual in that it examines both participants and non-participants. It found that participants’ income levels increased by between 20-35%, and that there was a very small decrease in their inclination towards civilian life as opposed to combatant life. The study found, however, that there was no ‘evidence that the program contributed to more satisfaction with the peace process or a more positive disposition toward current government institutions’. They conclude that ‘[s]ocial and political integration of ex-combatants likely requires much more than individually-targeted economic assistance’.

The use of job creation as a component in indirect AVR strategies is a relatively recent phenomenon. As a result, there is not a large body of evidence to support these strategies (OECD 2009, 48). One successful example is the ‘Luta Pela Paz’ (‘Fight For Peace’) project, implemented in Brazil, which has used youth job creation to effectively reduce youth participation in crime and violence (CLAVES 2006). Viva Rio, a Brazilian NGO formed in 1993, also used an integrated approach that addressed the inter-related aspects of gun violence in Rio to bring about a clear demonstrable reduction in levels of armed violence (OECD 2009, 91). There is empirical record of success in government-led AVR strategies in developed and middle-income countries such as the US, Colombia, Brazil and South Africa is perhaps more robust. The US-based Office for Juvenille Justice and Deliquency Prevention’s comprehensive gang prevention and intervention model has demonstrated some success and emphasises the importance of opportunity provision as a key component (MFA UNDP 2010a, 27). The Prevention of Violence in the Medellín Metropolitan Area (PREVIVA) programme in Colombia is another example of an integrated programme where job creation was used alongside other interventions (such as weapons recovery programmes, coercive action against organised crime and disarmament and demobilisation activities) to successful reduce the homicide rate by 90% in the Medellín area (OECD 2009, 97). A review of ten AVR programmes in the Carribean region and Rio de Janeiro found that those that used a multi-sectoral approach (which combined economic and social development incentives, community policing, targeted awareness-raising and special programmes for at-risk males) were most successful (OECD 2009, 103).

5. Gaps in the Current Literature

The main gap in the current literature is a lack of critical analysis of the impact and broader social, economic and political effects of youth job creation programmes. Despite growing rhetorical commitment to understanding the specific causes of youth violence in particular contexts, most donor interventions have not been based on a clearly articulated theory of youth violence, or a context-specific account of youth marginalisation or radicalisation. As a result, there has been virtually no detailed analysis of how donor interventions have influenced the processes of marginalisation and radicalisation that drive violence in any given context. There has also been very little critical reflection on the potential negative effects of poorly designed youth programmes.

Some recent studies (Gilligan et al 2010, Samii 2010, Amarasuriya et al 2009) have shown how micro-level analysis can provide a more complete understanding of the motivations that underpin youth violence, and how such an understanding may be used to inform donor-funded job creation programmes. Another positive development is the growing sophistication with which donors have collected data on armed violence. Work by donors to collect information which is disaggregated by age, ethnicity and sex has helped to challenge over-generalisations (IDS 2010). Donors should make greater efforts to articulate the proximate causes of violence and how their programmes may impact on them. This might
involve conducting more detailed analysis of how youth employment programmes impact on participants and non-
participants’ perceptions of the state, youth political allegiances or other communities. 3

This gap is closely related to a failure to thoroughly articulate and examine the mechanisms via which job creation
programmes impact upon local or national-level conflict. Donors have failed to distinguish between impacts on organised
armed violence and other forms of violence such as criminal violence, political violence and inter-personal violence. They
have also failed to clearly explore the links between local and national level violence and to assess how micro-level
interventions might impact upon conflict at the regional or national level. In many cases, detailed ethnographic research
into the causes of youth violence exists, but these lessons are not integrated into programming, which is still largely based
on poorly substantiated claims about why young people become involved in violence.

Good programming also requires up-to-date political analysis. The potential impact of job creation programmes on
certain groups of young people is closely related to the status of the political settlement in that particular country. In Sri
Lanka, for example, there is currently a danger that development interventions (including donor-funded job creation
programmes) may legitimise or entrench a ‘victor’s peace’ that has failed to adequately address the political
marginalisation of the Tamil minority.

Although donors have increasingly recognised the specific challenges and needs of female youth, young women have
continued to be under-represented in programming and policy (Sommers 2006, McLean Hilker & Fraser 2009). More
detailed analysis of the challenges facing female youth in post-conflict contexts and of the impact of job creation schemes
on female youth would help to tackle this problem.

There has also been limited literature that examines the linkages between processes of peacebuilding, reconciliation and
youth employment. This partly reflects the tendency to adopt a ‘deficit approach’ to youth, which has led to a general
neglect of the positive roles played by youth in processes of peacebuilding and reconciliation (Sommers 2006, Ebata et al
2005).

6. Examples

This section details some examples of job creation programmes that have been ‘successful’ at reducing armed violence or
conflict. Since most of these interventions have not been comprehensively reviewed or evaluated, it is difficult to state
definitively whether or not these programmes had a significant positive impact. These accounts are largely reliant on
organisations’ own accounts and are presented here largely to illustrate how some promising approaches may be applied
in practice.

The Youth Business Sri Lanka (YBSL) programme was a nation-wide expansion of the Hambantota Youth Business Trust
(HYBT), which was established in southern Sri Lanka in 1997 by the District Chamber of Commerce with the explicit aim of
preventing the recurrence of youth-led political rebellion (the JVP, a Marxist youth-led political group with a strong
presence in the South had rebelled against the state in the late 1970s and again in the 1980s). The HYBT supported
unemployed by providing them with credit and business development services to help them establish their own
businesses and fostered a marked improvement in the income levels of 250 youth and their immediate families. The
Trust’s work has helped to shift attitudes towards entrepreneurship in the district (previously many young people from
marginalised rural areas considered the private sector as class enemies). The scheme was expanded to other districts with
the support of International Alert (IA) and the ILO. YBSL aimed to act as a platform for inter-regional, inter-ethnic and
inter-cultural exchange and reconciliation, where participants from Business Trusts in different districts could meet and
share experiences. It provided mentoring to young entrepreneurs: a process that provided a space for people from
different ethnicities, castes, classes, genders and age groups otherwise divided by conflict to interact. Experienced
mentors from Hambantota could guide mentors in other districts. There was some evidence that the programme’s work in
Hambantota had led to a softening of the ideological positions of some youth in Hambantota. Although there were also
signs that the interaction between participants from ethnic groups in different districts had supported reconciliation and

3 A number of observational studies are underway, which may fill this gap. These include a World Bank study on livelihood generation
for ‘at-risk’ youth in Aceh, a study on vocational assistance for youth ex-combatants in Liberia (Samii comments). Chris Blattman
ethnic harmony, more in-depth and long-term qualitative studies are needed to assess the wider impact of the scheme (For more information see http://bit.ly/aPcvZN).

KATA⁴ was a four-year programme funded by USAID in Haiti between 2006 and 2010. The programme sought to address the high levels of poverty and inequality that were seen as key drivers of instability in the country. It sought to advance stability through short and long-term employment and rehabilitation of public assets in five unstable urban ‘hotspots’. The first phase involved cash-for-work infrastructure rehabilitation projects, which involved workforce development interventions and private-public partnerships. After the first year, the programme involved more complex programmes that require more advanced skills and promised more durable employment. The programme involved an active collaboration between the government of Haiti, communities and the private sector and these stakeholders were involved in identifying, prioritising and implementing the various infrastructure and employment generation projects. This engagement was one of the key factors behind the success of the project, ensuring that public investments were strategically focused. Another key factor in the programme’s success was the linking of short-term job creation with more durable workforce development initiatives and long-term employment opportunities that required more advanced skills. The programme worked closely with the private sector to ensure that the skills provided by training institutions matched the demands of the market. The programme also addressed low standards of education by targeting graduates of adult literacy programmes for job creation programmes. The programme has created over 105,000 new job opportunities. Although the programme aims to engender stability, the effects of the programme on levels of violence or political stability have not been measured by CHF International or USAID. (For more information see Blum and Angeles (2008) and USAID Fact Sheet http://bit.ly/9f91DI).

The USAID-funded Preventive Activities and Training that Works for At-Risk Youth (PATHWAYS) project was designed and implemented by the American Refugee Committee with the aim of improving the capacity of individuals and communities to prevent and respond to violence in Guinea through the creation of community management committees, conflict prevention-oriented life skills training and providing economic opportunities to at-risk youth. One of the features of the programme that was critical to its success included integrating youth into programme and design using ‘peer-to-peer’ capacity building techniques. This ensured that the project remained relevant to youth participants, helped to empower and build the confidence of trainers, and helped to ensure the programme’s sustainability. The training curriculum was experiential, culturally relevant and was appropriate for youth with low literacy levels and little business experience. Collaboration with local micro-finance institutions and local businesses ensured that the programme was demand-led. A perceptions survey administered at the end of the first year of the project found that participants’ incomes had increased, that the number of ex-volunteer combatants were prepared to take up arms again had fallen from 82% to 46%, and that participation in violence had declined. (For more information see Harrelson et al (2008)).

UNDP’s work in the Occupied Palestinian Territories provide a good example of how youth unemployment concerns are often integrated into broader developmental, humanitarian and peacebuilding programming. UNDP created a large number of short- and long-term employment opportunities through land reclamation and infrastructure development programmes. They combined these field activities with capacity-building work to improve the capacity of the Palestinian Authority and locally-elected bodies and work to develop a national youth organization, which provided inputs to the National Youth Policy. An evaluation of the project published in 2009 found that including capacity-building components improved the timeliness of the implementation and involving participants in the design of the programme increased their ownership and commitment. The report recommended that UNDP should raise the priority of youth in the future, in recognition of the fact that ‘solutions to social and economic problems can only come from civil society’. It also recommended providing more conflict resolution training to young people and providing greater support to youth leaders. (For more information see http://bit.ly/cp4qdk).

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⁴ KATA stands for “Konbit Ak Tet Ansanm” in Haitian Creole, which means ‘working together’.
7. Good Practices / Lessons Learned

A number of key lessons can be drawn from this study’s analysis of the academic, evaluative and policy guideline literature:

Analysis

- **Contextual analysis:** Youth job-creation schemes should be based on thorough contextual analysis of the prevailing local economic, social and political conditions (Chingunta 2006, UNIDO 2007, McLean Hilker & Fraser 2009). Particular attention should be paid to understanding the context-specific causes of youth violence, and the heterogenous motivations and expectations of youth in particular locales (they are likely to vary between rural and urban areas) (Amarasuriya et al 2009, OECD 2009, WRC 2010). Social stigma may be attached to certain kinds of work (such as manual labour) and there may be more reluctance to engage in private sector or entrepreneurial activity: these norms should be understood and where appropriate support provided to overcome negative associations (Amarasuriya et al 2009, WRC 2010). Agencies should make use of existing available data and can use quick preliminary surveys to overcome the poor state of labour market information relatively quickly (UN 2006). AVR strategies should be based on violence databases, which can map the intensity, concentrations and demographics of armed violence (OECD 2009).

- **Market research:** Interventions should be based on detailed market research to ensure that programmes are demand-driven and training programmes are appropriate (Amarasuriya et al 2009, PBC 2010).

- **Better M&E:** Interventions should involve rigorous monitoring to ensure continued relevance in a shifting political and economic climate (Sommers 2009). There should be much more thorough evaluation of the impacts of youth employment and peacebuilding programmes. In particular, donors should focus less on quantitative deliverables (such as the number of trainees employed), and focus more on comparing outcomes of participants and non-participants and place greater emphasis on understanding the effect of these projects on processes of peace and conflict (Sommers 2009, WRC 2010).

- **Clarify objectives and mechanisms of change:** Donors should be clear about what kinds of conflicts and violence they seek to address through youth job creation: inter-personal, community-level, regional or national. They should devote more resources to understanding the potential mechanisms through which these programmes might bring about change.

Programme design

- **Holistic programming:** Donors should look for opportunities to integrate youth issues into existing programmes but should not assume that including youth as a cross-cutting issue will be sufficient (McLean Hilker and Fraser 2009, Munive 2008). Youth programmes should include ‘life skills’ components to build participants’ self confidence and interpersonal skills (Harrelson et al 2008, Monterey conference 2009) and address low levels of education in conflict-affected areas through, for example, ‘catch-up’ literacy programmes (UN 2006, Blum and Angeles 2008, Munive 2008, UNICEF 2009, ILO 2010). Similarly, reintegration programmes should be coordinated with broader youth strategies, broader employment policies, SSR and justice sector reform and programmes in neighbouring countries (UN 2006, 7). AVR should be multi-level and multi-sectoral (OECD 2009).

- **Youth participation:** Young people should be involved in project design, monitoring and evaluation (UN 2006, McLean Hilker & Fraser 2008, Munive 2008, PBC 2010). This will help to clarify youth priorities and expectations and ensure that employment opportunities are appealing to young people (UN 2006, 5). A more top-down model of decision making may be appropriate in the immediate post-conflict phase to ensure rapid results (ILO 2010, 13).

- **Stakeholder collaboration:** Programmes should involve consultation and active engagement with all relevant stakeholders, including national governments, other donors, employers’ organisations, unions, the private sector, NGOs, communities and youth groups (UN 2006, Blum and Angeles 2008).

- **Link ex-combatants and non-combatants:** Although it may make sense to target ex-combatants, where possible programmes should also be designed to maximise links between ex-combatants and non-combatants (UN 2006). Efforts should be taken not to exacerbate divisions between these two groups (McLean Hilker & Fraser 2009, UN 2009, Pietz 2004, Harrelson et al 2008).
- **Link short-term measures with long-term programmes**: Donors should develop mechanisms to link short-term interventions (such as cash-for-work schemes) with longer-term employment creation, for example by integrating skills training into quick impact projects (UN 2006, UNIDO 2007, Blum and Angeles 2008).
- **Manage expectations**: Reliable and realistic information about training and the potential for finding employment should be provided (Taylor et al 2008, 10, WRC 2010).
- **Maintain flexibility**: Post-conflict environments are economically and politically fluid: donors should adapt programmes to meet changing conditions (MacLeod & Davalos 2008).

**Including marginal groups**

- **Targeting**: High-risk groups (such as ex-combatants, poor households) should be targeted in the immediate post-conflict phase, but as stability returns, programmes should become more needs-based (McLean Hilker & Fraser 2009, Amarasuriya et al 2009, Sommers 2006, 2007, Harrelson et al 2008). The most successful AVR strategies are those that target young men as the community members most vulnerable to being recruited into armed violence (OECD 2009, 103).
- **Female youth**: There is a tendency for women to be excluded from traditional post-conflict youth training programmes. Care should be taken to ensure that female youth are included and specific strategies are adopted to meet their specific needs and expectations (McLean Hilker & Fraser 2009, Amarasuriya et al 2009, Sommers 2006, 2007, Harrelson et al 2008). Female ex-combatants in particular may have particular needs and should be treated differently from male ex-combatants (UN 2006).
- **Urban and rural youth**: Donors should recognise the differences in expectations and needs of these two groups and ensure that programmes do not neglect either of them (there has been a particular tendency to neglect urban youth (Sommers 2007, 2009, Munive 2008). To ensure neither group is neglected, donors could look for opportunities to link rural and urban economic sectors (Munive 2008).
- **The poorest**: There is a tendency for programmes to exclude the poorest (Sommers 2006). Programmes should make efforts to reach and ensure the recruitment and ongoing participation of the most deprived.

**Address social exclusion**

- **Youth empowerment**: Youth employment programmes should involve strategies for addressing youth marginalisation (McLean Hilker and Fraser 2009, Sommers 2009). Donors should strive to understand the causes of marginalisation and exclusion.
- **Focus on community acceptance**: Job creation should not be simply about increasing economic opportunities, but also about boosting youth social acceptance and developing a sense of identity. Interventions should focus on the dynamics of acceptance for ex-combatants and other categories of unemployed youth (Taylor et al 2008, UN 2009). One strategy for achieving this might be to develop a ‘youth service corps’ or volunteer community services involving youth, where young people address their community’s post-conflict reconstruction needs (Ignatowski et al 2006, UN 2010). The community should be involved in designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating programmes (ILO 2010, PBC 2010). Effective AVR activities are underpinned by community-based initiative and mobilisation (OECD 2009, 78).

**Address the demand-side**

- **Involve the private sector**: The private sector should be involved in programme design; ensuring training courses are relevant and meet market demands (Munive 2008, Peeters et al 2009, WRC 2010). Failure to do this has led to the failure of many traditional vocational training programmes (Taylor et al 2008, WRC 2010). This may involve providing incentives to the private sector to invest and employ young people (Buxton 2008, PBC 2010).
- **Maintain focus on long-term economic growth**: Attention should be given to the wider macro-economic environment (Munive 2008). Large-scale economic infrastructure programmes should be properly timed and coordinated to make a contribution to the long-term productivity of businesses (Buxton 2008).
- **Support the informal sector**: Traditionally, creating jobs in the informal sector has been ignored, despite the fact that most new jobs in post-conflict countries come from this sector (Ebata et al 2005). A related problem has been a lack of micro-finance projects targeting young people, particularly in urban areas (Sommers 2003). Donors should provide more credit to young people to encourage entrepreneurship (UN 2006).
**Link to peacebuilding**

- **Positive roles**: It is important to balance a ‘deficit’ or security-oriented approach to youth with a focus on the positive role youth can play as peacebuilders or engines of social and economic recovery (McLean Hilker and Fraser 2009).

- **Conflict resolution training**: Youth employment and DDR programmes should involve conflict resolution training components (UN 2006, 8; WRC 2010).

- **Support youth organisations**: Donors should seek to build the capacity of youth organisations that provide a space for young people to meet and express their views (Ignatowski et al 2006).
8. Bibliography


Appendix 1: Terms of Reference

Description of the project

Armed violence in the context of both conflict and crime has been identified as an obstacle to development and achieving the Millennium Development Goals. In some fragile and post-conflict societies that are formally at peace, violent deaths outnumber those of countries experiencing conflict and civil war. Lack of opportunities owing to unfavourable political conditions and poor economic environment are seen as key factors in encouraging young men and women to turn to crime and participation in armed groups as a means of survival. Furthermore, insecurity and the absence or inadequacy of state institutions, have enabled the expansion of violence in many different forms, especially in low- and middle-income countries. The linkages between youth⁵, armed violence and the provision of alternatives to “violent livelihoods”, for example through job creation, have received increased attention in recent years. However, there has not been sufficient assessment of the impact of initiatives aimed at reducing youth’s involvement in armed violence and reliable evidence is lacking.

This project will examine the “state of the art” of current knowledge on the links between youth and armed violence, with a particular emphasis on the potential role of job creation programmes in reducing the involvement of youth in armed violence.

Assignment of the consultant

1º Produce a mapping focused on the role and impact of job creation in reducing and preventing youth’s involvement in armed violence

2º Participate in an experts meeting to present the results of the mapping, (27th of September, 2010, in Oslo, Norway)

Methodology

The work is essentially desk based, and entails reviewing key documents and reports, donor policies, and identifying relevant examples and evidence of impact (to the extent available).

The consultant should review programmes carried out by international organizations, such as, but not limited to, International Labour Organization, World Bank, UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNESCO (and others), relevant international NGOs (Oxfam International, Save the Children, others), as well as policies by relevant donor agencies such as DFID, USAID, GTZ, NORAD, SIDA and CIDA.

The mapping should be global in scope and not limited to specific countries; however, regional trends or other relevant patterns should be identified as appropriate.

⁵ According to the definition used by the United Nations, the term “youth” defines those persons age between 15 and 24 years old; this definition was endorsed by the General Assembly (see A/36/215 and resolution 36/28, 1981). http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unyin/qanda.htm
Appendix 2: Experts consulted and interviewed

Chris Cramer, SOAS, University of London
Saji Prelis, American University
Cyrus Samii, Colombia University
Marc Sommers, Boston University
Darryl McLeod, Fordham University
Shukuko Koyama, ILO/CRISIS
Shenji Li, ILO
Suresh Mahto, ILO
Ken Beasley, USAID
Markus Mayer, International Alert
Lindsay McLean Hilker, Social Development Direct
### Appendix 3: Perspectives on the causes of conflict and armed violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective</th>
<th>Main assumptions</th>
<th>Implications for Job Creation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greed/ Opportunity</td>
<td>Violence is an outcome of rational individual choices to maximise economic, political or social benefits.</td>
<td>Broadly-targeted youth job creation programmes in countries with large youth populations to increase cost of rebellion and generate a ‘peace dividend’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grievance</td>
<td>Violence is an outcome of inequalities or differences between different societal groups (especially horizontal inequalities).</td>
<td>More targeted job creation schemes, based on contextually-sensitive understanding. Schemes can reduce horizontal inequalities and build solidarity across ethnic or cultural divisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological</td>
<td>Young people are more prone to violence.</td>
<td>May lead to programming that sees youth as a threat and neglects positive roles played by youth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Exclusion</td>
<td>Youth violence is a product of the social and political marginalisation of young people.</td>
<td>Integrated and comprehensive youth programming that addresses corruption, patronimialism that underpins lack of opportunities for young people.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 4: Key donors' approaches to youth employment and armed violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Key Features of Approach</th>
<th>Key Documents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>‘Three track approach’ — stabilising income generation and emergency employment; promoting employment opportunities at the local level; and supporting sustainable employment creation and decent work.</td>
<td>Policy for Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration (2009); World Programme of Action for Youth (2010); Guidelines on involving youth in DDR Programmes (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacebuilding Commission</td>
<td>Emphasises ‘holistic’ community-oriented approach, involving youth in programme design and providing incentives to private sector.</td>
<td>Lessons Learned from Youth Employment in Peacebuilding Group (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Traditionally focuses on economic dimensions of conflict. Increasingly holistic approach to youth programming – linking support to private sector with initiatives to tackle social exclusion.</td>
<td>Toolkit for Intervention on Youth and Conflict (2005); Job Creation In Post-Conflict Societies (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>A systematic and cross-sectoral approach to youth, involving both young people and their communities.</td>
<td>Toolkit on Youth Employment (2010); Youth and Violence Toolkit (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Key Strategies and Approaches</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Emphasises need for co-ordinated strategy and importance of tackling youth issues in conflict work.</td>
<td>Youth Mapping Study (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>High priority to vocational training. Stresses the importance of linking counselling services, micro-credit and marketing training, and of strengthening co-operation with the private sector.</td>
<td>Strategy for Youth and Children (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td>Focus on developing tools to assist donors and governments to increase youth and children’s participation in policymaking and implementing development projects.</td>
<td>Forgotten Casualties (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Alert</td>
<td>Policy work addressing economic dimensions of conflict. Youth employment strategies should be more closely related to in-depth analysis of the causes of youth frustration.</td>
<td>Rethinking the nexus between youth, unemployment and conflict – Perspectives from Sri Lanka (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search For Common Ground</td>
<td>Identifies four key principles for working with youth: working with influential youth leaders, encouraging youth engaged in negative activities to channel their energies into more positive occupations, working directly with youth organisations, replacing the power of the gun and fostering adult-youth partnerships.</td>
<td>Children and Youth in Conflict Transformation (2009)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>