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A common public perception about modern day intelligence services in Africa is that they are mere extensions of the too-often authoritarian leaders under whom they operate. In some cases, the intelligence services appear to tolerate this perception – some would suggest even fuel it – because of the ...
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A common public perception about modern day intelligence services in Africa is that they are mere extensions of the too-often authoritarian leaders under whom they operate. In some cases, the intelligence services appear to tolerate this perception – some would suggest even fuel it – because of the apparent power, access and influence intelligence provides. As despised or ridiculed as intelligence services might be, they often hold a trump card in domestic and international relations, and are quite aware of this relative advantage. Another view is that intelligence services are ineffectual and irrelevant dinosaurs, and that effective power and influence in society and the state lies elsewhere. Genuine power and influence may be, for example, in the hands of the armed forces or political parties or whoever controls the disbursement of finances. In this scenario, intelligence services, if they know what is good for them, had better seek accommodation with these elements. There is a third, alternative and global narrative, one which argues that traditional intelligence services - secret intelligence gathering entities still in their Cold War vestments - are wholly unsuited to anticipating and addressing the complex security threats facing whole countries, regions and blocs. This narrative ponders the proliferation of sources of information and asks whether innovations in information gathering and dissemination are rendering intelligence organisations as just another resource that must compete with other state actors for resources, respect and the space to perform. An extension of this school of thought is that the world in which intelligence services operate is so complex that it will require very different architectures and capacities to make an impact on the kinds of security threats currently faced by countries and the world. Which school of thought is the most valid: intelligence as the power behind the throne, the mediocre bureaucracy that delivers unhelpful intelligence reports, or the entity that must adapt to the times and constantly reinvent itself to stay relevant and to ensure its survival? Though there has been little critical analysis of the role of African intelligence services – not least because they have tended to operate in the political shadows - there is enough anecdotal evidence to suggest that talk of their pervasive powers is reasonably well founded. And yet a more introspective study reveals a more nuanced picture - their power is wielded at varying times and in differing circumstances, to differing and not always spectacular effect. The book discusses the intelligence capacities of both larger, more established states and those of smaller and weaker states. Sometimes such states exist in a regional context, as is the case in the Great Lakes region. Here stronger states (Tanzania, Uganda) coexist with smaller ones (Burundi, Rwanda). Sometimes the size of a state does not necessarily translate into strength; the Democratic Republic of Congo is geographically large, but its state formations are relatively weak and in need of further development.

The most important and vexed issue relating to governance of the intelligence services in a democracy is arguably that of secrecy. It is the most important issue because the higher the level of secrecy, the harder it is to ascertain and assess the features and performance of the services. In the abs...
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The most important and vexed issue relating to governance of the intelligence services in a democracy is arguably that of secrecy. It is the most important issue because the higher the level of secrecy, the harder it is to ascertain and assess the features and performance of the services. In the absence of adequate information, it is impossible to have a meaningful discussion on the role and orientation of the intelligence community, on the need for intelligence reform and on the vital question of whether the services are protecting or undermining the security and freedom of citizens. The subject is vexed because it is characterised by strong competing pressures. On the one hand, certain aspects of the intelligence community and its activities must be kept secret in order to avoid compromising the security of the country, the integrity of operations, and the lives of intelligence officers and their sources. On the other hand, secrecy is antithetical to democratic governance, it prevents full accountability, and it provides fertile ground for abuse of power, illegality and a culture of impunity. Given these competing pressures, many governmental and non-governmental publications on intelligence assert that ‘a reasonable balance must be struck between secrecy and transparency’. This formulation is too abstract and non-committal to be of any value. This briefing note begins with an outline of a democratic approach to intelligence secrecy, and then makes practical recommendations on expanding intelligence transparency without prejudicing the security of the country. The approach and recommendations with reference to South Africa, whose intelligence transformation over the past fifteen years has been substantial, but remains incomplete. In 2008 the Ministerial Review Commission on Intelligence in South Africa released a report that highlighted a number of areas in which the intelligence dispensation was inconsistent with the Constitution. This briefing note is based on that report.

The purpose of this mapping study is to provide the UK Department for International Development (DFID) with a quantitative and qualitative snapshot of security and justice civil society organisations (CSOs) and networks working in and across the countries investigated. CSO engagement on issues of...
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The purpose of this mapping study is to provide the UK Department for International Development (DFID) with a quantitative and qualitative snapshot of security and justice civil society organisations (CSOs) and networks working in and across the countries investigated. CSO engagement on issues of security and justice is inherently difficult in many countries due to the nature of their governing regimes (such as where the state has authoritarian tendencies or where military regimes preside). In some cases the political space for CSOs to engage in issues of security and justice is being increasingly suppressed. Consequently, the success of donor support for security and justice CSOs often depends to a great extent on the political will of respective governments to enable CSOs to work freely. Furthermore, donors who wish to support security and justice CSOs need to take account of the extent to which donor interactions with government security and justice structures may influence the extent and quality of donor interaction with CSOs. In many countries, an understanding of security and justice as conceptualised and defined by donors is lacking amongst civil society – and an understanding of these issues as conceptualised by civil society is often lacking among donors and governments. This scenario even holds true in those countries where civil society as a whole is otherwise vibrant. Consequently, there is a need to increase the basic level of understanding on security and justice matters (both within CSOs and governments), to broaden the strategic community (those working in think tanks or engaged in policy analysis), and to support the development of research capacity and expertise in security and justice areas. Joined up approaches to security and justice work are rare in almost all contexts and common/collaborative/networking fora do not exist. Recommendations were made in almost all sub-regions stating that donor approaches should encourage collaboration at the outset between security and justice CSOs and devise schemes that reward or encourage joined up working.

A major problem in security sector reform (SSR) has been a lack of local input to and ownership of the emerging reform agenda. Consequently, many donor governments and organisations have made commitments to the principle of local ownership. Yet this has become more a rhetorical device than a guide t...
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A major problem in security sector reform (SSR) has been a lack of local input to and ownership of the emerging reform agenda. Consequently, many donor governments and organisations have made commitments to the principle of local ownership. Yet this has become more a rhetorical device than a guide to donor practice. This paper, by the Crisis States Research Centre, aims to contribute to operationalising donor countries’ policy commitments to local ownership of SSR. It discusses the content and political nature of SSR, and presents guidelines on guaranteeing the engagement of local actors and ensuring the security needs of citizens are met. It identifies obstacles facing SSR and a framework for their analysis. It suggests means by which donors can improve local ownership and makes proposals on institutionalising local ownership in donor governments’ procedures. The paper also draws on case studies of Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Liberia, Sierra Leone and South Africa. In practical terms, local ownership of SSR means that the reform of security policies, institutions and activities in a given country must be designed, managed and implemented by local rather than external actors. Donors should support projects initiated by local actors rather than local actors supporting donor programmes. The principle of local ownership is applicable in both strong and weak developing states, and in sectors other than security, such as development and post-conflict peacebuilding. The absence of local ownership of SSR is inimical to development and democracy. Local ownership should be pursued as a matter of both respect and of pragmatic necessity. Support for local ownership should be the primary objective and outcome of all donor programmes as without it, SSR is bound to fail. Such failure is evident in that: - domination and paternalism by external actors generate resentment, resistance and inertia among local actors. Local actors have little commitment to externally imposed products which generally do not reflect local needs, dynamics and resources; - a process orientated approach is more likely to yield good results in the long term than a product orientated approach. However good the content of an SSR initiative, a poor process that treats people as objects rather than subjects will lead to flawed outcomes; and - while donors justify the absence of local ownership of SSR on the grounds that often local institutions and actors lack capacity and legitimacy, only though enhancing the capacity and legitimacy of such institutions can the security of citizens improve. SSR takes place in a variety of environments, this limiting the applicability of generalisations that are often made. The strongest general recommendation that can be made is that donors should avoid a mechanical or formulaic approach to SSR and should instead develop programmes that are flexible and responsive to local actors and conditions. This paper also makes the following policy-relevant observations: - the major obstacles facing SSR are complexity, lack of capacity, resistance to change, and instability and insecurity; - to enhance local ownership donors should offer support in five areas: research of parliamentary committees that deal with security, security policy and planning units in government, small grants schemes for civil society that focus on SSR, drafting legislation, and comparative SSR exchange and study; and - the principle of local ownership should be institutionalised in donor governments through inclusion in their funding, evaluation, reporting and other bureaucratic procedures.

This paper directly challenges some of the popular SSR mythology that has grown around the UK’s involvement in Sierra Leone and the subsequent policy developments associated with SSR. It raises questions about the underlying political assumptions of the SSR process and contemporary SSR material, muc...
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This paper directly challenges some of the popular SSR mythology that has grown around the UK’s involvement in Sierra Leone and the subsequent policy developments associated with SSR. It raises questions about the underlying political assumptions of the SSR process and contemporary SSR material, much of which lacks analysis of underlying theories of SSR relating to broader state building and construction of a liberal peace. Using a case taken from the reconstruction of Sierra Leone this paper outlines some of the key issues emerging after ten years of reconstruction efforts. Sierra Leone is usually over-cited, but given its importance to any orthodoxy that may be said to exist, it is relevant here. Fundamentally, Sierra Leone remains a relatively small state in West Africa and the fact a viable state remains elusive challenges assumptions about time taken in reconstructing socio-political norms and structures, and also questions state-building as a post conflict approach. This paper will argue that SSR in Sierra Leone was never a developed strategy but came to represent a series of policies that evolved on the ground largely as the result of the interaction of individuals and groups engaged in those early decisions, sometimes against the wishes of Whitehall, but always sharing a ‘direction of travel’. This is an important point in terms of how SSR policy was actually developed and also how approaches come to be seen as being far smoother and well planned with hindsight but also in terms of how policy-makers and academics can learn about social, governance and security processes. Finally the paper moves on to analyse what lessons can and can’t be drawn from this experience and what the implications are for SSR going forward. It argues that the example of Sierra Leone as a ‘classic’ post conflict situation is enlightening but also damaging in the sense that any future SSR intervention will face radically different circumstances and needs to take into account broader issues of state-building and in particular recognising the deeply political aspects of what is being done when an international agency engages in SSR.

This research paper was commissioned by GFN-SSR as part of a helpdesk support to inform HMG to report on its engagement in the context of Nepal. The query asked for illustrative examples and lessons of integration; in particular, examples of integration into armies, integration into non-military fo...
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This research paper was commissioned by GFN-SSR as part of a helpdesk support to inform HMG to report on its engagement in the context of Nepal. The query asked for illustrative examples and lessons of integration; in particular, examples of integration into armies, integration into non-military forces (police, armed police, intelligence, etc), and creation of new security structures (industrial security forces, border police, etc) into which ex-combatants are then integrated. One of the most contentious current challenges of the Nepali peace process is related to the future of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) - the military organisation of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) – CPN(M). The main parties struggle over the key questions of whether, how and according to what criteria the PLA should be integrated into the Nepali Army (NA) or other security forces. Furthermore, the question of integration of the PLA is linked to other issues, such as the prevalence of other militias and armed groups, and a broader debate on the cornerstone of a national defence strategy. This paper provides a synthesis of key issues and lessons from academic and policy papers focused on issues relating to the integration of non-state and government military forces, as part of a wider peace settlement following civil war. As well as drawing upon existing studies the paper synthesises themes by examining the data from eight primary and fifteen secondary case studies, drawn from various sources. An overarching and consistent theme throughout all case studies examined is the requirement, with integration endeavours, to view the process as the outcome. The integration of non-state military forces into the state security apparatus is an element of wider post-conflict peacebuilding and statebuilding processes and as such the outcome is rarely predictable. An effective and sustainable solution from one context cannot be assumed to represent a template solution for other contexts. Support to the process of decision-making, and bodies established to implement decisions has been seen to be an effective strategy for external assistance. The paper has highlighted the complex and diverse nature of efforts to integrate ex-combatants into state security forces. There exist as many approaches and solutions as there are contexts in which they have been attempted. An examination of the available case study material has, however, provided some consistent themes that have been highlighted throughout the paper as lessons identified.

This publication details the security sector reform (SSR) process and activities in Sierra Leone over this period and is the culmination of a wide consultation of many of the primary actors engaged in the process from both Sierra Leone and the UK. Following a core narrative constructed around four k...
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This publication details the security sector reform (SSR) process and activities in Sierra Leone over this period and is the culmination of a wide consultation of many of the primary actors engaged in the process from both Sierra Leone and the UK. Following a core narrative constructed around four key events in the history of post-war Sierra Leone, starting in the mid-1990s and finishing with the successful General Elections of 2007, the work draws on a range of experiences from the process that may be used to inform future SSR policy and implementation, in Sierra Leone and elsewhere. SSR primarily grew out of governance as a response to the urgent problems on the ground in Sierra Leone and was supported by involvement from DFID, FCO and MOD and other Whitehall departments. This involvement is documented from different perspectives in the book. This publication was commissioned by the UK Government Global Conflict Prevention Pool and written by the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform and International Alert.